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Before delving into Governance in the European Union, the reader is entitled
to a warning.The approach to the art of governing — to which the reader is intro-
duced by the writers gathered together by Olivier De Schutter, Notis Lebessis and
John Paterson — is not the same as that which has sustained an abundant litera-
ture in political science over past years on new modes of European governance.
This literature most often adopts a descriptive point of view. It aims to de-
scribe the novel decision-making processes created by the European political sys-
tem, which have successfully established a supranational legal framework accom-
modating a multiplicity of ‘horizontal’or ‘vertical’powers that are not subject to the
classical hierarchies of the State.
The contributors to this book, on the contrary, are not directly interested in
the European Union or its novel political system.Their attention is focused beyond
the specificities of this system on what they describe as a profound mutation of
democracy in the nations of Europe and elsewhere.They detect its origin in a trans-
formation of the knowledge used in the formation of the rules of public life. Knowl-
edge is no longer ‘given’and accessible by the mechanisms of elected representa-
tion or by the concentration of specialist expertise, but rather thought to be ‘con-
structed’ and renewed in a process of collective learning that draws support from
social pluralism. This philosophical point of departure leads to recommendations
that the authors qualify as ‘procedural’. Indeed, such recommendations make this
very much a normative exercise.
Although this approach to governance has not been developed with the
European Union in mind, it is particularly well-suited to it.The EU, as a political sys-
tem,has bypassed the stage of ‘substantive rationality’,which so profoundly perme-
ates national institutional systems marked by a strict separation between the leg-
islative, executive and judicial powers. It is instead devoted to cooperation among
these three orders. Furthermore, because the Union does not replace the Member
States,it confronts,on a daily basis,the impossibility of establishing rules exclusive-
ly based on substantive rationality. While trying to establish a variety of trans-na-
tional and trans-cultural processes, the Union must take into account the diversity
of the European fabric.In this sense,few mechanisms are more complex than those
of the multiple channels of consultation that now enhance the exercise of the
Commission’s monopoly of initiative. Comitology similarly constitutes a procedural
effort that is remarkable for bringing together all the national administrations to
apply European directives in a variety of national contexts.And yet, this novel European construction also suffers a crisis of democracy.
The contributors to this book help the reader to understand how this crisis is not first
and foremost a question of a deficit, that is,of the absence of a parliamentary institu-
tion analogous to that found at the centre of national public life. For them — and I
must say that they have convinced me — the crisis of European political legitimacy
originates principally from the procedures of the European Community, which have
become formal rather than genuine. It is necessary to stress the word ‘become’ be-
cause this was not the original situation. Following their analyses, the reader is forced
to admit that the current management of complexity by the national and Community
powers in charge of Europe, though admirable in many respects, does not really do
justice either to the richness of knowledge or to the diversity of contexts in Europe.
The richness of social, cultural and scientific knowledge is no longer taken
into account by the European legislative system, despite the organisation of so-
phisticated consultation prior to the announcement of legislation. Instead,the sys-
tem unduly privileges sectoral perspectives at the expense of both the pluralism of
expertise and the problems to be resolved.The BSE crisis is a case in point.
Although open to national influence, the EU legislative system does not re-
flect the diverse context of the Member States when it comes to defining the
modalities of its application. Continuing to be based on a model that separates the
‘law’and the ‘modalities of application’,comitology and the national transposition of
directives further ignore the heart of the problem:the lack of feedback in the appli-
cation of rules as experienced by those ‘on the ground’to those who conceptualise
legislation ‘from above’. Effective and legitimate governance requires honest evalua-
tion,the involvement of stakeholders,and confidence in the control mechanisms.
In fact,it is as if ‘European governance’in the political science sense — a new
way to share legislative and executive powers in a community of nations who pool
their sovereignty — has only travelled half of the route. It must ensure that proce-
dures,which were designed with the aim of sectoral efficiency,are also authentical-
ly participatory and respectful of diversity.It is not by accident that the territorial di-
mension,which is inter-sectoral by nature and conducive to participation,is impos-
ing itself upon the new European governance.
Nevertheless, the way ahead — which concerns in particular the European
Commission’s future White Paper on European Governance — does not flow easily
from this procedural diagnosis. The decision-making processes to be reformed have,
in their time,established the very success of the Community approach. Thus, a great
deal of clear-headedness is necessary in order to recognise that the arrangements that
enabled the preservation of European institutions must now be challenged so this
power is once again exercised properly and advisedly. Finally, procedural rationality
alerts us to the importance of the formation of collective knowledge and learning;yet
this eminently political task also requires the expression of a subjective,indeed sym-
bolic,vision and meaning. Both remain necessary for every collective adventure.
Jérôme Vignon
Chief Adviser responsible for the White Paper on European Governance
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Olivier de Schutter,Notis Lebessis and John Paterson
The papers in this collection were written over a period of almost five years.They
represent the various stages of a debate launched at the end of 1995 with a seminar or-
ganised by the European Commission’s Forward Studies Unit together with the Centre
for the Philosophy of Law at the Catholic University of Louvain. This seminar led,in Oc-
tober 1997, to the Commission on  ‘Governance and the European Union’ at the
Journées juridiques Jean Dabin,which the Centre for the Philosophy of Law had chosen
to devote to the proceduralisation of law. Subsequently,the issue of governance,and
more specifically how to approach it in the light of proceduralisation (i.e.the setting up
of mechanisms to promote self-learning within organisations),continued to receive at-
tention from the Forward Studies Unit,which placed its consideration of the issue in the
context of the scenarios for the reform of the European Commission.
The 12 chapters of this book,organised into four sections,reflect this process
to varying degrees1. For the participants — mostly university researchers and Eu-
ropean Commission officials — the process offered a rare opportunity to consider
the practices of governance at European Union level from three starting points: a
theoretical interpretation of  ‘transformations in the art of governance’ (Part I); na-
tional experience in countries with administrative cultures as diverse as those of the
United Kingdom and France (Part II); and aspects specific to the Community con-
text (Part III). The conclusions (Part IV),written once all the other contributions were
available, attempt to suggest guidelines for the future, anchoring them very clearly
in the context of the European Commission’s current reform plans.
All those who took part in the process made essentially the same diagnosis
of the crisis in contemporary regulation;they also shared the same ambition,that is,
they were motivated by their concern to propose a way out of this crisis.
1 Some of the contributions were initially presented during the ‘Governance and the European Union’semi-
nar, which began work in December 1995: these are the reports by J. Lenoble and J. De Munck, A. Dunsire
and C. Hood, B. Perret, and J.-C.Thoenig. The report by O. De Schutter was presented during the Commis-
sion on ‘Governance and the European Union’at the Journées juridiques Jean Dabin in October 1997. Al-
though K.-H.Ladeur,G.Majone and R.Dehousse took part in the seminar,the studies by K.-H.Ladeur,by G.
Majone and M.Everson,and by R.Dehousse do not cover exactly the same ground as at the time. Lastly,it
was considered valuable to ask P.Calame for a contribution on his conception of active subsidiarity,P.Her-
zog for a consideration of the role of civil society and the opening-up of the European Union’s institution-
al system, and G.Bertrand and A.Michalski for a summary of the ‘Scenarios 2010’project begun in 1997 in
the European Commission’s Forward Studies Unit,given the obvious close connection between these sub-
jects and the seminar’s hypothesis.While N.Lebessis and J.Paterson contributed several reports during the
‘Governance and the European Union’ seminar, and thus influenced its course, the conclusions set out in
Chapter 11 are original.The basic hypothesis can be formulated in a number of ways. Traditional
forms of regulation are currently in crisis. This crisis is also a political crisis, since it
finds expression in widespread scepticism about the ability of our societies to mod-
ify themselves and thus alter their own historical course. However, the crisis is not
related to a given regulatory model,such as the substantive law of the welfare state
or the formal law of the liberal State; rather it is a crisis affecting the very idea of a
model, i.e. the idea that governance is to be understood in terms of applying a
method,in differing environments and despite such differences. Seen this way,the
political crisis is merely the symptom of a deeper crisis in formal (or,more precisely,
substantive) rationality and its presuppositions,namely that phenomena obey laws,
that we can update these laws, and that, thanks to the accumulation and process-
ing of information,we can use our knowledge to act effectively.
However, it is not enough to break with these suppositions, and with the
type of rationality that was based on them and to recognise ourselves as indebted
rather to the ‘procedural’type of rationality,as in H.Simon’s famous expression,i.e.a
form of rationality which takes better account of the limits on our capacity to
process information and construct models. For our institutions,in the narrow sense
conferred on the term by political science, reflect a strong allegiance to this sub-
stantive rationality from which we would like to be free. To start with, we have the
system of the separation of powers, which distinguishes between the justification
of rules by the legislator and their implementation by the courts or executive au-
thority. Substantive rationality also leaves its mark on the way in which we handle
what might be considered less important institutional issues, such as the aims and
mechanisms of consultation (upstream of policy implementation) or the evaluation
of public policy (downstream from implementation). And it also determines,
among other things,the role played by experts in the decision-making process and
that played by the representatives of civil society.
The studies which follow therefore have more in common than simply the
same diagnosis. They propose avenues for the future by envisaging what reforms
could be made to ensure that specific institutional arrangements (capable of im-
plementation at European Union level) reflect the need for a procedural approach
to rationality. The reforms envisaged thus reflect the concern to re-establish a link
between the justification for a rule and the application of that rule in differing en-
vironments:at the very least,application must have a retroactive effect on justifica-
tion (the rule must be subject to constant revision in the light of its application);at
best, the reforms will break with the separation between justification and applica-
tion,a separation which is so typical of the formal concept of the rule. The reform-
ers thus reject the idea that a conflict exists between the effectiveness of a rule and
its legitimacy in the eyes of those it affects:on the contrary,they consider this to be
a false dilemma,since what has no legitimacy cannot be effective,and what is inef-
fective cannot be maintained on the sole pretext of preserving vested interests.
The reforms will thus introduce reflexivity into the decision-making process,leading
those involved to reflect not only on how to ‘govern well’but also on what ‘govern-
ing well’ actually  means in a specific context where the criteria do not have the
same relevance as in a neighbouring context, and where the interests concerned
do not correspond to those which had been initially expected, as is discovered
18 Olivier de Schutter,Notis Lebessis and John Patersonwhen a policy is implemented. This reflexivity gives rise to a constant learning
process,which is a positive way of looking at what we described a moment ago in
negative terms as the abandonment of the idea of a model.
One final aspect of the proposals set out in detail hereinafter deserves to be
highlighted:it is the way they link up the need for good governance with the need
for democracy. In terms of procedural rationality, the opinions of the people in-
volved are not an obstacle to the effectiveness of a decision: they are an essential
ingredient,and it would in fact be costly to ignore them or to fail to contribute ac-
tively to their formation. Although P. Herzog expresses himself on such matters in
characteristically strong terms, most of the studies which follow share his point of
view concerning the operation of the European Union’s institutions, which are
‘handicapped by two structural defects: the system is not designed to explore the
views of society,and the impact of its choices is very poorly assessed,if at all. These
two defects could be rectified if organised civil society were to be involved in dis-
cussions upstream, and in assessment and retroactive action downstream, using
the channels of proceduralisation…’.
In their opening paper, which launched the ‘Governance in the European
Union’ seminar, J. Lenoble and J. De Munck discuss ‘transformations in the art of
governance’. They attempt to back up the diagnosis we have just made of the po-
litical crisis and to connect the latter to a crisis in the type of rationality from which
we draw our understanding of the role of politics and its instruments. One of the
interesting aspects of the paper is that it locates the present debate on governance
within an historical trend,which we have inherited and from which we must learn.
The report by K.-H.Ladeur represents an attempt to go beyond the ethics of
discourse laid down by J.Habermas, i.e.a form of proceduralisation which, working
in counterfactual mode, attempts to purge discourse of the power relationships
which pervert its use,since participants’involvement in the discussion presupposes
that they agree to submit to the law of the best argument. K.-H.Ladeur proposes a
form of proceduralisation which claims to be less idealistic and which takes ac-
count of the limits of our rationality and the complexity of society,to which agreed
rules must apply. These limits and this complexity may constitute an opportunity in
so far as they prompt us to devise new regulatory patterns, the cognitive vocation
of which should be explicitly accepted in an ‘experimental society’. In such a socie-
ty,rules become instruments of knowledge. They are designed in such a way as to
forge links between the various networks of a fragmented society: they thus en-
courage the overlapping of the knowledge characteristic of each of these networks
so as to encourage organisations,the holders of collective knowledge,constantly to
revise the cognitive frameworks on the basis of which they propose to address is-
sues of general interest.
In the second part a number of contributions describe national experiences
or set out considerations prompted by these experiences where they seem likely to
advance the debate on governance in the European Union. A.Dunsire and C.Hood
start from an analysis of changes in UK public administration over the last two
decades,i.e.since the beginning of the 1980s,and find some evidence of both ‘pro-
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channels for the users of public services, or in certain tendencies to contract out
public service tasks) and ‘collibration’(i.e. State intervention in social subsystems in
order to change the power relationships within them, thereby contesting the au-
tonomy of such subsystems and their tendency to return to a homeostatic equilib-
rium). Although one may have reservations about their interpretation of the con-
cept of proceduralisation, the two explanations that the writers contrast have in
common their choice of an institutionalist approach to social relationships,i.e.their
starting point for considering governance issues is the idea that the rules govern-
ing the behaviour of the various players within each subsystem are not  ‘given’, but
rather may be changed if they are subjected to critical revision. Governing thus en-
tails modifying the environment within which social players move, i.e. while not
necessarily constraining the players, at least refusing to fetishise the circumstances
in which they interact.
While the contribution from A.Dunsire and C.Hood attempts to relate issues
of public policy and regulatory method to certain hypotheses on changes in the
concept of rationality,the reports by B.Perret and J.-C.Thoenig proceed in what we
could call more of an inductive fashion. These two authors start from the French
experience, but rather than aiming to draw conclusions from it about competing
forms of rationality in the design of public intervention (J.-C. Thoenig sees proce-
duralisation as more of a slogan than an operational concept), they attempt to up-
date its lessons,in particular from the point of view of European governance. B.Per-
ret thus examines the transformation of public policy evaluation in the 1970s. He
describes this transformation in terms of the grafting of an evaluation model onto
the traditional model, which was until recently the only one available to us. Tradi-
tional evaluation was based on the positivist experimental approach, with the ex-
pert seeing himself as having the task of choosing, on the sole basis of the quanti-
tative data that he has been able to collect, the most effective method for achiev-
ing the goals of a given policy. A new form of evaluation,however,came to be su-
perposed on the traditional form: it is designed to take into account, first, the exis-
tence of a plurality of modes of knowledge (this assumes that evaluation is the
work of a group of experts who desire to pool their assorted knowledge) and, sec-
ond,those effects of a government decision that go beyond its initial target,effects
which must be taken into account by the type of evaluation which B. Perret terms
as ‘ballistic’. This new form of evaluation deliberately places the exercise within an
ongoing, collective learning process: it not only accepts that the evaluation may
take the evaluator by surprise and cause him to review his models,but it also urges
him to construct with others the appropriate analysis grid for the evaluation,
without assuming that there is one grid which is  a priori more appropriate than
another.
The study by J.-C.Thoenig, rather like that by A. Dunsire and C. Hood on the
United Kingdom, starts with a review of the ways in which government action has
changed in France and ends up making very specific proposals with respect to
governance in the European Union. J.-C.Thoenig calls in particular for greater mo-
bility among those responsible for European policies,not only between the various
European Commission departments but also between local and Union level and
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ences in national administrative cultures present to action by the Community. Oth-
er proposals call for decentralising Community action, contributing to the emer-
gence and vitality of networks of those involved in the implementation of Commu-
nity policy, and introducing ways of representing national or sectoral interests
which do not exclusively use institutional channels. The aim of these proposals,
which it would be pointless to attempt to reproduce in detail here, can be sum-
marised quite simply: the environment in which Community policies are imple-
mented, and the institutional environment in particular, should be transformed in
order to heighten the effectiveness of these policies, which run into difficulties
largely because of too sharp a dividing line between the level at which they are
adopted and the local level at which they are implemented.
Placed at the end of Part II,J.-C.Thoenig’s study actually anticipates the con-
tributions in Part III, which brings together proposals formulated explicitly with re-
spect to the European Union, some of them relating specifically to the reform of
the European Commission. G.Majone and M.Everson identify the main obstacles to
the implementation of Community legislation today as being the differences that
persist between the various administrative cultures in the Member States and,more
generally, the discrepancies between the administrative environment and what
would be required for the legislation to be totally effective. The authors place the
emphasis on a possible solution to these obstacles:the development of independ-
ent administrative agencies. The reservations against delegating certain tasks to in-
dependent bodies are well-known, in particular as regards political responsibility
and democratic control:back in 1958,the EC Court of Justice voiced such concerns
in its ruling in  Meroni v High Authority, thus creating within the Community’s legal
system a constitutional barrier to delegation that has never been completely over-
come since. G.Majone and M.Everson consider,however,that the delegation ques-
tion is posed today in radically new terms, especially in the light of the way the
principle of the separation of powers is now applied in the European Union.
Like G.Majone and M.Everson,R.Dehousse attempts to look at the question
of the legitimacy of European integration in a new light but does not restrict him-
self to considering it on the basis of the traditional conception (still dominant in
State affairs) of the separation of powers. R.Dehousse’s concern is that the need for
legitimacy should not be met simply by applying the classical institutional inter-
pretations that have prevailed in the past. The model based on representative
democracy and the separation of powers is not the only one capable of taking ap-
propriate account of legitimacy requirements. Legitimacy requires effective control
of action taken by those in government and, on the part of the latter, a certain im-
partiality in the content of their decisions: R. Dehousse shows that there are other
means,insufficiently explored to date,which may be used to take account of these
guarantees and which may be more suited to the specific nature of European inte-
gration, envisaged here in terms of a strictly constitutional project. To summarise,
not only can the legitimacy of the integration process no longer rest solely on
downstream aspects,i.e.on its achievements,following the functionalist vision of its
founding fathers, the upstream foundation of Community legitimacy should itself
be re-thought. This would be achieved by breaking with the illusion that any legit-
Governance in the European Union:introduction 21imacy is ultimately to be underpinned at State level (the States remaining ‘masters
of the Treaties’,to quote the German Constitutional Court) and by breaking with the
temptation of institutional fetishism,which consists in reproducing on a large scale
at Community level the democratic model found at national level.
The institutional proposals commented on by O. De Schutter take a similar
line. Initially presented during the Commission on Governance and the European
Union at the Journées juridiques Jean Dabin in October 1997,the report on ‘proce-
duralising European law’ lists a number of ways in which the demands for trans-
parency and participation formulated,with different emphases,by R.Dehousse and
P.Herzog could be satisfied in practice. The report envisages a new basic right,the
right of any party affected by a public decision to submit comments, to which the
author of the decision would be bound to reply; it highlights the new procedural,
rather than instrumental, terms in which the principle of proportionality, as a gen-
eral principle of Community law,could be conceived;it considers the changes that
the need for greater proceduralisation could mean in the judicial context;it outlines
more particularly the consequences that the proceduralisation of European law
might have for the way in which the European Commission exercises its functions,
notably the way in which it consults prior to adopting Community policies and the
mechanisms by which Community policies are evaluated. This list of issues covered
by the report is in itself sufficient to illustrate that the challenge lay clearly in trans-
lating the need for proceduralisation into operational terms via specific arrange-
ments — which the report attempts to identify among the tools already available
under Community law  — otherwise proceduralisation might never amount to
more than a vague abstraction,attractive perhaps,but denied any real effect.
As the author in 1996 of a report to the European Parliament on participa-
tion by citizens and civil society in the European Union’s institutional system (a ma-
jor source of inspiration for O.De Schutter),P.Herzog’s contribution to the collection
is a committed paper, in which he calls for the reaffirmation of European political
identity in the face of what he perceives as the Member States’reassertion of their
role in the European process. However, this will require greater involvement of cit-
izens and their organisations in Community decision-making. The democracy re-
quirement,the recognition of the failure of a form of substantive rationality,and the
concern to see a genuine European political identity emerge all combine to form a
particularly fruitful alliance:in his own words,P.Herzog devotes himself to exploring
‘ways of actively giving shape to a European civil society’with the same concern for
operational aspects as seen in the other chapters that make up this part.
P.Calame was asked to contribute a paper on the meaning he assigns to ‘ac-
tive subsidiarity’. Unlike the traditional (one dare not say ‘passive’) conception of
subsidiarity,which is based on a clear division of tasks between players or levels,ac-
tive subsidiarity starts from the hypothesis that,against a background of increasing
interdependence,‘the distribution of powers will be the exception and the inter-
linking of powers the rule’. In this connection, P. Calame talks of ‘shared sovereign-
ty’ between the parties concerned. The idea is that, in each specific environment
and starting from common issues that elicit different responses from each party,
the most appropriate action should be determined together: in reality we are wit-
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abandonment of the model of a single power having absolute control over a terri-
tory or subject area assigned exclusively to it. Authority must no longer specify
methods or lay down guidelines for the exercise of the powers it delegates: rather
it has to cultivate the sharing of powers and experiences and foster the emergence
of networks bringing together differing approaches to issues which are cross-disci-
plinary by definition,provided we are prepared to view them as such.
It is thus the rejection of the rule model that we are witnessing. However,
this rejection does not mean that we will fall into arbitrariness or subjectivism, as
long as it is combined with an obligation on decision-makers to provide public jus-
tification:such justification (for example,in the form of the gradual development of
‘public case-law’,the value of which P.Calame assessed with relation to the granting
of building permits) enables the apparent, rather than real, dilemma between the
formalism of the rule and subjectivism to be overcome: formalism pays insuffi-
cient attention to the context in which the rule will be applied and subjectivism is
harmful from the point of view of the security that the various parties will expect.
This concept of active subsidiarity as a pooling of knowledge rather than as a divi-
sion of assigned powers can also affect the way in which we evaluate public policy:
complementing B. Perret, P. Calame thus proposes a transition from ‘mechanistic’
evaluation,conducted by outside observers who have nothing to do with the poli-
cy being evaluated (the observer’s role being to help ‘correct’ the policy so that it
will better attain its stated goals), to ‘constructivist’ evaluation, carried out by the
very people who are concerned by the policy and for whom the exercise repre-
sents an opportunity for internal reflexivity.
G. Bertrand and A. Michalski propose the construction of ‘scenarios for the
future’as another way of encouraging this internal reflexivity, for which the appro-
priate kind of evaluation could indeed provide the opportunity. The contrasting of
different scenarios is seen as a means of breaking with an exclusively sectoral vision
of the future and arriving at ‘a holistic approach to policy-making’. One of the ben-
efits of constructing scenarios is thus methodological: by definition, such an exer-
cise presupposes the confrontation of different types of knowledge and, conse-
quently,the coming together of individuals from differing backgrounds,which is in
itself beneficial,independently of the heuristic value of the scenarios in themselves.
The paper considers five ‘future scenarios’ solely from the point of view of gover-
nance. While it is not possible to review each of the scenarios here (they include,
for example, the triumphant markets hypothesis and the hypothesis of creative so-
cieties, in which leisure would gradually become as important as work, and that of
‘shared responsibilities’, which cannot but remind us of P. Herzog’s vision of the Eu-
ropean integration process), we can nonetheless underline the similarity between
the authors’ conclusions and the other proposals made in this section: G. Bertrand
and A. Michalski conclude, for example, that we should encourage greater involve-
ment by those affected in the decision-making process,which should be based on
a diversity of opinions; that the European Commission should do less to direct the
network of parties concerned and more to foster and coordinate them, whilst
avoiding too great a rigidity in representative structures and in the positions of
those involved;and that these changes in European governance are urgently need-
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G.Majone and M.Everson), the diversity of national administrative cultures and the
lack of coordination between them make for ineffective Community policies and,
secondly, this problem will worsen once new Member States have joined an en-
larged Union. We are aware that this is familiar ground. One of the most interest-
ing aspects of G.Bertrand’s and A.Michalski’s paper is that,despite the originality of
their methodology,the remedies suggested remain essentially the same.
In the conclusions which they drew up for this book, J. Paterson and N.
Lebessis place the above papers in the context of the deadlines which the Euro-
pean Commission will have to meet in the coming months and years. Promoting
new forms of governance is among the strategic objectives that the Commission
has set itself for 2000–05: J. Paterson and N. Lebessis stress the urgent need for ac-
tion, not only because new enlargements are already scheduled, but also because
an effective solution must be found to counter the loss of Europe’s credibility in the
eyes of the public,i.e.what is sometimes called ‘euroscepticism’. As we have moved
from ‘negative’to ‘positive’integration, i.e. one based on harmonisation rather than
solely on the abolition of the European Community’s internal borders, this ‘eu-
roscepticism’ has gained momentum and is particularly dangerous in that it tends
to be self-perpetuating: in order to increase the objectivity and rationality of Com-
munity policies, we are tempted to have greater recourse to experts and to the
committee procedure, which in turn saps the democratic legitimacy of these poli-
cies and thus feeds the scepticism which the expert’s involvement was supposed
to diminish.
Rejecting the tendency to divide Community policies according to sector
and to fall back on the rule of expertise,J.Paterson and N.Lebessis propose a trans-
formation in governance in the European Union along three main lines. The first
consists in complementing the vertical, or sectoral, dimension of Community poli-
cies by taking account of a horizontal or cross-disciplinary, i.e.inter-sectoral dimen-
sion. The second entails greater involvement in the decision-making process of
laymen from the ‘European civil society’, not so that they replace the experts, but
rather so that the latter are prompted to re-examine what they know and,more es-
pecially, to take better account of the external aspects to certain policies and the
concomitant need to examine each issue in the light of several different kinds of
knowledge. Thirdly, the authors propose that attention should no longer focus ex-
clusively on the point at which decisions are taken: the debate on governance in
the European Union must also cover the implementation, evaluation and revision
of policies, and it is not an exaggeration to say that the organisation of such a
retroactive approach would form one of the major challenges. We may thus con-
ceive of a mode of European governance which would be a genuine source of con-
stant learning for those involved in Community policy-making: institutional
arrangements should positively incite policy-makers constantly to question what
they know in the light of other ways of viewing and tackling the problems con-
fronting them.
We will close this introduction by commenting on what might appear to the
reader to be a paradox. On the one hand,we said,we are not seeking a new model
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of governance that is better than the others: what we need today is to break with
the very idea of a ‘model’, i.e. a ‘good governance’ recipe that can be applied to all
situations. On the other hand, the studies which comprise this collection are pre-
sented as a set of fairly specific proposals; and, on the whole, the authors repre-
sented here were motivated by a concern for practical feasibility.
We do not see a contradiction here. From the point of view of the reflexivi-
ty injected into the formulation of public policies,the legitimacy of government ac-
tion in the eyes of those governed, the crisis in politics today, the greater or lesser
malleability accorded to institutional arrangements, and thus the greater or lesser
adaptability of these arrangements — from all these points of view, the various
forms of governance are not the same.
It is true that the authors broadly agree on the avenues that they propose,
but it would be wrong to affirm that they agree,to a greater or lesser extent,on any
one ‘model’of governance: the question that they ask together, and to which they
find some common answers, is: by what mechanisms can we hope to break with
the idea of a model and thus with forms of government action which are never tak-
en aback by the circumstances they encounter and which refuse to take seriously
the complexity of real life? All in all,there are some forms of governance which are
less likely than others to stiffen into ‘models’and more likely than others to prompt
competing models to re-examine themselves so that they might learn from the
others: the purpose of this collection is to invite readers to discover these forms of
governance and the possible applications they may have within the European
Union.PART I:
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTSTransformations in the art 
of governance
A genealogical and historical examination of changes
in the governance of democratic societies1
Jean De Munck and Jacques Lenoble
Introduction
The invitation to introduce the subject of ‘transformations in the art of gov-
ernance’is somewhat perplexing. Our belief,sustained now by 10 years of research,
is that conceptual and normative proposals (such as those we will put forward
here) only take on their full meaning in the contexts in which they are applied. Yet
these contexts,by definition,cannot be anticipated. It should not,therefore,be ex-
pected that we will give a model of politics, an abstract, general construction on
the basis of which practical directives can be deduced. One of our central points
on the crisis in politics is that it should not be categorised as a crisis of existing
models,as is too often the case,but as a crisis of the idea of models itself. We will
attempt to explain this point.
Such a clarification requires a detour — a conceptual,even philosophical de-
tour. We think that it is only through this work of examining the issues below the
surface that the questions more commonly posed, and rightly so, in European cir-
cles on citizenship, nationality, participation and so on can be addressed in a new
light and in all their gravity. The question of the art of governance today is not a
question of prescriptions. The central insight that will underlie our presentation is
that this crisis revolves around our models of rationality.
Modernity was directly conceived as an attempt at rationalising society. But
what is a rational decision?  We think that this question is now the key to under-
standing the transformation of our political systems. To understand how politics is
organised,therefore,it must be considered together with the ways in which collec-
tive knowledge is produced. Everything that has happened over the last two or
three centuries in our modern societies is directly linked to the way in which the
production of knowledge and laws is conceived, i.e. to cognitive approaches. It
seems to us that it is by evaluating these different ‘cognitive models’ which have
run through our societies that we may understand how to interpret what is going
1 Paper given in Brussels on 20 December 1995 as part of the seminar of the Forward Studies Unit of the 
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on and,at the same time,more normatively,try to steer the process of restructuring
the authorities which hold power.
How will we proceed?  For explanatory purposes,we will take a genealogical
and historical approach. We will proceed in five stages to put the contemporary sit-
uation into perspective.
First of all we will review the characteristics of the first way of conceiving the
question of politics that emerged in modern times: the formalist model of reason.
This model shaped the conception of law and the State — and hence of public ad-
ministration — in the early days of modern democracy.
Second phase:we will look at what changed at the end of the 19th century
and in the first half of the 20th century through the emergence of what was called
the ‘social State’or the ‘welfare state’.
Third phase: we will consider the contemporary crisis, i.e. the crisis of the
forms of rationality inherited from the first two phases. This crisis is not only the cri-
sis of the social State and a return to the first ‘formalist’phase — as some elements
of today’s ‘deregulatory’discourse would have us believe. It is a crisis affecting the
foundations underlying both the first and second phases.
Fourth phase: we will give a few conceptual pointers on the notion of pro-
cedural reason, which is, it seems to us, the overarching concept on the basis of
which the construction of a new model of regulation can be envisaged.
Final phase:using more empirical examples,we will attempt a first outline of
what is emerging in our societies, thus illustrating the way in which our modes of
governance have evolved.
The formalist model of the law and the State
In the 18th century, as is well known, our societies embarked on the adven-
ture of democracy. The Enlightenment project was one of reason. The starting
point for this project was obviously the abolition of the transcendental guarantee
of the law. In other words,the modes of social coordination and regulation were no
longer based on a meta-social guarantee. Therefore, what is called the ‘indetermi-
nacy of the law’emerged. An era of uncertainty as to the sources of regulatory le-
gitimacy then began. A society of individuals replaced the ancient regulatory order
based, in the last resort, on divine guarantee. It was from the simple interplay of
their will that the social order is assumed to have emerged — as shown by the
myths of modern natural law.
The trait that has just been noted — uncertainty — is a negative trait. But
how could this harmony of individual wills be seen in a positive light? What would
the dominant model be?  How should the coordination of collective action be con-
ceived anew in this context of uncertainty?  The first response — if we reduce it toits bare essentials — was organised around two fundamental concepts: contract
and nature.
Contract and nature
The theory of the contract — articulated essentially by Rousseau and Kant,
in a wide-ranging discussion involving many other writers — attempted to exam-
ine social legitimacy from the starting point of the category of subjectivity. In the
private sphere, this led to the theory of civil rights; in the public sphere, to the the-
ory of the general will. The social contract is the principal concept of this tradition.
Formal law (general and abstract) was the expression of this general will born of
the clash of subjectivities,a clash which replaced the old transcendent foundations.
Our whole legal and political organisation was indexed to this initial hypothesis of
a formal law guaranteed by the general will. The basis of social regulation was
found in the category of autonomy: the collective subject formed an autonomous
subject. The only legitimate law was that which the subject could give himself —
at the collective level,of course. It was on this basis that modern law was redefined.
Its formal universality became the touchstone of its validity. The law, emanating
from the representatives of the general will,was drawn up syntactically as a gener-
al, abstract law. This first major model, which would, to an extent, be embodied in
the organisation of society and politics, was essentially based on the hypothesis of
self-transparent subjectivity. As Habermas so aptly noted2,the link between reason
and will was here assumed to be ensured by the general, abstract form in which
this ‘general will’was expressed. The semantic form of the law set out by parliament
in itself guaranteed its rational expression and its embodiment of practical reason
in actuality.
In counterpoint, according to the subject/object doublet thoroughly
analysed by Foucault, the objectivity of nature provides the second point of sup-
port for rationality. This ‘naturalist’model runs through a whole section of modern
political philosophy:it can be found in Locke,in the idea of ‘natural rights’,of which
the right to property is the central element. It finds its full expression in the work
of Adam Smith. This is the theory of the market, where legitimacy, i.e. the guaran-
tee of harmonious coordination of the individual players,is no longer based on the
idea of a law expressed by the general will, but on the balance produced by the
market mechanism,which it is the function of the law to guarantee in its autonomy
(by the respect due to individual rights). The rational coordination of individual
projects is no longer the result of the formation of a general will but of the pre-es-
tablished harmony of interests. The moral autonomy model is replaced by that of a
natural law deemed to govern social life and the coordination of collective action.
The realisation of practical reason in society is no longer guaranteed by the gener-
al form of the law in which the general will is formulated. It is henceforth guaran-
teed by the combination of the calculations of individual interest that are the
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essence of the market. Either way, we remain in a simple formal game which de-
finitively guarantees the rationality, and hence the harmony, of collective action.
But the universalising form of the general law is replaced by the calculating form of
the maximisation of individual interests.
These first two models that modern society gave itself express an initial
shared presupposition:that there is a form of formal rationality (a formal manner of
producing knowledge) which is supposed to guarantee the rationality of the regu-
lating law. It is the content of the legislation that is legitimated by a formal mech-
anism,as an expression of unlimited reason. This is why we can talk of a substantial
rationality,as opposed to what is called ‘procedural rationality’. There is a guarantee
of the content of the law that ensures its relationship with the truth. The idea here
is thus of a self-transparent rationality, in keeping, of course, with the model of
truth-correspondence which dominated philosophical thought for so long: the
equal, free will of each individual/citizen is legitimately represented by the general
will, expressed by a law whose rationality is guaranteed by the general, abstract
form of its wording.
The organisation of the State
From this flow the characteristic traits of the legal and political organisation
which emerged in this period and the corresponding theories of law.
First of all, it explains the primacy of the legislature in the organisation of
powers. It also explains the form taken by the representative body — what politi-
cal observers have identified as the phenomenon of ‘parliamentarism’. The first
form of organisation of the legislative body was in fact based on a theory of elec-
tion that favoured the selection of ‘notables’3 with broad independence from the
legislative body, a public opinion that was distinct from the representatives and a
major capacity for debate within the parliamentary institution. All of this would
change fundamentally at the end of the 19th century when a party system
emerged.
The second dimension was that the law took as its model the rationality of
mathematical discourse. The law was defined by its formalism. Its rules of produc-
tion and application gradually changed in modern society and it gradually rid itself
of the specific traits that characterised it in pre-modern societies. First of all, a law
was no longer validated by the respect due to a criterion of material justice (sepa-
ration of the law from morality and politics) but through the formal,systemic crite-
rion of the respect due to a hierarchically superior rule. Then,as far as judgment re-
garding application of the rules is concerned, the rationality model was also for-
malised,becoming reduced to the model of a deductive type of reasoning.
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What does law mean in this model?  The process of drafting the law starts
out from individual preferences (this is the principle of subjectivity, mentioned
above). These individual preferences lead,via election mechanisms,to the selection
of representatives deemed to represent these preferences. It should be noted
straight away that the representatives are official:they are mandate-holders. This is
the idea of parliament. These representatives themselves engage in discussion on
the content of the law and,on this basis,decide on a general,abstract law,valid for
all people and for all situations. The general,abstract laws set the rules of the game
in the sense that the rules of a game of chess are set. Liberal law sees society as an
interaction of players for which rules must be set.
This is a very linear construction of the law. The law is extracted from indi-
vidual preferences by the mediation of representatives and is discussed by the par-
liament, which decides on its general, abstract wording. Then this wording goes
‘back down’into society by means of its application. Nothing could be simpler. This
is representation as conceived by the 19th-century liberals.
Emergence of the social State
The social State was eventually born as methods of governance adapted to
the industrial changes that western societies went through in the 19th century. It
must not be forgotten that the models constructed in the 18th century were virtu-
ally pre-industrial models. Industrialisation would challenge conceptions of the law,
government and legitimate representation. Historically, we can distinguish phases
in the process of change. Very roughly, just to set some pointers, we can isolate
three phases. First phase:from the 1848 revolution to the 1920s. This is the period
in which the social question was formulated. Second phase:the economic and po-
litical crisis of the inter-war period. Democracy was in such a state of crisis that in
Germany, Italy and Spain it tipped over into fascism. This was also the era of the
great workers’ party split between communism and social democracy. The third
A linear schema of the law
Let us sum all this up in a diagram.
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application of lawsphase began in the 1930s, by structural reforms in democratic Europe, and in the
United States through the New Deal. This is the phase of stabilisation of the social
State. What are the main features of the transformation of the model of the law and
the model of government during this period?
‘Materialisation’of the law
Let us go back to the ‘linear’schema of the law which we have just set out.
This normative schema of the law found itself in crisis, but only in part. The crisis,
which was extremely serious, affected two fundamental elements. First of all, from
the 19th century, the schema of the formation of the general will from individual
preferences was contested. Post-Hegelian philosophical discourse and the emerg-
ing sociology, on both the right and the left, highlighted the fact that a society is
founded not on individual preferences,but on actual social relationships. A society
is not made up of individual atoms, it is not a clash of liberties, but it is structured
by concrete organic totalities — already existing social relationships. The real chal-
lenge for representation is not to succeed in representing individual preferences,
but to represent these totalities themselves.
Let us take,for example,the developing industrial world. It is almost a cliché:
the industrial world was a world structured by social relationships. These objective
social relationships created collective entities: workers, the owners of the means of
production, the middle class of employees, etc. Since social relationships were
givens, this social reality could no longer be represented by means of elections on
the basis of individual preferences. Rather, organic representatives were preferred,
which,in practice,appeared on the social scene as a mobilising apparatus,mainly in
the form of trade unions, whose representativeness did not depend on a formal
mandate, but on their capacity to express objective interests which already existed
in the reality of social relationships.
At the same time, another system of representation appeared on the hori-
zon of the western democracies,a new system that was to clash with the first. This
was the fundamental critique of ‘parliamentarism’, made by socialism, communism
and the fascist right. For it must not be forgotten that the critique of formal medi-
ation was grounded on the same basic framework,even though it developed in op-
posing political directions. Fascist ideology thus promoted the concept of ‘corpo-
ration’. The corporation is clearly an ideal linked to that of ‘pre-structured social re-
lationships’.
While the first element relates specifically to representation, the second ele-
ment of change relates to the conception of the law. To be precise:the organic rep-
resentatives were called on to provide a general, abstract law. On this point, one
can say that the social State did not change the conception of the law,which con-
tinued to be formulated in standard wording applicable to all situations. However,
a nuance that would be decisive was introduced: the law was no longer, strictly
speaking, conceived in the form of rules of the game. Why?  This was a society in
the midst of incredibly dynamic change, carried along by the constant movement
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of course,an irrational desire. Rather,the general law must serve to dynamise soci-
ety and lead to progress. And this general law therefore no longer sets the rules of
the game but rather concrete objectives. This is what is called ‘the instrumentalisa-
tion of the law’. Let us define more closely the exact scope of this transformation,
this materialisation or instrumentalisation of the law that marked the emergence of
the social State.
The machine of the liberal State in fact seized up with the advent of the real
inequalities that the formalism of freedom rights and individual choice alone
proved incapable of remedying. The social State emerged:it would be responsible
for transforming social reality by means of a proactive policy. In striving to follow
a policy of social coverage, the law extended its field of intervention. As Weber
says,the law was no longer content to set the formal limits of action for which in-
dividuals would have sole responsibility: it materialised and aimed to defend sub-
stantive conceptions of justice in order to ‘cure’ society (redistribution of income,
economic regulation, social policy, etc.) or the individual (medicalisation of crimi-
nal law, for example) of some of its ills. But, as a result, confronted with the con-
tingency of action, the ways in which it was expressed were transformed and de-
formalised. The law increasingly defined the goals to be attained, thus leaving to
the public apparatus responsible for applying it an increasingly large margin of im-
precision. But the imprecision,momentarily open,unlike the formalist certainty of
classical liberal law, closed up immediately ‘thanks’ to scientistic rationalism: ex-
perts — and their technical knowledge — were supposed to provide the bases for
a rational calculation making it possible to define the irreducible regulatory frame-
work in ‘deformalised’areas. The application of the law recovered — albeit in new
ways — the certainty that had momentarily been compromised. Reason kept its
same magic power:calculating reason extended its grip to State legislation. In this
sense, one might say, the conception of the approach to application itself did not
change, even if it was henceforth increasingly cast in the form of teleological rea-
soning. And this is where there is continuity with the first phase as such. On the
right-hand side of the diagram, we are still in an approach to application con-
ceived on the basis of the formalist distinction between justification and applica-
tion. It is the formalist model that continues to apply on that side. Admittedly,the
social State added a second figure to this first figure of rationality. But it would not
substantially change its organisation. The formal approach to the criteria for the
soundness of the State’s ‘commands’ was, no doubt, no longer considered suffi-
cient. But the idea of possible rational determination of these criteria was still en-
dorsed. State regulation,if it extended its hold,would,in future,be guaranteed by
an instrumental knowledge that the ‘experts’were supposed to be able to provide.
These new scholars of power would ‘calculate’ the best conditions to realise the
collective well-being with a view to a more genuine equality between members
of society. Of course, a number of political and ideological conflicts that ran
through our social States involved a major functionalisation of the classic liberal
doctrines and the utopian projects to transform history. But they remained at-
tached to a ‘scientistic’ conception of rationality and therefore reproduced, but
with new emphases,the models and distinctions on which the now reviled liberal
State drew. In this sense, notwithstanding their significant differences, these two
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Changes in governance
The transformations thus brought about in the organisation of the liberal
State obviously also had an effect at the level of the organisation of the State: the
balance of powers changed. A rise in administrative power could be seen. In-
creasing importance was attributed to the regulatory agencies,both in the United
States and in Europe. There was an extraordinary rise in the power of the execu-
tive.
As for the system of representation, mass parties emerged. As political sci-
entists note, from this point on it was more about choosing parties than notables.
Electoral choice was an expression of belonging or identity. The emergence of
what were called mass parties fundamentally transformed the manner in which the
legislative body functioned. The freedom of personal speech of the representatives
diminished and the main forum for debate shifted from parliament to party head-
quarters.
Thus,even though the linear schema of the law was maintained,there were
changes. Social relations replaced individual preferences, mobilising apparatus re-
placed formal mandate-holders. Lastly, the laws were no longer rules of the game,
but objectives requiring planning if they were to be achieved.
The economic side:Fordism
This model of the formation of the political will was,to a certain extent,em-
bodied in the economy itself. By overturning the category of subjectivity and indi-
vidual autonomy,the social State could no longer maintain the ‘naturalist’represen-
tation of economic life. The representation of the market had itself been subverted.
models of the State can be described as two species of the same genus that is
dominated by a formalist, calculating approach to social regulation by State com-
mand.
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application of lawsKarl Polanyi’s book on ‘the great transformation’4 clearly describes this transition
from the separate, self-regulated market of the 19th century to a market that was
re-embedded in society — the society of the 20th century. In place of the market,
the concept of ‘economic regulation’emerged.
Let us pursue this parallel with the metamorphosis of the general will. At
their core, economic relations were no longer seen as a clash of individuals, but
conceived on the basis of institutional agreements that were agreements of coor-
dination between economic agents. A new mode of regulation was thus con-
structed,which can be called ‘Fordism’,as it is by many sociologists and economists
today, following in the footsteps of the regulatory school of thought. We cannot
analyse it exhaustively here. For our purposes it is sufficient to stress two particu-
larly important features of this type of regulation: product standardisation and pri-
macy of supply.
This is true, first of all, of the producer/consumer relationship. The industrial
product is standardised before its sale to the consumer. The same car is made for
everyone: it is supposed to represent an ‘average’ of individual preferences. The
mass product is inextricably linked to a certain type of calculation of profitability:
the economy of scale. A large number must be produced in order to reduce the
marginal cost. In this type of reasoning,demand is situated downstream of supply.
This sometimes causes crises of overproduction.
The relationship of the producers among themselves also bears the mark of
formalist standardisation. On the one hand, in terms of the organisation of work,
the dominant model is Taylorism. What is Taylorism? It is a way of rationalising work
that consists of dividing up the acts of work, analysing them and homogenising
them. Workers thus find themselves subject to the production imperative,which is
a general,abstract rule. In Modern times,Charlie Chaplin immortalised this Taylorian
model and the mortification of work that it creates in tragi-comic form. On the oth-
er hand, in terms of employment relationships, a transformation takes place which
is an exact reflection of what has happened in the political order: employment re-
lationships are no longer thought of as a clash of individual preferences but as a
clash of collective entities. And the labour market is thus increasingly regulated by
the establishment of organic representation. This is where the collective agree-
ment is born.
This Fordist regulation and the transformation of the way in which the gen-
eral will was formed were in symbiosis with each other. It was a long process of his-
torical construction but, after some terrible crises, it led to an extremely manage-
able, secure world, for at least 30 years — between 1945 and 1973. These 30 years
after the great crises that accompanied its emergence were this model’s heyday.
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1988).The contemporary crisis
Today, the pillars on which this model of regulation rests are all crumbling
away. This is true in both the political and economic spheres.
Three signs of crisis in the political field
In the political field,at least three signs of crisis,three warning lights,indicate
that this model has ceased to be stable.
Let us start with the first, the one that is best known to the general public:
the crisis of the mobilising apparatus. The mass party — such as the communist
party,the socialist party,the Christian socialist parties in Europe — was supposed to
embody a very ‘organicistic’idea of the construction of representation. Mass parties
were supposed to represent a loyal electorate,loyal because they recognised in the
parties’ positions the objective representation of their interests. The phenomenon
of the floating voter,whose decision is not known in advance,intrigues today’s po-
litical scientists. These individuals are, to an extent, disconnected from their social
anchors. They no longer vote socialist or Christian Democrat because they belong
to the socialist or Christian world. They no longer necessarily vote communist be-
cause they are workers. The working people are divided between the national
front, the communist party, the socialist party, and so on. In other words, the very
idea that there is an aggregation of pre-existing social relationships and the mobi-
lising apparatus to express them seems to be disintegrating dramatically. It is also,
of course,the trade unions that are in crisis. In some systems of union legitimation
we are seeing the use of elections and referendums re-emerge, as if organic repre-
sentation and the way it is legitimated could no longer function.
The second warning light concerns the application of laws. An internal di-
alectic has been put in place,which is,in a way,leading the idea of pure and simple
application of the law to its self-destruction. Basically, the starting point was the
idea that, since there were objectives, general, abstract laws could define the
‘means’ to attain them. It was thought that the application of these general, ab-
stract laws was enough to obtain the desired effects. But, in fact, a process of ap-
plication on the basis of objectives requires particular attention to real situations,
and constant adjustment of the steps taken. And so,clearly,the administration was
increasingly forced to practise ‘situationism’. It was obliged to adjust its supposed
application process to the always concrete,infinitely varied,multiplicity of situations
that it encountered. And, consequently, this administration was called on to revise
the general, abstract law, to make it more flexible and amend its actual wording.
There was an inflation of administrative regulations. This required an increase in the
interpretative capacity of the civil servant, who does not have to apply a law, but
meet objectives (carry through a programme). Furthermore, these objectives are
multiple and, on occasion, contradictory. The aim must be not only growth, but al-
so equity, or a reduction in the cost of externalities, and the objectives must there-
fore be prioritised:the law is applied less and less, and interpreted more and more.
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a formalist framework, this poses a serious problem of legitimacy, for the admini-
stration is supposed to apply,not reformulate,the text of a law adopted earlier.
The third signal that is turning red is the fact that the ‘organic representatives’
are going through a crisis of legitimacy. On the one hand,they are called on because
they have acquired an undeniable competence. But,on the other,these representa-
tives have also,like the civil servants,become involved in the teleological movement
of transforming social issues. Consequently,they become experts in the sense that
their legitimacy no longer stems from an aggregation of social relationships of which
they express the internal logic,but rather from their capacity to manage complex sit-
uations and make a success of policies. And so you see union officials and the repre-
sentatives of the party apparatus become experts and technocrats. They disconnect
from the regulatory intuitions of actual players,speak an ever more complicated jar-
gon,become embroiled in opaque reasoning and thus endanger their legitimacy.
Towards a ‘post-Fordist’order
If you look at the economic aspect of the model,you will see the same indi-
cations of crisis.
The rule of the relationship between producer and consumer is undergoing
a radical transformation, in the sense that the very idea of product standardisation
is gradually tending not to disappear but to be complemented by its exact oppo-
site; the idea that, to guarantee profitability margins, products must not be stan-
dardised but differentiated has gained currency. This is true both in the world of in-
dustry and in the world of service production. The new schools of management
point out that it is not supply,but demand,which must drive economic production.
Just-in-time manufacturing,for example,is replacing the Fordist model and is trying
to adjust the production system to actual demand, keeping it under constant con-
trol (notably through new technologies). What does competitiveness require in an
industrial context?  The word is on everyone’s lips. But in terms of historical and po-
litical analysis, what is important are the rules and cognitive schemas which struc-
ture understanding of this competitiveness. The big difference from Fordism today
is that profitability is no longer solely based on economies of scale, but also on
economies of diversity. The rules of competitiveness no longer necessarily consist
of reducing the marginal cost of the product through mass production,but,rather,
through diversification of the product range.
Consequently, in terms of the relationship of the producers amongst them-
selves,Taylorism is of course vanishing as a way of rationalising work,especially in the
service sector — because what is required there is a qualitative added value. The
production standard is therefore put in context:it is interaction with the consumer
that will produce the service’s added value. Individualisation of work becomes ab-
solutely fundamental. And clearly (unfortunately,one might say,for economic regu-
lation) the wage relationship has ceased to be the central attractor of the economy.
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A series of indicators have thus turned red, telling us that the model of the
rationalisation of collective action on which the social State was founded is in crisis.
We can sum up the features of this model of rationality in two words: standardisa-
tion and formalism. Are we capable of inventing a new model which will enable us
to generate rules which avoid this standardisation and formalism?  Here then is our
question on the development of models of governance, appropriately — in our
view — reformulated. We think that a response can be given to this question
through the concept of ‘proceduralisation’. We would now like to introduce you to
this concept. Let us start with a ‘conceptual’approach;we will then move on to ac-
tual examples.
Proceduralisation:a first conceptual approach
Unfortunately, we cannot enter into the technical and more philosophical
debates that would be essential to really open out the concept of proceduralisa-
tion. We will merely attempt to pin down two of a number of criticisms which were
formulated in the 1960s and 1970s which may enable us to establish some con-
ceptual benchmarks so that we can consider the new modes of rationalisation
which are coming into being.
The first idea is that what was characteristic both in the early modern (formal-
ist) model and in the model which applied this representation when the social State
emerged is the idea that there were totalities of pre-existing meanings:in nature,in
social relations,in the direct access of subjectivity to itself. What ensured the univer-
sality of the law, namely its legitimacy, was a guarantee that the content could in
some way express what was universal. One belief was unshakeable:reason must dis-
cover the laws of reality. Whether this is in the structure of the wording itself (gener-
ality and abstraction in Rousseau and Kant),or whether it is in the ‘totalities of mean-
ing’,there is a code which enables us to access truth,or what is universal,and which
provides us with the key to good regulation. Both the first and second phases of
modernity relied,more or less consciously,on this ‘positivist’assumption.
Today, one could prove the deconstruction of this assumption, both in the
philosophy of science and in the philosophy of law. The idea that a method (in the
positivist sense) could access the truth is increasingly being rejected. In its place
the idea of discussion is being put forward, i.e. the universal is no longer deter-
minable in its content. It can be no more than a vision of a universal agreement in
a discussion that, as such, is never perfect. It is therefore no longer anything other
than the vision of a horizon,and,ipso facto,the method no longer provides us with
the content of what is just,true,authentic,but simply boils down to the procedural
conditions which guarantee a discursive,argumentative process.
This initial critique had a strong impact on political philosophy. You find
traces of it in Rawls, who tries to restore a non-metaphysical version of the ‘social
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And it can be found in German philosophy,mainly in Habermas. What are the con-
sequences of this type of proceduralisation?  Firstly,this critique leads to the devel-
opment of a theory of public space. It is on this basis, notably, that four years ago,
together with the Forward Studies Unit, the Centre for the Philosophy of Law in
Louvain-la-Neuve came up with the concept of post-national and post-convention-
al identity as an approach to the specific characteristics of the European model.
The idea of proceduralisation with respect to both the liberal State and social State
models consists of saying:what is lacking in the democratic space is in fact the fail-
ure to constitute a forum, an adequate public space. A rule would be all the more
legitimate if it resulted from the revitalisation of a public cultural space. The second
consequence is that a European identity will only be truly democratic if it is con-
structed on the basis of a renunciation of the national image, in other words a re-
nunciation of the identification of political space with cultural space. What must be
fostered is a decoupling of the political from the cultural in favour of cultural plu-
ralism. This leads to the concept of post-national identity.
All of this has been carefully thought out by Habermas,and by writers such as
Jean-Marc Ferry. But there is a second element that characterises proceduralisation,
which is not yet properly constructed,and it is to this that the Centre for the Philoso-
phy of Law is now directing its energies. This second element does not concern the
idea of the law itself,but the process of its application. With reference to the liberal
State,the fundamental idea was that the implementing bodies are simply authorities
that, in a strictly mathematical manner, deduce the meaning of an implementing
measure from the general,abstract law. This reasoning was syllogistic. In the social
State,as we have pointed out,there was a shift from syllogistic to teleological reason-
ing — reasoning by objectives. This teleological reasoning became the model on the
basis of which organisation was re-thought,in terms of both the administrative and
the judicial functions. But this reasoning still harboured a grain of positivism:there
was as it were a retrieval of the imaginary from the rationality of the content. In line
with the development of positivism in the social sciences,there was an extraordinary
upgrading of expertise in all fields. For example,in the management of mental dis-
ability,there was a desire to use the expertise of psychiatrists and psychologists,who
were supposed to provide a key to reality. This is why managers — administrators or
judges — were those who were capable of applying a law that had become pro-
grammematic by recourse to the social sciences. In both the formalist and teleologi-
cal orders,the distinction continued to be made between two separate logical oper-
ations — this is an old presupposition of western rationality. Justification of the law
is independent of the operation of application. The fundamental assumption of this
conception is that,in a well-understood rational process,there can be no retroaction,
no working backwards from application to validity. Assessment of a context does not
mean challenging the validity of a rule,and we are not,therefore,in a process of per-
manent reconstruction of the rules,because the two phases in fact have a logical au-
tonomy.
The proceduralisation of which we ourselves speak presupposes a dialectic
between the rule and its application. And this dialectic must be based on the con-
cept of learning. This then leads to a restructuring of our political space in a com-
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cy requires the creation of a public cultural space;it must also be asserted that the
issue of democratic reorganisation concerns not only,and this goes without saying,
the promotion of cultural public spaces, but also the reorganisation of all imple-
menting bodies. And, indeed, what is under way today is a gradual proceduralisa-
tion of the institutions,i.e.a restructuring of the ways in which the rules are applied.
These are, at the same time, processes of renegotiation that must be linked to an
acceptance of a broader range of ways in which the players concerned can partic-
ipate.
What is called the end of the cult of the law, i.e. the putting in place of
checks on the legislature,shows that the creation of general,abstract rules is in fact
subject to constraints,in the same way as the judiciary. The role of principles is thus
strengthened, while, at the same time, they become increasingly vague. In this re-
spect, it is extremely interesting to note that these principles have no content that
is determinable a priori and that they have meaning only within the framework of
a local situation in which the principle of proportionality is applied. At the same
time,in the implementing bodies,methods of conflict resolution or the monitoring
of administrations give rise to a generalised proceduralisation of the administrative
and supervisory bodies, as well as a radical transformation of the role of the judge.
The judge is not there to tell the truth in the place of the executive or the legisla-
ture. But the movements towards a changed and strengthened role for the judge
must be conceived in terms of monitoring the discussion process, which, itself,
must be thought of as a learning process. Whether this is in social,administrative or
family law, we are gradually seeing checks being put in place on the process of ar-
gument that puts the law in context.
In the liberal State, the legislative body was primordial. It was in the social
State that executive power emerged. Today, the bodies monitoring administrative
staff are being boosted, while the ways in which the administrative bodies them-
selves operate and are made up are being transformed. What characterises the
new phase now emerging in the way we organise democracy is the transformation
of the bodies more particularly in charge of operations applying the rules. The the-
oretical reason for this, as has already been indicated, is that the distinction be-
tween justifying and applying a rule, i.e. the means of conceiving change and
hence social regulation, is now being fundamentally reassessed, on both the theo-
retical and practical fronts.
To say that is not to disqualify parliament or the groups that have become
established in the social State. It is merely to say that this type of regulatory con-
struction is now no longer sufficient. It follows that,for example,at European level,
to dynamise the European institutions,it cannot be sufficient to revitalise the Euro-
pean Parliament or bring the social partners to a hypothetical table of European
social negotiations. The European institutions must resolutely face up to the ques-
tions posed by the proceduralisation of public decision-making. The European ad-
ministration is a young administration with the means to be a vector for democrat-
ic invention. Nonetheless, it must still avoid becoming trapped in nostalgia that
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feel the Commission’s internal work must take.
This then is the sense in which we are talking about proceduralisation. Fun-
damentally,it is about rethinking modes of collective regulation using a new mod-
el of collective rationality. The misunderstandings perpetuated by language must
therefore be avoided. The ideas set out above, however, show clearly that this pro-
ceduralisation of the law is to be understood neither in the functionalist sense of
Niklas Luhmann nor in the formal, idealistic sense of Jürgen Habermas. This is why
we talk about a cognitive proceduralisation: a putting in place of mechanisms
which enable learning processes to be generated at a collective level which can
cope with the uncertainty linked to contexts of bounded rationality. In this sense,
therefore, proceduralisation must not be confused with formal procedures. As we
know, the law drawn up by the French revolutionaries set great store by proce-
dures. But these procedures were formal rules,which,precisely,could not be put to
the test of application and constantly revised. Rationality itself was not,in this case,
put to the test of procedure. It is precisely this ongoing testing which seems to us
to be the characteristic of the emerging model. In this model, rationalisation no
longer consists of reading the laws of reality using the appropriate methodology,
guaranteed by deductive reasoning or by social science, but rather of reflexively
constructing situations by procedures. It is a genuine collective invention,which is
now guaranteed only by itself,i.e.by its own creative process. What is most impor-
tant in this process are the two conditions which we have just explained in con-
ceptual terms:open dialogue between all the parties concerned by a problem;
and the ongoing reflexive loop between justification of the law and its appli-
cation in practical contexts.
A few examples
To try to illustrate this definition of proceduralisation, we will give and com-
ment on a few examples. First of all,we will give two examples of new procedures
for producing collective knowledge. Then we will give two examples of the new
types of monitoring. Of course, these examples are open to conflicting interpreta-
tions. And the models that they illustrate may generate undemocratic tendencies,
perverse effects, etc. We propose these examples as opportunities for discussion
and not as perfect paradigms of proceduralisation.
Proceduralisation and production of collective knowledge:
two examples
Regulation of drug use
The regulation of drug use will be the first example of a transformation in
the way collective knowledge is produced, a transformation which is taking place
before our eyes but of which we are only semi-aware.
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part was put in place in the 1960s and 70s (when drug addiction became a serious
and disturbing problem for society) was genuinely typical of the social State. The
mode of regulation linked two types of intervention. The first type represses drug
trafficking and use. A formal law expresses an ideal of abstinence that is seen as the
model of health in general. And as for the ‘drugs’ thus criminally penalised, they
have been defined by the experts. The other type of intervention is therapeutic,re-
lying on psychologists. Criminal judges themselves eagerly become psychologists,
or at least surround themselves with expert opinions. In both types of intervention,
knowledge about drug addiction is expressed in ‘causalist’terms:the cause is either
in drugs (hence the idea of outlawing these substances),or in the drug addict him-
self (hence the ‘will to cure’which characterises social behaviour towards addicts, a
dimension which did not escape the lucid observation of Michel Foucault). Based
on positive knowledge,programmes were then put in place,with an aim that was
not considered a problem as such:abstinence.
Unfortunately, of course, as everyone knows, 20 years on, the results of this
policy were disastrous: the phenomenon of drug trafficking and use has only got
worse. Meanwhile, however, the model of regulation has evolved and is still in the
midst of ongoing change. What happened? First of all, there was a change in the
epistemological attitude: awareness has grown of the whole range of determining
factors. Above all,it is the very definition of the problem that has changed:to sum
it up in a phrase,it is no longer the product which is perceived as the source of the
problem,nor an ‘internal predisposition of the drug addict’,but the psychological-
ly and socially constructed use of a certain type of product. The crucial point
is this:there can be no definitive list of toxic substances. There are ‘soft’uses of so-
called ‘hard’drugs (even heroin),and even ‘social’use of these products (cocaine,for
example,among high-earning professionals),or ‘hard’uses of supposedly ‘soft’drugs
(such as marijuana, alcohol or tobacco). The very idea of a closed list of products
has, moreover, been demolished on the ground itself: new synthetic products are
burgeoning and the definition of drug addiction is expanding: what about am-
phetamines,antidepressants,designer drugs,solvents,etc.?  But the need to refer to
use in order to define and regulate drugs means, ipso facto, that there is a need to
examine the context. It is hard to imagine a policy to combat the use of cocaine
among high-earning professionals that would be the same as that pursued in Eu-
rope’s inner cities. The social context,the causes and effects of drug use are always
different. A purely formalist approach to the problem, based on a ‘standard’defini-
tion of health,is no longer tenable.
We are gradually seeing new modes of production of collective knowledge
emerge in this field, particularly through the somewhat haphazard promotion of
the concept of prevention. The Dutch, of course, were the forerunners: they were
the first to break the monopoly of the positivist experts,and involve representatives
of the drug addicts themselves in drawing up policies (by means of the famous
Junkiebonden). In Europe, a whole range of experiments involving new partners is
flourishing: doctors, social workers, street educators, pharmacists and groups of
drug addicts themselves are contributing. How the objectives of the regulatory
policy and the resources implemented are put into practice depends on various cri-
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mately connected with the fight against drugs. There is a new dialectic between
decentralised modes of action and central power. New channels of coordination
are appearing: the public prosecutor’s office, for example, is called on to play a co-
ordinating role between players, and not just prosecute offences. Control of these
new mechanisms is,of course,being fought over. The different players — including
the police,the central State,welfare bodies and judges — are trying to throw them-
selves into what is a new game,and to acquire a maximum of resources in the play-
ing of it.
The Cambridge experiment
The second example is that of the Cambridge Experimentation Review
Board, which was set up in Cambridge (United States) in 1976. To sum up the his-
tory of this experiment in a few words:in 1976,Harvard University decided to install
a new genetic engineering laboratory on the fourth floor of one of the university
buildings. An alarmist article which appeared in the Boston Phoenix rang warning
bells: the building’s wiring was not safe, the plumbing was ancient, and seemingly
ineradicable colonies of insects had taken up residence in the building — were
they not potential transmitters of micro-organisms to the world outside the labora-
tory? The scientists tried to allay the fears of the mayor,arguing that the usual safe-
ty regulations had been taken into account. The experts who had conceived the
plan were reliable. But to no avail:invoking the ‘monsters’that the laboratory would
inevitably produce,the mayor,Alfred Velucci,imposed a moratorium on the univer-
sity, pointing out that it was his duty as mayor to ensure that nothing was done in
public or private laboratories which could endanger the health of the city’s inhabi-
tants. The scientists were utterly dumbfounded:one of the world’s most prestigious
universities deprived of the capacity to conduct research into genetic engineering
by a local government decision!  But the scientific camp was actually split: at least
one Nobel laureate lent his support to the mayor. On the question of public health,
even science itself seemed unsure.
After much negotiation,a compromise was reached:a special Citizens’Com-
mittee was set up and charged with giving opinions and recommendations on the
project. This was the Cambridge Experimentation Review Board. Remarkably, in
this committee responsible for studying a highly technical dossier,there was no re-
searcher as such. Lear describes as follows how Sullivan, then City Manager of
Cambridge, put together the committee5: there were eight places to be filled plus
the chair, to which the new city councillor for health and hospitals, Dr F. Commu-
nale, had already been appointed. Every part of the city was to be represented by
these nine members; Sullivan first ensured that this was the case. Then came the
ethnic considerations, which he dealt with by including an Irish, an American, an
Italian,and a French national,a Jew and an African-American among the members.
Both sexes had to be equally represented:Sullivan gave four seats to men and four
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politics — the Cambridge Civic Association and those who ran independently of it:
Sullivan chose an important female figure in the association, and an independent
man who had been mayor. To ensure that the committee had an independent
source of scientific knowledge on the physical constraints,Sullivan chose a civil en-
gineer, an authority in the country on construction issues. For a religious point of
view, he appointed a nun who was both a nurse and a member of the administra-
tive staff of a hospital. To represent the world of business, an oil company execu-
tive was appointed. A black social worker spoke for the poor. Sullivan completed
the Review Board with a student of urban policy who had a degree in the philoso-
phy of science, a doctor specialising in the treatment of infectious diseases, and 
a cousin of the mayor — a political activist who had a day job at Carter’s Ink 
Company.
The Committee worked flat out. It consulted experts in favour of and op-
posed to genetic engineering. It visited laboratories and carried out simulations of
genetic combining processes. After six months,it presented a unanimous report. It
recommended that the experiments be continued,and required the teams of biol-
ogists to comply with the security directives issued by the national scientific body,
while also adding new safeguard measures. It required the laboratory staff to be
trained to deal with all the risks that might arise during the experiments. It set out
the technical reliability specifications for the equipment used and precise measure-
ments of resistance to antibiotics for the micro-organisms ‘produced’by the labora-
tory. The city was to appoint its own inspection committee with authority to inter-
vene in all the laboratories at any time.
The report was hailed as an excellent piece of work by both the scientists
and the politicians. It enabled Harvard University to get out of an unprecedented
crisis that was endangering its capacity to carry out research. It satisfied the mayor.
In short, it produced a new type of legitimacy through non-traditional channels,
avoiding both formal political representation and positivist expertise. This experi-
ment can already be seen as a historic step in the regulation of the relationship be-
tween science and society in the United States.
Three features are worth highlighting. First of all, the committee was not
composed on the basis of preconceived ideas about interests. In fact,the members
were chosen to ‘reflect’the urban community,but without an obsessive concern for
representativeness: for example, Hispanics, as such, were not represented. It was
more the ‘people’s jury’model which prevailed. Secondly,its work evidenced a gen-
uine group learning process. The group’s chairman pointed out that all the recom-
mendations, including some sophisticated measures that were undervalued or
avoided by the NIH officials and the experts, came from members of the citizens’
committee,and not from its ad hoc scientific advisers. In the course of its work,the
group gained both technical competence and self-confidence. Some members
who could not even formulate a question at the start learned not only how to ask
relevant questions but also to detect unsatisfactory replies and throw them back
with more detailed enquiries. Some were even sometimes able to spot statements
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for dealing with a complex question,had thus been produced. The third character-
istic of the procedure was that it was a public procedure. Some of the committee’s
hearings took place in public. Its membership was known to everyone. This broke
with the secret practices of the expert committee. It was only in this way that the
process of constructing knowledge was able to acquire legitimacy.
Proceduralisation and monitoring of public decision-making
As indicated above, the proceduralisation of public action that the current
transformation of our advanced democracies seems to call for is principally linked to
a new understanding of the relationship between justification and application of the
rules. It is in order to accede to this necessary transformation of our systems of legal
regulation and to what motivates it — a better understanding of ‘normative’require-
ments linked to the dynamic of reason — that we are talking of the emergence of a
third paradigm of the law. Beyond the formal law of the liberal State and the substan-
tive law of the social State,the paradigm of procedural law is now taking shape. As we
have said,to differentiate it from the functionalist perspective of Luhmann or the for-
malist,idealist perspective of Habermas,it is a cognitive proceduralisation:the put-
ting in place of mechanisms which enable learning processes to be generated at col-
lective level to manage the uncertainty linked to contexts of bounded rationality.
Essentially, there are three fields in which the practical consequences of this
‘cognitive proceduralisation of the law and institutions’ can be seen at the end of
the 20th century.
(a) Constitutionalisation of the law: monitoring of laws and regulations in the light
of the fundamental rights of the individual (and of groups)
Beyond the ethical gain that this constitutionalisation implies, the increasingly
important reference to principles — prime among them,the principle of equal-
ity — makes reflexivity legally possible within the legal system. The dimension
of revisability of the rules which results from the interplay of double condition-
ality (respect for consistency and relevance within the context of application) is
marked today by the technical possibility given to the players in the legal de-
bate to question the justification of particular rules in terms of the conse-
quences they entail in a particular context from the point of view of the re-
quirements of equality and respect for fundamental rights. A reflexivity internal
to the legal system is being introduced and gradually activated. This reference
to fundamental principles is the necessary (though not sufficient) technical con-
dition for the extension of a form of legal reasoning based on the logic of the
principle of proportionality. This increasing emergence of principles most clear-
ly expresses the interplay between the syntactic and semantic dimensions of
the law. Certainly it can legitimately be said that these principles only acquire
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E.,Cambridge,New York:Cambridge University Press,1988,p.320.legal validity,at least in our constitutional systems of written law,by being writ-
ten into fundamental charters. The role of the overarching principle played by
the principle of equality is one of those most explicitly established by these
charters. What is interesting is precisely that this inclusion demonstrates the
fact that our legal systems are taking into account the reflexivity that a correct
understanding of social rationalisation and of the formalisation of the law im-
plies. Let us note immediately that this reflexivity, made possible by the in-
creasingly important role played by fundamental rights,most of all the principle
of equality,is distinguished technically by the fact that these principles are often
increasingly applied concurrently. It can be deduced that the sense of these
fundamental rights can now only be determined in cross-reference to the other
concurrent principles and in accordance with their context of application: this
explains the increasing importance of the principle of proportionality,which the
meaning of the principle of equality increasingly comes down to.
(b) Restructuring of the administrative and judicial functions
The powers of the judges are being increased at the very time that this increase
requires them to exercise their supervisory function on the basis of ever-broad-
er legal concepts. This strengthening blurs the traditional boundaries between
the functions of administration (discretionary assessment,judgment as to expe-
diency) and adjudication (ruling on legal issues and passing sentence). This ex-
tension can be seen in a wide range of legal disputes, whether the cases are
constitutional, economic, family, criminal or administrative. But what it is also
important to note is that this extension of the judges’ powers also means a
change in the nature of the monitoring process: increasingly (especially in the
field of administrative,social and economic law),it aims less at defining the sub-
stantive solution required than determining the extent to which the material
decisions were taken in line with the constraints on the discussion process sup-
posed to ensure respect for a minimum of rationality. Monitoring becomes
more and more procedural precisely in the sense of monitoring the rational
constraints on a learning process in the context of bounded rationality.
On the administrative front too, the issue of monitoring is undergoing great
change. In Germany, France, Belgium and the United States, there has been in-
creasingly strict monitoring of administrative decisions over the last 15 to 20
years7. In these countries, more and more mechanisms have been put in place
to check the substance of administrative decisions. These new safeguards en-
sure that an administrative action is considered legal only if it has been able to
gather all the opinions of the people concerned and to respond to the various
arguments that have been put forward. The question of the monitoring of ad-
ministrative acts is:how is it possible to ensure that a public decision is rational?
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7 This does not appear to apply to the Luxembourg Court to the same degree. It is often said that the Lux-
embourg Court is a proactive court. This is both true and false. It is a proactive court with regard to na-
tional legal orders. But it is a very formalist court with regard to the European institutions. The way in
which European administrative law is constituted is related to the formalist models of State-controlled ad-
ministrative law.The lawyers’ response today goes well beyond the model of expertise, one of
the incarnations of which, the cost–benefit calculation, you are no doubt famil-
iar with. At the same time, the exercise of the administrative function is reveal-
ing administrative authorities with a high participation ratio from the milieux
concerned and a mode of operation that is increasingly similar to the processes
of contentious administration (blurring of the three functions defined by Mon-
tesquieu and transfer to the administration of quasi-judicial powers). What is in-
teresting about these so-called ‘independent’administrative authorities is not so
much their stated independence from the executive as the fact that the deci-
sion-making procedures are restructured so as to ensure compliance with the
‘cognitive’ conditions of collective decision-making in the context of bounded
rationality.
Obviously, this is not the place to go into recent developments, mainly in the
United States, of these techniques of proceduralised and strengthened control
exercised by the judge with regard to public decisions. There is a significant and
growing amount of literature in the United States on this question, building
from the pivotal article by R. Stewart,‘The reformation of American administra-
tive law’8. However, by way of example, we will refer to two recent examples
taken from French case-law. These attest to the fact that tendencies towards
proceduralisation are not only emerging, though less clearly, in Europe, but also
concern not just the classic sector of the public authorities. In fact,they concern
the general functioning of collective institutions, particularly in social and eco-
nomic policy. This shows that what is at issue is the transformation of the way
in which the coordination of collective action is conceived in our modern 
societies.
The two examples concern the thorny problem of mass redundancies for eco-
nomic reasons. These two decisions9 are interesting because,in both cases,the
case-law subordinates the legality of a decision by the management of a com-
pany not only to the obligation to allow the different interests concerned (such
as the workers) to argue their point of view10, but also to checks on the ration-
ality of the discussion process leading to the final decision. In both cases,while
refusing to identify with the manager, the judge also refuses to go along with
the classic position which, to avoid the judge having to assume the delicate
power of entering into a discretionary assessment of the soundness of the man-
agement decision, recognises the autonomy of the management’s power to
manage. Contrary to these two antinomical positions,which are both based on
Transformations in the art of governance 49
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9 Judgment No 27 of 20 January 1993 of the Dijon Court of Appeal (Gonot v SA Devanlay Lacoste) and Judg-
ment of 15 November 1991 of the Paris Court of Appeal (Alia et consorts v Société Marquis Hotels Lt).
10 This is certainly the first phase of a genuine proceduralisation which is already emerging in several sectors
of substantive law. See also,in the labour law sector,the very significant ruling of the President of the Paris
Tribunal de grande instance (regional court) of 11 June 1993 in interim proceedings in the case Syndicat
national du personnel navigant et a.v Air France:‘We therefore order Air France to send each of its affected
employees and the representative trade unions a letter in which it explains its decision and gives its inter-
locutors an opportunity to make known their point of view and their suggestions, before any implemen-
tation of its decision’.a substantive approach to rationality,the judge follows the path,albeit still with
great care, of checking the discretionary assessment and the consistency of ar-
gument of the management’s decision in the light of the economic imperatives
invoked to justify the mass redundancies.
The first case concerns a company producing ice-cream which used the sea-
sonal nature of its production (70% of the product was sold between April and
September) as an argument for laying off permanent staff and re-employing
staff on seasonal contracts. The Dijon Court of Appeal, assessing the rationality
of the management’s economic reasoning11, concluded that ‘the explanations
provided by the employer and limited only to the impact of the rate of produc-
tion on labour costs do not show that the company’s interest,taken in its broad-
est sense,justified redundancies’. The procedural approach requires the compa-
ny to be looked at as a whole,i.e.as what in English is known as a stakeholder
community. Without a reasoned argument between the different interests in-
volved and without a proportional sharing of the costs imposed on them,there
can be no rationally justified decision.
In the second case, the Paris Court of Appeal contested the fact that the deci-
sion for mass redundancy was motivated by economic reasons. The financial
situation of the owner company (MHLP) was certainly problematic. But, the
Court considered, this situation had, in a way, been deliberately caused by the
parent company of which MHLP was a subsidiary by pursuing a strategy12
adopted for the multinational group’s own reasons. Also taking into considera-
tion the fact that the management had ‘not seriously negotiated’ nor ‘honestly
provided the information that the employees needed in order to determine
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11 These are the Court’s main citations:
‘Whereas it should be ascertained whether the economic grounds invoked by the employer justified the
axing of permanent posts;
whereas on this point, an analysis of the documents presented by the management of S.A. MIKO to the
works committee shows the unsuitability of the personnel structure to seasonal fluctuations in production;
whereas the plan implemented to resolve this difficulty consists of reducing the excessive staff numbers in
winter by getting rid of permanent posts and meeting the increase in demand in summer by recruiting a
seasonal work force;
Whereas a reorganisation of the company,as undertaken by the management of S.A.MIKO,may constitute
an economic cause for job conversion only if it is decided upon in the interest of the company;
whereas in this case,it is not debatable that the axing of 90 jobs during part of the year would increase the
company’s profitability, this choice should be assessed in the light of all the interests at stake within the
company; it can thus be seen that S.A. MIKO is the French market leader in ice-cream, with a constantly
strengthening position, and whereas, while the volume of production declined by 3.1% in 1991, the in-
crease in prices led to a 7.4% growth in turnover for the same year;
whereas in this context,the reduction in labour costs is a response less to economic necessity than to the
employer’s desire to put profits before job stability;
Whereas, furthermore, this choice is not based on a rigorous analysis of the situation as, in 1989, the audi-
tor’s report sent to the works council in the Saint-Dizier factory revealed:‘the company does not have suf-
ficiently precise accounting procedures to undertake an analysis of the costs and margins per product
which would make it possible to measure the seasonal financial impact of the business’.
12 This strategy,the Court noted,consisted of:
‘ — rapidly carrying out major renovation works at a total cost of FRF 84 million;
— financing these works principally through loans the costs (abnormally high, as rightly noted by the
auditor) of which were borne by the company’s budget;
— making transfers from this same budget of very high sums for which the consideration is not clearly
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their course of action’,the Court considered that the decisions affecting the em-
ployees were not related to ‘sufficiently clear economic difficulties or to techno-
logical change’and were therefore justified only by the interest of the company
or related to its own imperatives.
(c) Deformalisation of modes of conflict settlement and public decision-making
There is thus a threefold movement in contemporary law: an upward trend in
regulatory requirements; a downward trend in the processes of the production
of legal meaning; and a horizontalisation in negotiating conflict resolution and
decision-making methods. These developments are the expression of a grow-
ing contextualisation of the procedures for drawing up and applying rules. The
structure of a State governed by the rule of law based on production of law.
However, more fundamentally, the functions of the players cannot be appre-
hended by means of the classic distinction between the drafting and the appli-
cation of the law:new ways of producing law and legal meaning are emerging
which reveal a fundamental questioning of the traditional ways in which rules
are applied. Thus, Montesquieu’s theory on the distinction between the three
functions (legislative, executive, judicial) is thus strongly challenged. Not only
does the vertical organisation of powers within the State,based on a clear inde-
pendence of these three functions,appear less and less effective,but more fun-
damentally, the functions of the actors can no longer be understood by the
classic distinction between the elaboration and the application of law: new
methods of producing law and legal meaning emerge which express a funda-
mental questioning of traditional modes of applying rules. This reflects a new
conception of the distinction, traditionally held to be irreducible, between the
justification and the application of a rule.Proceduralisation and its use 
in a post-modern legal policy
Karl-Heinz Ladeur
Abstract
Proceduralisation as a form of replacing a substantive decision by a legally
established process of consultation,participation,or balancing conflicting interests,
is quite frequent as a pragmatic approach. Its value can only be considered ade-
quately if the relationship between law and its cognitive infrastructure is taken into
account:the law has increasingly to generate knowledge by its decisions instead of
drawing on experience.
Introduction
The concept to be outlined here is itself based on the concept of learning in
the sense of self-modification — as such it should be self-reflective enough to pro-
tect us from indulging in the illusion that there could be a kind of blueprint of a
correct path to follow in legal theory.Proceduralisation is a method which takes in-
to account that many practical problems are not accessible to theoretical recon-
struction. It could serve as a kind of framework for an open process of observation
of society from outside and self-observation of law from within. This brings us im-
mediately to the core of the approach,the link between legal systems and (chang-
ing) cognitive assumptions, rules attributing responsibility, and stop-rules for the
search for knowledge in decision-making processes. These are not truth-based
rules but practical constructions linking cognition and action. That is why self-mod-
ification of society has a profound impact on its ‘social epistemology’, its self-de-
scriptions used as a cognitive infrastructure for legal decision-making. Procedurali-
sation tries to adapt legal methods to alterations in the cognitive basis of society
and adjust them to differentiated forms of knowledge.
General remarks on social causality and decision-making 
in law and politics
Causality and the State
The rise of the modern concept of State is closely linked to the idea of
causality: the traditional legitimation of political power with reference to the past
and the continuity to be derived therefrom in modernity, was replaced by a Stateorder based on an abstract conceptuality showing many parallels with the natural
scientific representation of causality imposing an abstract order of stable laws sub-
suming the fluctuation of multiple single events and allowing for understanding
and the technical use and manipulation of nature drawing on knowledge of its
laws1. The modern State,on the other hand,was supposed to set up a human gen-
eral order separating man from the burden of the specific,irrational,fragmented lo-
cal order and establishing the equal legal personality as a unit to which specific le-
gal acts and legal positions (property rights) could be attributed. As a countervail-
ing part of this new abstract order,the State has to take up a similar position:as the
creator of a new abstract legal order the State is supposed to have legal personali-
ty itself2 — at least in continental legal systems. A society which derives legitima-
tion from the future — and no longer from tradition — would need a flexible
knowledge base allowing for operation on partial information3. And that is why the
functioning of the legal system is linked to a paradigmatic construction of reality.
Causality as a social concept presupposes a specific type of cognitive open-
ness allowing for learning from experience4,a concept which combines continuity
of a basic paradigmatic framework superimposed on a world which gets its struc-
ture and accessibility from a pre-established separation of levels of complexity sep-
arating general law-like,experience-based and singular specific relationships5. One
of the basic assumptions within this domain of causality is the possibility of assign-
ing responsibility for direct effects of actions to an adult individual whereas distant
consequences and diffuse effects of far-reaching interrelationships between laws
and the accumulation of a plurality of events potentially darkening the clear-cut at-
tribution rules are excluded from consideration. The same is valid for the exercise
of ‘negative’ rights absolving the subject from responsibility for consequences
which could not themselves be conceived as harm imposed on a third person6.
‘Harm’ in this sense is not just a disadvantage imposed on somebody but a devia-
tion from a presupposed normal course of events,reducing the value of a good at-
tributed to a person and protected by subjective right. The concept of harm lays
open the close interrelationship between the factual assumptions and legal attri-
bution rules of liberal order7.
This model of knowledge which is inherent to the liberal legal system may
have simplified social interrelationships; on the other hand, however, it has both
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1 See for the concept of causality Rasmussen, J.,‘Event analysis and the problem of causality, in  Brehmer,
B./Leplat, J. (eds.), Distributed decision-making, Chichester: Wiley, 1991, pp. 247 ff.; see also Simon, H. A.,
Economics,bounded rationality and the cognitive revolution,Aldershot:Elgar,1995.
2 See only Runciman,D.,Pluralism and the personality of the State,Cambridge:CUP,1996,
3 This is why the concept of ‘observation’which indicates a mobile changing ‘operative’position in polycon-
textual setting instead of the ideal observer has got such a prominence in systems theory, see Luhmann,
N.,Beobachtungen der Moderne,second edition,Opladen:Westdeutscher Verlag,1996.
4 See for this concept Koerner, S., Experience and conduct: a philosophical enquiry into practical thinking,
Cambridge:CUP,1976.
5 See  Hacking, I., The emergence of probability, Cambridge: CUP, 1993, for the epistemological conditions of
the rise of ‘probability’.
6 See Sugden, R., The economics of rights,cooperation and welfare, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; see also Klosko, G.,
‘Political construcivism in Rawls’s political philosophy’,American Political Science Review,1991,pp.611 ff.
7 See Ladeur,K.H.,‘Coping with uncertainty’,in Teubner,G./Farmer,L./Murphy,D.(eds.),Environmental Law and
Ecological Responsibility,Chichester:Wiley,1994,pp.299 ff.constrained and enabled individuals to abide by its main assumptions and develop
and adapt their ‘mental model’of reality on the basis of its rules. This is particularly
important for the role of public and private education and for the functioning of
the economy as well.
One of the main problems of present-day law and politics is the lack of a
shared model of reality establishing a basic framework of description to be used es-
pecially in legal practice and serving as a knowledge base for the management of
social conflicts and the adaptation of law to a society which is changing. There has
always been a concern for a normative consensus in society but at least the same
value should be attributed to the importance of a certain basic cognitive frame-
work which can be used for a common description of society, or can at least help
to structure conflicts according to some shared criteria8.
Politics and law-making are increasingly confronted with the rise of ‘ill-struc-
tured’ problems for which there is no common understanding even though the 
value basis of a society may be homogeneous. For example, there is a shared 
normative assumption that — contrary to classical liberal ideology — mass un-
employment is a public concern. However, a productive polemic on modern un-
employment proves elusive; possible causal factors proliferate rendering it difficult
to establish a shared model of these causes,let alone a solution. The idea of proce-
duralisation of State action should first of all be helpful in reconstructing the prob-
lem of modelling society and of designing a common frame of reference for poli-
tics,which could serve as a functional equivalent to the liberal cognitive paradigm9.
The lack of a shared ‘mental model’of society and the necessity to
stimulate cognitive learning processes
The mode of decision-making based on a stable pattern of causality and ex-
perience could be called ‘substantive rationality’: in the first place, this means
that decision-makers are not confronted with the necessity of constructing the do-
main of options within which they have to formulate a decision. This domain can
be presupposed as given, and general assumptions can be separated from specific
ones, the range of alternatives is limited, and choice is prone to subjective values.
The sustainability of this mode of substantive rationality is mainly challenged by
the difficulty of integrating time and change into its stable frame of reference.
Once self-modification of society is more rapid, and complex feedback between
variables and events in historical time have to be taken into account learning is a
primary concern. And learning is a crucial element of procedural rationality,
which leads to institutional flexibility and enables decision-makers to construct
their domain of options, which can no longer be presupposed to be structured by
the stable separation and differentiation established by the traditional model of so-
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9 See Lindbeck, A.,‘Incentives and social norms in the welfare state’, Stockholm University, Institute for Inter-
national Economic Studies,Seminar Papers,617,1996.cial causality10. The simple reason for this is that more and more specifically tech-
nological and economic decisions include an element of experimentation and
strategic design,as they tend to change reality in a much more fundamental way
than in the past. Contrary to the ‘society of the individuals’,in the ‘society of organ-
isations’ we are confronted with actors possessing a much more sophisticated
strategic potential of decision-making. This means that they can coordinate a plu-
rality of different actions within a broader time horizon and are no longer exclu-
sively dependent on general conditions which themselves are excluded from
strategic intervention, as was the case within an order based on the individual as
the main actor.
The concept of learning which tries to tackle the new problem of private
and public decision-making should not be reduced to the collection of more infor-
mation but includes the necessity of constructing and considering an ‘internal
environment’,within which the decision-making takes place,once the external en-
vironment can no longer be presumed to be structured by the general rules of
causality11. Decision-making can no longer draw on a stable frame of reference,
clearly separated levels of complexity nor the legitimacy of linear relationships re-
producing a societal equilibrium. The new complexity undermines the stable hier-
archy of rules,concrete experience and single events. That is why reference to rules
should increasingly be substituted by organisational design which combines exter-
nal and internal self-observation. The new external complexity has to be managed
within organisations by considering decision-making processes as depending re-
cursively on the generation and the execution of processes of decision-making
themselves.The reconstruction of decision-making units has to draw on the neces-
sity to stimulate and orient their learning capability and to broaden their action po-
tential vis à vis the turbulence of the external environment and so develop flexibil-
ity in order to compensate for lack of transparency and structure in social reality by
generating more options and more adaptability because strategic,multiple actions
tend to change reality. This means that processes of self-revision and adaptation
have to be integrated into private and public organisations.
The main difference between substantive and procedural rationality
The traditional model of decision-making was dominated by substantive ra-
tionality, which could be regarded as being ‘instrumentalist’: it started from given
goals, given conditions and given constraints. The rationality of decision-making
was then dependent on the actor whose main task was to search for the one best
solution on the basis of pre-structured social causality and legal norms. Procedural
rationality, however, presupposes the relevance of the process which generates a
situation to be tackled by a learning approach. Information needed in decision-
making is not just collected but generated by decision-making processes them-
selves, and information will always be partial and subject to change. This certainly
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has important repercussions on decision-making itself: decisions have to be open
to self-revision because procedural rationality is a kind of ‘bounded rationality’(H.A.
Simon).
Substantive rationality starts from a few basic assumptions about social
causality and social rules;it treats reality as transparent and does not need sophisti-
cated external observation processes. Procedural rationality, on the other hand,
takes into consideration the fact that it can only reduce uncertainty and set up
some kind of ‘best available’partial knowledge. That is why it has to focus on viable
procedures which in their turn have to take into consideration limited attention
constraining the decision-maker to focus informational activity and to be aware of
the fact that the creative element of knowledge-generating process and design is
unavoidable. Decision-making is no longer oriented toward some specific final out-
come but it is linked to post-decision-making processes of improving data and re-
designing models12. It has to guarantee flexibility in order to be able to buffer the
effects of errors or to broaden the range of alternatives taking into account the ne-
cessity to ‘second guess’ the decision-making. This approach either excludes deci-
sions altogether or places a burden of argumentation on them,with far-reaching,ir-
reversible consequences and a demand for systematic integration of evaluation.
Substantive rationality,however,presupposes a basic set of normative assumptions
(legal rules etc.) and constructions of reality allowing for specific facts of the case to
be subsumed under general concepts. It presupposes the ‘omniscient decision-
maker’ who has to emphasise the precision of detailed empirical descriptions of
cases and can refer to a universal normative framework attributing responsibilities
(mainly) to individuals,and stabilising expectations.
Traditional problem structure in public decision-making
Legislation
19th-century legislation was characterised by a paradigm set by police law
whose main function consisted in preventing people from causing ‘danger’to pub-
lic goods,including health of individuals,through specific police measures. The leg-
islative paradigm was based on a norm structure which followed the model of an
‘if/then’ structure: a legal consequence was attributed to a general description of
facts13. Of course,rules were indeterminate,a fact especially valid for police law,but
the legislature could draw on basic assumptions structuring indeterminacy: for ex-
ample it presupposed goods, especially rights, as indicators of harm and causal at-
tribution rules which themselves presupposed the possibility to refer to normal
states and the possibility of linking specific causes to specific effects which may be
separated from a background of an opaque flow of influences.
12 See for the new experimental logic of search and creation generally Hayek, F. A., New studies in philosophy,
politics,economics and the history of ideas,reprint,London:Routledge,1990.
13 See Luhmann,N.,Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts,Frankfurt (M):Suhrkamp,1982.The legal model of the late 19th century is based on stable separation be-
tween the rule and its application,a model which is not called into question by the
Anglo-Saxon common law because,although this shifted the main task of elabora-
tion and conservation of law to judges,it presupposed a basic stability no less than
the continental legal systems did.
Liberal administration
The same paradigm of police law can also be used in order to describe de-
cision-making processes within the liberal administration: inherent to police law is
the assumption that the police dispose of the average knowledge (experience)
which does not exclude that it might be necessary to consult specialists who them-
selves have had to interpret a common knowledge potentially accessible to every-
body. For example, engineers having to judge dangers caused by the use of some
steam boiler have to draw on basic textbooks on engineering and to answer the le-
gal question whether it is to be regarded as ‘safe’or not. This evaluation of course
implies a value component, and especially a decision on the general acceptability
of technical risks, because the concept of ‘safety’ as a criterion of decision-making
cannot be taken at face value. There are some discussions, especially concerning
early railway projects, on how and to whom to attribute risks, especially of fire. But
even though judgments are open to discussion, they have to relate to some com-
mon representation of a state of normality open to slow social evolution which is
not called into question by even serious accidents14. The attribution rules them-
selves are considered to be stable whereas in detail one could quarrel about
whether cattle-grazing on the rails is ‘normal’ or whether thatched roofs catching
fire from sparks emitted by railway locomotives is a harm to be attributed to railway
companies or just bad luck to be borne by owners. Nonetheless, the alternatives
are rather clear-cut15.
Even though administration had the power of discretion, decision-making
was considered to be oriented at a state of equilibrium presupposing shared and
general public knowledge and values. Experience reinforced and reproduced itself,
continuously on a case-to-case basis,and learning had to be only spontaneous and
not systematic.
Judicial decision-making
The same problem can also be demonstrated in civil law cases:where some-
one buys a steam boiler and is hurt when it explodes, the question of compensa-
tion under this system is reduced to the problem of liability for negligence. Again,
this rule expects average care from the producer, and so refers to experience and
knowledge generated by people working in a specific domain of the economy. The
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he will not be liable even if after the fact he comes to learn that the constructions
in question were far from perfect. Accidents not falling within the ‘negligence’cat-
egory have to be borne by the victim as just ‘bad luck’. It presupposes attribution
of specific actions which could be controlled by individuals on the basis of public
knowledge. Presupposing technical progress, the public accepts that technical
system at a certain stage of evolution but this has to be considered as ‘normal’,and
there is no liability for normal action.
Summary
Public decision-making based on the traditional paradigm of social causality
and liberal law presupposed general rules with application being separate from
them. The reverse side of the separation consists in the assumption that the deci-
sion-making process does not modify the rules themselves; even if knowledge
changes,its evolution is supposed to develop spontaneously and slowly,without al-
ternatives,underlying public or private decision-making. Furthermore,it referred to
specific facts (being distinguished from a general background of reality) as its priv-
ileged cause and not some global risk or events to be considered as just ‘hazard’or
bad luck. This paradigm establishes a common frame of reference for legislature,
administration and the judiciary leading to a certain model of decision-making
which corresponds to the rules of private decision-making.
Substantive rationality of the law presupposes clear legal programmes
based on ‘if/then’ relationships and a stable knowledge basis enabling interpreta-
tion and adaptation of law to continuous processes of transformation of society. In
addition to that,the functioning of the legal system draws on basic attribution rules
assigning responsibility to individuals for controllable cause–effect relationships to
be distinguished from a background of ‘noise’ created by processes of self-modifi-
cation of society. This basic idea of causality establishes stop rules for the inevitable
search for new knowledge in liberal society.The dominant type of knowledge gen-
eration is experience which is itself closely linked to the general structure of a so-
ciety of individuals and especially to a decentralised structure of technical evolu-
tion drawing on practical trial-and-error processes spontaneously generating a kind
of average knowledge accessible to everybody. This basic knowledge structure is a
crucial presupposition for the functioning of the legal system inasmuch as it allows
the construction and application of laws referring to prestructured complexity.
Procedural rationality and public decision-making
The example of law-making
The new problems the legislator is confronted with can be demonstrated by
the decision to introduce co-determination procedures for workers in big firms in
Germany. It is not necessary to go into details on how this fits into the structure of
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essence refers to the constitutional protection of property. In systems allowing for
constitutional control of parliamentary laws especially,we need an idea of a core of
property which should be exempt from legal interference. Apparently weighing up
constitutional compatibility of co-determination with this core element of property
depends on the effects of co-determination on the decision-making process with-
in enterprises. But how do we know? How can future scenarios be evaluated? Of
course, one can arrange parliamentary processes of ‘hearings’ with trade unions,
employers, associations, experts on economy, lawyers, etc. One of the crucial prob-
lems we are confronted with is obviously that the information we will get is equiv-
ocal to say the least. A forecast of the effect of a change in decision-making on the
efficiency of co-determined enterprises is highly uncertain. This is not only a prob-
lem of lack of ‘information’, which the law itself tries to turn into a medium of
change of hitherto established processes of decision-making,but it develops an ap-
proach of ‘legal policy’ focusing on its own attribution rules. The legal system no
longer presupposes a prestructured state of normality but aims at a transformation
of reality without being able to fully determine the elements of this process16.
This problem of course raises the question of how to manage uncertainty:
does constitutional protection of property exclude experimentation with its rules
or should Parliament dispose of discretion once detrimental outcomes are not evi-
dent? This brings us to the problem of how to manage the process of knowledge
generation within political institutions. Is Parliament the adequate organ for the
generation and observation of knowledge for complex decision-making processes?
Can Parliament compensate for the lack of a common knowledge, especially of a
shared domain of experience? Or do we have to impose new constitutional rules
on decision-making in complex domains stressing mechanisms of knowledge gen-
eration? The answer to this question has crucial consequences for the control of
constitutionality by constitutional courts17 because there is a close link between
the role of parliamentary decision-making and the role of constitutional control.
We could of course shift the emphasis to the constitutional court as an institution
which should observe and evaluate the role of property under conditions of com-
plexity. This would also be the equivalent of advocating a more active role for the
court in the management of highly uncertain issues. And one could argue that
courts are not well-prepared for this type of decision-making. One could argue,
however, in favour of a strong constitutional barrier against uncertainty excluding
modification of law once outcomes are not well-known and hard to forecast. But
this could not be an acceptable solution because self-modification of society is a
process which is not even primarily created by the law itself; on the contrary, in
complex fields of decision-making it is also highly uncertain where the cause of
self-transformation of society is to be located. Does the law initiate a process of
change or does it rather interfere and structure a spontaneously generated process
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self-modification of society as a continuous process is rapid and does not necessar-
ily allow for piecemeal type intervention, since decision-making based on partial
knowledge is inevitable and it would only be an illusion to establish a constitution-
al rule shifting burdens of proof onto those who advocate specific change.
Nonetheless we must accept that we cannot fully override our ‘duty’to make deci-
sions; and therefore cannot establish a general principle restricting decision-mak-
ing or parliamentary law-making under conditions of uncertainty.
An alternative could consist in a kind of combination of discretion of Parlia-
ment on the one hand and a restructuring of decision-making procedures on the
other, which could as well pave the way to a reinterpretation of the role of consti-
tutional courts, since the new method of ‘balancing’of pros and cons constitution-
al courts use in complex cases is not sufficient. So one could imagine new proce-
dural rules taking into account the complexity of knowledge generation,and prob-
lems of potential irreversibility of decision-making on partial information and one
could think of explicit procedural obligations to observe in a systematic way the
consequences of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, whereas nor-
mally self-modification would be left to spontaneous processes of information after
the fact. So the only way to manage these ill-structured problems of decision-mak-
ing consists in re-entering the problem into decision-making procedures. Proce-
dure in this sense is not limited to explicit procedural norms, rather it advocates a
shift of emphasis from aims which are highly unstructured to processes of knowl-
edge generation and monitoring of decision-making under conditions of indeter-
minacy. This approach tries to find a functional equivalent to a shared common
knowledge collected and distributed as experience. And this common basis can
consist only of a procedural approach re-entering the problem of unstable frames
of reference into the legal process itself,whereas in the past knowledge generation
could be considered to be more or less evident and to function spontaneously.
Parliament nowadays is confronted with ill-structured issues where there is
no clear-cut aim, no shared description of problems, where contradictory criteria
have to be applied,no stable attribution rules can be presupposed and where even
observation of consequences to be assigned to a ‘reformed statute’ is highly con-
troversial. So one of the elements advocated by a procedural approach would con-
sist in a reconsideration of the institutional structure of Parliament with reference to
generation of knowledge,its potential management of ill-structured problems,tak-
ing into account its institutional conditions of decision-making as opposed espe-
cially to private decision-makers, administrators and the judiciary. In particular, the
element of self-revision and monitoring of outcomes of statutes should be taken
more seriously. Constitutional theory should explicitly take into account that law-
making has to set up and differentiate an experimental design,laying open prob-
lematic assumptions, alternatives, weaknesses of informational bases and combin-
ing discretion left to the majority with sophisticated processes of monitoring based
on competing assumptions and open to alternative evaluation after the fact.
Above all,this means to take seriously the fact that we do not dispose of a common
basis of experience for complex problems of decision-making. (This assumption
Proceduralisation and its use in a post-modern legal policy 61does not of course exclude that there are still many decisions to be taken on the
basis of experience,but this is no longer the typical situation of law-making.)
Administrative decision-making in ill-structured domains
The new problem of administrative decision-making under conditions of
complexity can be demonstrated with issues of nuclear law as opposed to the ex-
ample of licensing the use of a steam boiler mentioned above.Nuclear law can no
longer presuppose a stable concept of ‘safety’but has to take into account risks18
linked to lack of knowledge,as well,a problem which can no longer be left to spon-
taneous processes of new experience generated from trial-and-error processes. Ad-
ministrative decision-makers have to take into account requirements of the ‘state of
science and technology’ (the wordings in European nuclear laws are different but
the substance of the problem is the same). This formulation also raises the problem
of the function of the legislature. What about the ‘reservation’of legislative compe-
tence? How far has the legislature to structure this problem of knowledge genera-
tion by the norm itself? Is this formulation equivalent to a delegation of compe-
tence to administration or experts?
For administration itself,this means that decision-makers can no longer draw
on a common experience: design of nuclear power plants is based on highly so-
phisticated new types of knowledge, statistics, models, and theoretical calculation
of probabilities, etc. The administrators need expertise, but this expertise again is
no longer easily accessible because it cannot draw on homogeneous public knowl-
edge as could the engineer consulted by administrators deciding on the safety of a
steam boiler. Knowledge of nuclear risks is specified (linked to practice without be-
ing easily transferable to a general public), incomplete, heterogeneous and prone
to diverging evaluations (it consists of empirical elements,methodological general-
isations, technological design, constructing mathematical models, ‘safety philoso-
phies’ and highly opaque interrelationships between its components). This, inter
alia, results in the fact that the choice of scientific advisors can predetermine the
character of the expertise which administrators will receive. This is especially due to
the fact that the ‘state of science and technology’ is not just a more sophisticated
type of knowledge as compared to experience but it is a different type of knowl-
edge which is referred to: science and technology are much less closely linked to
practice and decentralised processes of trial and error open to spontaneous learn-
ing than experience. Ecological designs are much more complex and far-reaching
than traditional technical constructions, but we should take into account particu-
larly that technology itself generates new knowledge which does not draw prima-
rily on stable experience. For the administrator this means that public decision it-
self has no settled knowledge basis: risks have to be evaluated according to theo-
retical knowledge, and assumptions linked to a certain design which is itself based
on theoretical model building. This situation has the side-effect that learning from
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power plants are much more difficult to observe than the functioning of tradition-
al mechanical, technical devices. On the other hand, industry has a strong interest
in keeping information secret. Administration is confronted with a new version of
the link between knowledge and action, but this time the link is much more com-
plex than their own experience-based knowledge which is better structured and
more accessible because the process of its continual enlargement and self-revision
is public and distributed over a multiplicity of agents19.
Thus,administration is confronted with the same type of complex problems
as the legislator, especially because there is no longer a clear relationship between
legal concepts and a presupposed body of knowledge. Knowledge is,rather,rapid-
ly evolving, uncertain, heterogeneous, theory-laden, and involved in fragmented
strategic decision-making with limited public access. That is why it will not be suf-
ficient to accumulate ‘more of the same’, that is just more information because in-
formation generation in complex processes is potentially infinite. Rather,we need a
clear profile of procedures for decision-making laying open the problems related to
the ill-structured character of scientific and technological design;to emphasise the
necessity of establishing explicit mechanisms allowing for more transparency of,
and more sensitivity to, the different heterogeneous components of this type of
scientific and technological knowledge;and,to integrate sophisticated processes of
monitoring into decision-making reintroducing a substantive problem as a proce-
dural issue.
Judicial decision-making on complex issues
New problems raised by liability for defective products have revealed the ex-
isting limits of the traditional experience-based reference to ‘negligence’ as a basis
for responsibility of harm. One of the problems related to the growing differentia-
tion of production is demonstrated by accidents which have more and more ques-
tioned the rationality of the proof rules to be applied in these cases. For example,
when a glass bottle of lemonade explodes and hurts someone, the victim had to
prove the producer’s negligence20. However,strict application of this rule results in
the victim almost always bearing the consequences as ‘simple bad luck’. For pro-
duction methods are not really accessible to the public once defects are not visible
and knowledge is too specialised. That is why court practice has experimented
with reversal of the burden of proof. Reversal of the burden of proof in many cases
leads to more sophisticated documentation of production processes and its rules
which then might help producers to prove that it was not in fact negligence which
led to the accident. This is a kind of second-order duty imposed on producers to
guarantee access to knowledge on production processes where duty to produce
safe products is insufficient. Another case of such a second-order procedural type
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20 See generally Meder,loc.cit.of duty consists in warnings21 producers have to publish if potential side-effects
come to light only after the product has been placed on the market. Courts try to
compensate for the lack of a common set of knowledge by developing new
knowledge-related duties, an approach which to a certain extent manages prob-
lems related with the lack of a common knowledge base in a satisfactory way. On
the other hand, we are increasingly confronted with a certain complexity generat-
ed by this approach itself. For example, warnings have to take into account the
problem of limited attention. The issuing of too many warnings by producers may
be counterproductive: inundated with superfluous information, consumers may
simply ignore crucial warnings. We are confronted here with a rather typical prob-
lem of producing unintended consequences of decision-making.
The reason why this happens is again related to the dynamics of knowledge
generation: knowledge, and practical attitudes and convention, evolve in ways
which are not easily foreseen because they do not follow continuous linear paths.
Much knowledge remains implicit in practice and so allows actors to withhold it, a
situation which was not so pressing in the past because experience as a common
knowledge basis was much more open to spontaneous evolution. On the other
hand,strengthening liability may again produce unintended side-effects because it
could lead firms to shift risky production to undercapitalised small firms,a problem
which could then of course be tackled by broadening responsibility. But this ap-
proach would again create new uncertainties. Yet we have to take seriously the risk
of suffocating innovation if liability is expanded beyond hitherto accepted rules.
We cannot go into details of product liability here,the examples given serve
only to demonstrate that the judge as well as the legislator and the administration
are more and more confronted with ill-structured problems related to lack of
knowledge and lack of stable rules of experience allowing us to forecast behaviour
once certain legal rules are changed under conditions of complexity and indeter-
minacy. That is why the introduction of rights with regard to risks beyond the tra-
ditional limits of harm will not be very helpful because they will only create new
problems of balancing22. A new productive approach to tackle this type of ill-struc-
tured problem can only start from reflection on the transformation within the rela-
tionship of normative and cognitive components of the legal system,and especial-
ly the loss of structure established by the concept of causality. Diffuse causality
leads to ‘moving targets’and especially to unintended side-effects. This is related to
one of the phenomena judges are confronted with: the hitherto established clear-
cut separation between the general norm and public experience; application in a
specific case is called into question because the court decision can easily lead to
far-reaching transformation of economic processes and consumers’ attitudes in a
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longer presuppose a stable frame of reference for their description of the case un-
der consideration, more and more they are constrained to take into account large
groups of actors and their behaviour. For example,in calculating which type of ac-
tor can more easily obtain insurance against certain risks or which actor has more
strategic resources to structure a certain field, questions arise as to whether we
should just expect consumers to learn about risks and take into account that an
adaptation might be slow and divergent,or whether we should ‘use’producers and
their resources to advocate adaptation?
These reflections show that judges are increasingly constrained to develop a
strategic approach in deciding cases in rapidly evolving environments. And again,
proceduralisation can be helpful in the development of more sophisticated and dif-
ferentiated approaches stressing the problem of knowledge generation and the in-
evitability of taking into account repercussions of decisions within larger groups,
once not only products and production processes change but also consumers’atti-
tudes and habits. In cases of negligence, one could in the past have presupposed
a certain type of product and a certain experience of how to use the product, in-
cluding of how parents prepared children to adapt to everyday risks. Once self-
modification of society affects the whole process of knowledge generation and its
transfer between generations, decision-making on assigning responsibility be-
comes much more difficult and demanding. This evolution leads us to reconsider
the relationship between legislation,administration and the judiciary in the light of
the knowledge problem. Functions of public institutions have to be redesigned in
a cooperative manner redesigning the relationship between law-making, adminis-
trative decision-making and judicial control. The different resources of State pow-
ers should be re-evaluated with reference to their potential contribution to the
management of uncertainty, which is a common task and whose complexity un-
dermines the clear-cut separation of powers.
Social State and social complexity
New types of knowledge used in welfare policy
Other examples of difficult problems related to lack of stability of patterns of
responsibility or of a shared social model of description of society can be found in
the field of social policy. In the past, individuals were not held responsible for dis-
tant consequences of actions, but only for harm to bearers of legally protected
rights. On the other hand, individuals were held responsible for their well-being
and failure to earn a living was just ‘bad luck’,perhaps a case for charity but not for
collective responsibility. As we all know,this has changed. And there are good rea-
sons for this transformation of the legal system especially in the establishment of
public insurance, social assistance, etc. However, contrary to widespread assump-
tions, solidarity in complex society is not a solution but a problem. This can be
demonstrated by a reflection on the first steps in the development of new public
insurance systems: they were only possible on the basis of a new type of knowl-
edge enabling decision-making beyond the traditional model of individual
cause–effect relationships and rules of individual attribution of responsibility,that is:
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(diseases, unemployment within large populations) which leave aside the individ-
ual23. This is one of the aspects which show that calculability of risks to be ensured
not only introduces a new complex concept into our social modelling but also con-
flicts between the old individual attribution of responsibility still valid in economy
and the new collective form generated. The conflict is due to the fact that the new
rule necessarily leads to an attenuation of the rigidity of the old one: this leads to
problems of ‘moral hazard’creating the risk of overburdening collective responsibil-
ity. Exploiting social insurances distributes costs over a large number of people,
that is why its effects are diffused and more acceptable to individual beneficiaries.
A further aspect is related to the huge public bureaucracies which are necessary to
administer systems of collective responsibility (the same is true for social assis-
tance): they tend to have no incentive to attain a certain efficiency because failing
programmes or decline of public attention for social policy may easily weaken their
own position. However, this sector is dominated by large corporate groups (trade
unions,welfare organisations,etc.) which have their own stake in this domain. Their
interests tend not to be identical with those of the individuals to be protected
(poor people etc.). Without going into further details here, these few remarks
should have made clear that collective responsibility is a problem because of a lack
of transparency of the field and the difficulty in constructing shared models of
complex realities. This problem has a self-reinforcing character because organised
groups get more and more interested in changing public perception of the prob-
lem, remoulding the self-image of people and establishing a culture of ‘victimisa-
tion’preventing clear insights into the structure of social policy and its rules24.That
is why, on the other hand, the system tends to invite people to abuse the system
who otherwise would be opposed to it if they could understand how it works. This
helps organisations to concentrate on the creation of ‘positive’ideas of a just socie-
ty — which everybody is sympathetic towards — without telling what the prob-
lems of justice under conditions of complexity really are. This is a destructive circle
because the evolution of the system does not know any stop-rules allowing for ob-
servation and the construction of a rational,transparent administrative order. Once
a basic level of social security is transcended,the system necessarily gets into more
and more self-contradictions, the reflection of which is at the same time sealed off
by ideological formulas25.
We have had to become familiar with ‘complex causality’ in nature — put-
ting into question the calculability of linear cause–effect relationships — but socie-
ty has become no less complex. For the new social problems there will not be any
‘end of the pipe’technologies,either. I will only mention one example:the explana-
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tion for unemployment. The American economist, Paul Krugman26, has recently
quite plausibly observed that all present approaches provide only partial explana-
tions for this intriguing phenomenon, and that the most realistic assumption will
have to accept that this is a case of complex causality,that is,a lot of different con-
curring and competing partial causes are to be considered. The challenge for econ-
omy — and,we have to add,also for legal science — must consist in gaining access
to an institutionalised approach to model this new type of complex causality. In le-
gal terms this could mean, for example, that complex systems of collective respon-
sibility, including collective bargaining processes, would have to be constrained to
link their policy to certain model construction assumptions about their expecta-
tions concerning central data of the underlying processes. Such a model would
have to be designed in such a way as to allow for comparison and retrospective ob-
servation. This could be a way of confronting society and social actors with self-
generated constraints systematically,and of explicitly taking into account problems
of ill-structured fields of action which tend to be more and more opaque. The self-
modelling and self-designing capacities of society,which in the past were based on
trial-and-error processes within society of the individuals,have to be reconstructed
and adapted to the conditions of the society of the organisations with the prospect
of an ‘experimenting society’. This concept tries to link itself to the liberal princi-
ple that a constitution must always be based on a kind of pre-constituted order
from which it derives the distinctions with which it organises decision-making
processes and attributes responsibilities. In the past, we could more or less rely on
some implicit regenerative power of society. But under the conditions of the new
paradigm,the process of generation of new possibilities,the intertwining with un-
intended consequences, must be taken into account more explicitly. A new func-
tional equivalent to the classical liberal substantive rationality based on general
rules,individual responsibility,experience,and decentralised decision-making has to
be found.
For the internal rationalisation of the State, the above-mentioned approach
could mean,for example:administrative tasks which are difficult to structure should
only be taken up if a systematic evaluation programme is set up because informa-
tion has to be generated explicitly once experience spontaneously emerging from
trial-and-error can no longer be relied upon. Public tasks in general should be more
related to the development and conservation of the informational infrastructure of
society in a broad sense which would have to be set up in order to generate more
possibilities and widen the ‘pool of variety’in society. In this way,procedural objec-
tive duties of the State could be linked with the rationality of traditional liberal
rights rather than being integrated into the continuity of a substantive purpose-
oriented logic of the welfare state.
26 See Krugman,P.,Inequality and the political economy of eurosclerosis,CEPR DP,867 (1993).Outlook:toward the ‘experimenting society’
Critique of discursive rationality
Contrary to the ‘argumentative rationality’of the post-conventional model of
deliberation prompted by the Habermasian school, the model here advocated
would rather presuppose bounded rationality and draw on the operation with pro-
visional conventions, the management of self-produced constraints, the search for
stop-rules oriented towards ‘viable’ patterns of decisions and attribution of conse-
quences. At present, new distinctions are necessary, which have to be adapted to
self-organisation of processes in society which are no longer registered by the old
‘representative’ macro organisations. A discourse-ethical version of proceduralisa-
tion of constitutional law would, however, neglect specific functions of the legal
system. Priority of a discourse of justice would expect too much collective action
potential, it underestimates the inevitability of constraints for the ongoing process
of differentiation of society which cannot be overcome by ‘deliberation’. There is no
a priori justice which does not consider problems of implementation of justice in
a complex society and that is why the priority of a discourse of justice over com-
peting systemic and instrumental rationalities is far from being plausible. Such a
claim to priority is an integral part of the form of discursive rationality but cannot
be justified explicitly. It is not astonishing that Habermas27 derives the self-enlight-
ening potential of political discourse from a rationality inscribed into language itself
which has to be liberated from political power relationships and economic instru-
mental rationality. Judging from real history,it is far from evident that ‘disinterested’
political discourse has in any way privileged access to a global rationality. The main
danger for liberal society in the past has been created by ‘altruistic’political move-
ments, which specifically for their altruistic nature, ask for sacrifices which lead to a
circle of self-destruction of society at large. The main problem in society is not to
find rules for political argumentation but to maintain patterns of cooperative ac-
tion. The problem of how to establish a cooperative order within a fragmented
and rapidly evolving society cannot meaningfully be tackled without taking seri-
ously the problem of knowledge, a common frame for self-description of society
under conditions of indeterminacy if necessary. Neutralising interest by delibera-
tion would — even if it were possible — only solve the problem of fairness which
is,by far,not the more pressing one.
A post-modern society cannot be integrated through a stable set of com-
mon shared beliefs but rather by ‘overlapping networks’ of practical differentiated
political and social interactions generating a kind of implicit knowledge which can
be used as the raw material for setting up explicit conventions. The complex soci-
ety confronted with uncertainty must turn into an ‘experimental society’,restructur-
ing its institutions in the sense of a reshaping of incentives for learning and adap-
tation. The fact that the main actors now are organisations and not individuals
blocks the way back to a pseudo-liberal deregulated society. However, the liberal
traditions exclude as well the alternative of a State replacing spontaneous self-reg-
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ulatory potentials of the market by substantive goal-oriented regulations. That is
why a renewal of a liberal society under conditions of complexity which must lead
towards a self-organising society, can only be imagined to come about by intro-
ducing into organisations periodic ‘irritations’ which create potentially externalised
problems which can no longer be left to spontaneous evolution. The procedural
character of this conception consists in the assumption that it is more requisite va-
riety which is at stake. The general frame of reference should be focused on meth-
ods and procedures of confronting social systems and organisations with self-gen-
erated constraints challenging the risk, especially of organisations, of becoming
locked into some established track of their development. The emphasis of this
concept is laid on a paradoxical external determination of internal self-determina-
tion of organisational networks of interrelationships, leading towards a new legal
order of a ‘self-organising society’28 which is distinguished from the primary lib-
eral society of the individuals by the characteristic that its self-modification com-
prises also its own rules.
The central role of causality and experience as building-blocks allowed the
establishment of an integrating framework structuring social reality,and the formu-
lation of individual expectations in social interaction and cooperation. Society can-
not be reinvented,nor can the knowledge generated by and implicit in practice be
ignored by any political and legal theory. That is why a meaningful solution to the
present crisis of State29 can only consist in the search for a functional equivalent of
the classical relationship between the basic legal structure and its institutionalised
model of society as well as its method of generating and evaluating new knowl-
edge in a framework of self-observation of its own functioning. The relationship
between legal order, and cognitive structure of society established by liberal order,
is taken as a starting-point in this approach because it has functioned in an ac-
ceptable way. A global, justice-oriented, argumentative procedure cannot play this
role because it neglects the constraints implicit in differentiated social practice
fields. The model of proceduralisation presented here is linked to the specific
processes of knowledge generation and their relation to private action and public
decision-making, as was the case with the traditional link between abstract legal
norms and reference to general experience. It tries to combine normative and cog-
nitive components in a prospect of an experimenting, flexible self-organising soci-
ety. It regards procedures explicitly as generating new knowledge, new options
and new models as a functional equivalent of the link between abstract general
rules, and experience as a public knowledge base of a society of individuals. Both
approaches are characterised by the necessity of mobilising knowledge for deci-
sion-making in a society confronted with indeterminacy emerging with future ori-
entation as opposed to reproduction of tradition.
28 See generally Ulrich,H./Probst,G.,J.B.,Self-organisation and management of social systems:insights,promises,
doubts and questions,Berlin:Springer,1984.
29 See only the salient analysis of Guéhenno, J. M., The end of the nation State, Ann Arbor: University of 
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THE NATIONAL CONTEXTProceduralisation and the UK public
administration reform
Andrew Dunsire and Christopher Hood
Substantial changes have occurred in UK public administration over the past
two decades. Whether those changes should be interpreted as consistent with the
‘proceduralisation hypothesis’(and, if so, whether proceduralisation is an unintend-
ed consequence of measures which had rather different aims) is debatable. Fol-
lowing the format requested for the European Commission Cellule de prospective
‘Governance in transition’ seminar in 1996, this paper first briefly outlines some of
the major changes that have occurred in UK public administration over approxi-
mately two decades, and then considers (second section) how far these changes
amount to ‘proceduralisation’. In the third section it considers alternative ways of
conceiving administrative change.
UK public administration reform:a brief summary
In the half-century or so since the end of World War II, British public admin-
istration has exhibited both trends and cycles. The clearest cycle is shown in the
shift from the post-war programme of nationalisation of utilities and ‘strategic’ in-
dustries (in which central State internal control,to a degree,took the place of regu-
lation),to the equally far-reaching privatisation programme of the 1980s and 1990s,
in which private ownership was accompanied by more formal and explicit regula-
tion. Perhaps the clearest long-term trend is the fall in direct public employment in
central government. The UK civil service (which encompasses only the central gov-
ernment departments and agencies) is roughly half of its size at the end of World
War II; the large imperial bureaucracy of 50 years ago has all but disappeared; the
armed forces are a fraction of their post-1945 (or even pre-1939) size. The other
public services (including local authority staffs, healthcare workers, school and uni-
versity teachers,and police) have had varying fortunes,but in total have undergone
a smaller contraction from their post-World War II peak.
Although the internal and external ‘management problems’faced by the UK
State have changed dramatically over that period (including post-war reconstruc-
tion,decolonisation,membership of the European Union,major internal conflicts in
Northern Ireland,the economic consequences of the ‘oil shocks’of the 1970s,and of
liberal trade regimes in the 1980s and 1990s),some features of its public administra-
tion would still be fairly recognisable to a time-traveller from 50 years ago. Its public
service remains divided between a relatively small civil service at national level,dom-
inated by career ‘generalists’rather than lawyers or engineers,and a large public serv-ice at local government level more dominated by specialists. It has a highly spe-
cialised structure of administrative tribunals rather than the more general structure of
administrative law courts in the public law countries. Formally it has no national po-
lice force and no overall Ministry of Justice. Defence,diplomacy,immigration,tax and
social security are the only major policy programmes administered on a UK-wide ba-
sis (unless we add the operation of the intervention system for the common agricul-
tural policy,run by a civil service board since EU membership in 1973). Civil servants
have no formal ‘statute’, continue to operate at the topmost levels in large part as
‘courtiers’rather than ‘managers’(see Sisson,1976),and their terms and conditions are
largely covered by general employment law rather than special public service law,
though senior civil servants remain subject to greater restrictions on their political
party activity than applies in most other countries.
Over the 20 years leading up to the election of the Blair Labour Government
in 1997, however, important changes occurred in the UK public service. Most of
these changes have been exhaustively described and commented on elsewhere1,
and space restrictions prevent detailed discussion here. Accordingly,we give only a
highly selective account.
The major overall changes over this period can characterised as:
— A general shift from a ‘public bureaucracy State’ to a ‘regulatory State’ and ‘en-
abling State’, with privatisation and outsourcing of tasks formerly performed by
State employees at both central and local government levels.
— A growth in the scope of public services provided by ‘quangos’ or special-pur-
pose public bodies outside general-purpose authorities, arising in many cases
from transfer of responsibilities away from local authorities (for example, in
housing and education, and for many other services in London after the disso-
lution of the Greater London Council in 1986).
— A change in the style and formality of oversight of public services, including
more ‘judicial activism’ in review involving both the European Court of Justice
and domestic courts; an expansion of ombudsmen and grievance procedures,
with approximately 17 ombudsmen, and specialised complaints bodies for po-
lice,security services,and the armed forces in Northern Ireland;a growth in pub-
lic audit, which at both central and local government level expanded in the
1980s from ‘regularity audit’to policy analysis and efficiency scrutiny, and of re-
lated scrutiny activities — for example, the introduction of ‘clinical audits’ in
health services and much-expanded inspection activities in school and higher
education services (see Hood et al.,1999).
— A move towards more explicit and codified forms of accountability.Public serv-
ice codes of conduct for ministers, local councillors and public servants were
published. ‘Open government’measures were imposed on local government by
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(1989), Chapman (1991), Drewry and Butcher (1991), Metcalfe and Richards (1991), Painter (1991), Stoker
(1991),Foster (1992),Jordan (1992),Stewart and Walsh (1992),Jones and Burnham (1995),Ferlie et al.(1996),
Hood (1996),Hood and James (1997).statute in the 1980s,and adopted by White Paper for central government in the
1990s (freedom of information legislation is pending at the time of writing).
Public servants were exposed to a range of new procedural requirements, in-
cluding requirements for demonstrating efficient service provision (compulsory
market-testing under the conservatives, replaced by the Blair Labour Govern-
ment by a ‘better value’ regime for local government involving certificated effi-
ciency); compulsory assessment of the ‘compliance costs’ (to business) of new
regulatory initiatives; and the requirements of the 1991 ‘Citizen’s Charter’, which
is discussed in the next section.
— Substantial constitutional changes in a formerly ‘hyper-unitary’State, beginning
with major changes in the administration of Northern Ireland following an An-
glo-Irish agreement of 1985; and the introduction in 1999 of devolved elected
assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The latter was part of a
‘consociational’ settlement among the conflicting political forces in Northern
Ireland that was brokered by the UK and Irish Governments (and remains pre-
carious at the time of writing). An elected mayor and assembly for London is
due to be set up after elections in 2000. These changes matched the territorial
administrative devolution of the United Kingdom with corresponding devolu-
tion of elected authority,but also introduced new administrative arrangements.
Probably the public service changes which are best known internationally
are those which occurred in the public enterprise sector (see Abromeit, 1986; Vel-
janovski, 1987;Wiltshire, 1988; Dobek, 1993). An initially tentative and low-key pro-
gramme of privatisation beginning in the late 1970s (and in fact starting with a sale
of government shares in the oil company BP by a Labour Government in 1977) de-
veloped into a massive transfer of one million jobs from the public to the private
sector in the subsequent decade (see Foster,1992).
The key point about the privatisation programme for our present purposes
was the way that it engendered a new structure of ‘external’regulation, involving a
greater measure of quasi-independent control, and greater explication of the ‘rules
of the game’ than had applied during the nationalisation era, in spite of repeated
Treasury attempts to introduce explicit control frameworks. Regulatory functions
were now divided between sectoral departments and quasi-independent ‘offices’
constituted as non-ministerial departments, and dominated by Directors-General
largely recruited from outside the civil service and given direct statutory powers.
This structure was modelled on the fair trading regulatory regime that had been re-
developed in the early 1970s, and represented an ambition to create a distinctive
‘light rein’ style of regulation very different from the juridified and heavy-duty US
approach to industry regulation. Whether that ambition has actually been realised
is a matter of debate. The view that utility regulation in fact became steadily more
complex and legalistic is commonly expressed.
As with privatisation, the Thatcher Government at first avoided dramatic
changes in the civil service, and consciously eschewed wholesale restructuring of
ministerial responsibilities, in contrast to the approach taken by Sir Edward Heath’s
Conservative Government in the early 1970s (Hennessy, 1990, p. 645). Major
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pay strike of 1981,when the department responsible for civil service pay and man-
agement was abolished,its permanent head despatched to the House of Lords and
early retirement, and a modest degree of discretionary pay later introduced to re-
place the traditional classified civil service system of fixed grades and increments.
Towards the end of the 1980s, the service-delivery elements of civil service
work began to be transformed by ‘corporatisation’, separating out executive opera-
tions from policy ministries into quasi-independent civil service agencies2.R e -
quirements for compulsory tendering of a proportion of departmental activities
(‘market testing’) were introduced in the early 1990s, and were superseded by a
new regime of ‘running costs controls’(focusing on organisational rather than pro-
gramme costs), linked to efficiency plans. ‘Fundamental expenditure reviews’were
introduced in 1993, heralding a radical ‘delayering’ of some departments, notably
the Treasury itself. By 1996 all central controls on pay had been removed,and Trea-
sury control revamped into an ostensibly more ‘strategic’approach which concen-
trated on monitoring of running costs.
Other changes affecting the conduct of business by civil servants included a
White Paper in 1993 introducing a general principle of ‘openness’,the publication of
a Civil Service Code of Conduct in 1995 in response to concerns about civil service
ethics raised by the (then) Treasury and Public Services Committee of the House of
Commons;an extension and revamping of the compliance cost assessment regime
for new regulations originally introduced in 1985;and a reshaping of the powers of
the Civil Service Commission (the recruitment and testing body) in 1995. This latter
change for the first time gave the First Civil Service Commissioner a role in civil
service promotions, through membership of the committee which makes recom-
mendations to the Prime Minister about permanent secretaryships. It also finally
separated the role of regulation of merit appointment systems in the civil service
from the operational process of civil service recruitment,and introduced a First Civ-
il Service Commissioner from outside the civil service (rather than a serving civil
servant) in order to limit conflict of interest. The Blair Labour Government retained
most of these changes, introduced a new spending review regime that involved
quasi-contractual departmental performance targets and proposed to introduce
freedom of information legislation for central government.
In the local government sector, the 19th-century style of uniform and inclu-
sive local authorities which persisted until the 1980s was steadily eroded by re-
structuring (including the abolition of the Greater London Council and all the Met-
ropolitan Councils in England in 1986). Successive transfers of powers took place
from elected local authorities to what was dubbed a ‘new magistracy’ (Stewart,
1992) of appointed ‘quangos’(which have been claimed to be responsible for about
a quarter of all public expenditure in the United Kingdom). Powers of local author-
ities to decide spending and local taxing levels were restricted by ‘capping’ (see
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Jordan,1992;Theakston,1992;Trosa,1994;Cabinet Office,1994b;Dowding,1995).John, 1994). The traditional local authority property tax (based on notional rental
value and levied only on householders,and predominantly falling on private house-
owners rather than public housing tenants) was briefly replaced by a poll tax on all
adult local residents, only to be further superseded by a ‘council tax’ based on no-
tional capital value and levied on all households. The Conservatives introduced in-
stitutional routes for State schools to ‘opt out’of local authority control,but this pol-
icy was reversed by the Blair Labour Government after 1997. The same went for the
Conservatives’policy of expanding statutory compulsion on local authorities to put
areas of service provision out to competitive tender (see Ascher, 1987), rather than
retaining in-house provision by local government employees without tendering.
The Blair Labour Government modified this policy by introducing a ‘best value’
regime involving more extensive central inspection of costs and service quality,ac-
companied by powers to compel local authorities to give up direct provision of
services.
In the health service sector,the other major area of UK public administration,
a number of moves were made to circumscribe the previous pattern of profession-
al autonomy (particularly by hospital consultants) and professional self-govern-
ment. Those moves included the introduction of clinical audits in the 1980s, and
the creation of organisational structures dominated by general managers hired on
fixed-term contracts and paid on the basis of performance. The formerly ‘monolith-
ic’ NHS hospital organisation (once run as a single nationwide service) was ‘corpo-
ratised’, with public hospitals steadily being transformed into independent ‘public
trusts’run by boards of local business people. The Conservatives introduced an ‘in-
ternal market’in healthcare involving an institutional split between purchasers and
providers (see Pollitt, 1993, pp. 64–6; Stewart and Walsh, 1992, p. 502). The Blair
Labour Government modified these arrangements but retained the purchaser-
provider split in the system and announced the creation of much expanded audit
and inspection arrangements for healthcare, coupled with powers to take action
against ‘failing’hospital trusts.
The changes briefly summarised above have often been described as
amounting to the most radical shift in UK public administration since World War II
and perhaps in the 20th century. Many of these changes were in the direction of
what came to be known as ‘new public management’(NPM), a shorthand term for
a set of related ideas about how to organise public services which challenged es-
tablished or traditional ideas (see Hood,1991;Pollitt,1993). Different commentators
have given different lists of the characteristic traits of NPM,but in general the thrust
of the reforms has been to remove what had once been uniform system-wide rules
greatly restricting managerial discretion over matters like pay and budgetary con-
trol. But at the same time, in what could be seen as a mirror-image process, paral-
lel measures introduced measurement of managers’ own performance, and other
kinds of procedural controls by specialist regulators covering matters like data se-
curity and privacy, merit hiring principles, or quality and efficiency. Some of these
controls span both public service and business  (see Hood et al., 1999) and the ex-
pansion of public-sector regulation under the conservatives was taken further by
the Blair Labour Government.
Proceduralisation and the UK public administration reform 77UK public administration reform and the
proceduralisation hypothesis
In this section, we briefly review some of the reforms outlined in the previ-
ous section and test them against the ‘proceduralisation hypothesis’. We have
worked on the assumption that ‘proceduralisation’ can be seen as embodying ad-
vance towards four main values in the relations of individuals, organisations, bu-
reaucrats and politicians,in democratic countries:
Éclairage,or transparency and openness;
constitutionalism,or Kantian universality of internal process maxims;
empowerment,or enabling of individuals and groups;
inclusion (dialogue),or participation in decisions by those affected.
Three of these terms are used in the Draft Phase 1 Report of the European
Commission’s Seminar. The second, ‘constitutionalism’, is not explicitly used but
seems to us implicit in the term ‘proceduralisation’. ‘Constitutionalism’ here does
not,of course,have its legal sense of ‘conformity to the Constitution’; rather does it
serve as an antonym of tyranny, absolutism or arbitrary rule, as in Vile’s title Consti-
tutionalism and the separation of powers (1967). ‘Kantian universality’ of maxims
refers to Kant’s aphorism in Foundations of the metaphysics of morals that ‘I am nev-
er to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a
universal law’3.
These four values are not mutually exclusive, nor do they exhaust the con-
tent of the ‘proceduralisation hypothesis’; but they may serve as a useful checklist.
Let us move through the UK administrative reforms listed above. Privatisa-
tion, and contracting-out of work formerly done by State employees, seem not to
have any necessary or direct relation to any of these four values,except in so far as
individuals were ‘enabled’by purchasing shares in a State asset when they were of-
fered — and then only if they kept them rather than cashing in for the immediate
profit. A gain in openness and constitutionalism may be said to have been realised
indirectly from the privatisations of public utilities, paradoxically because of the in-
crease in overt regulation which accompanied them, with the regulators’ criteria
being published; and similarly in the case of local authority and other contracts for
previously in-house services. But no obvious gain emerges in empowerment or
participation values.
The explosion  of ‘quangos’to run public services,substituting for control by
elected authorities, has been almost purely and decisively negative for ‘procedural-
isation’, whether in transparency, in constitutionalism, in empowerment, or in dia-
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Gesetz werden.’logue. In principle the development of new elected authorities in 1999–2000 takes
the system in a different direction,but as yet no attrition of quangos is observable.
Growth in oversight mechanisms (judicial review, ombudsmen, complaint
channels,public audit) shows clear advance in openness and constitutionalism,and
a lesser advance in empowerment. These all began as specifically processual re-
forms: that is,monitoring and revising internal process,rather than structure or sub-
stance, of challenged decisions; but certainly the last — audit — has crossed the
threshold into content and outcome, which is again an advance in empowerment
(by proxy). And the ‘regulation of regulation’has recently produced a set of bench-
marks (Better Regulation Task Force, 1998) including transparency, accountability
through consultation and public support for policy.
Changes in the size of the central civil service,and in their pay structure and
recruitment arrangements, do not strike one as advances in ‘proceduralisation’ in
any of its main values. Reshuffling of ministers and departmental boundaries in-
creases opacity rather than transparency. As already mentioned, the separation of
operational from policy-making echelons is a gain in information dissemination on-
ly by virtue of the publication of the ‘framework documents’and reports of the ex-
ecutive agencies. Rather absurdly,it is still claimed that the accountability relation-
ship of the heads of these agencies with MPs, the press, and citizens, has not
changed at all — it is still via ‘ministerial responsibility’. Several recent cases show
that this is a fogging, not a clarification, of the situation — a decline in processual
constitutionalism, even a disempowerment of a potential complainant, compared
with the previous position. There is no gain in participation values either.
The recent willingness of State authorities to produce more information
about the basis of Cabinet decisions (Cabinet Office, 1994a), to publish lists of the
names and tasks of Cabinet committees, to invite the public at large to nominate
people for State honours, and other moves towards more ‘open government’ (in-
cluding a White Paper in 1993 which vested monitoring of its provisions by the Par-
liamentary Commissioner for Administration), is a gain in éclairage,and perhaps in
constitutionalism,even if they do little for the other two values. Advocates of ‘free-
dom of information’ (Wilson, 1984), however, claim that the Blair Government’s 
intended further legislation in this field is a step backward — away from the prin-
ciple that all State information should be made public unless to do so would en-
danger the security of the State or the privacy of individuals,or breach commercial
secrecy. Other openings-up which might be mentioned, marking gains in trans-
parency and constitutionalism, are the registers of MPs’ financial interests, and the
institution of a public appointments commissioner to oversee the selection of peo-
ple to serve on ‘quangos’.
The decade also saw a somewhat startling development,the announcement
of the name of the new head of the Security Service (MI5),and her delivery of a tel-
evised lecture on its work. The Service,perhaps in response to a possible challenge
under the European Convention on Human Rights, was put on a statutory footing
for the first time in 1992, and a quasi-independent security service commissioner
set up to oversee the security services and hear complaints,so increasing constitu-
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ipation. MI5 has since (amid controversy) gained a foothold in internal policing, to
replace its now-redundant ‘cold war’role.
Compulsory competitive tendering, market testing, and other initiatives in
the attempt to clarify ‘true’costs of administrative operations are moves to enhance
the ‘rationality’of decision-making. Yet they do not promise much to the citizen in
the way of transparency, constitutionalism, empowerment, or participation, except
in so far as the knowledge so obtained is made public. The same is true of  ‘NPM’
reforms and of performance measurement: the ostensible purpose is better mana-
gerial control,but a by-product of the managerial ethos is the knowledge gained in
drawing up the standards, and in those cases where measurements are published.
Other examples are the negotiation of the ‘framework documents’for the executive
agencies (created under the ‘next steps’ programme), a kind of ‘mission statement’
for the agency as well as warrant for its head; and the preparation of the rating as-
sessments of the performance of schools, universities, hospitals, and local authori-
ties. Those ‘league tables’ are intended to enable a more informed choice by par-
ents, students, patients and their families, or local taxpayers (so counting as a con-
siderable gain in empowerment). The question arises why the National Audit Office
(the House of Commons’most powerful investigative arm) does not do something
similar for government departments, ranking the ‘good’, the ‘indifferent’, and the
‘poor’along standard scales — for which it is certainly competent,were it to be po-
litically disposed to do so.
Such seeking for comparisons, even where invidious, represents a ‘learning
process’in which the bureaucrats and politicians are not greatly more sophisticated
than the press and their readers, and where experts are far from infallible or skilled
in communicating what they know. It brings into the public domain — to some
extent — decision processes and practices otherwise impenetrable, except by the
specific investigations of auditing offices or ombudsmen. The process may be said
to furnish a gain in dialogue and inclusion values as well as transparency and em-
powerment — high in a ‘proceduralisation’ ranking, although not particularly en-
hancing processual virtue. A learning process of a more sophisticated kind can al-
so be seen: awareness that any such comparative ranking depends crucially upon
what is measured, and what is left out of the calculation — for instance, the drive,
in the ranking of schools by examination performance, towards including ‘value
added’criteria (how much improvement there has been since earlier testing of the
same cohort).
The matter of compulsory assessment of ‘compliance costs’for any new reg-
ulatory action raises a different aspect of ‘dialogue’. In preparing their assessments
civil servants are required to consult firms and other organisations which are likely
to be affected — that is, their decision process is constrained, and advance in con-
stitutionalism (in our non-legal definition), while the fruit of such consultation
brings it within the ambit of the ‘proceduralisation hypothesis’ in that specific way
described in the Draft Phase 1 Report, p. 4, as ‘insertion and reinsertion of the con-
text into the elaboration and application’of rules:
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tion linked to the participation of plural actors’.
Now in one sense there is nothing new for the British administrator in this
practice. When Dunsire was a UK civil servant 40 years ago, it had long been stan-
dard practice (required by statute in many instances, such as the 1946 Road Traffic
Act and the 1948 Merchant Shipping Act) to consult the affected parties in the
preparation of any new regulations: relevant industry associations, bodies repre-
sentative of manufacturers,of wholesalers,of retailers,of users,scientific and profes-
sional experts, other government departments, and so on, as appropriate. The for-
mulation of the precise wording of a regulation would usually be in effect a joint
exercise,its technicalities not concealing a political negotiation among interests,of-
ten ‘laundered’ (or legitimated) by their being integrated into an official ‘advisory
body’. This process is well documented in two volumes of administrative case stud-
ies published by the Royal Institute of Public Administration in the 1960s (Willson,
1961;Rhodes,1965)4. The practice of encouraging the insertion of the ‘context’into
the elaboration of rules is thus of some antiquity.
Yet this practice was not true éclairage, or opening up of the governing
process to the light of day. On the contrary,it took place in an environment of offi-
cial secrecy behind closed doors, and widened ‘participation’ no further than was
pragmatically necessary. And when the practice reaches its apotheosis in ‘corpo-
ratism’, it may represent a denial of constitutionalism and the opposite of empow-
erment of the individual. The tripartite policy-making a closed shop of industrial-
ists,trade unions,and bureaucrats can be seen as a ‘conspiracy against the citizen’.
It has been noted by many commentators that,despite the antiquity of ‘con-
sultation’ practices in regulation elaboration and application, in many dimensions
the last two decades saw,respectively,a reduction in the amount of public consul-
tation by government ministers (Mrs Thatcher appointed not one Royal Commis-
sion during her terms of office); an increase in legislative change with insignificant
preparatory research or pilot testing (the ‘poll tax’being the prime example and the
1991 Dangerous Dogs Act often cited as another); and a dominance of ideological
drive over preference gathering. Nevertheless, running through Thatcherite think-
ing there was another thread,which might be seen as at least from the same loom
as proceduralisation: the ideas of:
1. ‘tenant power’ for public housing residents to ‘opt out’ of local authority man-
agement,and ‘parent power’in education (institution of parent governors for all
State schools, and a compulsory ballot of parents on the question of  ‘opting
out’from local authority control);
2. a ‘property-owning democracy’ (sale of municipal housing to tenants, and ma-
chinery for a housing estate to ‘opt out’of local authority control);
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in privatising State assets);
4. a ‘charter’ for ordinary members of trade unions, through a series of statutes
bringing about a notable shift from more-or-less unregulated internal rule
books to processual control of ballots for leadership elections, for strikes, for
contributions to political funds, and similar matters. Above all, this was the
thread from which John Major’s own ‘big idea’was woven;
5. the ‘Citizen’s Charter’.
It is our contention that none of these Conservative programmes are really
‘proceduralist’in motivation  (for example,the first two were squarely aimed at re-
ducing the power of Labour-dominated local authorities, and the fourth at re-
ducing the power of union leaders), though they may have largely unintended 
procedural effects. In the space available we shall discuss only the last-named: the
Citizen’s Charter,rebadged as ‘service first’by the Blair Labour Government.
One of the first moves of  Margaret Thatcher after she became Prime Minis-
ter in 1979 was to announce a programme of civil service reform,cutting its size by
a quarter,and aiming to change the culture at its top,from the ‘mandarin’values of
trusteeship for the public good, to the ‘managerialist’values of performance meas-
urement and efficiency. One of John Major’s first moves after succeeding Margaret
Thatcher as Prime Minister was to launch his own ‘reform of the civil service’ —
aimed this time not at the senior ranks but at the middle and lower levels of the
bureaucracy.
The government, said the document entitled The Citizen’s Charter (Cabinet
Office,1991),wanted to ‘change the relationship between the citizen and the State’,
and to ‘give more power to the citizen’. It therefore promised that every govern-
ment department and State agency would produce its own ‘charter’,laying down in
straightforward terms that everyone could understand exactly what standards of
service the citizen would be entitled to expect from its public officials, including
courtesy and helpfulness at all times, but more importantly, commitments to
prompt action, expressed in terms of a target response rate for correspondence, or
a target maximum waiting time or delivery time, and the like. Moreover, the ‘char-
ters’ would lay out what channels of complaint and redress of grievances were
available to the dissatisfied customer,and in some cases,what forms of compensa-
tion would be payable when published targets were  not met.
This initiative was presented as at once simple and revolutionary. Although
it was greeted in the British press with a degree of scepticism and even ridicule —
mere ‘window dressing’— it attracted a good deal of international attention,as the
most radical and far-reaching attempt to improve the quality of public services ever
launched by any government.
There was a certain amount of foot-dragging by some departments, and it
took nearly a year for even the earliest departmental charters to appear; but by
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each of its component nations separately, with titles indicating the clientele em-
braced, such as the Passenger’s Charter, the Taxpayer’s Charter, the Parent’s Charter,
the Patient’s Charter,and so on.
Under the Passenger’s Charter,the still-publicly-owned British Rail agreed,in-
ter alia, to pay cash compensation for the late arrival of trains in certain circum-
stances; the Taxpayer’s Charter undertook that Inland Revenue staff would be fair,
helpful and courteous at all times, and would keep taxpayers’private affairs strictly
confidential; the Parent’s Charter gave parents rights to vote for parent governors
of every State school and to stand for election, to be balloted on whether the
school should apply for self-governing (directly grant-aided) status,and to question
their children’s examination results; the Patient’s Charter guaranteed treatment
within one year for heart by-pass operations, and such rights as a choice of hospi-
tal meal, menus in the appropriate language, and meals to be ordered no more
than two days in advance. Each department further pledged to set quality stan-
dards of various kinds for its own staffs and to publish how well they lived up to
them.
There are for present purposes two key questions about all these develop-
ments. One concerns the impact that these citizen’s charters have had over the first
few years in improving the quality of British public services. The second is whether
this scheme fits the ‘proceduralisation hypothesis’.
To the first question there is no satisfactory answer. The original public scep-
ticism has not in any way modulated into enthusiasm. Surveys in 1993 and 1994
showed that although most people knew about the charters,only one in three had
actually seen one, one in ten had read one, and only one in 50 had used one to
make a complaint. This state of affairs was in spite of the fact that 20 million copies
of the Parent’s Charter were sent out to homes in the United Kingdom,and the Pa-
tient’s Charter was delivered to every household. A special ‘Charterline’ telephone
helpline service set up in May 1993, expecting a thousand calls a day, was closed
down in May 1994,having had roughly 25 inquiries per day at a cost of GBP 68 per
inquiry (Rich and Willman,1994). Since then press coverage of the charters,as such,
has dwindled to almost nothing.
But given this public indifference, has the quality of public service improved
noticeably as a result of the charters?  There is plenty of documentary evidence,but
no independent and objective audit of central departments’performance, as is pro-
vided for local authorities’ schemes by the Audit Commission. The Citizen’s Charter
Unit in the Cabinet Office makes an annual report on the working of the Charter
scheme, and awards a ‘Charter Mark’ to services or agencies  which have turned in
good performances. In The Citizen’s Charter — five years on (Cabinet Office, 1996),
marking the half-way point of its 10-year programme,the Prime Minister reported 42
national charters and more than 10 000 local charters,417 Charter Mark holders and
298 ‘highly commended’, and many examples of performance improvements. Each
organisation with a charter makes its own annual survey and report. In 1993, the
Citizen’s Charter Unit set up a Task Force to investigate particularly the adequacy of
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Good practice guide in 1995 (CCCTF,1995),and a main report,‘Putting things right’,in
the same year (Blackmore,1997).
But massive failures in quality of service that achieve widespread publicity
(waiting lists and bed shortages in the hospital service, inefficiency in the Child
Support Agency or the Passport Agency,etc.) tend to be pursued without reference
to whatever the relevant charter might have said. The greatest volume of com-
plaints is currently against the (privatised) railway system; the fact that it is not in
the public sector does not prevent the Transport Minister coming under daily fire
for the perceived shortcomings of Railtrack and the 25 separate service-running
franchises. Such high-profile controversies may create a climate of apparent dissat-
isfaction with public services that eclipses any more general improvement in qual-
ity of service by hundreds of agencies which do not hit the headlines. The mere
fact that civil servants are obliged to specify what standards of service quality they
aspire to in the coming year, and to measure their performance overtly against
these standards at the end of the accounting period, is a revolution of a sort in it-
self, and may have an impact upon bureaucratic culture more significant than
whatever changes in empirical performance are able to be announced.
Coming now to the second question, the relation of the Citizen’s Charter
idea to the ‘proceduralisation hypothesis’: in some ways, it certainly fits. It ‘under-
lines the new functions of the State,of opening up to the light,and empowerment’
(‘Note on presentation of Phase 2’, p. 1). It is designedly  ‘concerned with a recon-
sideration of the relationships among individuals (and) bureaucrats in democratic
States’ (Draft Phase 1 Report, p. 4), and could be seen as a move towards ‘the con-
cept of stake holding as modifying the traditional model of representative democ-
racy’ (Draft Phase 1 Report, p. 6). The concepts of ‘parent power’ and Patients first
(the title of the National Health Service charter),as principles of the delivery of pub-
lic education and health services, seem to uphold a ‘process of knowledge con-
struction by and with those whom that knowledge is deployed to serve’ (Draft
Phase 1 Report,p.4). It lays down clear rules for ‘Kantian universality’of process and
punishes departures from them.
In other ways, however, the Citizen’s Charter idea (at least up to its relaunch
by the Blair Government) is contrary to the spirit of the ‘proceduralisation hypothe-
sis’— in particular, to its ‘participation’value. As several of its academic critics have
pointed out (e.g.Chandler, 1996;Wilson, 1996), the use of the word ‘citizen’is a mis-
nomer: the charters are for the customer or consumer, not the citizen. The philos-
ophy is one of liberal individualism, not membership of a self-ruling community.
Hood, Peters and Wollman (1996), in a cross-country comparison dimensionalising
consumer ‘empowerment’as active/passive and direct/indirect, classify the UK Citi-
zen’s Charter as a passive/indirect form of public service consumerism.
The initiative in fact is of a piece with all the other moves to impose private
sector disciplines on the public sector. The original White Paper of 1991 identified
four main themes across the whole of the public sector (quality, choice, standards,
and value), to be achieved through privatisation, competition, contracting-out, per-
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of information,effective complaints procedures,tougher and more independent in-
spectorates, and better redress for the ‘citizen’(Cm 1599, 1991, pp. 4 and 5). That is
what the charters fit into.
The Citizen’s Charter scheme displays a degree of éclairage,of constitutional-
ism, of ‘empowerment’, but hardly any  ‘participation’. There was no democratic (or
even user) consultation about what standards would be appropriate in any service;
there is confusion between minimum,average,and ‘best practice’standards (Pollitt,
1994). The charter provisions substitute for an ‘exit’ reaction (Hirschman, 1970)
where that is not available to the public service consumer (paradigmatically, an in-
dividual and even discourseless proceeding, taking one’s business elsewhere). But
with few exceptions,they make no provision for the ‘citizen’role — essentially a col-
lective one, achieving ‘voice’ through representative organs. The only ‘democracy’
involved is the ‘democracy’of the market place or regulatory substitutes for it.
The main manifestation5 under recent Conservative Governments of the in-
stitutionalisation of ‘voice’through electoral machinery is ‘parent power’in schools.
As already noted,critics argue that the establishment of school boards of governors
was a political move against what were seen as Labour-dominated local education
authorities and teacher unions. There is, for instance, no formal representative or-
gan for prisoners,soldiers,pensioners and other benefit recipients,or taxpayers;and
existing quasi-representative ‘user councils’for patients, passengers, and utility con-
sumers were in fact gravely weakened under these governments. ‘Greater partici-
pation and inclusion’ in the definition of objectives is not one of the aims of the
‘charter’idea.
Other (non-governmental) evidence of ‘proceduralisation’in the United King-
dom more generally makes a rather mixed bag. The last two decades have seen a bur-
geoning of the kind of private research institution known  (somewhat absurdly) as
the ‘think-tank’. The current list of privately-funded bodies investigating public policy
questions and publishing reports might reach a score,of varying sizes and authorita-
tiveness. These are complemented by the spread of  ‘investigative journalism’,some
of it specialising in making fullest critical use of the statistical and other information
which government publishes but to which it does not necessarily draw attention
(‘privishing’,as it has been called by one of us (Hood,1983,p.27)).
In the sphere of local and regional government structural reform, a number
of non-governmental initiatives occurred, in the face of what often appeared as
Conservative hostility to subnational government as such. Most notable was the
‘Scottish Convention’, a grouping of representatives of local authorities and other
interests in Scotland (including the Labour Party and Liberal Democratic Party but
not the Conservatives or Scottish Nationalists), which met over several years to ar-
rive at an agreement on the general form of a Scottish Parliament and devolved
government — an agreement closely followed by the ensuing Labour Govern-
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agement,and for compulsory balloting for leadership,strikes and political funds by trade union members.ment’s devolution statute. A comparable initiative was the setting up in 1993 of the
Commission for Local Democracy,a purely non-governmental body of self-selected
individuals including journalists,academics,consultants,and former public servants,
which commissioned and produced a score of detailed research papers, and its
own main reports in July 1995 (CLD,1995).
On a smaller scale and a narrower focus (notably on crime and punishment),
there have been at least two ‘experimental’citizens’forums,exercises in ‘deliberative
democracy’organised by academics and TV companies. These have had as their os-
tensible social science purpose the measuring of difference in people’s responses
to a question, before and after an intense bombardment of facts on the question
and participation in argument about it. Less theoretically ambitious has been the
Labour Party’s reported reliance on consulting ‘focus groups’— discussions among
invited ‘experts’and non-experts on a given topic — before policy changes. Many
political parties, broadsheet newspapers and other types of organisation, now
mount private opinion polls to gauge reactions to events and proposals. All such
ventures may enhance openness,empowerment and participation in public policy-
making,to different degrees.
A similar series of ‘openings-up’ has been seen in the spheres of business,
law, and parliamentary practice. The Cadbury Committee on the Financial Aspects
of Corporate Governance (Cadbury,1992),set up by the Stock Exchange,suggested
inter alia that the posts of company chairman and company chief executive should
not be held by the same person, and that the remuneration of executive directors
and senior management should be fixed by non-executive (i.e. part-time) directors
— a clear attempt to improve constitutionalism. The apparently inexorable rise in
company top salaries, however, continues to cause concern, in spite of further re-
ports in 1995 and 1997. The result has been to open up the discussion of ‘corporate
governance’ and the public  responsibilities of private firms and their directors.
Opacity is at least reduced, though empowerment and participation are minimally
recognised,even in annual shareholders’meetings.
In the legal sphere, the then Lord Chancellor (Lord Mackay), the political
head of the judicial system, removed the ban on judges giving interviews to the
press or appearing on television, and the then Lord Chief Justice (the most senior
judge) announced that the judges themselves should decide whether and on what
conditions they should accede to any such requests. This decision has not led to
any great rush among judges to become TV pundits, but it has enabled some
judges, notably the two succeeding Lord Chief Justices, to speak for themselves in
respect of certain current disputes about the legislative plans of the Home Secre-
tary,informing the public and enhancing the constitutionalism of the legal system.
Finally, we might allude to the enormous increase in public enlightenment
on the processes of government in the United Kingdom which accompanied two
inquiries by High Court judges appointed by the then Prime Minister to investigate
(1) certain alleged malpractices in government departments in relation to the sup-
ply of armaments (Scott, 1995); and (2) matters concerning the non-Parliamentary
income and lobbying activities of MPs in the House of Commons (Nolan,1995),fol-
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turn for cash. This is not the place to expound these matters further, but each in-
quiry to some extent lifted a curtain, and revealed to everyone what actually went
on behind the scenes of public life; and thus contributed to éclairage and consti-
tutionalism,if also to the great embarrassment of officialdom.
These judgments upon the conformity of recent UK administrative reforms
to the core values of the proceduralisation hypothesis (as we see it) are summarised
in Table 1. From that table it can be seen at once that, although these UK reforms
have contributed very well to the first proceduralisation value, éclairage or in-
creased transparency of administration, and to only a slightly lesser extent to the
value we have called constitutionalism or universality of maxims, they have been
much less productive of empowerment, and even less of the ‘democratic’ value of
inclusion or participation.
Table 1: UK public-sector reforms and proceduralisation
Values of the proceduralisation hypothesis
UK administrative changes Éclairage Constitutionalism Empowerment Inclusion
Privatisation indirect indirect indirect — 
Contracting  out — — —  — 
Quango expansion minus minus minus minus
Growth of oversight yes yes some — 
Civil service changes —  —  —  — 
Executive agencies indirect —  —  — 
More open government yes some —  — 
MPs’register yes yes — — 
Public appointments Cssr yes yes —  — 
Security service changes —  yes —  — 
Market testing indirect —  —  — 
Performance measurement indirect —  —  — 
League table comparisons yes —  yes yes
Compliance cost assessment —  yes —  yes
‘Parent power’ yes yes yes yes
Citizen’s Charter yes yes yes — 
Think-tanks etc. yes —  —  — 
Scottish Convention yes yes —  yes
Citizens’Forums yes — yes yes
Cadbury & Greenbury Ctte yes yes —  — 
Judges & media yes yes —  — 
Scott & Nolan Cttees yes yes —  — 
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contemporary society
The ‘Note on presentation of Phase 2’suggests in its final paragraph that au-
thors might address themselves to administrative developments which, though far
removed from procedural solutions,bring an interesting response to the regulative
problems of public action. We would like to accept this invitation and discuss
briefly three alternative responses in recent literature to the spreading and deep-
ening of social complexity and pluralism. Those ideas are network theory,reflex-
ive law theory, and ideas that we have been developing under the term collibra-
tion theory.
Network theory is a product of the same social changes as have brought
forth ‘the procedural hypothesis’. It describes a ‘centreless’ system of endemic bar-
gaining between organisational agents who need to exchange resources (not only
money,but goods,land,information,skills,etc.) in order to survive and achieve their
(different) objectives (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). From such a perspective, an agent
of government is seen as only one player among many,with few cards to play that
are intrinsically different from those in other players’ hands. It is a card game in
which no actor holds ‘trumps’.
Reflexive law, associated principally with the name of Gunther Teubner
(1986), refers to ‘rules about rules’ — for example, a law prescribing internal proce-
dures for organisations of a specified type,which will govern the process of their in-
ternal decisions although leaving the substance of these decisions unregulated.
Reflexive law is closely bound up with Niklas Luhmann’s version of ‘autopoiesis the-
ory’ (1986), emphasising that each sphere of society, or social subsystem (the eco-
nomic system, the legal system, the educational system, and so on), has its own
unique institutions, processes, and codes, exhibiting ‘closure’ and ‘self-reference’ —
the impossibility of doing other than making its own decisions according to its
own lights without interference from outside. The political system is just another
subsystem.
For all such analyses, the idea of ‘governance’ presents a severe theoretic
problem, and central governance an even greater one. Yet any approach which
simply ignores or sets aside intersocietal, international, or interorganisational 
aggression and defence, or the facts of democratic electoral platforms and voting
majorities (with the consequent responsibilities and drives of national and other
central State authorities), is a very incomplete analysis. It can be argued (both at a
factual and normative level) that the State retains a responsibility not held by 
other social actors,for the defence of the society from external and internal threats
to its integrity,and has legitimate grounds for imposing other social goals for which
the governing group has gained an electoral mandate (Dunsire, 1996). If that is so,
State authorities need ‘trump cards’, means of governing, of controlling, of steering
and influencing behaviour within these ‘closed’social spheres — the economy, the
law,medicine,education,religion; even sport,entertainment and the arts.
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and the analyses of Luhmann and Teubner concerns the debate about greater par-
ticipation and the ‘democratic deficit’. At its narrowest, this can be expressed as:
how in a democratic polity is the State’s use of its ‘trump cards’to be kept under the
people’s control?
Collibration theory begins from an observation that — even in a complex
society of pluralist (‘centreless’) interaction — social systems tend to be remarkably
robust. They persist through perturbation. Social stability is more likely than insta-
bility. Societies are not constantly in danger of flying apart or imploding into still-
ness.
It is of the very definition of ‘society’that it is grounded in interdependencies
and mutualities,which are binding agents. One type of analysis,paradoxically,bases
social stability in the very strength of its mutual antagonisms6. The doctrines of po-
litical pluralism echo these analyses of societal stability. There,it is precisely the ab-
sence of an overarching principle,the equal value of all political goals,the rights of
all to form groups and to pursue their own interests in interaction with rivals, that
produces the ‘checks and balances’ which ensure political stability at system level
(Lindblom,1965).
A second observation is that a typical advanced society does indeed contain
a large number of organisations which come into existence precisely to ‘check and
balance’some other organisation,institutionalising a policy or interest conflict. Em-
ployers’ associations are set up because trade unions have been founded. Land-
lords organise because tenants do so; and so on. The identity, the raison d’être,o f
such organisations is not (in current jargon) self-referential, but only comprehensi-
ble when taken together with their counterpart; it is the pair-system which is
self-referential. If left alone,the mutual monitoring and corrective action within this
pair-system can render it self-regulating7.
The literature on ‘regulatory failure’, both American and European, after
showing that the ‘classic’ methods of central steering (legislation and the imposi-
tion of rules) work very imperfectly in the kind of complex and pluralist society we
are speaking of, canvasses alternative modes of central action, more compatible
with the ‘closure’and self-referentiality of modern social structures. Three types are
usually found: subsidy,partnership or co-production of steering; and reflexive law.
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7 The most conspicuous recognition of such self-regulation through conflict of interest is the economic the-
ory of market competition,based on the twin principles of voluntariness and rivalry. Trades between ‘will-
ing buyer and willing seller’, rivalry among buyers and among sellers, will ‘clear the market’in the most ef-
ficient way if left to their own devices. But the adversarial theory of legal process,as practised in common
law countries, rests on a similar philosophical foundation; as indeed does competitive international sport,
and the theory of scientific advance.Subsidy,through grant or other forms,is the most familiar device. At its sim-
plest, it merely ensures that an organisation whose output is valued by a State au-
thority is able to continue in operation. When a grant becomes overhung with
conditions and stipulations,it becomes subject to all the problems of regulation.
Co-production of steering means that State authorities bargain with the
target social realm (often through an ‘intermediary body’, an association of organi-
sations or a representative guild), so as to be able to harness its internal self-regu-
lating capacities to political ends (often designated ‘the public interest’) (Mayntz,
1983). Most of the regulation that takes place in the United States,say Bardach and
Kagan (1982, p. 217), is the work of inspectors, auditors and assessors employed
within private organisations, often policing standards drawn up by the industry as-
sociation or a guild of technical experts.
Reflexive law,as discussed by Teubner,involves measures such as the statu-
tory establishment of collective bargaining, and co-determination or ‘industrial
democracy’laws in Germany (Teubner, 1986). The American literature has many il-
lustrations of similar procedural regulation, involving imposition of minimum stan-
dards, requiring the appointment of specialist staff, criminalising certain behaviour,
and so on (see e.g.Bardach and Kagan,1982).
These three modes of intervention combat complexity and pluralism by not
attempting to make substantive internal decisions for social organisations, but by
harnessing for the purposes of the State, respectively, their outputs, their internal
control capacity,and their internal differentiation of tasks. Many of these ideas
are present in the proceduralisation hypothesis. But none attempts to harness the
mechanisms of social stability just discussed — the ‘checks and balances’ of their
mutual antagonisms. The fourth alternative mode of intervention we want to put
forward,under the term collibration,works by doing just that.
Collibration uses the idea that the stable state at which,left alone,a social sub-
system will arrive, can with care be disturbed, influenced, or manipulated without de-
stroying stability. The stability involved is not an equilibrium,and the process is not one of
homoeostasis (the return to a designed steady state),but rather what chaos theory calls
a ‘far from equilibrium’ situation, where there may be a very large number of possible
steady states,no configuration being exactly repeated (Gleick,1988; Laszlo,1986,p.154).
The principle of manipulating the conflict of others for one’s own benefit is
a very ancient one, explicit in traditional ‘Macchiavellian’ maxims of statecraft and
colonialism, like ‘divide and rule’. But it is in much more endemic use in current
processes of governance today than such pejorative precedents might suggest.
One less associated with connotations of the Obrigkeitstaat is the fertile notion of
‘handicap’used by governing bodies in sport. For instance,in horse-racing and golf,
some contestants are constrained (within the rules of the game) in the interests of
achieving a ‘fairer’(or more exciting) competition.
A few leading examples of governmental collibration can be given. In the
industrial relations field, the Social Democratic Government in Sweden in the early
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tirement and so on,to ‘tip the balance’in favour of employees. In the 1980s,exact-
ly the opposite handicapping took place in the United Kingdom,when the Conser-
vative Government passed a similar series of laws, restricting picketing, enjoining a
ballot before a strike,nullifying ‘closed shop’agreements,and so on,in the interests
of employers. Yet neither government wanted to end the traditional ‘two sides of
industry’bargaining system over wages and conditions of work — as happened in
other European countries at the same time, where governments imposed wage-
freezes or specified permitted increases; not so much intervening in collective bar-
gaining as destroying it altogether (Baglioni and Crouch,1990).
It is a use of the same stratagem of ‘loading the scales’to obtain a policy ob-
jective,when judicial outcomes in the courts are ‘tweaked’by altering rules such as
who has legal standing to bring an action, or where the burden of proof is placed.
But perhaps the most unremarked feature of this mode of steering by the State is
its ubiquity in the economic subsystem.
It has been well accepted since Adam Smith that,despite strong ideological
defences against ‘government interference’,any real market is embedded in law and
politics one way and another. State authorities ensure the keeping of contracts,
provide good coinage, legislate against monopoly, compensate for externalities,
and so on. The State can also become a participant in the market, using its large
purchasing power to drive down a price, selling foreign currency to prop up its
own,exerting labour market leverage as a large employer,etc.
But State authorities habitually act in the market-place in many ways which
are neither ‘regulating’nor ‘participating’in these senses. Large areas of macroeco-
nomic operations summed up as ‘Keynesian’ (including demand-management
through public spending,pump-priming by supplying cheap factory premises,pro-
viding or subsidising industrial or technical training, and influencing financial mar-
kets by altering central bank interest rates), are actions to avert an undesired out-
come of a ‘free’ market and steer it towards a desired outcome: in the sporting
metaphors,not so much ‘levelling the playing field’as ‘moving the goalposts’.
These are all interventions towards ‘economic’ends; but State authorities al-
so routinely use the potent market mechanism to further non-economic policies.
There are three notable types of such action: using the taxing power as a pro-
gramme tool;loan guarantees;and the provision of  ‘remedial information’.
Taxation of commodities and services not to raise revenue but to alter costs
(and so prices) differentially, and affect consumption patterns, is almost as old as
markets. High taxes on tobacco and alcohol, lower taxes on diesel fuel than on
petrol, a carbon tax for environmental ends — these are all social engineering via
the market-place.
A loan guarantee is, likewise, a State authority putting its thumb on the
scales of a private transaction in the money market, to make balance what other-
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wise probably would not — the banker’s criterion of loan-worthiness and the ap-
plicant’s financial standing.
Remedial information is State action to redress an asymmetry of informa-
tion between buyer and seller. It appears in the food industry in compulsory la-
belling of many kinds, in the money market in mandatory expression of interest
rates in a standard form,in the obligatory display of bar prices in a hotel,and so on.
The ubiquitous taxi meter represents mandatory disclosure of remedial informa-
tion. A Freedom of Information Act is an example of remedial information that the
legislature imposes on the executive8.
It may be clear that there is a common factor in all these idiomatic expres-
sions that are the metaphors of this surprisingly universal stratagem of social inter-
vention by State authorities: divide and rule, loading the scales, thumb on the
scales,rigging the market,tweaking the rules,levelling the playing-field,moving the
goal-posts, and so on. All signify an intervention to manipulate what would other-
wise stabilise on one configuration (‘find its own level’), so that it stabilises on an-
other,more desirable one. Yet there does not seem to be any generic term for this
mode of government action. We therefore invented co-libration, or collibration.
When weights placed in one pan of a letter balance begin to equal the weight of a
letter in the other,the scales librate,oscillating gently around the horizontal. Co-li-
bration means taking a hand in this, introducing a compensator into the field so
that it arrives at a desired steady state.
Making comparisons between these four alternative perspectives on the re-
lations between individuals, organisations, bureaucrats and politicians — network
theory, reflexive law theory, collibration theory, and the proceduralisation hypothe-
sis — is  no simple task,and especially where (as here) the characterisation of each
perspective is more of a caricature,so skeletal are the outlines. All of the four theo-
ries, considered as descriptions, are attempts to make sense of contemporary soci-
eties like the EU Member States, the United States and other advanced countries.
Each focuses on the complexity of their problems and internal relationships;the rel-
ative lack,in any of them,of a single dominating ideology or source of social legiti-
macy; and the wide distribution of social power. All of them had their genesis in
the consciousness of ‘government failure’ (see analyses of ‘market failure’ in eco-
nomics), which, however, turned out to mean the inability of only one of the ‘tools
of government’(Hood,1983) available to the State;namely,the use of law and legal
regulation,to produce the results desired9.
Where the four perspectives begin to differ, or specialise, is in the degree to
which they focus on two aspects of the problems of governance. One is the ac-
8 Away from the ‘market’, in the field of party politics, the art of the political ‘dirty trick’is, similarly, to rig the
adversarial electoral machinery in favour of one side,by gerrymandering constituency boundaries,by sup-
plying ‘pork barrel’expenditures, and so on, down to stuffing ballot boxes. At more elevated levels, a trick
on the scale of the ‘political business cycle’(Nordhaus,1975),even a declaration of war for domestic politi-
cal advantage,is far from unknown.
9 This ‘regulatory crisis’was being noted and analysed in the United Statesas long ago as the 1970s (Stigler,
1971; Horowitz, 1977; Nonet and Selznick, 1978; Savas, 1977), as was the necessity of getting private insti-
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knowledgement of continuing responsibilities for central State authorities of some
kind even in a highly-pluralistic society. The other is attention to the growing and
deepening ‘democratic deficit’— not only the perceived impotence of parliaments
and representative institutions in controlling the executive arms of the State, let
alone the rest of society, but a much more significant lacuna in administrative ra-
tionality: the purely instrumental folly in a complex society of excluding the po-
tentially crucial knowledge and experience of ‘end users’,and those affected by gov-
ernmental and other decisions, from participation in the processes of arriving at
these decisions,and of putting them into practice.
For the first of these two problems,proceduralisation theory and collibration
theory seem to us to be more successful than network theory and reflexive law in
encompassing the continuing need for State authorities with effective means of
carrying out the will of the people. For the second, the integration of the knowl-
edge and preferences of all ‘stakeholders’ into the processes of policy-making and
implementation,the proceduralisation hypothesis,it seems to us,is superior to both
network theory and reflexive law, and even to collibration theory. The latter, how-
ever, is the only one to include the harnessing of existing social stabilising mecha-
nisms in its analysis of alternative solutions to ‘regulatory failure’. Table 2 summaris-
es this evaluation of the four theories.
Table 2: Comparison of four theories of public action
Capacity of theory Types of theory
Network Reflexive  Procedural- Collibration
theory law theory isation
Recognises contemporary  yes yes yes yes
social complexity
Recognises contemporary  yes yes yes yes
societal pluralism
Recognises ‘regulatory failure’ yes yes yes yes
Harnesses social actors’ yes yes yes yes
internal control processes
Recognises State’s continuing  yes yes
responsibilities
Recognises the ‘democratic  yes
deficit’
Recognises societal stabilising  yes
mechanisms
Harnesses societal stabilising  yes
mechanismsConclusion
A number of the administrative developments in the United Kingdom over
the two decades up to 1996, when this paper was originally written, appear to be
compatible with the proceduralisation hypothesis; and a number of developments
under the subsequent Blair Labour Government also appear to fit that hypothesis.
That applies particularly to those changes which form the mirror-image of ‘man-
agerialisation’, namely, the expansion of grievance adjudication systems, the so-
called ‘audit explosion’ (Power 1994, 1997), and the more elaborate ‘contractorisa-
tion’of many aspects of public services (even when they are not outsourced). But
moves towards éclairage and ‘constitutionalism’ seem rather easier to demonstrate
than empowerment and inclusion. This may well be partly because interpreters dif-
fer sharply as to who has been empowered against whom by these changes. And
indeed it could be argued that any general social empowerment (if such a thing is
possible) is an unintentional by-product of political tactics intended to achieve rel-
atively narrow partisan ends.
However,it is also possible to interpret many of these changes as manifesta-
tions of ‘collibration’, namely the deliberate steering of social systems by State 
authorities selectively inhibiting antagonistic forces that are more or less formal
role-antonyms. Collibration is an empirical generalisation intended to identify
mechanisms of governance,at all levels of government from EU to regional and lo-
cal level,which are by no means new,but not previously recognised to form a class
of effective intervention in complex plural societies. While collibration and proce-
duralisation may in many cases overlap, they need not always do so. That is, while
proceduralisation may often be adopted in the service of collibration, the reverse
does not necessarily apply. Indeed,some instances of administrative change,in the
United Kingdom at least, seem to have entailed ‘deproceduralisation’ (for example,
some of the shifts from elected local authority to quango delivery of services or,ac-
cording to Foster (1996), breakdown of once-established civil service conventions
for record-keeping and policy clarity).But it is hard to find a case of ‘decollibration’.
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the promises of evaluation
Bernard Perret
Introduction
The aim of this paper is not to take stock of the French system of interminis-
terial evaluation of public policies,but to use experience there — and,in particular,
the methodological approach of the Scientific Evaluation Council — to highlight
some of the most promising implications of the concept of evaluation, in line with
the hypotheses on the proceduralisation of collective action put forward by the
leaders of this seminar. After decades of evolution of the concept, evaluation has
come to be seen as a new way of looking at the rationalisation of collective ac-
tion, broadening the traditional view of the relationship between the social sci-
ences and political/administrative practice.
Evolution of ideas on the method 
and social uses of evaluation
Programme evaluation emerged in the United States before the Second
World War and really took off in North America and certain European countries
from the 1960s onwards. It was originally seen as a technique for rationalising pub-
lic decision-making that was almost exclusively based on the use of quantitative
methods. This positivist, instrumental approach gradually turned out to be inade-
quate both in theory and in practice, and, while it has not been completely re-
jected, it has now broadly given way to other approaches, which vary greatly but
share the characteristic of taking seriously the many types of knowledge and the
many types of interaction between knowledge and action.
The paradigm of medical ‘treatment’
From an epistemological point of view,evaluation,particularly the evaluation
of social programmes, was originally based on the model of protocols used to
measure the effectiveness of experimental medical treatments. This approach re-
flected the behaviourism which pervades the social sciences in the United States,
particularly in the fields of psychology and education1. American writers on evalu-
1 With regard to the disciplines of origin of the evaluators T.D.Cook describes the American situation as fol-
lows (addressing the first world conference on evaluation, in November 1995 in Vancouver):‘Within the ation often use the term ‘treatment’to refer to all the measures to which the social
‘targets’ of a policy are subject: ‘In the 1960s, ... the key evaluation issue was the
black-box task of generating unbiased, precise estimates of the causal conse-
quences of programmes or their major constituent parts. The preferred analytic de-
signs for doing this were experimental, and the preferred analytic techniques were
quantitative’2.
The rational decision-maker model
Similarly,the advocates of evaluation saw it as a way of applying rational sci-
entific thought to public decision-making: ‘Twenty years ago, many evaluators
naively anticipated that their results would be routinely used as the central input
into policy decisions. The advocacy of experimentation at that time fed into this
naiveté because the decision logic underlying experimentation seems to mirror the
rational actor model from public policy. In this model, a problem or need is first
clearly defined (in experiments, the analogue involves specifying outcome criteria);
alternatives for solving the problem are determined and implemented (the various
treatments are put in place); the outcome criteria are then monitored (in experi-
ments,data are collected);and finally a decision is made from the data about which
alternative is best for solving the problem (a statistical test is conducted to assess
which treatments are more effective)’3.
This ideology culminated in Donald Campbell’s work on the ‘experimenting
society’, a virtuous utopia of a society in which the quest for truth through experi-
mentation would be made central to socio-political regulation.
Towards a more complex vision of the method 
and purposes of evaluation
Since the 1970s,we have been witnessing a dual challenge to evaluation,on
both the epistemological and political fronts. In terms of epistemology, a critique
has emerged of the positivist presuppositions which inspired experimental proto-
cols and modelling. In most real social situations,it is very difficult to rigorously es-
tablish the existence of causal links,and even more difficult to measure their extent.
Moreover, the re-examination of the social sciences’ claims to objectivity in the
fields to which evaluation applies is not confined to questions of extent and causal-
ity: researchers today are more aware of the impossibility of adopting a totally ob-
100 Bernard Perret
United States, members of the American Evaluation Association (AEA) are mostly trained in psychology
and education and evaluate programmes with a corresponding disciplinary flavour. Economist and politi-
cal science evaluators tend to be in the Association for Public Policy and Management (APPAM) and con-
centrate on policies more than programmes. Most evaluators in the American Public Health Association
(APHA) examine policies and programmes designed to improve physical  health. This disciplinary fraction-
alisation is not necessary,and we need to build more bridges’.
2 Ibid.
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jective standpoint, independent of the subjective perception of those affected, to
describe the result of actions whose purpose is to serve the interests or change the
living conditions of certain categories of the population. One of the crucial points,
as Chen notes, is that there are many ways of defining the result of a policy:‘The
outcome criteria finally selected in an evaluation are only a limited set of a large
pool of potential outcomes that might be affected by the programme’4.
On the political front, evaluators have had to face the fact that little direct
use is made of the results of evaluations. This is disturbing but not surprising. It is
not enough for information to be intrinsically relevant to a problem for it to be
used,because,as Jean Leca notes,‘multiple,changing interests introduce new stan-
dards for action without warning: from these the “political decision-maker” has a
much better and more effective knowledge than the knowledge specialists’5.
Faced with these practical interests (the political influence of a lobby, the practical
impossibility of undertaking reform immediately) or ideological interests, the ab-
stract concern for truth has little weight,particularly since the decision-makers can-
not spare much time for gathering information: in a world where attention is
among the rarest of major resources,information may be a costly luxury because it
may deflect our attention from what is important to what is not. We cannot afford
to process an item of information simply because it is there6.
This crisis has prompted two developments. First, it has led to a reassertion
of ‘qualitative’methods,based on the use of verbal material or texts,on the ‘natura-
listic’ observation of social reality (monographs, ethnosociology), or on the devel-
opment of group work techniques (group of experts or actors) — methods which,
it was seen, were likely to provide information that was often more directly useful
for the action than quantitative methods:‘Qualitative methods are very useful for
making explicit the theory behind a programme; for understanding the context in
which a programme operates;for describing what is actually implemented in a pro-
gramme; for assessing the correspondence between what the programme theory
promised and what is actually implemented;for helping to elucidate the processes
that might have brought about programme effects; for identifying some likely un-
intended consequences of the programme;for learning how to get the programme
results used;or for synthesising the wisdom learned about a programme or a set of
programmes with similar characteristics; or even for ‘answer(ing) the same ques-
tions about generalisation and descriptive causal relationships to which quantita-
tive methods are primarily addressed’ 7.However, there is no denying the power of
objectivisation of figures, which have the merit, among others, lending themselves
better to comparison (in time and space) and to aggregation (putting partial find-
ings together). It is now broadly accepted that evaluation requires the combined
use of the two types of information.
4 Theory driven evaluation,London:SAGE, 1991, p.42.
5 Jean Leca, ‘Le rôle de la connaissance dans la modernisation de l’Etat’, Revue française d’administration
publique No 66,April to June 1993, p.187.
6 Herbert Simon.
7 T.D.Cook,conference cited.Having adopted a more qualitative orientation, evaluation has also become
more participatory, since cooperation by the different stakeholders in the policy
evaluated, and, in particular, actors on the ground, is a precondition for the mobili-
sation of the practical knowledge that they possess.
A second development has consisted of a more complex view of the social
impact of evaluation gradually being imposed. Without denying the practical use
of evaluation, it became apparent that its main use in practice was to provide en-
lightenment of the decision-making context. And, furthermore, it started to be-
come clear that decision-makers are not the only users of evaluation:knowledge of
the way in which a public action is implemented and the results it achieves is a
useful resource for all actors. Hence the stress laid on the ‘educational’dimension
of evaluation (evaluation as a process of training and increasing involvement), and,
more recently,on the fact that evaluation may serve to increase the autonomy and
capacity for action of a group of people (described by D. Fetterman as empower-
ment evaluation).
The ‘doctrine’of the Scientific Evaluation Council:
from the ‘tool method’to the ‘process method’ 8
A pluralistic view of the purposes of evaluation
This coexistence of purposes and increasingly diversified methodological
references has, inevitably, led to complex disputes about theory. In its annual re-
ports on the development of evaluation practices, the Scientific Evaluation Council
has always challenged the entrenched opposition between ‘managerial’ and ‘dem-
ocratic’evaluation. The development of evaluation has responded to a set of close-
ly interwoven problems: budgetary difficulties, crisis of legitimacy of public action,
complexity of policies and interpenetration of levels of government,dysfunction in
public services, etc. Evaluation may be seen as having a variety of purposes, which
may vary in importance, depending on the case, but which are in no way incom-
patible:
(a) An ‘ethical’purpose: to give an account to politicians and the public of the way
in which a policy has been implemented and the results it has obtained. This di-
mension covers the improvement in the accountability of systems of public ac-
tion,the informative purpose and the ‘democratic’purpose of the evaluation.
(b) An educational purpose:to contribute to training and to increasing the involve-
ment of public officials and their partners by helping them to understand the
process in which they are participating and to adopt its objectives.
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8 Concepts taken from Setbon, M. and Lascoumes, P., L’évaluation pluraliste des politiques publiques, Groupe 
d’analyse des politiques publiques,research funded by the Commission for the National Plan,1996.(c) A management purpose: to distribute human and financial resources more ra-
tionally between different actions and improve the management of the servic-
es responsible for implementing them.
(d) A decision-making purpose: to prepare the decisions involved in running,
adopting or adjusting a policy.’9
It should be added that, in the current context of collective action, one of
the main purposes served by evaluation is to catalyse cooperation between au-
tonomous public actors involved in the same action (it has been called the ‘lan-
guage of partnership’).
Mobilising all the relevant information and the
contributions of all the different disciplines
The Scientific Council has likewise stressed the multi-disciplinary nature of
evaluation,and the complementarity of the quantitative and qualitative methods. Tak-
ing the utility criterion into account requires the mobilisation of all the relevant cogni-
tive resources,without taking account of divisions between disciplines:‘unlike scien-
tific research carried out within the framework of a specific discipline,which gives pri-
ority to a limited number of arguments, evaluation tries to use all “heuristics”and to
adapt to the real conditions in which the deliberation and decision take place. Like any
discussion or reflection carried out for practical purposes,evaluation does not auto-
matically exclude any element of information concerning its subject,whatever its na-
ture (quantitative or qualitative) and origin,as long as it appears to be relevant’10.
In practice, this means that evaluation uses a wide variety of information
sources, either exploiting existing data or documents (previous studies, administra-
tive data,legal texts,press cuttings),or carrying out ad hoc surveys or investigations
to gather new data (statistical surveys by questionnaire,monitoring a panel of ben-
eficiaries of a measure,in-depth interviews,monographs,hearings,groups of actors
or experts).
New methodological issues
This increasing complexity of the concept of evaluation can be seen in the
emergence of new methodological issues. Originally, questions of method posed
by evaluation were no different from those habitually encountered in the collec-
tion,processing and interpretation of information in the various social sciences (ob-
server neutrality,validity of experimental protocols,problems of modelling and sta-
tistical inference).
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9 Petit guide de l’évaluation,La Documentation française,1996.
10 Ibid.Once the diversity of models integrating knowledge into the operation of
systems of action and decision-making is taken into account, the methodological
and ethical principles applicable to the political and organisational management of
evaluation take on greater importance. In addition to the social science ‘toolbox’,
evaluation must therefore form its own corpus of methodological principles,based
on both epistemological and socio-organisational — even political — principles.
Of course this does not mean abandoning the ideal of a reliable, objective knowl-
edge of social reality,but this is not enough to define the aims and requirements of
evaluation. In practice,the method responds to several challenges.
First of all, the variety of methods must be organised. In order to come to
clear conclusions, it is not enough to simply juxtapose information of different
kinds: on the contrary, there is a risk of confusion. The conditions in which hetero-
geneous data and arguments are compared and integrated therefore constitute a
new field of methodological development.
Secondly, the extension of the debate on the social use of evaluation has
brought to light the question of the conditions in which the results are usable:
it is not enough for an item of information to be scientifically accurate for it to be
considered credible,relevant and useful by its users. In practice,therefore,great im-
portance is laid on (i) the quest for consensus (or, more precisely, working out
a politically and socially legitimate standpoint) on the definition of the sub-
ject and wording of the questions which the evaluation must answer, (ii) the
credibility of the information used and, (iii) the legitimacy of the interpreta-
tions and value judgments which underlie the conclusions, recommendations
and proposals.
Solving these problems is not a matter of proven technical expertise: it re-
quires a specific methodological construct for each evaluation operation and
makes the quality and productivity of the reports drawn up between the different
stakeholders crucial. At the very most agreement can be reached on the list and
the order of the questions which must be addressed during the preparatory work
before a study is launched (see Annex,the main stages in drawing up an evaluation
project).
Institutionalisation,an alternative to self-regulation 
of a professional milieu?
One of the difficulties of formulating the regulatory principles of the
‘method-process’ in a uniform fashion is the diversity of the social situations to
which evaluation applies. Furthermore, the degree of institutionalisation of the
evaluation procedures is a key variable. Basically, a North American tendency to
make the professional evaluator the guarantor of a specific evaluation ethic can be
contrasted with a more European tendency to institutionalise the procedures. In
the American context, the evolution of the concept of evaluation has been inter-
preted in disciplinary and professional terms: evaluators increasingly consider
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generation’ evaluators according to Guba and Lincoln). It is in this sense that T. D.
Cook’s remark must be understood that ‘the interest in method is one source of po-
tential unity in a field where evaluators work in different substantive areas and have
been trained in many different disciplines’.
It is particularly significant that handbooks for evaluators specifically address
ethical questions:‘Because of the acknowledged political nature of the evaluation
process and the political climate in which it is conducted and used,it is imperative
that you, as the evaluator, examine the circumstances of every evaluation situation
and decide whether conforming to the press of the political context will violate
your own ethics’11. Likewise,the definition of quality criteria specific to evaluation
is understood as an internal matter for the evaluator’s profession.
In the European context, the development of evaluation often has a more
institutional character. There is more talk about evaluation of ‘public policies’ (not
just programmes), and initiatives by the public authorities are playing a decisive
role in the emergence of a range of evaluation practices distinct from both audit-
ing and other study and research practices. The distinction between evaluation re-
search on the one hand and institutional evaluation that is integrated into the op-
eration of political/administrative systems on the other is more marked in Europe
than in the United States. At the recent world conference on evaluation in Vancou-
ver,it was also noted that European researchers gave more attention to political in-
fluence on the process and uses of evaluation than their American colleagues. The
situation in France,with the role of institutionalised referee conferred on the Scien-
tific Evaluation Council,is typical of this approach.
The Scientific Council,institutional guarantor of the
autonomy of the process and the suitability of the methods
for evaluation’s social purposes
In view of the powers conferred on it12, the Council considered that its role
was to be the guarantor of the political usefulness,the scientific rigour and the ethics
of evaluation. In the words of Jean Leca,president of the Scientific Evaluation Coun-
cil,evaluation of a policy is within the policy (it constitutes,in a way,an extension or
enlargement of the system of action which that policy sets up),which does not mean
that it must be used or manipulated by the policy. The paradox of evaluation is that it
is a useful policy resource only if it is accepted that it is partially detached from the
policy in order for it to have its own credibility. The concept of an ‘evaluation auton-
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ples of evaluation.omy zone’13is particularly important:it means that,by agreeing to play the game of
evaluation,politicians (and any other actors that may be involved in the decision to
evaluate) take the risk of putting their practical knowledge,their ideological concep-
tions and their ‘theories of action’to the test,in a collective process to which they are
party but which they do not totally control. In other words,they must pay the price
for the credible information and shared references which the evaluation aims to put
together. In practical terms,this idea of an ‘autonomy zone’is implemented by nego-
tiating a draft evaluation which formalises the agreement of the stakeholders in the
evaluation on a subject,an approach and a cognitive strategy,and by setting up,for
each evaluation, an evaluation committee, which is a steering committee with
broadened and formalised functions (see annex).
The aim of the two opinions given by the Scientific Evaluation Council men-
tioned in the annex is to ensure that this conception of evaluation is adhered to. At
the stage of the first opinion (quality of the draft evaluation),the purpose is:
— to encourage the political sponsors of the evaluation to explain their concerns,
their ‘preliminary diagnosis’of the policy to be evaluated and what they expect
from the evaluation;
— to help them to translate this general issue into questions which make sense for
the social sciences;
— to orient the evaluation committee towards a choice of methods which are re-
alistic and suited to these questions, in order to produce cogent arguments for
the readers of the evaluation report (this means,in practice,that they should be
based on several complementary types of argument: descriptive arguments,
logical or theoretical arguments,opinion-based arguments);
— to ensure that the composition of the evaluation committee reflects the main
relevant points of view, allows effective steering of the study programme and
does not produce any malfunctions which could block the process (which, in
practice,is not that simple).
The second opinion, on the quality of the evaluation report, has the dual
purpose of:
— validating the results of the evaluation. There is no question of the Scientific
Council expressing an opinion on the conclusions of the evaluation, let alone
the relevance of the recommendations made by the evaluation committee; it
should merely ‘assess both the degree of coherence between the evaluation re-
port and the various studies carried out to this end,and the logical link between
the recommendations and the findings and analyses of the report as a whole.
The primary aim is to provide decision-makers with an external guarantee of
the scientific value of the arguments put forward by the committee’14.
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These opinions are based on a set of quality criteria similar to those sug-
gested by Chen in his book Theory-driven evaluation (utility-relevance,reliability,ob-
jectivity,possibility of generalising the results,transparency).
To ensure ‘transparency’ in the evaluations, the Scientific Council lays great
importance on the formal rigour of the arguments put forward in the evaluation re-
ports:‘an effort should be made in evaluation reports to rigorously articulate the
judgments and the facts: ideally, all normative statements should be backed up by
reasoned arguments,themselves based on duly documented observations .... Eval-
uation reports should comprise methodological sections,descriptions,reminders of
the conclusions of previous reports, analyses based on new information, and, final-
ly,interpretations by the evaluation committee. These various types of text must be
distinguished as far as possible. In particular, imputations of cause and effect (X
public action produces Y individual effect) and normative judgments must be
clearly identified as such and backed up with reference to the studies carried out as
part of the evaluation. The most commonly found flaw is the inclusion of unsup-
ported value judgments in a descriptive exposition’ 15.
This requirement of formal rigour is designed to warn readers of an evalua-
tion report against an erroneous interpretation of its conclusions by drawing their
attention to the gaps and uncertainties which limit its scope. It also attempts to
satisfy didactic and even rhetorical concerns:the evaluation report must be a rigor-
ous,readable and cogent communication tool.
Evaluation and procedural rationality:challenging 
the two rationalities of action and social knowledge
Although the Scientific Council has never conceptualised its doctrine in
these terms, it can be described as ‘procedural’, in the sense that it attempts to or-
ganise and systematise in the form of procedures the complex processes of recip-
rocal adjustment between the work of social science researchers and the practical
knowledge of actors and decision-makers.
In the traditional view,there is an absolute dichotomy between scientific ra-
tionality and the specific rationality of the way in which systems of collective action
work:the constitution of a scientific knowledge of social reality and the instrumen-
tal action within social systems are governed by fundamentally differing practices,
with no possibility of interaction. Evaluation, in contrast, has to deal with the para-
doxical proximity of these two systems of logic in the sense that it tries to organise
the interaction between them: researchers and actors share the duty to constantly
carry out more or less arbitrary tasks of describing reality, making judgments, con-
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as a normative activity,and any complex social activity as an activity which includes
theoretical aspects. The result is a double deconstruction of the rationalities of
public action and of social knowledge.
A critical unveiling of the theoretical approaches and
normative sets of criteria which underlie public policy
Any public policy or action is based on a ‘theory of action’,a set of representa-
tions and ideas (often implicit) on which its initiators and/or actors predicate its op-
erating mechanisms and cause-and-effect relations between the measures taken
and their expected social impact. One of the advantages of evaluation is that it re-
quires the objectivisation of this theory (since it involves formalising its objectives
and setting out an initial schema of the operating mechanisms) and therefore en-
ables it to be put to the test. One of the leitmotifs that run through the evaluation re-
ports is that key decision-makers’theories of action are over-simplistic and that they
need to be refined and reformulated in the light of real social processes. Apart from
the fact that they are almost always contradictory (it is not in politicians’interest to
make their choices between different objectives too clear),theories of action gener-
ally do not know how capable the different protagonists of the ‘system of action’are
of superimposing their own rationality on that of the ‘official’objectives of a policy. If
carried out properly, evaluation provides political and administrative leaders with a
more realistic vision of the ‘co-production’of public policies,and leads them to give
greater attention to the conditions in which they are implemented (including,prima-
rily,informing and training the actors). In other words,evaluation contests the ‘ballis-
tic’vision of the way that public decisions impact on society,and highlights the con-
stant temptation for the key actor to underestimate the autonomy of the other actors
and the various unintended effects of his or her action on society.
It should be noted that the aim of this deconstruction is not to delegitimate
the actors’rationality,let alone replace it with an all-embracing substantive rational-
ity,such as economic rationality,which is likely to relativise the specific objectives of
the various public policies. Unlike the public economy,which attempts to translate
the value of public action into monetary terms (the concept of value for money),for
example by simulating the existence of a market in fields where it should not nor-
mally play any role16,the evaluation of public policies implicitly endorses the hetero-
geneity and the vagueness of this value. The criteria against which the results of the
policy which have been observed are to be compared are still built on goals which
have been democratically set for it,even if these almost always need to be interpreted
and updated in line with current priorities. It is true that these results must be
weighed up against the cost of the policy,but no conclusive consequence can auto-
matically be deduced from this comparison. The question of value thus changes from
a measure to a value judgment:in general there is no one single answer that can be
given, but one can be given in reference to a given social and political context, in
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aims regarding the costs and effects of this policy. The evaluation assessment must
not,however,be confused with a political assessment,which belongs to the voters;in
a way it constitutes a sui generistype of social construction of the value of a public ac-
tion which is based on both science and common sense.
A procedural approach to the regulation of scientific work
For its part,any social knowledge that is supposedly useful for the action can
be suspected of being based on the arbitrary choices and conventions needed to
identify a line of enquiry, determine the objectives of research, build information
systems and describe observations. The academic structuring of different scientific
disciplines imposes a de facto regulation on this normative activity by researchers
by instituting scientifically legitimate modes of questioning. But this form of
regulation of scientific activity has the disadvantage of making interdisciplinarity
difficult (think how difficult it would be to construct a dialogue between the eco-
nomic, sociological, historical and anthropological approaches to the problem of
employment). Evaluation could, in theory, have the effect of replacing this type of
regulation by discipline with an institutional regulation of how research topics are
established, perhaps giving the multidisciplinary approach to certain complex
problems a better chance:‘In evaluation,the position of researchers is not the same
as it is in the usual research context. It is important that they should be able to find
the right balance between the interpretation grids specific to their discipline and
the interpretations most likely to be discussed by the evaluation committee within
the framework of its own subject area’17.
Similarly, evaluation shifts and enriches the debate about the validation of
knowledge. The rigorous approach cannot hope to produce a single truth about
social reality, but ‘merely’a legitimate, credible and useful representation of this re-
ality. The ‘constructivist’conception of objectivity developed in certain texts by the
Scientific Evaluation Council is particularly significant in this respect:‘In the context
of experimentation,the word ‘protocol’refers to the aim of constructing a ‘social ex-
periment’analogous to a scientific experiment,i.e.by giving themselves the means
of rigorously controlling the influence of exogenous factors on the effects of the
policy or programme evaluated. By transposing the concept,we can talk of ‘proto-
col’ in the more general sense of organising the conditions in which the informa-
tion supporting the evaluation assessment is produced and interpreted. Just as in
the case of the experimental protocol, the conditions of validity of the knowledge
must be monitored. The objectivity in question is not the same thing as scientific
objectivity: it could be defined as the fulfilment of what is required to establish a
shared belief in a given social context. The pluralism of opinions and skills brought
to bear in the work of synthesising and interpreting the information is an essential
condition of the construction of objectivity in the sense it is given here’18.
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La Documentation française,1993, p.157.The risk nonetheless exists that the requirement of scientific rigour will dis-
solve in the quest for a consensus between the relevant actors. This is why the
quotation above must be supplemented and qualified by this other definition of
objectivity, given by the Petit guide de l’évaluation:‘objectivity is understood as the
fact that the results of the evaluation have not been influenced by the personal
preferences or institutional positions of those responsible for the evaluation (con-
sultants or members of the committee), or at least that these preferences have
been explained or checked to the extent that it can be supposed that another eval-
uation answering the same question and using the same methods would lead to
the same conclusions’.
In other words, the Council established a (theoretical?) distinction between
the desirable pluralism of opinions and skills on the one hand and the influence of
personal and institutional interests,which must be carefully monitored,on the oth-
er. In practice, the Council has frequently warned the evaluation committees
against their natural tendency to become places of negotiation between vested in-
terests. Discussion of interpretations must not be manipulated for strategic pur-
poses, but rather regulated twice over, first by the values common to the various
stakeholders of a policy,and second by the ‘standards’of validity specific to the var-
ious scientific disciplines used. The aim of the Council’s supervision is to check that
the summary report is written in line with this ethical approach to the treatment of
conflicts of interpretation, and that the methodological eclecticism of evaluation
does not lead to the confusion of styles of argument:‘unlike an ordinary discussion,
carried out without formal method, evaluation endeavours not to mix the different
types of argument,but rather to rank them,weight them and link each one to spe-
cific conclusions’(Petit guide de l’évaluation). The Council’s approach leads to a con-
ception of the forms of objectivity that is not only relativistic and pluralistic, but al-
so differentiated and prioritised.
Final observations
Is the conception that has just been developed at least partially validated by
the analysis of evaluation practices?  As noted in the introduction, this review, de-
liberately theoretical and forward-looking,is not a critical assessment of the modus
operandi of the institutional system set up in 1990. The experiment has also come
up against difficulties of various kinds which we will not analyse here,and it has re-
mained, if not marginal, at least too limited for it to be possible to draw definitive
conclusions from its results which, in any case, vary depending on whether the fo-
cus is on the quality of the evaluation reports or their actual impact. In spite of the
apparent weakness of these reports (confined, depending on the case, to a few
technical measures or a partial clarification/reformulation of the problem and the
objectives of the policy evaluated), the interest and potential usefulness of the
practical conclusions which could have been drawn from the evaluation reports
should not be underestimated. Without going further into this point, we can at
least make an assessment of sorts as a provisional hypothesis:evaluation has failed
as a technique for renewing the work of government,but it has proved its capacity
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searchers who have analysed the implementation of the first interministerial evalu-
ations and the social effects produced by them:‘The experiment shows a huge gap
between the expectations, depending on whether they are political or administra-
tive in origin, the resources mobilised, and the uses made of evaluation results.
While,in theory,evaluation of public policies should be a tool to make the effects of
public action democratically intelligible, the apparent consensus on this function
barely conceals a difference of opinion (or a misunderstanding) on its limits. It is
clear that while political actors do not see it as a solution to their problems,admin-
istrative players have a vague sense that it may be a means of renewal ... the use-
fulness of evaluation is more tangible and more profound at the administrative 
level: it is a means of clarifying problems, a broader feedback on atomised public
action, a place where isolated rationalities can be compared, even a means of 
embarking on an oft-called for, but rarely found, cooperation. Most administrators
concerned have a strong impression of learning and development that is generally
irreversible’19.
However,the lack of involvement of the political players (in spite of the num-
ber of official declarations in favour of developing evaluation), means that evalua-
tion cannot fully play its role in redefining public policies at government level: ‘eval-
uation is not currently a factor in reconstructing public policies, i.e. putting the
problem back on the public agenda. Currently,other ways of getting issues on the
agenda and developing public policies are the rule:social demands,interest groups
and pressure groups,crises,etc.’20.
If evaluation is to act as a lever to reform modes of government,it must first
become a factor in the balance of powers, in other words Parliament must make it
a means of shedding light on the democratic debate and a routine instrument to
help draft legislation. Politicians will get involved in evaluation when it has become
the stuff of a power relationship between the legislative and the executive, or, al-
ternatively, a place for developing and testing their action (it goes without saying
that the way in which the media use the results of evaluation may play a role in this
development). It is clear that, as things currently stand, political players are not
ready to play along with a practice which appears to restrict their liberty to act ‘po-
litically’, i.e. on the basis of the traditional mechanisms of aggregation of social de-
mand,expression of values and representation of interests. In this case they will al-
most always reduce evaluation to surveys or covert forms of control. However, it
can still be hoped that, though politicians are unlikely to participate, this will not
discourage administrative players from making use of evaluation.
The list of policies evaluated (see annex) illustrates the way in which evalua-
tion has been kept on the margins of mainstream politics and, at the same time,
been perceived as an instrument allowing new forms of political/administrative
regulation. These are complex policies involving a number of actors and simulta-
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neously pursuing many objectives, and there are even ‘thematic’ evaluations look-
ing at a set of heterogeneous public actions concerning a single problem (e.g.
combating poverty, protection of wetlands). In purely decision-making terms, it
would have been more effective to give priority to developing programme evalua-
tion within each ministerial department or, more ambitiously, to carry out evalua-
tions directly linked to immediate and important political issues (e.g. immigration,
monetary policy). On the positive side, evaluation does appear to have been used
as a means of clarifying complex but relatively uncontroversial questions, and of
getting round the obstacles within interministerial work. This is linked to the fact
that evaluation is developing rapidly at regional level within the framework of part-
nership policies involving several levels of public decision-making (State–Region
Planning Contracts, European programmes); this way of using evaluation is proba-
bly one of the more promising, in view of the increasing complexity of public ac-
tion systems.Annex
Some facts on the French system 
of evaluation of public policy
The 1990 system (to which this paper directly refers) will be presented first,
followed by the new system established by the decree of 18 November 1998.
A.The decree of 22 January 1990
Setting up an interministerial system for evaluating public policy was one of
the components of the policy for the renewal of government initiated by the Ro-
card Government at the end of the 1980s, the main thrusts of which were: a re-
vamped industrial relations policy; a policy for the development of responsibilities;
a requirement to evaluate public policies; and policy to improve accessibility and
service to the public. The decree of 22 January 1990 set up an Interministerial Eval-
uation Committee (Comité Interministériel de l’Evaluation — CIME), responsible, in
the words of the decree, for ‘coordinating government initiatives on the evaluation
of public policies’. As such, it had the right to choose evaluation projects which
would be eligible for the National Evaluation Development Fund (Fonds National
de Développement de l’Evaluation  — FNDE), also set up by the decree. Once the
result of the evaluations was known,it deliberated on the action to be taken. A Sci-
entific Evaluation Council Conseil Scientifique de l’Evaluation — CSE) was also set
up. This was made up of 11 members appointed for six years (not renewable) by
the President of the Republic, on the basis of their expertise in the field of evalua-
tion or of economics,social science or administration.
The CSE was given the task of ‘promoting the development of evaluation
methods and defining an ethical approach’. More specifically,it was made responsi-
ble for ‘ensuring the quality and objectivity of work eligible for the National Evaluation
Development Fund (FNDE)’ (a budgetary fund created to finance interministerial
evaluations decided on by the Interministerial Evaluation Committee). To this end,it
drew up two opinions on the evaluations covered by the interministerial procedure:
— the first concerned the methods and conditions under which the evaluation
projects funded by the FNDE should be carried out;
— the second concerned the quality of the work carried out; it was issued at the
same time as the evaluations themselves.Policies evaluated under the 1990 system
— Computerisation of government
— Regeneration of social housing
— Reorganisation of school,childcare and leisure time in line with children’s needs
— Making public services accessible to the disadvantaged
— Policies to help young people in difficulty
— Protection of the wetlands
— Social and cultural measures by the State for civil servants
— Support for location of activities in conversion areas
— Measures to help workers aged over 55
— Individual help with housing
— The five-year law on employment
— Policies to combat poverty
— The prevention of major natural disasters
— Policy on mountainous areas
— Integration through the economy
— Energy management
— Policy to combat smoking and alcoholism
B.The new system established 
by the decree of 18 November 1998
The 1998 reform demonstrates the will to relaunch interministerial evalua-
tion, continuing to follow the main guidelines laid down in 1990: the link between
evaluation, democracy and the modernisation of government; the requirements of
pluralism, transparency and scientific rigour; the involvement of the administrative
authorities in the evaluation of policies which concern them. Features which dis-
tinguish the 1998 decree from its predecessor are a determination to increase the
involvement of local authorities in the evaluation of national policies and a deter-
mination to integrate the methodological work and the management of the evalu-
ations to a greater extent. This was probably done at the cost of weakening the
role of methodological authority that the Scientific Council had previously held.
The Interministerial Evaluation Council was abolished and the Scientific
Council was replaced by a National Evaluation Council (CNE) made up of 14 mem-
bers appointed for three years by decree of the Prime Minister (renewable once).
Because of the way it is made up the CNE has a more political/administrative and
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less scientific nature than the former CSE. In fact,the CNE’s job is both political and
methodological:
— every year it proposes an evaluation programme to the Prime Minister;
— it defines the main conditions for carrying out the evaluations (content and mo-
tives for the evaluation,mode of composition of the evaluation body,criteria for
choosing consultants to carry out the studies,evaluative research etc.);
— at the end of the evaluations, it gives an opinion on the quality of the work
done (as was the case in the previous system).
The Commission for the National Plan also had its powers increased in terms
of leading the development of evaluation in government and in the management
of the interministerial system. It itself provides secretarial services for the CNE.
The first annual evaluation programme drawn up by the CNE was approved
by the Prime Minister in July 1999. It applies to the following policies:
— prevention and treatment of AIDS;
— public housing policy in the overseas departments;
— employment promotion measures in the non-market sector;
— the ‘new services — youth employment’ programme in the youth and sport
sector;
— the policy on drinking water quality.
C.The main stages in drawing up an evaluation project
— Definition of the scope of the evaluation
— Identification of the official or implicit objectives of the policy
— Identification of the purposes of,and issues involved in,the evaluation
— Initial diagnosis and hypotheses
— Drawing up of a framework of reference
— Formulation of the evaluation questions
— Organisation of the evaluation plan
— Survey of information available
— Planning of a study programme
— Choice of operators116 Bernard Perret
D.Structure of the questioning 
(categorisation of the questions to be examined)
— Implementation of the policy
— Achievement of objectives and indicators of results
— Effectiveness,own effects,impact
— Cost–benefit efficiency
— Cost-effectiveness
— Study of the action mechanisms
— Context of the implementation and conditions for generalisation
E.Role of the ‘evaluation body’
(Extract from the Petit guide de l’évaluation)
‘Evaluation is neither pure knowledge nor pure political mechanism. An au-
tonomy zone for evaluation,between science and action,must be recognised and
organised. When the complexity of the subject warrants it, this may be done by
setting up an ‘evaluation committee’, a group charged by the commissioner with
supervising the evaluation. The evaluation committee is more than a steering com-
mittee: it must enjoy broad responsibility within the framework of a written man-
date from the sponsor. Specifically,it has two types of task:
(a) To steer the evaluation work, i.e. to oversee the putting together of the evalu-
ation project, to translate the evaluation questioning into specifications for
studies and research, commission and monitor the various studies, hold hear-
ings with the resource people, administrators, experts or other ‘witnesses’, or
even make group on-site visits.
(b) To integrate the evaluation work, i.e. collate the documentation and the stud-
ies,validate their results,interpret these results in the light of the other informa-
tion collected (from hearings or previously available information), answer the
questions posed by the evaluation project,formulate some general conclusions
and,if necessary,suggestions,and write the final report.
The committee is generally the place where reasonable conclusions are de-
duced by deliberation from the analysis and interpretation of studies. It should be
seen as an arbiter between the different points of view and not a mediator be-
tween the different interests which need to be accommodated.From State action to collective
action:France in a process of change:
and the Commission?
Jean-Claude Thoenig
Notice
This document accompanies a presentation made on 17 September 1996 as
part of the seminar on governance organised by the Forward Studies Unit of the
European Commission.
It looks at whether public action in France has changed over the last two or
three decades and in what way. This should form the basis for a subsequent exam-
ination of whether the proceduralisation hypothesis adopted at the seminar with
regard to action by the European Union,is applicable to France.
Given the amount of discussion which has already been devoted to the sub-
ject,and to avoid the usual pitfalls of intellectual radicalisation,this document con-
fines itself to an empirical analysis of a long and comprehensive series of surveys
carried out in France. I will speak neither of governance nor of crisis, as neither of
these concepts applies to the results of the surveys.
1. Outwardly, the national system of government is characterised by the relative
continuity of its institutional, political and administrative arrangements. The
State remains unitary. Presidential power is strong and central. Parliament has a
weak role as regards control of the executive. The restrictive and elitist higher
echelons of the civil service monopolise administrative posts. National politi-
cians are weighed down by local council mandates. Regulation by the budget
is the main instrument of coordination. The official social partners (unions,
employers associations and economic organisations) try hard to maintain their
representativeness at a time  when demands and requirements are sometimes
vicariously — and often unexpectedly — expressed from certain quarters. The
administrative sector has continued to grow in size and in status despite eco-
nomic uncertainties. Finally, 95% of the staff of government departments work
in the outlying regional and local offices scattered throughout the country.
2. State reform has been undertaken periodically. The 1960s introduction of a
planning-based budgeting system (RCB — Rationalisation des choix budgé-
taires) ended in disappointment. It was the end of the 1980s before the subject
of management and administrative reform came up again, given the cautious
approach taken by governments. A succession of initiatives followed which
were much vaunted by the various prime ministers. In 1988, Michel Rocard
termed his idea for reform ‘administrative modernisation’. Ministries were askedto set up ‘centres of responsibility’ to identify operational objectives and use
techniques involving negotiation and instilling a sense of responsibility to moti-
vate staff. Use of outside consultants, particularly those from industry, was en-
couraged. An interministerial mechanism to assess State  policies was also in-
troduced. Edith Cresson, as Prime Minister, used another method: she favoured
decentralising administrative and public bodies from Paris to other parts of the
country (including the ENA). Édouard Balladur and Alain Juppé had their own
approaches. While with each successive government,the stated aims of reform
were the same — improving quality, simplifying administrative procedures,
bringing public services closer to their users (it should be noted that there was
no productivity objective),the actual measures and their underlying philosophy
changed. The lack of continuity in these efforts reflected the lack of govern-
mental continuity. Overall, the results achieved were modest, but there were
some notable and lasting exceptions1,at the initiative of particular departments
(Ministries of Equipment and Defence), where certain principles  of human re-
sources management and the matching of resources to objectives were adopt-
ed, while respecting the sacrosanct rules on public accounting and the terms
and conditions of officials.
3. The symbolic value of administrative reform — which is at least as important as
the  operational side — is part and parcel of good government. It is true that in
the 1980s many new ideas and fashions emerged. Thatcher’s methods of gov-
ernment in Great Britain made an impression, even though, in France, the con-
sensus was that they would not travel. The paradox of Michel Rocard’s ap-
proach was to try to keep French administrative methods while introducing
management methods from industry,even though it meant making them com-
patible with the legal provisions applicable to government departments. The
Right continued the same policy once back in power: the objective was to re-
store the State,not to privatise the public sector. The core of the public service,
of which ENA was one of the symbols,was left untouched.
Outside factors played an important role in the taking of initiatives. Three of
these factors were:enlargement of the market (which led to a proliferation of in-
dependent administrative agencies, free of the usual ministerial structures, reg-
ulating sectors such as audiovisual affairs, competition or financial markets,
billing for their services and competing with international organisations and pri-
vate companies,for example in the field of telecommunications or banking),the
increase in Community aid,particularly to sub-national operators and,above all,
the spectacular increase in the power and autonomy of local and regional au-
thorities as a result of the decentralisation measures taken by the State from
1981 to 1985.
To a greater extent even than the budgetary constraints in the Maastricht
Treaty, political decentralisation was the challenge facing State and govern-
ment. Towns,counties and regions threw themselves into the breach,taking on
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agement public,11.1.1993.powers delegated by the State (initially to divest itself of certain areas and fi-
nancial burdens) and considerably extended their range of activities2. In many
ways, their dynamism, the quality of their work and their flexible management
surpassed what the State could offer (in terms of economic aid, social action,
culture, etc.). The power held by the prefects over activist bureaucrats and
somewhat apathetic local politicians before 1981 was followed by an open situ-
ation,which arose from competition between groups — including the State —
to take charge of particular areas or problems. The power held by local author-
ities has left some government departments marginalised,through lack of legit-
imacy or resources, and rendered them obsolete, through lack of adequate or-
ganisation and technical skills. The questions of what the State’s external serv-
ices — which are the main instruments at the disposal of government depart-
ments — should be used for, and what new role should be given to the préfet
— who symbolises the State and daily life  — are vital for the State,which is still
caught up with its outdated network of regional offices. The administrative
problems associated with devolution are related to political decentralisation.
This is, however, a rather empty statement at the moment, because decentrali-
sation and devolution are not dealt with together.
4. In two decades, huge changes have taken place in local and regional govern-
ment in France. From a self-reliant and even hierarchical system in which the
State was dominant and public action was taken only within a clear institution-
al framework, a largely acentric State has emerged which is exemplified by the
breaking down of barriers  — between the public and private sectors and be-
tween local, national and supra-national affairs — and by the diversity of the
protagonists.
Political and administrative affairs in France in the 1960s were defined by a set
of relations linking the State — through its administration — to local commu-
nities under a system known as cross-regulation3. This was based on the princi-
ple of exchange between government departments and local elected officials
(mayors, chairpersons of county councils etc.). It fostered arrangements where-
by collective action at local level filled in the gaps left by central administration.
The national territory was  administered vertically. The State was predominant.
It produced goods and services, enlisting the help of a few representative dig-
nitaries from the  regions. Public action was based on a combination of cen-
tralised technical and statutory rules for each sector and the implementation of
strongly regionalised public policies, within the framework of a doctrine for ac-
tion in which the values of public power and public service were tightly inter-
woven. The result was a close intermingling of local and national  areas of ac-
tivity. This was a subtle but effective solution to the key problem of how to in-
tegrate a varied social and geographic area through public action. The bureau-
cratic or technocratic hegemony of the central ministries combined with the
co-opting of local dignitaries favoured growth and the sectoral approach.
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different model: that of the institutionalisation of collective action4. This is suit-
ed to a world in which regulation is no longer the only long-term answer, in
which integration from the top or at national level is rarely or ineffectively im-
posed,while becoming increasingly relevant at grassroots level. Managing pub-
lic affairs is becoming very problematic, with increasingly heterogeneous re-
gions and fragmentation (depolarisation) of political power. Multiple interde-
pendencies are emerging, between players, problems and sectors of public ac-
tivity. New principles of cooperation have to be invented from one day to the
next. The region, rather that the State, defines what constitutes a problem
which should be dealt with in the public sector. Deprived of its control, the
State contrives to be one of the many negotiating players. It manufactures op-
portunities for dialogue (policies on cities,the environment,town planning,safe-
ty,etc.),it does nothing by itself any more.
The State offers procedures which aim to provide a solution to multi-partner co-
operation by suggesting medium to long-term avenues of action in a non-co-
ercive fashion. Alongside law,statistics and politics,it sets itself up as one of the
available tools with which a public authority may classify and identify empirical
situations and problems as areas for action. It is not about allocation of servic-
es or resources but about encouraging debate and identifying issues. To identi-
fy the specific attributes of institutionalisation in accounting terms, it can be
compared to the cross-regulation model. Cross-regulation is an adjustment
which comes into play after public action in implementing policies,in the gaps
in the bureaucratic system. It produces shifts within the generally accepted
boundaries that apply to universalist problems and decisions. The system of ac-
tion and the social scene are also strictly delimited. The institutions and the pro-
cedures are not a problem. The policies of the State are essentially distributive,
redistributive and in conformity with regulations.
Institutionalisation is a completely different thing. The process of adjustment
starts before any public intervention. It deals with defining the nature of public
problems,with priority and arbitration between issues,and with the distribution
and content of the principles on which decisions are based. Public action is
built collectively. Institutions and  political and administrative procedures be-
come a problem. Because,in many ways,the boundaries which should separate
collective issues from public policies, decision-makers from those affected by
their decisions, the general from the particular, are blurred. Public power no
longer manifests itself through the setting of universalist criteria, through over-
all or even hegemonic solutions or through the use of independent technical
expertise. It acts essentially by formulating constitutive policies.
A constitutive policy lays down rules on rules or organisational procedures. It
does not define the problem or recommend practical courses of action. It con-
fines itself to setting out framework procedures to be used without prejudice to
the level of agreement or involvement of the parties concerned. Scenarios for
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August 1996.action and situations are created which offer scope for exchange and adjust-
ment and which are given value,legitimacy and recognition by public power. A
constitutive policy delegates action on content. It exercises constraint or a
weak form of coercion on those affected by the policies it presumes to deal
with. Finally,the number of players called upon to adapt is high and variable,as
are their representativeness and relevance as partners in the exchange. The
search for collective interlocutors leads public authorities to make use of consti-
tutive policies.
In other words, constitutive policies are made in the hope that they will create
windows of opportunity for collective action. In more precise terms, they can
be thought of as potential policy windows, possible interfaces between the
problems,resources and parties concerned. Their legitimisation is important,as
it recognises that public power does not have a dominant or major role in the
formulation of public policies. New policy systems, which are different from
those set up by the official division between political and administrative work,
are thus given an official stage and credible capabilities.
The institutionalisation of collective action is based on the principle of compul-
sory cooperation. The challenge is to build networks which can be used to pro-
vide ad hoc solutions to problems. Such compulsory cooperation leads to com-
pulsory communication,for once it is no longer simply a question of direct ben-
efits, protecting oneself by non-communication is a losing game. Someone
who does not communicate is not up to date with things. There is no sense in
hiding. Achieving quality relationships with others and being a team player
have become virtues. The negotiations are open. When no one person has the
key to a problem,informal relations are legitimate.
Acting in partnership allows risks to be mutualised, refusing openness leads to
marginalisation. This is like the deskilling of social policies: social workers have
lost exclusive ownership of the problems they deal with. In the same way, fail-
ure at school is no longer the sole responsibility of the national education sys-
tem, and public safety is not under the complete authority of the police force.
This underlines the importance of cognitive mechanisms when  trying to build
cooperation. What is needed is a collective lesson in ‘joint conceptualisation’.
Part of the activity of coordination is the creation of reference frameworks com-
mon to the interests concerned,without which subsequent efforts will come to
nothing. Coordination should be based on collectively endorsed arguments; it
should not be imposed regardless. In the educational context, it is strength-
ened by the pooling of experiences. The acceptable approach is not that of ob-
jectives but that of procedures of choice.
The challenge of institutionalisation lies in the production of informal but prag-
matic systems, oriented towards problem management rather than the ratifica-
tion of values and objectives. Informality as a mode of action has a new status
which is not the same as that of cross-regulation, which is harnessed formality.
It has to be invented each time and stands on its own merits. It is not adapta-
tion. Innovation is at its core. It provides interdependent parties with a collec-
tively identified solution. It does not hide but proclaims itself to be institution-
alisation. It carves out a method of coordination which is an alternative to the
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ty,informality is defined as a management method which is always flexible and
does not treat relationships as governed by strict rules.
The passage from the implicit to the explicit,from the latent to the manifest,has
become legitimate in the name of efficiency. The State is distancing itself from
a purely legal interpretation of its role. Each strategic dimension is subject to
one condition: it must allow involvement in open negotiation. The balance of
power replaces preferential treatment.
In these circumstances, money, authority and technical expertise become in-
struments of limited capacity and legitimacy where the State is concerned. The
State’s central position with regard to the peripheral regions it manages is not a
sufficient basis for action by the State. Nodality — the ability to assemble the
parties concerned, and to make them work together — or at least to identify
and mobilise them and provide them with a mutual framework for adjustment,
is becoming a decisive vehicle for State action. Contractualisation is a common
institutional and management mode, whether in relation to policy on the city,
social  action or culture, not to mention town and country planning, economic
development or the construction of communications infrastructures. Negotia-
tion involves many partners,from both the public and private sectors,often new
to the public arena and operating on a local or regional basis.
Institutionalisation is fostered by a division of public roles and policies which
has become obsolete,together with the advanced state of fragmentation of the
regions,competences and parties involved. It tries to tie together disparate ele-
ments and to make those who are still attached to their sectoral frame of refer-
ence assume collective responsibility. To achieve this, it works on two areas si-
multaneously: organisation and legitimisation. Organisation because it is struc-
tures and procedures that define the division of tasks. Legitimisation because it
specifies who can legitimately create value through dialogue and negotiation.
The ‘cities’ policy illustrates this dual approach. Complex procedures stipulate
the conditions and limits set for joint tasks involving both public and private
sectors. At the same time, institutionalism designates local players — some-
times well-established but more often little known,like young people’s or immi-
grants’ associations, to which it attributes considerable capacity and rationality
— in relation to the problems tackled — and a semblance of independent rep-
resentativeness in relation to  the established channels of representative
democracy.
Use of institutionalisation makes for greater differentiation between areas of
public action. Outwardly it appears that the unity safeguarded by the political
and administrative territorial system is being watered down and replaced by a
chaotic and unworkable breakdown into individual cases and knee-jerk reac-
tions. Looked at more closely, this is not the whole truth. Territorial manage-
ment is not spinning uncontrollably towards anarchy:it is changing. To be more
precise, the familiar set-up of electoral and administrative constituencies is be-
ing replaced by more specialised scenarios classified by type of issue and mode
of exchange, each with a specific group of players. This principle of differentia-
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third parties,requires public authorities to be constantly vigilant and to adapt to
the changing nature of problems. At the same time,differentiation complicates
the game by placing political conflicts in a more autonomous context than oth-
er types of conflict relating to the statement and resolution of collective prob-
lems. Compartmentalising problems by type draws demarcation lines between
the partisan approach and the management approach. Though locally elected
representatives may not retain sole ownership of problems, they retain their
monopoly over the legitimacy of political decisions. At the same time,the play-
ers which institutionalisation seeks to place in each area remain largely free to
take part in collective action and to accept the modes of exchange proposed to
them. They can, at any time, default, negotiate other arrangements or redefine
the collective problem.
There is another dimension besides the differentiation of problems and those
involved: institutionalisation creates the conditions under which problem areas
can be distinguished. If the nature of a problem justifies making one area inde-
pendent from others,there is still a need for some means of adjustment so that
the problems and persons concerned can situate themselves in relation to each
other and share some common reference framework. Specification takes the
form of drawing up management rules for one particular area and only for that
area. Special rules are established not only by the State but also by practical ex-
perience on the ground. Such rules apply to one area only and are not trans-
ferable to others. The rules on water are not at all the same as those on the city
or on town planning. Such codes of conduct and arbitration are based on the
particular nature of the sector or the area they concern:that is the basis for the
operational procedures which regulate individual roles, including that of the
State. At the same time,such codes of conduct evolve rapidly because new so-
lutions and arrangements which emerge on the ground are constantly being
added.
5. The role of lowest common denominator sits uneasily on the shoulders of the
State. Two factors influence it:
— the globalisation of economic and political spaces (centrifugal force from
above),
— subnational changes to regional planning (centrifugal force affecting public
action from below).
The latter raises at least two questions:
— that of the failure to define territories (failure to cover the political territory
and the area of public action),
— that of the break up of  democracy into several areas.
In a situation where guidance from the centre is weak, the State allows the
grassroots to act while keeping in reserve the arbitration solution and fixing the
rules of the game: redistributive (through the tax and social welfare systems)
and constitutive (through the institutionalisation of public action at territorial
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continue to act as if they had a productive role.
6. Two models coexist in France:that of public regional planning (which takes dif-
ferentiation as a starting point and moves towards the problem of integration)
and that of European integration (which takes the problem of integration as a
starting point and moves towards differentiated management,but in which the
reality of differentiation is masked).
European integration has a centralising effect. Where centralisation takes place,it
is because there is no ‘confidence’in the  periphery and the hierarchy imposes it-
self as the only mode of affirmation of specific political ideas. In terms of political
sociology,consolidation of the centre could require the setting up of a strong hi-
erarchy as soon as the risks of centrifugation appear. Everything depends on the
origin of the uncertainty. If it is ‘global’and concerns all parts of the organisation,
it is important that each of these has the capacity to respond in a consistent man-
ner. The standardisation of responses therefore becomes an effective procedure,
provided that the hierarchy can lay down a doctrine on which action by decen-
tralised units could be based. The theory of public power is based on this sort of
construction. Centralisation and hierarchy are ways to manage turbulent areas.
French decentralisation coincides, however, with a political situation in which
belonging to a national community is not a problem. The surge in local power
and local independence is based on a lack of political uncertainty as regards the
reality of the centre. The uncertainty relates more to taking charge of and deal-
ing with public problems. Overall political unity authorises the decentralisation
of management solutions.
Under these circumstances,the development of Europe has added its own,very
different mechanisms. Quite apart from the strictly political decision-making pro-
cedures, the nature of the uncertainty being managed (the creation of an inte-
grated geographic area) explains the intensive bureaucratisation of European
policies and their high degree of standardisation. In other words,French decen-
tralisation and European integration are based on different political issues  and
reasons for action,even if the latter favours the use of the principle of subsidiarity.
At the local level,however,they produce similar effects — bringing about a radi-
cal transformation of the place of the State,rather than its disappearance.
7. The European Commission is faced with national realities which,as France’s case
suggests, do not present a single institutional architecture visible from the out-
side (from Brussels) or even from the capital (for example, from Paris). At the
same time, the instruments of legislation and the budget are relatively weak,
limited and unreliable.
To my mind, in the wake of proceduralisation (which is more a slogan than an
operational instrument), I would recommend that the Commission adopt con-
crete measures to ensure:
(a) mobility of all management officials, not just between directorates and
services within the Commission, but also — above all — between Brussels and
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the countries of the European Union — managers should have personal experi-
ence of work on the ground, both at national and subnational level, in at least
two countries;
(b) a slightly more solid base for the Commission either in the Member States
or in the regions — the question of Commission branch offices in the Commu-
nity is both crucial and delicate;
(c) an inventory of the practices already in use,both formally and informally,in
the Commission with regard to constitutive policies,with an impact assessment
of each of these and an evaluation of the ability of officials to conduct them;
(d) a programme of training/awareness for all management staff on the con-
duct of constitutive policies and the running of networks — all managers re-
cruited (or almost all) should receive such training fairly soon after recruitment;
(e) aid to certain countries or sectors of the Union so that they can adopt a
more substantial and less bureaucratic approach to managing collective affairs
—  ‘institution building’ is vital in some cases to make up for the weaknesses
and gaps in traditional administrative tools;
(f) an end to the representation of sectoral and national interests solely by of-
ficial institutions or approved lobbies. Listening through local and sectoral
channels can ensure that all sides of the story are heard.
In practical terms, proceduralisation requires that we free ourselves from that
formidable duo — official slogans and informal routines.PART III:GOVERNANCE 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNIONInstitutional reform:independent
agencies,oversight,coordination
and procedural control
Giandomenico Majone and Michelle Everson
Introduction
At its simplest,the core message of this paper is that the consensual approach,
traditionally characteristic of regulatory policy-making in the EC,is no longer viable;in-
stead,a clearer assignment of individual responsibilities for achieving policy objectives
is urgently needed. In particular,the Community must be able to assume responsibility
for the consistent and effective enforcement of European rules throughout the Union.
The experience of several decades shows that mutual trust and loyal coop-
eration among the Member States are not sufficiently developed to achieve eco-
nomic integration without an adequate administrative infrastructure at EC level.
Similarly, regulatory expertise and management skills vary too much across the
Member States — and will vary even more in an enlarged Union — to justify ex-
clusive reliance on traditional modes of decentralised enforcement.
The need for a clearer separation between political and technical-adminis-
trative responsibilities is also made more urgent by the growing politicisation of EC
policy-making. The procedure introduced by Article 214 of the Consolidated
Treaties introduces a deep transformation in the relationship between the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Commission.The ‘parliamentarisation’ of the Commission
is becoming inevitable as more and more tasks involving the use of political discre-
tion are shifted to the European level. It is also a positive development from the
point of view of democratic legitimation,but it does force us to rethink the core in-
sight of functionalism — that integration is most likely to occur within a domain
shielded from the direct clash of political interests — and to identify domains
which must still be shielded from such conflicts.
The main reason why all mature democracies choose to delegate powers to
non-majoritarian institutions such as independent central banks and regulatory
agencies is the need to preserve policy continuity against the changing prefer-
ences of variable parliamentary majorities.In turn,policy continuity is seen as a ne-
cessary condition of policy credibility. Similarly, the need to preserve the credibility
of the integration process, notwithstanding the growing politicisation of the Com-
mission, provides the strongest argument in favour of an increased recourse to
non-majoritarian institutions of regulatory policy-making at European level.
For all these reasons, the question is no longer whether European agencies
are needed, but rather how they should be designed so that their accountabilitymay be secured and so that their sectoral responsibilities can be coordinated with
broader horizontal concerns.
At the European level,one particular legal barrier to the consolidation of ex-
isting European agencies, as well as the foundation of new independent institu-
tions better adapted to the EC’s demanding regulatory tasks, is the continuing in-
fluence of the Meroni doctrine of the European Court of Justice (ECJ); a reading of
Article 4 of the Rome Treaty which allows for the delegation of EC competences
only under very limited circumstances. It is the contention of this paper, however,
that the time is now ripe for a reassessment of the constitutional and legal limits to
the delegation of powers within the EC (infra III) and for the detailed consideration
of new procedural controls, which will not only secure the accountability of Euro-
pean agencies, but will also ensure that they form a coordinated part of a consoli-
dated programme of European regulatory activity (infra IV).
The need for European agencies
We have already noted the strength of the prima facie case for European
agencies. The more detailed arguments which underline our assertion that the pri-
mary question is not one of whether Europe needs agencies,but rather one of how
such European agencies should be structured,fall into four closely interrelated cat-
egories. (1) Europe is experiencing a period of institutional change and a politicisa-
tion of hitherto largely administrative bodies, such as the Commission. This situa-
tion (2) requires us more closely to consider the evolution of institutions which can
imbue European law-making with a visible degree of regulatory commitment.
Equally,however,European regulatory activity is currently characterised by (3) a per-
ceptible institutional deficit. In this regard,many reasons speak for (4) the ‘filling in’
of the institutional gap by means of agencies in preference to other regulatory so-
lutions such as self-regulation.
The perils of politicisation
Policy-makers and students of European integration have been so absorbed
by concerns over the democratic deficit that they have generally failed to probe
the consequences of the increasing level of politicisation of EC policy-making. The
idea of reducing the democratic deficit by assigning a larger role to the European
Parliament (EP),and,in particular,by involving the Parliament in the appointment of
the Commission, is an old one. It featured in the solemn declaration on European
Union adopted in Stuttgart in 1983; it has always been high on the list of the EP’s
demands; and it has figured prominently in the arguments of those who advocate
the development of the Union in the direction of a parliamentary system.
The procedure introduced by Article 214 of the Consolidated Treaties, con-
tains a number of radical changes with respect to previous practices — the custom
of the newly appointed President of the Commission to be heard by the EP’s en-
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of the EP shortly after it takes office — but also with respect to the new Article 158
of the Treaty on European Union. If, under Article 158, the national governments
could nominate a new Commission President only after consulting the EP, now
their nomination must be approved by Parliament. Moreover, the President and
other members of the Commission are subject to a vote of approval by the EP,as in
classical parliamentary systems.
A further institutional innovation is offered by the link, established in 1995,
between Parliament’s term of office and that of the Commission. Since a newly
elected Parliament takes part in nominating the Commission, any significant
changes in the EP’s composition can be reflected at Commission level.
Already,the difficulties surrounding the appointment of the Santer Commis-
sion showed that the EP intends to influence the distribution of portfolios among
Commissioners. The events of March 1999, further strengthened these tendencies.
Influential MEPs are even advocating a ‘Parliamentary Commission’ in which the
composition and programme of the Commission would reflect the will of the par-
liamentary majority.
As Renaud Dehousse has pointed out (Club de Florence, 1996), these devel-
opments augur a deep transformation in the relationship between the EP and the
Commission. The Commission will,henceforth,be fully responsible to the EP,whose
influence will be felt in all its activities, whether administrative or legislative. Thus,
the right given to the EP to request the Commission to ‘submit any appropriate
proposal on matters in which it considers that a Community act is required’(Article
143 Consolidated Treaties), may be seen as coming close to a true right of legisla-
tive initiative. It appears that the signatories of the Maastricht and Amsterdam
Treaties, in their desire to establish the Union’s democratic legitimacy, have radical-
ly modified the balance of power between Commission and Parliament. President
Prodi’s recent declaration that the Commission should augment its political rather
than technocratic functions may, in part, be seen as a response to this increased
politicisation.
These developments have been informed,more or less consciously,by a par-
ticular model of democracy — the strict majoritarian or ‘Westminster’ model —
which views parliaments as the sole,or,at the least the main,source of legitimation
for policy-making and governance. Under the strict version of this model, all insti-
tutions that are not directly accountable to the voters or to their elected represen-
tatives — independent central banks and regulatory commissions, but even the
courts — are democratically suspect.
The tendency to equate democracy with majority rule is quite common,but
is nonetheless puzzling, since the pure majoritarian model of democracy is the ex-
ception rather than the rule:most democratic polities,with the partial exception of
Britain and of countries strongly influenced by the British tradition, rely extensively
on non-majoritarian principles and institutions. This is particularly true of federal or
quasi-federal systems. Federalism is fundamentally a non-majoritarian, or even an-
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tonomous existence to institutional arrangements that prevent the domination of
minorities by majorities.
We must acknowledge that an increasing level of politicisation of Commu-
nity policy-making becomes unavoidable as more and more tasks involving the use
of political discretion are shifted to the European level. Thus, a significant part of
the third pillar,as well as the Schengen arrangements have been moved to the first
pillar. These developments and the problems connected with the next enlarge-
ment, not only increase the administrative tasks of the Commission, but also em-
phasise the Commission’s political responsibilities. In this context,the demand for a
greater role of the EP becomes understandable.
At the same time,we should not be blind to the risks which politicisation en-
tails for the process of European integration. It may be worthwhile to recall the
core insight of functionalist theories:integration is most likely to occur within a do-
main shielded from the direct clash of political interests. This should not be inter-
preted as a rejection of democracy in favour of an abstract model of technocracy.
Rather, it is the realistic appreciation of the fact that in the early stages of integra-
tion, political conflicts are about divergent national interests rather than the con-
flicts along ideological or party political lines with which we are familiar at national
level. The same functionalist line of reasoning explains the many non-majoritarian
features of the founding Treaties. Hence,for several decades,law and economics —
the discourse of legal and market integration — provided a sufficient buffer to
achieve results that could not be directly obtained in the political realm. The in-
creasing politicisation of the Commission forces us to rethink the core insight of
functionalism — and to identify domains which still have to be shielded from the
direct clash of political interests.
Agencies as an instrument of regulatory commitment
The growing politicisation of the Commission — a process which is both in-
evitable and positive in terms of perceived legitimacy — is perhaps the strongest
argument in favour of an increased recourse to non-majoritarian institutions of reg-
ulatory policy-making at the European level. In particular, it forces us to consider
the problem of achieving credible regulatory commitments.
The commitment problem is a direct consequence of the nature of the
democratic process. One of the defining elements of democracy is that it is a form
of government pro tempore. The time limit inherent in the requirement of elections
at regular intervals is one of the main arguments for democracy, but it also implies
that the policies of the current majority can be subverted,legitimately and without
compensation, by a new majority with different and perhaps opposing interests.
Hence, political executives tend to have shorter time-horizons than their counter-
parts in the private sector and lack the ability credibly to commit themselves to a
course of action.
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majority can do. The discretionary power of the current majority gives rise to the
problem known to economists as ‘time inconsistency’. Time inconsistency occurs
when a policy which appears to be optimal at time to no longer seems optimal at a
later time tn. Without a binding commitment holding them to their original plan,
governments will use their discretion to switch to what now appears to be a better
policy. The problem is that if private actors anticipate such a policy change, they
will behave in ways which prevent policy-makers achieving their original objec-
tives. For example, a policy of low inflation may be optimal over the long run, but
at any time there can be short term gains from surprise inflation. If policy-makers
have the possibility of revising the original policy to achieve such short-term gains,
private actors will recognise this and change their behaviour in such a way that the
outcome is worse than if the ex ante optimal policy had always been adhered to.
Such arguments provide the main theoretical justification for the independ-
ence of central banks; mutatis mutandis, they also justify the independence of reg-
ulatory agencies. Rogoff (1985) supplies us with the classic reference:selection of a
central banker whose preferences are different from the preferences of a majority
of voters implies that the banker must be independent. Otherwise the voters
would be tempted to dismiss him when he is trying to implement a restrictive
monetary policy. Hence,it is important that delegation to the central bank is cred-
ible. In fact, the Statute of the European Central Bank gives the Bank a very high
level of independence,which should guarantee the Bank’s ability credibly to pursue
its main objective of price stability.
The logic of the model of an independent central bank, however, holds also
in the area of economic and social regulation. In most countries,regulatory policy-
making is now delegated to specialised agencies operating at arm’s length from
government. The point of insulating regulators from the political process is to en-
hance the credibility of regulatory commitments. The head of an independent
agency will, normally, attach more importance to the agency’s statutory objectives
than the government,parliament or the average voter. Agency heads generally ex-
pect, and are expected by others, to have a well-defined agenda, and to measure
their success by the amount of the agenda they accomplish. They also are aware
that courts can review their decisions and can overturn them if they seem to de-
part too greatly from the language and the aims of the enabling statute. Thus,reg-
ulators have an additional incentive to pursue the statutory objectives of the
agency, even when those objectives, because of changed economic or political
conditions,no longer enjoy popular support.
To summarise, the delegation of policy-making powers to non-majoritarian
institutions, such as an independent central bank and regulatory agencies is a
means whereby governments can credibly commit themselves to policies which
would not be credible in the absence of such delegation. This credibility problem
will become increasingly severe at European level with the growing influence of
the EP upon the nomination and performance of the Commission, and the conse-
quent politicisation of Community policy-making. For example,one can expect re-
newed interest in the idea — advocated, among others, by the German Federal
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areas of cartels,abuse of a dominant position,mergers and perhaps also State aids,
be transferred to an independent European Cartel Office,while legislative powers in
this area would remain with the Commission.
The institutional deficit
(a) Foodstuffs,pharmaceuticals and technical harmonisation
A second reason for proposing the creation of European agencies in several
areas of economic and social regulation is the perception of EU citizens and eco-
nomic actors alike,that the present system — with its heavy concentration on rule-
making and its weak control of the enforcement process — is no longer able to
cope with the regulatory challenges of globalised markets. This negative percep-
tion has been powerfully reinforced by the recent series of crises in the food safety
area. In this regard,it may be worthwhile to recall that a political decision was tak-
en in 1990 that a consolidated European Food Agency was not needed. Instead,an
attempt was made to foster better coordination of national scientific expertise.
Such efforts notwithstanding, the current approach to issues of food safety
lacks credibility,not only in the eyes of EU citizens,but also internationally — when,
at the June 1999 meeting of the G8, President Chirac proposed the creation of a
World Scientific Council on Food safety, the US reaction was noteworthy for its
heavy sarcasm. American officials commented that should Europe require a strong
regulatory body for food safety, they need only copy the US  Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (Financial Times, 21 June 1999). Perhaps because of this reaction,
France is now proposing the establishment of a European Agency for Health and
Environmental Safety (Le Monde,25 June 1999).
Another highly instructive example of the limits of a highly decentralised
regulatory framework is the failure of an early form of mutual recognition for the
approval of pharmaceuticals. The old procedure for EC-wide approval included a
set of harmonised criteria for testing new products, and the mutual recognition of
toxicological and clinical trials conducted according to EC rules. In order to speed
up the process of mutual recognition a ‘multi-State drug application procedure’
(MSDP) was introduced in 1975 (Council Directive 75/319/EEC, OJ L147/13). Under
the MSDP,a company that had received a market authorisation from the regulatory
authority of a Member State could ask for the mutual recognition of that approval
by at least five other countries. The authorities of the countries nominated by the
company were required to give their approval, or to raise objection, within 120
days. In case of objections, the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products
(CPMP) had to be notified. The CPMP would express its opinion within 60 days,and
could be overruled by the national authority that had raised objections.
The procedure did not work well. Actual decision times were much longer
than those prescribed by the 1975 directive,and national regulators did not appear
to be bound either by decisions of other regulatory bodies or by the opinions of
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1983. Now,only two countries need be nominated in order to set a multi-State ap-
proval application in motion. However, even this new procedure failed to stream-
line the approval process, since national regulators almost routinely continued to
raise objections against each other. These difficulties finally induced the Commis-
sion, strongly supported by the European pharmaceutical industry, to propose the
establishment of a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, and
of a new centralised procedure, compulsory for biotechnology products and cer-
tain types of veterinary medicines, and available on an optional basis for other
products,leading to an EU-wide authorisation. Both the agency and the centralised
procedure are established by Council regulation (No 2309/93 of 22July 1993).
The ‘new approach’ to technical harmonisation likewise leaves a number of
issues still unresolved. The crucial problem here is the tension between the essen-
tial safety requirements of the ‘new approach’ directives, which are legally binding,
and the voluntary character of the harmonised standards, which provide the tech-
nical framework for risk assessment. According to the Council Resolution of 7 May
1985 on the New Approach to technical harmonisation and standards (OJ C 136/1),
the essential requirements should be worded precisely enough to create, upon
transposition into national laws,legally binding obligations. They should also be ‘so
formulated as to enable the certification bodies straight away to certify products as
being in conformity having regard to those requirements,in the absence of techni-
cal standards’. It is not clear, however, how the risks may be addressed without the
technical framework which the European standardisation bodies are supposed to
provide. With few exceptions,such as the safety of toys and pressure vessels direc-
tives, most new approach directives involve essential requirements expressed in
such general terms that risk assessment is impossible without the support of de-
tailed technical standards.
It has been argued (Previdi,1997) that the serious difficulties experienced by
European standardisation in a number of areas, perhaps most strikingly in the area
of construction products, derive directly or indirectly from the artificial separation
that has been made at European level between regulation and standardisation.
The artificial nature of the distinction is reflected in the persistent tensions that
characterise relations between the Commission and the European standardisation
organisations — a situation which industry has often deplored. The point is that
the Commission is confronted by a dilemma that cannot be resolved within the ex-
isting institutional framework. On the one hand, the separation of regulation and
standardisation, and the independence of the standardisation bodies were neces-
sary in order to allow internal market legislation to advance rapidly. On the other
hand,independence implies that harmonised standards must be voluntary — since
delegation of the power to adopt binding standards would require a real executive
power which the Commission does not possess under the Treaty — with all the le-
gal uncertainty which this situation entails. A way out of this dilemma,according to
Previdi (1997, p. 241) would be the creation of regulatory agencies ‘endowed with
autonomous decisional competences independent from those of the Member
States (thus, excluding any decisional procedure of a comitology type!), and re-
sponding to the professionalism requirements indispensable for risk regulation’. It
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to flesh out the legislative objectives, which by their nature cannot be part of the
voluntary area now set consensually through technical negotiation, thus achieving
the principle stated in the 1985 resolution,namely that binding regulatory precepts
ought to be reflected in sanctionable obligation.
(b) Telecommunications
As the examples discussed above indicate, legislative harmonisation is not
sufficient to create and sustain a truly integrated European market. Regulation is
not achieved simply by passing a law, but requires detailed knowledge of and inti-
mate involvement with, the regulated activity. In all industrialised countries this
functional need has led, sooner or later, to the creation of specialised bodies —
agencies, commissions, boards, tribunals — capable of fact-finding, rule-making,
and enforcement. The lack of such administrative infrastructure at the European
level is a serious obstacle to the completion of the internal market.
The limits of the legislative approach to market integration are also becom-
ing apparent in the case of telecommunications. Telecoms regulation is particular-
ly interesting not only because of the economic and political significance of the in-
dustry,but also because the principles of open network provision (ONP) legislation
provides the basic framework for future regulation of other trans-European net-
works (TENs). Although the telecom market is,by now,more or less completely lib-
eralised, it is doubtful that the legislative framework already in place will be suffi-
cient to achieve a well-functioning market for telecoms equipment,services and in-
frastructure. Among the shortcomings of the current, highly decentralised regula-
tory system are:imprecise obligations and pricing rules for interconnection;the ab-
sence of a one-stop-shop for licenses; inconsistencies between competition policy
and industry regulation at both national and European levels; mechanisms of dis-
pute resolution which fall far short of the standards of judicial review;uneven qual-
ity of national regulation in terms of independence, as well as expertise; and, poor
coordination of the national regulatory authorities among themselves and with the
European Commission (Pelkmans,1997).
While some of these shortcomings could be corrected by improved legisla-
tion, the deeper problems of the present regulatory system are institutional. This
explains the recurrent demands for a European telecommunications agency. A
well-publicised plea for such an agency was made by the High Level Groups on the
Information Society (Bangemann Group) in a report to the European Council meet-
ing at Corfu in June 1994. According to the report of the Bangemann group, the
European regulator, in addition to advising the national regulatory authorities,
would be charged with issues of a Community-wide nature such as licensing,inter-
connection,frequency allocation,and numbering.
More recently, in the spring of 1997, the EP, in the conciliation procedure on
the interconnection directive, forced the Council to agree that the Commission
study the merits of a European Telecommunications Agency, and that the result of
the study should be used in the review of the present system to be carried out in
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agenda. However, opinions on the structure and powers of the new regulatory
body still differ widely.
The present decentralised system of telecoms regulation is supported by
the Council and by the incumbent operators. The Member States argue that the
national regulators and the newly established regulatory regimes should be given
a fair chance to prove themselves. The compromise on a highly decentralised set-
up was necessary in order to establish an internal market for telecom services in
the first place. However,because of the shortcomings noted above and also of the
poor record of implementation and enforcement of non-voice liberalisation be-
tween 1990 and 1995,the present system suffers from serious credibility problems.
Hence,it is unlikely to represent a stable institutional solution of the complex prob-
lems of telecoms regulation in Europe.
Here, perhaps the best solution would be an intermediate body lying be-
tween the model of a European FCC — the US FCC (Federal Communications Com-
mission) has all the necessary powers to declare that its regulation supersedes
State regulation if inter-State telecoms are significantly affected, and to settle dis-
putes that cannot be resolved at State-level — and the current decentralised
regime. The European telecoms regulator would be neither a centralised body,nor
a collection of national representatives,but a network built on the ONP Committee.
(c) Public utilities
Telecoms regulation is, however, only one special case of the general prob-
lem of regulating public utilities based on large physical networks such as electric-
ity,gas,water and railways.
Technically,economically and politically,public utilities are special industries.
Their technology exhibits,in general,important economies of scale;a large propor-
tion of their assets are specific or,in the language of economics,non-redeployable;
and their customers comprise the entire voting population. Each of these charac-
teristics has significant regulatory implications.
First,as natural monopolies,utilities have always been subject to some form of
regulation. Second,public utility regulation is constantly exposed to political inter-
ference because the social significance of the services offered by these industries nat-
urally attracts the attention of politicians. No government can ignore the utilities,
whether they are publicly or privately owned. Finally,the non-redepolyable nature of
their assets makes the utilities particularly fragile industries. Once the investments
have been made, politicians may be tempted to use regulation to set prices below
long-run average costs,de facto expropriating the utilities’sunk costs. Hence,without
a credible regulatory commitment to allow a fair rate of return on capital,the compa-
nies will refuse to invest or will not invest enough to satisfy actual demand.
History is full of examples of attempts to gain political advantages by ma-
nipulating the prices of public services and of attempts by the public utilities to
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of State public utility commissions in the United States was related to the inability
of the municipalities to commit to stable regulatory regimes. Throughout the 19th
century, American public utilities were typically regulated at the municipal level.
Between 1907 and 1922,nearly 30 States created utility commissions,apparently to
prevent cities from imposing onerous regulations that would discourage future in-
vestments (Troesken,1996).
In contemporary Europe, the problem of public utility regulation is compli-
cated by the fact that, until recently, most public utilities were, and some still are,
State monopolies. Because of this close association with the national governments,
the former monopolists still enjoy enormous political and economic power with re-
spect to would-be competitors and the consumers at large. Indeed, the managers
of the newly privatised utilities have played an important role in the definition of
the regulatory system which was supposed to control their companies. Thus, be-
cause of the ‘regulatory bargain’struck between the utilities and the British Govern-
ment at the time of privatisation — a bargain generally slanted in favour of the util-
ities — regulators operate within a regulatory system which was the outcome of an
earlier capture. As Veljanovski (1991) has shown, this happened in the very formu-
lation of the authority of the regulatory agencies and the structure of the industry
itself. Such pre-emptive regulatory capture has occurred not only in the United
Kingdom,but in all the other Member States.
Because of this situation, the doubts expressed above about the adequacy
of the current decentralised system of telecoms regulators,are even stronger in the
case of other public utilities, in particular, electricity. It seems highly unlikely that
the equivalent of the ONP Committee established by Directive 90/387 for telecom-
munications, would be forceful enough to restrain the power of the former mo-
nopolists, and the tendency of national governments to intervene in their favour.
The members of the ONP Committee are drawn from the national regulatory au-
thorities,but many Member States still lack credible public utility regulators.
Also Directive 92/44 on the application of ONP to leased lines, introduced a
number of significant innovations. Thus,Article 8 of the directive requires the Mem-
ber States to establish a dispute-settlement procedure which should be easily ac-
cessible,capable of settling disputes in a fair,timely and transparent manner,and re-
spect due process and the rights of parties to be heard. Article 12 introduces a
conciliation procedure for disputes that cannot be resolved at the national level,or
involve telecommunications operators from more than one Member State,through
review by a working group of the ONP Committee. However,the working group is
charged solely with non-binding arbitration and,thus,can be seen,at most,as a first
step in the direction of centralised conflict resolution.
It is possible to argue that the establishment of a European Public Utility
Commission (EPUC), responsible for the implementation of all ONP legislation,
would remedy the defects of the current system, and create a countervailing force
to the power of the former State monopolies. Given the special characteristics of
the public utilities,the EPUC should enjoy direct democratic legitimation. It should
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in a fair, timely and transparent manner. These requirements could be satisfied if
the majority of the ‘Commissioners’(for example, four out of a total of seven mem-
bers) were designated by the European Parliament and the Court of First Instance.
The institutional preference for agencies
Here we discuss the more general justifications for the delegation of powers
to regulatory agencies rather than other institutions. The main institutional alterna-
tives to regulatory agencies are government departments (or Directorates-General),
control by Courts,or self-regulation. A number of factors may influence the placing
of new regulatory tasks on agencies, rather than allocating them to existing de-
partments,or giving more work to courts. In some cases,the new activities may not
match the already existing duties of departments or courts. In other cases, func-
tions are thought likely to be better administered if they are the sole or central in-
terest of a specialised agency, rather than a peripheral matter dealt with by some-
one whose attentions are primarily directed elsewhere.
The increasing technical and scientific complexity of many regulatory issues
has also led to the establishment of agencies which are seen as experts in these
substantive matters. The required expertise might have been developed inside ex-
isting departments or courts, however, the need for expertise is often found in
combination with a rule-making, decision-making or adjudicative function that is
thought to be inappropriate for a government department or court (Baldwin and
McCrudden,1987,pp.4 and 5).Moreover,a department is often seen as not able to
provide the independence from government needed in some of these applications
of expertise. This is because experts are oriented by goals, standards of conduct,
cognitive beliefs and career opportunities that derive from their professional com-
munity, giving them strong reasons for resisting interference and directions from
political outsiders. Thus,any expert agency provides a much more attractive work-
ing environment than a bureaucratic organisation.
Delegation of rule-making powers,may also be needed where constant fine-
tuning of the rules or standards, and quick adaptation to technical progress are re-
quired. As the experience of technical standardisation in the EC prior to the new
approach demonstrates, a collegial body, such as the Council of Ministers, often
cannot justify devoting the time needed to these matters, or else they simply can-
not act quickly enough.
Agencies’ separateness from government may also make them a preferred
mechanism for co-opting certain groups into the decision-making process. This
seems to have been an important consideration in the creation of such agencies as
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
and the European Agency for Health and Safety at Work. In more general terms,
agencies are intermediary institutions between State and civil society, in that they
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are an instrument of State action,but at the same time they open the door of gov-
ernmental institutions to civil society.
Equally, when regulatory responsibilities are delegated, not to agencies, but
to private or semi-private bodies,one speaks of self-regulation. Self-regulation plays
a significant role in highly technical areas, such as standardisation and wherever
product quality is an important consideration. A self-regulatory organisation (SRO)
can normally command a greater degree of expertise and detailed knowledge of
practices within the relevant area than a public authority. A second advantage is
that the rules issued by a private body are less formalised than those of public reg-
ulatory regimes. This informality reduces the cost of rule-making, facilitates quick
adaptation of the rules to new technical knowledge and changing conditions, and
permits more flexible enforcement. Another attraction of SROs in a period of fiscal
austerity is that the administrative costs of self-regulation are normally internalised
in the trade or activity which is subject to regulation.
However, as we have seen with regard to the ‘new approach to technical
harmonisation and standardisation within the EC’, self-regulation may also pose
problems. In the EU context,the de facto binding nature of voluntary standards as
elaborations of general ‘essential requirements’causes problems of liability should a
harmonised standard turn out to be defective:the European standardisation organ-
isations are private-law associations with which the Commission has only contrac-
tual relations as it has with hundreds of private consultants. In this case,an agency
structure might be a preferable solution.
Equally, self-regulation also poses the problem of the risk of capture by the
regulated interests. Capture is also a problem for agencies,but with self-regulation,
regulatory capture is there from the outset. Precisely to reduce this risk, the Euro-
pean standardisation organisations are required to allow all interested parties to
participate in standard-setting. However, this requirement may not be sufficient to
give adequate representation to diffuse, ill-organised, interests. Public regulatory
agencies may provide better protection of such interests than an SRO.
Monitoring is a third potential problem. As already mentioned,an important
advantage of entrusting regulation to SROs is that practitioners are likely to be bet-
ter informed than the public authorities about what is happening in their field of
activity: their ability to discover and expose malpractice is superior. The disadvan-
tage is that the willingness of an SRO to publicise and punish wrongdoers is likely
to be less than that of a public regulator. One possible solution is a two-tiered sys-
tem where a public agency acts chiefly as a regulator of regulators, with the SRO’s
handling day-to-day rule-making and supervision.
In conclusion,self-regulation — at both national and European level — may
be a useful adjunct to statutory regulation administered by a public, independent
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The Meroni doctrine reassessed:preserving the
institutional balance
The delegation problem:the separation of powers and
democratic accountability
In a recent article (Dorf and Sabel, 1998), two prominent American academ-
ics have reiterated the vital and responsive governmental role played,in the United
States, by the founders of the new deal commissions of the 1930s and the regula-
tory agencies of the 1970s. In the 1930s, a desire to increase congressional activity
in the area of economic regulation led to a vast increase in governmental tasks,
which the Congress itself did not have the resources to undertake. Similarly, in the
1970s, the complexities of social regulation overtaxed and overburdened both the
expertise and the technical legislative resources of the congressional arm of gov-
ernment. However, rather than abandon ambitious regulatory programmes, or be
satisfied with sub-optimal legislative regulation, the founders of the new agencies
responded innovatively to the ‘serious mismatch between the increasingly spe-
cialised functions of government and the administrative instruments at its disposal’
(Majone, 1996). They established new and experimental institutions, which were
not foreseen within the scheme of American Government,or the American Consti-
tution.
In this sense, boards, commission and agencies, operating at arms length
from traditional governmental structures, have long existed and have always pos-
sessed a form of functional legitimation of their own. Where the initial choice is
one of giving up ambitious legislative programmes, or alternatively of being con-
tent with their sub-optimal legislative execution,a third way,or recourse to unfore-
seen and experimental institutions brings obvious advantages through its ensuring
of efficient and responsive government. However, as also noted (Dorf and Sabel,
1998), the use of such innovative institutions also gives rise — in law — to impor-
tant legitimacy concerns,and,in particular,raises the question of how to ensure the
faithfulness of these bodies to the long-term aspirations and more immediate po-
litical goals of the citizenry as a whole.
Traditionally, such legitimacy concerns are grouped together under the
heading of the ‘delegation problem’. Generally-speaking, however, this problem is
twofold. First,it entails,a ‘high-level’constitutional dilemma,relating to the mainte-
nance of a constitutionally-stipulated ‘separation of powers’, or a clear distinction
between the exercise of judicial, legislative and executive functions; and thus en-
compasses a concern, dating back to the 18th century, that civil society must be
protected from any intrusive or overextensive exercise of governmental functions
by any one institutional actor. But, secondly, it also entails a more practical consid-
eration about how the law might ensure democratic accountability, or the adher-
ence of independent institutions to the policy goals identified by the political
community and the citizenry.Meroni and the European balance of powers
In the setting of the European Communities and European Union, however,
the traditional delegation problem has taken on an added complexity by virtue of
Article 4 of the Rome Treaty’s stipulation that the legitimacy of European institu-
tions must be based, not simply upon the general principle of the separation of
powers, but, more particularly, also upon the European principle of the ‘balance of
powers’(Laenerts,1993). In this sense,then,the delegation of competences to ‘new’
institutions created outside the structures of the EU must not only satisfy the dual
requirements (found in the shared constitutional traditions of the Member States)
of democratic accountability and the strictly delimited exercise of governmental
power. Instead, delegation within Europe must also be compatible with the func-
tionalist treaty scheme that sees the relative powers of (self-interested) national
and (integration oriented) European institutions,as well as the vital core sovereign-
ty of the Member States, balanced, consolidated and preserved by the provision
that each of the institutions named within Article 4 Rome Treaty act only ‘within the
limits of the powers conferred upon them by the Treaties’. Accordingly,in this man-
ner, the functionalist commitment to consolidated integration embodied by Euro-
pean institutions might be institutionally weighed against the more nationally self-
interested concerns of the Member State Governments.
The European Community’s complex threefold commitment to the strictly
delimited exercise of European competences,democratic accountability within the
European scheme of government and the European balance of powers was, ac-
cordingly, early confirmed by the 1958 case of Meroni v High Authority (case 9/56
(1957-8) ECR 133, p. 151). Relating specifically to the ECSC Treaty, Meroni remains
‘good law’,applies mutatis mutandis to all European Treaties,and,in effect,seems to
act as an immutable barrier to the wide-ranging delegation of complex modern
administrative tasks to institutions not named within the European Treaties. In the
Court’s 1950s reasoning, the Commission could, in fact, delegate tasks to experi-
mental institutions of European administration. However, in line with the primacy
of the European balance of powers, as well as ‘democratic’ and power-delimiting
concerns that continuing oversight need be maintained, such a delegation was
subject to certain strict constraints:
(i) delegation might only relate to powers which the Commission itself pos-
sessed;
(ii) such assignment must relate to the preparation and performance of executive
acts alone;
(iii) as a consequence of this,independent bodies may not be afforded any discre-
tionary powers;
(iv) the Commission must consequently retain oversight over the delegated com-
petence and will be held responsible for the manner in which it is performed;
(v) and finally,delegation must also not disturb the ‘balance of powers’within the
European Community (Laenarts,1993).
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have developed, they have also, to date been severely restricted in their sphere of
operation and subordinated, in the institutional framework, to the European Com-
mission.
The modern administrative challenge
Notwithstanding the continuing validity of the normative concerns and
constitutional ideals that underlie general notions of the separation of powers and
the more particular European emphasis upon the balance of powers, the current,
somewhat ad hoc, environment of European regulatory institutions (of agencies,
committees and regulatory networks) contains many indicators that the strictness
of the Meroni doctrine is no longer fully compatible with the complex demands
now being made of European regulation.
Most striking in this respect is the clear paradox between the ECJ’s tradition-
ally restrictive reading of Article 4 Rome Treaty, and the consequent retardation in
the development of fully independent — or ‘external’ to named treaty institutions
— European agencies and the motivation which led to the insertion by the SEA of
Article 145 into the EC Treaty; demanding, and indeed obliging the Council to del-
egate a wide-range of ‘implementing’powers to the Commission. With the Court of
Justice confirming (most recently, in Germany v Commission, C 240, p. 90) that the
Community concept of ‘implementation’ indeed does entail a wide rather than re-
stricted measure of discretion, the case of ‘internal’ delegation within the Commu-
nities and Union seems, thus, to reflect a more modern view of administration,
which accepts that delegatee authorities must be afforded a wide room for policy-
forming and implementing manoeuvre in their daily activities.
One possible explanation for the dichotomy between these two views of
administration within the Union, is nonetheless provided by the growth within the
institutional structure of the EU of a series of regulatory,management,scientific and
advisory committees, retardedly given a legal basis under the Council’s comitology
decision (derived from Article 145 EC Treaty,(1987) OJ L 197,p.33),and grouped un-
der the Commission umbrella, though with subsidiary Council/Member State rep-
resentation. The comitology system accordingly plays a major part in the exercise
of the implementing powers delegated to the Commission by the Council and so
engages in the specification of framework directives, and thus of regulatory stan-
dards,within the internal market.
With its threefold emphasis upon continuing national representation within
the delegatee body or committee,the primacy of the Commission’s policy initiative
and the reference to scientific and technical expertise, the committee system is
thus argued to supply the vital connection between delegatee bodies not foreseen
by the Treaties and the ‘balance of powers principle’ contained within Article 4
Rome Treaty (Vos,1997). First,national representation within the all-powerful regu-
latory committees is argued to ensure the continuing core sovereignty of the Mem-
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ber States, particularly with regard to their own constitutional duties to secure the
health and welfare of their citizens. Secondly, the Commission’s right of initiative is
claimed to maintain the credibility of the Community’s functionalist/integrationist
goals, ensuring that policy-making within the committee system is not directed to
subsidiary or short-term political goals. Finally, committees of experts are also said
to contribute to the functionalist/integrative credibility of the Community, seeking
to ensure that decision-making is not merely rational, but may be proven to be
such.
Not wishing to challenge this reading of the manner in which Committees
supply the essential bridge to the notion of the balance of powers, it needs
nonetheless immediately to be noted, that, for all its value, the comitology system
has not satisfied public demands that administration be made politically account-
able. Thus, notwithstanding the wide-ranging committee practice of publishing
their agendas and reports (also on the Internet), commentators continue to 
bemoan their opacity; the threefold political/executive/scientific divide perhaps
serving the ‘balance of powers’ within the EU, but also making it very difficult 
immediately to identify and assess the dominant rationality behind each individual
decision. Such concerns were brought to a head by the BSE crisis, where public
suspicion of the motives of national representatives within the committee system
reflected the traditional constitutional concern that delegation within opaque insti-
tutional structures might, in fact, conceal a case of institutional ‘self-aggrandise-
ment’or the perversion of decision-making to serve the interests of only one insti-
tutional actor;in this case,with regard to certain Members States,who,in the public
mind at least, could conceivably have used their position within the comitology
system to further national economic interests, rather than Community health and
safety concerns.
Such worries,however,are,vitally,also augmented by the various procedural
shortcomings within the committees system. In other words, the vital balancing
between political goal setting and expert/functionalist rationality is ultimately a
matter for political discretion, or negotiation between Member State representa-
tives (Joerges & Neyer, 1997), and not one for supranational legal oversight. The
large national political element within decision-making,thus proves a barrier to the
attempt to mount an effective legal challenge to individual decisions.
Given such considerations, the retarded status of agencies within the Euro-
pean Union requires reassessment in order to ascertain whether the various nor-
mative shortcomings traditionally associated with their use might not be over-
come. To reiterate,the legal problems are threefold and interrelated regarding:first,
the European agencies’ relationship with the European notion of ‘the balance of
powers’;second,their status in relation to the principle of the separation of powers;
and third,the identification of a scheme of control which might ensure the contin-
uing accountability to Europeans of such independent bodies.Meroni restated
The key to a modern reassessment of the Meroni doctrine is,perhaps,an un-
derstanding of the judgment as a creature of its time. Tackling the issue of the del-
egation of powers in the context of the 1950s, the Justices of the European Court
were thus,on the one hand,addressing the maintenance of a European balance of
powers in the light of the institutional arrangements and dynamics of that time. On
the other hand,they were also denied recourse to the body of literature which has
since grown up to demonstrate how the normative requisites of the principle of
the separation of powers may be satisfied and the situation be created whereby
‘no-one controls the agency,yet the agency is under control’(Moe,1987).
(a) The balance of powers as a dynamic principle
It should thus be noted that the principle of an ‘institutional balance of pow-
ers’,especially as it is formulated in Article 4 EC Treaty,has always been strongly crit-
icised (Läufer, 1990, pp. 219–220). In this view, the instrumentalism inherent to the
European institutional balance of powers — and, in particular, its legally formalistic
anchoring in the notion of the exercise of Treaty-enumerated competences —
weakens its power as a normative principle of governmental organisation within
the European Communities and Union. Thus,or so it is argued,with each Treaty re-
vision and consequent re-apportioning of competences between European institu-
tions,the balance of powers in the Treaty is altered,determining that it has no more
status than a mere ‘snapshot’of existing institutional arrangements.
By contrast, however, such a view also clearly fails to pay due regard to the
fact that the European balance of powers is representative less of a traditional con-
stitutional desire to preserve a European civil society from the illegitimate use of a
sovereign State power, and more of a need to ensure and support the complex
evolution of an international community,which seeks to consolidate and further its
own goals of economic integration,while at the same time preserving the core sov-
ereignty of its constituent Member States.
Seen in this light, the European notion of a balance of powers accordingly
represents a ‘dynamic’ rather than ‘static’ (constitutional) principle of governmental
organisation. In other words, it is not to be read simply as a negative obligation to
limit the encroachment of State power into a civil sphere (in the manner of a prin-
ciple of the separation of powers), but also and, indeed, more as a positive duty to
ensure — regardless of all institutional realignments — the continuing credibility
of the European integration project,as well as the core place within that project of
the Member States. On the one hand,this dynamism inherent to the European no-
tion of balance of powers helps to explain why the ECJ has never, in fact, taken its
formalist stance in relation to Article 4 EC Treaty to its ‘delegation ban’limit and has
instead allowed — in the interest of efficient EC government — the delegation of
a wide range of European tasks (if not, strictly-speaking, competences) to institu-
tions, such as agencies and committees, which are not even listed within that arti-
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they are allowed to do so, play in relation to recent realignments of competences
within the EU.
As noted above (supra II.1),recent institutional reform within the EU has not
only seen very many once exclusively-held Member State competences ‘communi-
tarised’ through their transference from the third to the first pillar of the Union
Treaty,but has also witnessed a vital change in the make-up and role of the institu-
tions of the European Union. First, the continuing empowerment of the European
Parliament, designed to overcome certain of the democratic deficits of the EU, has
introduced an element of direct democratic participation within European policy-
formulation. Secondly, the right of the EP to approve the Commission and its pro-
gramme of policy-making has similarly augmented political activity within that in-
stitution. Thirdly,the process of politicisation of the Commission has also been giv-
en added impetus by the enhanced powers of the President of the Commission to
choose his Commissioners. Fourth, and as a consequence of such realignments
within the Commission and Parliament, the Member States’ political precedence
over the integration project has been, if not weakened, at least challenged by the
growing politicisation of Community organs.
Accordingly, it may be argued that a Community reliance upon European
agencies, specifically operating ‘at arm’s length’ from the political branches and in
close association with national bodies (transnational regulatory networks),can help
preserve the institutional balance: (a) between the European institutions; (b) be-
tween the European institutions and the Member States; and (c) between political
and non-political branches of the Union (ECJ, ECB). Thus, on the one hand, ‘de-
politicised’ agencies might, in no small measure, reassert the credibility of the
Union’s functionalist/integrationist policies; on the other hand, they might equally
— through both their assumption of policy-implementation tasks from the politi-
cised Commission and their networking with national administrations — preserve
a core national presence within the European project.
(b) The separation of powers and democratic accountability
Briefly recapping, the creation of innovative institutions, such as agencies,
which often perform all three executive, legislative and judicial functions, and
which are further not recognised by the national constitution,has historically given
rise to very particular legal problems. Thus,or so it is argued,the delegation of tasks
from the legislative, executive or judicial arms to constitutionally unforeseen insti-
tutions, creates an essential problem of control: first, upsetting the regulative bal-
ance between the powers of the named executives,legislatures and judiciaries;and
secondly, distancing the exercise of power from citizens. Tricky as such a constitu-
tional dilemma may be, however, solutions are there to be found and here the US
example provides us with a valuable insight.
Thus,the US Constitution’s historical commitment to a plural scheme of gov-
ernment, which strictly apportioned powers between President, Senate, Congress,
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the danger that minorities of citizens might be subject to misrule by the majority,
initially appeared to stand in the way of the evolution of independent regulatory
agencies. The American Constitution separated and thus controlled power on the
basis of the apportioning of executive, legislative and judicial competences to par-
ticular institutions;within this scheme,new institutions accordingly seemed to have
no formally legitimated place. However,the Supreme Court,mindful of the need to
allow a government,established by ancient and static legal texts,to evolve in order
to deal efficiently with modern problems, nonetheless opened the door to the es-
tablishment of independent agencies (for full details of a long and tortuous body of
case-law,see Strauss 1984).
The argument deployed was simple, highly effective and generalisable for
constitutional schemes of government throughout the world:if the underlying log-
ic of the separation of powers was to control power by spreading its exercise
among many bodies,then,while any attempt by any named constitutional organ to
wrestle power from another would certainly constitute an injury to this principle,
the delegation of powers to new and independent institutions was not, in any
sense, an act of institutional ‘self-aggrandisement’, but, on the contrary, a contribu-
tion to the fragmentation of power and,thus,supportive of the basic pluralist prin-
ciples underlying the separation of powers. Certainly, agencies might appear con-
currently to exercise executive, judicial and legislative functions; nonetheless this
mixing of tasks served efficient government. In the final analysis,the threefold and
functional executive, legislative and judicial divide was only one means of frag-
menting power,and other pluri-institutional solutions might also legitimately serve
the same ends.
The second, and in a certain sense, more pressing legal problem that agen-
cies pose, however, is that of the need to ensure that independent bodies are ade-
quately controlled by the law, so that their adherence to the immediate political
aims of the citizenry can be assured. This essentially democratic concern that the
law must ensure that the will of the polity is done, is thus the flip-side to a legal
principle of ‘non-delegation’ which applies to legislative bodies and their compe-
tences. In other words, most national bodies of constitutional and administrative
law — and both civil and common law systems — start from the assumption that
any delegation of legislative functions from the parliament to other policy-making
institutions is de facto an abuse of the democratic imperative of the citizenry,which
finds representation within the legislative arm of government. In this, its strictest
form,the non-delegation principle is clearly a barrier to the evolution of independ-
ent regulatory bodies (and might also, in its broadest terms, be used to block the
activities of all non-majoritarian institutions, including the courts). It has, therefore,
slowly been modified as the need to ensure efficiency of government has proven
to be imperative and the legislative arm has sought the regulatory aid of new reg-
ulatory institutions.
In brief, the legal historical attempt to modify the non-delegation principle
and to create some other form of democratic accountability for agencies,is littered
with pitfalls and has ultimately only come close to resolution as legal science has
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how, with the aid of various institutional design and procedural mechanisms, a sit-
uation can be created whereby ‘no-one controls the agency, and yet the agency is
under control’(Moe,1987).
To explain further: the once widely accepted legal notion of ‘transmission
belt’ administration and control, based upon the assumption that the legislature
would give very strict direction to delegatee bodies to guide their daily activities,
while the judiciary would simply ensure that such rigid mandates not be deviated
from,was,for example,to be quickly frustrated throughout the legal world. Modern
administration was a matter of constant interaction between policy-making and
execution and thus necessarily required a far greater degree of operative flexibility
than such mandates allowed (Craig, 1994). Equally, however, the very democratic
impulse,or desire,to create some form of connection between the citizenry and in-
dependent agencies, proved equally difficult to accommodate solely within the
doctrines of the law of standing, or locus standi. Thus, on the one hand, individual
citizens might challenge agency decisions if their individual rights were affected;
yet,such a rights-based reading of administrative review,achieved little with regard
to ensuring that the interests of all citizens be respected. Similarly, on the other
hand, allowing interest groups to challenge the activities of independent regulato-
ry authorities did ensure added political representation for groups of citizens with-
in the administrative process; however, once again, this was surely only a partial re-
flection of the public interest of citizens and the political community as a whole
(Croley, 1998). Clearly, some more comprehensive mix of oversight mechanisms
was required to ensure the accountability of independent institutions.
In this respect, academic literature has accordingly recently developed a se-
ries of more comprehensive administrative oversight mechanisms. These instru-
ments of control of democratic accountability may be divided into four categories;
the vital point to note,however,is that such instruments derive their major strength
in the controlling of accountability from their ability to complement one another to
give rise to an overall scheme of control.
Independence:one of the primary causes of intransparent administration is
thus argued to be a close linkage between government departments, or political
actors, and the administration. Thus, where administration is buried within or an-
swers directly to governmental departments,political goals may be easily adjusted,
or subverted, without any public debate. Accordingly, it is apparent that ensuring
that agencies, and similar bodies, enjoy a degree of independence from govern-
ment, can, in fact, serve democratic transparency, determining that all policy
changes are discussed in the public debating arena.
Founding statutes: though the exact mandating of agencies to perform
specific ‘daily’ tasks has proven not to be possible, well-constructed ‘founding
statutes’ which lay down the general policy goals which agencies must pursue, as
well as the level of performance which they must achieve, nonetheless play a ma-
jor part in ensuring the accountability of independent bodies. Such founding
148 Giandomenico Majone and Michelle Eversonstatutes thus furnish the vital yardstick against which agency performance may be
evaluated.
Accountability to the named institutions of government:though the in-
dependence of agencies needs to be safeguarded, they may still be subject to a
subtle control by the named institutions of government. In the United States, for
example, the President retains a degree of control through his power to nominate
the chiefs of individual agencies. In the United Kingdom and US, the power of the
legislative arm to review agency budgets also furnishes greater accountability since
agencies may be allowed or denied the funding which they have requested to fol-
low particular policy goals. Similarly, courts retain a major power to review the ac-
tions of agencies through mechanisms such as the US Administrative Procedure
Act,which requires agencies to follow set patterns in their policy,rule and decision-
making processes.
Accountability to the public: various ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ mechanisms may be
used to ensure accountability to the general public. Primary amongst soft mecha-
nisms of control is the stipulation that agency staff must be suited to the tasks
which they are required to perform. They must be ‘experts’ in their field, so ensur-
ing the core convergence between the policy which the agency pursues and the
goals which it is set by the public (a primary legitimating plank within the new deal
agencies). Such expertise can thus be assured through the publication of decisions
— allowing experts external to the agency to review the work of their peers — or
through review by parliamentary committees. Similarly,soft control can also be fur-
nished through review (budgetary or otherwise) of annual agency reports by other
independent auditing bodies. In contrast,‘hard’ mechanisms of public control are
the classical instruments of judicial review,which allow individuals (and sometimes
groups) to challenge decisions which have personally affected them. In law, indi-
vidual ‘rights’provide the vital basis for standing before the courts, while procedur-
al legal instruments, such as the American Administrative Procedures Act, furnish
the courts with a legal quality yardstick with reference to which they may review in-
dividual decisions. Where procedures have been incorrectly followed, or decisions
poorly-reasoned,they may be overturned.
Interestingly, in the EU setting various such mechanisms have already been
developed to ensure the accountability of the nascent agencies now operating. Thus,
for example,a measure of budgetary control over the agencies is provided through a
review of their reports and activities by the Commission, European Parliament and
European Court of Auditors. Equally,the notion that ‘expertise’can ensure commit-
ment to the well-defined political goals laid down in founding statutes,has found a
hold at the European level. Thus,Council regulations stipulate the policy aims which
European agencies are required to pursue;while the independent staffing policies of
the agencies, as well as their large degree of more informal networking with inde-
pendent and national scientific/technical expertise (EIONET is a credible example
here),secure the quality of the expertise employed. Similarly,the possibilities for a ju-
dicial review of agency action at the European level are increasing. For example,the
ECJ’s recent willingness to deploy Article 190 EC Treaty to ensure that the decisions of
Community institutions are ‘well-reasoned’and are taken with adequate reference to
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which will increase the public accountability of the European agencies through
rights of individual review (see,in particular,the case of Hauptzollamt München-Mitte
v Technische Universität München, Case C-269/90, (1990) ECR I-5469, requiring the
Commission to consult ‘experts’prior to giving a decision).
In conclusion then,the process of restructuring the Community’s legal envi-
ronment to allow for the control of tasks delegated to bodies outside the treaty
structures has already begun,and current analytical and practical efforts must now
focus more rigorously upon the refinement of mechanisms of agency design, con-
trol and coordination.
Means of agency control and coordination
Agencies and regulatory networks
Prior to expanding upon mechansims of agency design and control,it is im-
portant to note that ‘agency’is not a technical term,but rather an omnibus label to
describe a variety of organisations — commissions, directorates, inspectorates, au-
thorities,services,offices — which perform functions of a governmental nature,and
which often exist outside of the normal departmental framework of government.
The most comprehensive definition is probably provided by the US Administrative
Procedures Act (APA). According to this important statute which regulates the de-
cision-making processes of all agencies of the federal government, an agency is a
part of government that is generally independent in the exercise of its functions
and that by law has authority to take a final and binding action affecting the rights
and obligations of individuals, particularly by the characteristic procedure of rule-
making and adjudication.
It should therefore be noted that agency status does not require that an
agency exercise its power with complete independence, either vertically (in terms
of being subject to administrative review), or horizontally (in terms of being re-
quired to act in concert with others). If an authority is in complete charge of a pro-
gramme, it is an agency with regards to that programme, despite its subordinate
position in other respects.
To exemplify, the independent regulatory commissions, such as the Inter-
state Commerce Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission are
agencies in the sense of the APA,but so are the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (located within the Department of Labour) and the Army Corps of En-
gineers. Thus, in the EU context, most European agencies of the first and second
generation,as well as Eurostat,are de facto agencies in the same sense.
Equally, however, the term ‘agency’ includes a great variety of activities, ob-
jectives and institutional designs. In the United Kingdom, for example, the next
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tus over their activity while others do not; some agencies are self-funding, while
others rely on departmental funding; and a number of agencies perform regulato-
ry functions while others are primarily concerned with service delivery.
Such functional differences can have a significant impact upon the practical
operations of the agencies, and should therefore be reflected in their institutional
design. This point should be emphasised as the European Union has — to date —
followed essentially one institutional model for all the agencies created since 1990.
A more sophisticated approach must instead rely on a sufficiently rich taxonomy of
agency types and functions,especially to enable the definition of appropriate stan-
dards of effectiveness and of accountability.
In particular,note should also be made of the fact that an agency can oper-
ate as a part of a network including both national and European regulatory author-
ities. In fact,the new European agencies have not been designed to operate in iso-
lation, or to replace national regulators. Rather, they are expected to become the
central nodes of networks including national agencies as well as international or-
ganisations.
National and EU representatives and experts sit in the management boards
and the scientific committees of the new agencies. These committees formulate
the scientific opinion of the agency, and may perform other important functions.
Thus,the two scientific committees of the medicines’agency,EMEA — one for pro-
prietary medicinal products, CPMP, and one for veterinary medicines, CVMP — also
arbitrate disputes between pharmaceutical firms and national authorities. The
CPMP, like the CVMP, consists of two members nominated by each Member State,
while the Commission is no longer represented in the committees,no doubt in or-
der to emphasise their functional independence.
The committee members represent the national regulatory authorities,but it
would be wrong to assume that,through their power of appointment,the national
governments effectively control EMEA’s authorisation process. In fact, both com-
mittees — which already played a significant role in the old multi-state drug appli-
cation procedure — have not only become more important, but more independ-
ent since the creation of the EMEA. This is because it is in their interest to establish
an international reputation for good scientific work,and for this purpose the degree
to which they reflect the views of the national governments is irrelevant.
This change in the incentive structures of regulators operating in a transna-
tional network deserves to be emphasised by making use of a distinction intro-
duced by sociologist Alvin Gouldner. In his work on the sociology of the profes-
sions (1998), Gouldner introduced the distinction between ‘cosmopolitans’
and ‘locals’. Cosmopolitans are likely to adopt an international reference-group ori-
entation, while locals tend to have a national, or sub-national (e.g., organisational)
orientation. Hence, local experts tend to be more submissive to the institutional
and hierarchical structures in which they operate than do cosmopolitan experts,
who can appeal to the standards and criteria of an international body of scientific
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formation of national regulators from ‘locals’to ‘cosmopolitans’. It does this by pro-
viding a stable institutional focus at European level and important links to extra-Eu-
ropean regulatory bodies,such as,the US Food and Drugs Administration.
Another interesting network structure is emerging in the area of competi-
tion policy. The recent Commission White Paper on the modernisation of the rules
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (European Commission 1999),
represents a significant move toward a coordinated partnership between national
and European authorities in the implementation of Articles 85 and 86 of the Rome
Treaty, and, in particular, towards a decentralisation of the Article 85(3) exemption
procedure.
For such a transnational regulatory network to function properly, however,
several conditions have to be satisfied. First, there must be a good deal of mutual
trust and cooperation. In the case of competition policy, for example, if a national
authority comes to the conclusion that a case has a Community dimension and re-
quires action by the Commission,it should be able to forward its file,including any
confidential information, to the Commission. Conversely, if the Commission finds
that the effects of a disputed practice are felt primarily in one Member State, it
should be entitled to send the whole of the file to the competent authority in that
Member State, so that the authority can continue the investigation, making direct
use in evidence of the information supplied (European Commission,1999,p.33).
A second condition is a high level of professionalisation of the regulators.
One reason why Regulation 17, which was adopted in 1962, established a cen-
tralised authorisation system for all restrictive practices requiring exemption under
Article 85(3), was that in the early years, the contours of competition policy were
not widely known in many parts of the Community. A decentralised authorisation
system is possible today because national competition authorities everywhere are
becoming more professional and increasingly jealous of their independence. Pro-
fessionals are oriented by goals,standards of conduct and cognitive beliefs that de-
rive from their professional community,giving them strong reasons for resisting in-
terference and direction from political outsiders (Moe,1987,p.2).
The importance of professionalisation is clearly recognised by the recent
White Paper;for example,where it states that ‘(I)n the context of pre-accession strat-
egy, the Commission will devote particular attention to the development of com-
petition in the candidate countries and will provide their competition authorities
with increased assistance’ (European Commission 1999, p. 37). A similar pre-acces-
sion strategy should be followed in all other areas of regulation in order to facilitate
the development of similar Trans-European Networks.
A common regulatory philosophy is a third important condition for the
proper functioning of a regulatory network. A good example is again provided by
competition policy where a high level of harmonisation has already been achieved
spontaneously in the Member States. However, regulatory philosophies evolve in
response to changing economic,technological and social conditions. Hence,some
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change of views among national and Community regulation. To this end,the White
Paper (European Commission 1999, p. 37) proposes to reinforce the role of the Ad-
visory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions. According to
the Commission’s proposal,the Committee:
would become a full-scale forum in which important cases would be dis-
cussed irrespective of the competition authority dealing with them. It
would continue to be consulted on legislation drafted by the Commission
and on draft Commission decisions in the same way as today, but the
Commission, acting on its own initiative or at the request of a Member
State, could also be empowered to ask the Committee for its opinion on
cases of application of Community law by national authorities.
Some of the new European Agencies, such as EMEA, could provide a similar
forum in their respective areas of regulation.
Typically, these conditions for the viability of a transnational regulatory net-
work — mutual trust,professionalism,and a common philosophy — will not be ful-
ly satisfied at the beginning. However, the very existence of the network provides
an environment favourable to their development. A national agency that sees itself
as part of a transnational network of institutions pursuing similar objectives and
facing analogous problems, rather than as a marginal addition to a large central 
bureaucracy pursuing a variety of objectives, is more motivated to defend its pro-
fessional standards and policy commitments against external influence, and to 
cooperate with the other members of the network. This is because the agency ex-
ecutives have an incentive to maintain their reputation in the eyes of their interna-
tional colleagues. Unprofessional, self-seeking or politically motivated behaviour
would compromise their international reputation and make cooperation more 
difficult to achieve in the future.
Thus, the function of a network is not only to permit an efficient division of
labour and the exchange of information, but also to facilitate the development of
behavioural standards and working practices that create shared expectations and
enhance the effectiveness of the social mechanisms of reputational enforcement.
There is no reason why the network model,given the right conditions,could
not be extended to all areas of economic and social regulation of Community in-
terests,and indeed to all administrative activities where mutual trust and reputation
are the key to greater effectiveness.
Agency costs and transaction costs
However varied their form,agencies — as the term indicates — are the agents
established by some principal(s) to carry out their single or joint purpose. An agency
problem accordingly arises because of the possibility that the administrative agents
will not comply with the policy preferences of the principal. This problem creates
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implement faithfully the principals’objectives,and the losses which principals sustain
where they are not able to control their agents perfectly. Agency costs include the
costs associated with selecting the executives of the agencies and monitoring their
compliance,the costs of using corrective devices (rewards,sanctions,and legislative
direction), and the cost of any residual non-compliance that produces a difference
between the policy enacted and what is implemented.
Agency problems can be addressed in a number of ways. For example, the
same level of administrative compliance can be achieved with less monitoring if ex
post rewards and sanctions are made more effective at aligning the incentives of
the agents with the principals’policy preferences. Similarly,neither monitoring nor
incentive devices are as important if it is possible to appoint agency executives
who share the objectives of the principals. The objective of institutional design is
to identify the mix of selection,monitoring,and ex post incentive and correction de-
vices that will reduce agency problems at lowest cost to the principal(s).
The decision to delegate certain tasks to an agency does not depend only
on agency costs, but also on other ‘transaction costs’, such as, the cost of decision-
making per se and the cost of achieving credible policy commitments. Moreover,
the two classes of cost are closely related. Thus, a broad delegation reduces deci-
sion-making costs since the principal does not have to invest resources in working
out the details of regulation, but it increases the cost of controlling the agency’s
discretion. Similarly, a high level of agency independence increases the credibility
of regulatory commitment by reducing the influence of political considerations in
agency decision-making, but it increases the risk that the agency will not comply
with the policy preferences of its principals.
Though rather abstract, these considerations do have practical application
— and may in fact be illustrated by the Commission’s current stance that the ben-
efits of delegation to the comitology system may outweigh its costs — and prepare
the ground for a general discussion of the relevant decision variables in the follow-
ing pages.
Institutional choice
It is up to the principals to structure relationships with their agents so that the
outcomes produced through the agents’ efforts are the best the principals can
achieve, given the choice to delegate in the first place. The following institutional
choices are crucial for the design of an efficient and accountable agency (Horn,1995):
(i) The extent to which decisions are delegated to the agency rather than taken
by the principals themselves — i.e.institutional variable D,ranging from 0 (‘no
delegation’) to 1 (‘full delegation’).
(ii) The governance structure of the organisation to which powers are delegated:
ministerial departments, single-headed agency, multi-headed commission,
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along which these organisations vary is their degree of independence from
their political or bureaucratic principals. Thus, institutional variable G can
range from 0 (‘no independence’) to 1 (‘full independence’).
(iii) The rules that specify the procedures to be followed in agency decision-mak-
ing: rules of evidence, reason giving requirements, rules defining the rights of
various groups to participate directly in the decision-making process. This vari-
able P is clearly multi-dimensional. If, however, we focus on participation, we
can again scale P from 0 (‘no participation’) to 1 (‘full participation’).
(iv) The extent of ex post monitoring through ongoing legislative and executive
oversight, the budgetary process, judicial review, citizens’ complaints, expert
criticism, and so on. This variable M can be scaled from 0 (‘very easy’) to 1
(‘very difficult’).
The institutional design problem facing the principal can be represented in
very general terms as:choose the values of the variables D,G,P and M so as to min-
imise the sum of agency costs,decision-making costs,and commitments costs,sub-
ject to some constraints.
These constraints indicate how agency and transaction costs are related to
the four choice variables. Thus, agency costs increase with increasing values of D,
since more delegation means greater agency discretion,and with increasing values
of G, since more independence implies more discretion; they decrease when the
cost of ex post monitoring (M) is low and procedural requirements (P) are tight.
Again, principals’decision-making costs are inversely related to the degree of dele-
gation,as already discussed,and positively related to P,because of the time and ef-
fort taken in setting tighter procedures;while G and M should not have much of an
impact on the decision-making costs of the principals. Finally, commitment costs
decrease with increasing levels of independence and tighter procedures, while ex
post monitoring will have different effects according to who does the monitoring
(e.g., judicial review will typically increase the credibility of regulatory commit-
ments,while administrative sanctions will have the opposite effect).
This analysis is not meant to suggest that agencies can be designed by
mathematical algorithms. Rather, its purpose is to identify the crucial institutional
choices to be made in designing an agency, and to call attention to the relation-
ships between these choice variables and the different categories of cost. More-
over, these choice variables are important not only from an efficiency perspective
— the minimisation of the sum of agency and transaction costs — but also for the
design of an effective accountability structure.
Executive oversight
Even a country like the United States, with its century-old experience of
statutory regulation at State and federal level,had no executive branch oversight of
regulatory agencies until the 1970s. After the emergence of the health, safety and
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verify that these regulations were in society’s best interest and,in particular,that the
costs they imposed were justified by the benefits they were expected to produce.
Traditionally, agencies were constrained by little other than their legislative
mandate and potential judicial review as to whether they were adhering to the
mandate. Congress can, of course, pass legislation requiring that an agency take a
particular type of action, but routine regulatory actions seldom receive congres-
sional scrutiny. Most important, there is no need for congressional approval for a
regulatory agency to take action provided that it can survive judicial review. Hence
the need for executive oversight of the agencies. Such oversight is the responsibil-
ity of a specialised unit within the Executive Office of the President, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB).
A regulatory clearing house is needed also in the EU in order to ensure that
actions taken by different agencies and Directorates-General meet basic standards
of consistency and efficiency. Moreover, such a unit would help the President to
fulfil his responsibility of providing political guidance to the Commission’s work un-
der Article 214 of the Consolidated Treaties. A European OMB could be established
within the framework of the present treaties. It would systematise and generalise
what the Commission is already doing, for example, in the case of the Medicines
Agency. For all these reasons it is instructive to analyse in some detail the role of
the American OMB in controlling and coordinating the work of federal agencies.
The first stage of the development of a federal regulation occurs at the time
when an agency decides to regulate a particular area of economic activity. Once a
topic is on the agency’s regulatory agenda, it must be listed as part of its regulato-
ry programme if it is a significant regulatory action that is likely to have a substan-
tial cost impact. OMB has the authority to review this regulatory programme,
where the purpose of this review is to identify potential overlap among agencies,to
become aware of particularly controversial regulatory policies that are being devel-
oped, and to screen out regulations that appear to be particularly undesirable.
These reviews have essentially an informational function,alerting OMB to potential
inter-agency conflicts.
The next stage in the development of a regulation is to prepare a regulato-
ry impact analysis (RIA). This requires the agency to calculate benefits and costs
and to determine whether the benefits of the regulation are in excess of the costs
it imposes on the regulated activities. The agency is also required to consider po-
tentially more desirable policy alternatives,such as information strategies instead of
a command-and-control approach. After completing the RIA, the agency must
send the analysis to OMB for its review, which must take place 60 days before the
agency issues a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register.D u r -
ing this period OMB reviews the proposed regulation and the analysis supporting
it. In the majority of cases,OMB simply approves the regulation in its current form.
In some instances,OMB negotiates with the agency to obtain improvements in the
regulation,and in a few instances OMB rejects the regulation as being undesirable.
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This OMB review is generally a secret process. The secretive nature of the re-
view process is intended to enable the regulatory agency to alter its position with-
out having to admit publicly that it has made an error in terms of the regulation it
has proposed. Keeping the debate out of the public arena prevents the parties
from becoming locked into positions for the purpose of a public image. The disad-
vantage of secrecy is, of course, that it excludes Congress and the public from the
regulatory policy debate. For this reason, under the Clinton administration, OMB
has made a major effort to open up more aspects of this review process to public
scrutiny.
If the proposal does not receive OMB approval,the agency can make an ap-
peal to the President or to the Vice-President if the latter has been delegated au-
thority for this class of regulatory issues.
After receiving OMB approval,the agency can publish the NPRM in the Federal
Register. Included in the material inserted in the official journal is typically a detailed
justification for the regulation, which often includes an assessment of the benefits
and costs of the regulatory measure. Once the proposal has been published in the
FederalRegister,it is open to public debate. This is a 30 to 90 day period for public no-
tice and comment. After receiving and processing these public comments, the
agency must then put the regulation in its final form. In doing so,it finalises its regu-
latory impact analysis, and it submits both the regulation and the accompanying
analysis to OMB 30 days before publishing the final regulation in the Federal Register.
OMB has roughly one month to review the regulation in its final form and
decide whether to approve it. The overwhelming majority of regulations are ap-
proved and published as final rules in the official journal. Generally-speaking, one
can say that the OMB review process alters regulations in minor ways, such as in-
troducing alternative methods of compliance that will be less costly but equally ef-
fective as those proposed by the agency. The main function of OMB review is to
force the agencies to support their proposals by well-developed analyses. OMB has
also been successful in screening out some of the most inefficient regulations,such
as those with costs per life saved,well in excess of USD 100 million (Viscusi,Vernon
and Harrington,1996,Chapters 2 and 20).
Coordination and regulatory budgets
In addition to monitoring the quality of individual agency proposals,a regu-
latory clearing house located at a sufficiently high level in the Community bureau-
cracy, preferably in the office of the President, could also coordinate all regulatory
activities by imposing a novel type of budgetary discipline.
Coordination is a serious problem in all complex organisations, but it is es-
pecially acute in the case of regulatory activities. While the size and priorities of
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tives through the normal budgetary process, budgetary constraints have a limited
impact on regulatory activities. This is because the real costs of regulations is borne
not by the regulators,but by the individuals and organisations that have to comply
with the regulations. The result is a serious lack of coordination both within and
across regulatory programmes and agencies.
Regulatory issues tend to be dealt with sector by sector,and even within the
same sector it is often difficult to see that regulatory priorities are set in a way that
explicitly takes into consideration either the urgency of the problem or the benefits
and costs of different proposals. For example,the imbalance between water and air
pollution control existing in the EC can hardly be explained by differences in the se-
riousness of the relevant problems. Also,the marginal health benefits produced by
certain environmental directives, such as the one on the quality of drinking water,
appear to many analysts to be out of proportion with the very substantial costs im-
posed on the water industry and, ultimately, on all citizens. Again, the piecemeal
procedure of the Commission in proposing new regulations has resulted in direc-
tives in areas where harmonisation is a low priority, while neglecting other areas
that need a considerable amount of harmonisation. Such problems are com-
pounded whenever previously centralised responsibilities are allocated to various
decentralised agencies.
If lack of budgetary discipline is a serious defect of the regulatory process,
one can attempt to create coordination and control mechanisms similar to those
traditionally used for direct public expenditures. This is the idea of a regulatory
budget. In its basic outline, the regulatory budget would be established jointly by
Congress and the President for each agency, starting with a budget constraint on
total private expenditures mandated by regulation,and then allocating the budget
among the different agencies. Simultaneous consideration by OMB of all major
regulatory proposals would permit an assessment of their joint impact on particu-
lar industries and on the economy as a whole.
Thus, the administrative procedure for implementing a regulatory budget
would mirror that of a fiscal budget. In addition to the traditional budget submis-
sions,the President would send to Congress a budget limiting the regulatory costs
that could be imposed on the national economy. After hearings by the relevant
committees, each house would vote on the specifics and a conference committee
would produce a compromise bill. After enactment by both houses,the regulatory
budget would be forwarded to the President to sign into law. Like the fiscal bud-
get, the regulatory budget would be open to political debate. In fact, the actual
level of the regulatory budget can only be determined through the political
process,as in the case of the fiscal budget.
Again like the fiscal budget, the regulatory budget focuses on the costs
rather than the benefits of regulation. However, since each regulatory agency
would face a constraint that limits its total mandated spending,it would have an in-
centive to allocate its resources in the most efficient manner to achieve its policy
objectives. If forced to choose between programmes, agencies would be encour-
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ising this portion of the budget allocation process, Congress and the President
would have an added interest in ensuring that regulatory funds are allocated to the
agencies which produce the most substantial benefits for society. They would also
assume responsibility for the overall magnitude and priorities of regulation,and for
inter-agency coordination.
The primary difficulty in implementing a regulatory budget is cost estima-
tion. Without a reliable, consistent estimate of costs (broken down by agency and
by regulatory programme),it is impossible for a budgetary authority to make sensi-
ble allocations of resources across different agencies and regulatory programmes.
Regulatory costs fall into three distinct categories:
(i) Operation of the regulatory agency. These costs are represented by salaries,
administrative costs and capital expenditures needed to operate the agency.
(ii) Compliance by firms, consumers and government organisations. This catego-
ry includes the direct expenditures that are needed to comply with a given
regulation. So-called process costs — the costs of filling out paperwork and
dealing with administrative requirements — also fall into this category of di-
rect costs.
(iii) Indirect economic costs in the form of reduced output and efficiency loss. For
example,if a regulatory agency mandates a new safety device on a product,then
the price of that product will almost certainly rise because of higher production
costs. Because of this,some consumers who would have bought the product at
the old price will now find themselves priced out of the market. In addition,pro-
ducers will earn lower profits,and some marginal firms may go out of business.
These combined efforts are often termed ‘dead-weight loss’to reflect unrecov-
erable costs to society of reduced production due to regulation.
Now, operating costs are relatively easy to quantify, as they are already re-
ported as part of the fiscal budget;they are by far the smallest part of the cost of reg-
ulation. Compliance costs are generally obtained through surveys or audits of af-
fected firms,or through engineering studies. Indirect economic costs would have to
be calculated by means of general equilibrium models simultaneously examining the
interactions of all consumers,all firms and all markets. Whatever the theoretical inter-
est of such general equilibrium analysis,its usefulness in a policy structure such as the
regulatory budget is probably limited. In practical terms,the most important inputs
into the regulatory budgetary process are estimates of compliance costs.
Sophisticated techniques of compliance cost assessment (CCA) have been
developed in recent years, not only in the United States, but also in Europe. In the
United States,for example,the Environmental Protection Agency has carried out ex-
tensive analyses to estimate the cost of recent amendments to the Clean Air Act
(CAA) and to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Estimates of pollution control ex-
penditure mandated by the CAA amendments indicate a ‘budget’of USD 79 billion
in compliance costs borne by economic agents between 1993 and 2000. Similarly,
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budgeted at USD 1.5 billion to USD 2.4 billion a year,or USD 20 billion for the entire
1993–2000 period.
In the United Kingdom, all government departments must prepare a CCA
when evaluating policy proposals likely to affect business. Similarly, all papers for
cabinet and cabinet committees, and minutes to the Prime Minister for collective
discussion that deal with proposals, which may have an impact on business, must
clearly spell out likely compliance costs.
Departments are also asked to prepare a CCA for all EC regulations and di-
rectives likely to be burdensome to business, whether or not the Commission is
preparing an impact assessment. A CCA should also be prepared for all UK legisla-
tion to implement agreed EC directives, as well as for Community acts, which,
though not binding on Member States,may lead to burdensome regulations.
In 1986, the European Commission introduced a system similar to the UK
CCA system for EC legislative proposals. Originally, every draft legislative proposal
being considered for adoption by the Commission was to be accompanied by an
impact assessment (fiche d’impact) outlining the impact of the proposed measure
on small and medium sized enterprises. Since 1990,however,assessments have on-
ly been completed on the most burdensome legislative proposals contained in the
Commission’s work programme.The DG XXIII (now Enterprise DG),at the beginning
of each year, identifies those measures on which impact assessments should be
completed. Others may be added to the list during the course of the year.
Thus,important elements of a regulatory budget are already available at the
EC level and at least in some Member States. This mechanism could be developed
further in selected policy areas such as water pollution control. A Community OMB
would provide the necessary focus for such efforts.
Procedural controls
There are two main forms of control of agency decisions:oversight — mon-
itoring, hearings, investigations, budgetary review, sanctions — and procedural
constraints. We have already tackled the role of a regulatory clearing house in
overseeing and coordinating the behaviour of agencies,now we examine in greater
detail how procedural requirements discipline agency discretion. Administrative
law views procedures primarily as a means of assuring fairness and legitimacy in
regulatory decision-making. This is, of course, a very important function of proce-
dures, but the point we wish to stress here is that procedures also serve control
purposes,for example,by mitigating informational disadvantages faced by political
principals in dealing with expert agencies.
It should be noted that oversight does not deal directly with the problem of
asymmetric information. If agencies have better information than their principals
do, they have a range of discretion that is undetectable to external overseers.
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could be devoted to achieving politically more rewarding objectives. Finally, most
of the methods for imposing meaningful sanctions for non-compliance also create
costs for the overseers. Thus, a publicly visible investigation and punishment of an
agency may raise doubts in the mind of citizens about the efficiency and honesty
of the principals themselves. At the same time, the sanctioning process lowers
morale and distracts the agency from the pursuit of its statutory objectives.
In sum, direct oversight of agency behaviour is unlikely to be a completely
effective solution to the control problem;it needs to be supplemented by more in-
direct and less costly mechanisms of a procedural nature. An optimal mix of con-
trol strategies, where each strategy complements the strengths of the other and
substitutes for the other’s weakness,will ensure less costly and more effective con-
trol of agency behaviour than exclusive reliance on any single control mechanism,
however powerful. What is at least as important,a diversified system can reconcile
accountability and independence by creating a situation whereby ‘no one controls
the agency,and yet the agency is under control’.
Also in the area of procedural controls,the American experience is highly in-
structive. We refer specifically to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946
and to its later extensions: the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) passed in 1966
and amended in 1974, 1976, 1986, and 1996; the Government in the Sunshine Act
(GITSA) of 1976; and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), enacted in 1972
and amended in 1976 to incorporate the GITSA standards for open meetings. APA
codified over a half-century of court decisions affecting agency proceedings. Prior
to the APA, procedural requirements imposed by the courts differed across agen-
cies. These included procedures relating to information gathering and disclosure,
and standards of evidence. Two important affects of the APA,therefore,were to im-
pose greater uniformity across agencies and to raise the minimum evidentiary stan-
dards to which an agency must adhere.
The FOIA gives citizens the right to inspect all agency records that do not
fall within any of 10 specified categories, such as, trade secrets and those files, the
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to constitute an invasion of pri-
vacy or compromise a law enforcement investigation. However,even these excep-
tions are not absolute. To reduce even further the chances that an agency can ma-
nipulate the FOIA to its own advantage, the law requires the agency to prove that
it need not release the information (rather than requiring the citizen to prove that
it should release it). The FOIA was adopted in response to claims that many core
documents and other information underlying important agency decisions were not
available to the public, thereby impairing the right of citizens and of the media to
monitor government performance.
The Sunshine Act is similarly designed to prevent secrecy in government,
but its reach and impact are more limited than the FOIA’s. The GITSA applies to
agencies headed by collegial bodies, such as the independent regulatory commis-
sions. It obliges such agencies to provide advance notice of meetings at which
agency business is to be conducted,and to meet in public unless the members,by
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emptions. Yet, Congress recognised the legitimacy of protecting oral deliberations
on issues whose resolution could be undermined by premature disclosure and thus
Section 9(B) of the Sunshine Act permits closure if discussion would:
disclose information,the premature disclosure of which would… be likely
to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action..
…but (this exception) shall not apply in any instance where the agency
has already disclosed to the public the content or nature of its proposed
action,or..…is required by law to make such disclosure on its own initia-
tive prior to taking final agency action on such a proposal.
The narrow terms of this exception, however, make closure difficult in most
cases.
The FACA establishes requirements that agencies must follow when consult-
ing groups of individuals who are not federal employees, and it prescribes how
such advisory committees shall proceed in rendering their service to the agency.
The main requirements for the creation of an advisory committee are the existence
of a charter, which must be approved by the General Services Administration; se-
lection of members to assure diverse views on the issues to be considered; and
mandatory expiration, or rechartering after two years. The main obligations of es-
tablished committees are to publish advance notice of their meetings and to de-
liberate in public,subject to the GITSA exceptions permitting closure.
While the APA and the other laws mentioned above have affected the con-
tent of agency decisions by bringing new information and views to the attention of
regulators, Congress was not seeking through their enactment to affect specific
policies. Other statutes do have clear substantive objectives, though they often
employ procedural means. The following are two examples of procedural statutes
with substantive goals.
The National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 sets forth procedural re-
quirements to assure agency consideration of environmental values in the formula-
tion and implementation of policy. Its core is the requirement that before taking
any major action that may significantly affect ‘the quality of the human environ-
ment’,an agency must prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) identifying
those effects,detailing their significance,and evaluating their alternatives. NEPA au-
thorises the Council on Environmental Quality to coordinate the consideration of
environmental issues among federal agencies and, with presidential support, the
Council has periodically issued guidelines for the preparation of EISs. NEPA has
served as a model for other statutes that seek to broaden the range of values and
the types of information which agency executives weigh in making decisions. Our
second example,the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980,is an illustration.
The RFA was a product of mounting concern about the impact of environ-
mental and health regulation on economic growth and,in particular,on small busi-
nesses. The focus of the Act is ostensibly procedural;it does not alter,or require an
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information about the impact of regulatory requirements on small business.
The RFA requires all federal agencies to modify their rule-making procedures
and to consider regulatory alternatives to rules,‘likely to have a significant econom-
ic impact on a substantial number of small entities’. Before issuing a proposal, the
agency has to prepare an ‘initial regulatory flexibility analysis’ that estimates the
proposed rule’s impact on small business and explores alternatives that would ac-
complish the same objectives. A final ‘flexibility analysis’is required to be part of the
record of the agency’s published rule.
Congress left unclear the issue of how compliance with the RFA was to be
assured. The original Act specified that an agency’s failure to prepare a ‘regulatory
flexibility analysis’for a rule not certified as exempt shall void the rule. But it went
on to provide that agency determination of the Act’s applicability, as well as their
analysis,shall not be subject to judicial review.
The RFA was extensively amended in 1996. Probably the most significant
feature of the amendment statute is the provision allowing the judicial review of
the contents of an agency’final ‘regulatory-flexibility analysis’, of the agency’s certi-
fication that a rule will not have significant impact on small businesses, and of the
agency’s fulfilment of its obligation to review existing rules to see if they should be
amended or rescinded in order to minimise significant economic impacts on small
businesses. The 1996 legislation also prescribed additional steps that certain agen-
cies, notably, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration,must take to elicit the views of small business firms,and
requires agencies generally to publish guides for small businesses on how to com-
ply with agency rules (Mashaw,Merrill and Shane,1998).
The examples just given show quite clearly that procedural rules are not on-
ly a means of assuring fairness and legitimacy in agency decision-making;they also
fulfil important control functions, providing cost-effective solutions to problems of
non-compliance by agencies. Specifically,procedures can first,reduce the informa-
tional disadvantage of political executives, stakeholders and citizens at large; and,
second,they can be designed to assure that agency decisions will be responsive to
the constituents that the policy is intended to favour, even when the statutory ob-
jectives are vague and seemingly give an agency great policy discretion (McCub-
bins,Noll and Weingast,1987,pp.243–277).
Thus,the procedural requirements under the APA,FOIA and GITSA reduce an
expert agency’s advantage over its political sponsors in a number of ways. First,
agencies cannot present political principals with a fait accompli. They must an-
nounce their intention to consider an issue well in advance of any decision. Sec-
ond,the notice and comment provisions assure that the agency learns who are the
relevant stakeholders,and takes some notice of the distributional impacts associat-
ed with various actions.
Third, the entire sequence of agency decision-making — notice, comment,
deliberation,collection of evidence and construction of a ‘record’(dossier) in favour
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spond when the agency seeks to move in a direction that officials do not approve
of. Finally, the broad public participation, which the several statutes facilitate, also
works as a gauge of political interest and controversy, providing advance warning
about serious distributional consequences of the decisions the agency is likely to
make,in the absence of political intervention.
By controlling the extent and mode of public participation, legislators can
strengthen the position of the intended beneficiaries of the bargain struck by the
coalition that created the agency. This has been called ‘deck-stacking’. Deck-stack-
ing enables political actors to cause the environment in which an agency operates
to mirror the political forces that gave rise to the agency’s legislative mandate,long
after the coalition behind the legislation has disbanded. The agency may seek to
develop a new clientele for its services, but such an activity must be undertaken
not only in full view of the members of the initial coalition, but following set pro-
cedures that, in relation to the RFA, for example, automatically integrate the inter-
ests of small business in agency decision-making. This in turn has lead to exemp-
tions procedures that are designed to favour them.
The National Environmental Policy Act provides another clear example of
deck-stacking. In the 1960s, environmental groups sought to affect the pro-
grammes of almost every federal agency. However,the political cost of passing leg-
islation for each agency that would alter its decision-making procedures in ways
favourable to environmentalists, was too high. Sweeping procedural change that
would affect the decision-making of every federal agency was a more attractive
strategy. As we saw,NEPA imposed procedures that required all agencies to file en-
vironmental impact statements on proposed projects. These procedures gave en-
vironmental actors an effective avenue of participation in agency decisions and en-
abled participants to voice their concerns at a much earlier time than had been
possible previously. The requirements of the statute also provided environmental
groups with an increased ability to press suits against agencies. Thus, the passage
of NEPA effectively projected the new political environment of the 1960s and 1970s
into the proceedings of any federal agency whose decisions could affect environ-
mental interests.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 is similar to NEPA in its approach and
effect. As mentioned above,the RFA requires analysis of the impact of rule-making
(but not adjudication) by public agencies on the cost to small business. The effect
has been to enfranchise automatically the interest of small business in agency de-
cision-making. This in turn has led to exemptions for small business in the require-
ments of many proposed regulations.
This section has reviewed a number of administrative and procedural mech-
anisms to control agency discretion, reduce the informational disadvantage of po-
litical executives and citizens, and to induce specialised agencies to take into ac-
count broad concerns such as the environment or the competitiveness of small en-
terprises. It may be useful to add a few comments concerning the last point,which
relates directly to a central dilemma of regulatory policy-making.
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by the agencies’expertise in a fairly narrow range of technical issues. To go beyond
this range would seriously compromise not only the legitimacy, but also the credi-
bility of an agency’s determinations. However, these determinations may affect
concerns and interests outside the agency’s mandate. As indicated above, proce-
dural requirements cannot go so far as to require the balancing of conflicting val-
ues. This is a political responsibility that should not be delegated to technicians.
Hence,it must be possible for the political executives to intervene whenever an au-
thoritative resolution of value conflicts is needed. Such interventions cannot be ar-
bitrary,however,but must follow well-defined procedures;they should be transpar-
ent (that is,plain for everybody to see),and should entail significant costs whenev-
er they are perceived to be motivated by partisan considerations. A good model is
provided by the procedures, which the German Government must follow when it
wishes to overrule a decision of the independent Federal Cartel Office.
Conclusion
The central theme of this report is that the current crisis of EC regulation is,
above all, a crisis of credibility. Like paper money, regulation is only as good as the
confidence people have in it. Popular confidence in the efficacy of EC regulation
has been badly shaken by the series of crises that have crippled the market for
foodstuffs; but these episodes are only the symptom of a more widespread dissat-
isfaction with a system which seems to be increasingly unable to deliver what it
promises — or what consumers and economic actors expect it to deliver. More-
over,because rule-making — positive integration — is so central to EC policy-mak-
ing,any systemic shock,such as the events which led to the resignation of the San-
ter Commission,poses a direct threat to the credibility of Community regulators.
That the EC distinctive approach to regulation is seriously flawed, is hardly a
new observation. Indeed, many reforms undertaken since the 1980s — the shift
from total to minimum harmonisation, the new approach to technical standardisa-
tion,the establishment of mutual recognition as a pivotal regulatory principle,qual-
ified majority voting for internal market regulation — may be interpreted as at-
tempts to increase the credibility of European regulations. However, these impor-
tant reforms were driven more by immediate policy concerns than by a clear per-
ception of the credibility problem.
This problem has several roots which, for the sake of simplicity, we may cat-
egorise into internal and external threats to credibility. Internal threats arise from
the way the regulatory system has been designed and is operated, while external
threats originate in the social, economic, or political environment in which the sys-
tem is embedded.
The major internal threat to credibility identified by the present report,is the
serious mismatch between the Community’s highly complex and differentiated
tasks,and the available administrative instruments. In sector after sector,experience
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truly integrated market. Regulation is not achieved simply by passing a law — or,
by approximating national laws — but requires detailed knowledge of, and inti-
mate involvement with the regulated activity. In all industrialised countries, this
functional need has led, eventually, to the creation of specialised bodies — agen-
cies, boards, commissions, tribunals — capable of fact-finding, rule-making or adju-
dication, and enforcement. The lack of such administrative infrastructure at Euro-
pean level is a serious obstacle to the completion of the internal market.
In some areas, such as the public utilities, the problem is compounded by
the fact that many Member States still lack regulatory authorities that are suffi-
ciently credible in terms of expertise and independence. In other cases, the credi-
bility of Community regulators is threatened less by a lack of administrative and le-
gal instruments than by scarcity of resources. For example, only the limited re-
sources available to EC competition regulators can explain why the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the US Department of Justice, rather than the Competition DG, discovered
and successfully prosecuted the ‘vitamin cartel’— a cartel composed by European
firms. To reduce such internal threats to credibility,the Community must be able to
assume responsibility for the consistent and effective enforcement of European
rules throughout the Union.
Among the external threats to credibility,this paper emphasises the risks in-
herent to the process of progressive parliamentarisation of the Commission. We
view such a process as both unavoidable and positive from a normative viewpoint.
At the same time,we believe that the increasing politicisation of the Commission is
the strongest argument in favour of an increased recourse to non-majoritarian in-
stitutions of regulatory policy-making at the European level. In this respect,too,na-
tional experiences are instructive. All mature democracies delegate the implemen-
tation of regulatory law to specialised agencies operating at arm’s length from gov-
ernment. The point of insulating regulators from the political process is to enhance
the credibility of regulatory commitments. Independent regulators have strong in-
centives to pursue the statutory objectives assigned to their agencies, even where
the objectives are no longer politically popular.
In short, we argue that independent agencies represent an appropriate re-
sponse to internal,as well as,external threats to the credibility of EC regulation. This
conclusion is based on the general characteristics of the regulatory process,but al-
so on the specific features of the Community system,such as,the need to preserve
the balance between the European institutions and the Member States, and be-
tween the political and non-political branches of the Union.
To prevent misunderstandings,however,it is important to keep in mind that
the independence of regulatory agencies is relative. Even the powerful Indepen-
dent Regulatory Commissions in the United States, are independent only in the
sense that they operate outside the presidential hierarchy,and that ‘Commissioners’
cannot be removed from office by simple virtue of their disagreement with presi-
dential policy. All Commissioners are created by congressionally enacted statutes;
their legal authority and their objectives are defined and limited by such statutes.
166 Giandomenico Majone and Michelle EversonIn short,political principals have at their disposal a large number of substantive and
procedural means to oversee agencies and keep them accountable, without inter-
fering in their day-to-day today decision-making. In sum, agency status does not
require that the agency exercises its power with complete independence, but,
rather,that it possesses the legal authority to take a final and binding action affect-
ing the rights and obligations of individuals.
Equally, this model raises doubts about the wisdom of a generalised use of
the principle of collegial decision-making — even for decisions not involving polit-
ical discretion — but it does not in any way challenge the EC/U Treaties-based
powers and responsibilities of the Commission. On the contrary, the delegation of
implementing power to autonomous agencies would permit the Commission to
concentrate on the tasks that are truly essential to the process of European inte-
gration.
Similarly, European agencies are not meant to replace national regulatory
authorities; rather, they would form the central node of transnational networks in-
cluding national regulators,as well as international organisations. Agency networks
thus possess ‘super-additive’qualities. By this,we mean that a well-functioning net-
work is a good deal more than a mere sum of administrative bodies: the nature of
each agency in the network is positively changed by the very fact of membership.
An agency that sees itself as part of a transnational network of institutions pursuing
similar objectives, rather than as a marginal addition to a large central bureaucracy
pursuing a variety of objectives, is more motivated to defend its professional stan-
dards and policy commitments against external influences, and to cooperate with
the other members of the network. This is because the agency executives have a
strong incentive to maintain their reputation in the eyes of their international col-
leagues. Unprofessional, self-seeking or politically motivated behaviour would
compromise their international reputation and make cooperation more difficult to
achieve in the future.
According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ, Article 5 of the Rome Treaty im-
poses a reciprocal obligation of cooperation,not only between Community institu-
tions and national authorities, but also between the national authorities them-
selves. Traditionally, this general principle has been honoured in the breach, but
networks of autonomous agencies may provide the best conditions for its political
implementation.
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of legitimacy:the need 
for a process-based approach
Renaud Dehousse
The heated debates that have preceded the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty have brought to the fore the question of the legitimacy of the integration
process. They have made clear that the European Union can no longer be regard-
ed as a ‘classical’ international organisation, the decisions of which are legitimated
by the consent of their members. Not only is the EU system a greater producer of
binding norms of all kinds than most of its international counterparts, but various
elements,from the resort to majority voting to the role of NGOs,make it impossible
to simply reconduct all its decisions to the sovereign will of EU Member States.
While there seems to be a broad agreement on the fact that traditional in-
tergovernmental approaches no longer suffice to make sense of (let alone legit-
imise) the complex patterns of decision-making that characterise contemporary
European governance,there is no real consensus as to how the present institution-
al structure ought to be amended to improve the legitimacy of European decisions
in the eye of public opinion. As a result, Europe has engaged in a phase of ‘mega-
constitutional politics’1, in which a substantial part of the political debate is devot-
ed to institutional issues. The Maastricht Treaty has been amended only four years
after its coming into force,and a new Treaty round is already under way.
This contribution attempts to shed new light on this mighty problem by
suggesting that the traditional,parliamentary-based,approach to the reform of Eu-
ropean institutions is defective,normatively as well as analytically. Taking as a start-
ing point the transformation of modern governance, it advocates an alternative,
procedural approach, in which concepts of openness, transparency and participa-
tion play a central role.
The limits of representative democracy
For many years, discussions on the legitimacy of the European institutions
have revolved around the place of the parliamentary branch in the institutional sys-
tem. The alleged weakness of the European Parliament and the inability of most
national assemblies to significantly influence the behaviour of their executive were
perceived as the core of the Union’s ‘democratic deficit’. The European Parliament
1 The expression is borrowed to Peter Russell, Constitutional odyssey — can Canadians become a soveriegn
people?,Toronto University Press (1992).itself was not slow in raising the issue. From the mid-1980s onwards, it has repeat-
edly emphasised that while the competences transferred to the European Commu-
nity were mostly of a legislative nature,its own legislative powers remained weaker
than those of national legislatures, which was said to result in a weakening of the
democratic quality of European decision-making2.
Interestingly, this parliamentary vision of democracy has featured promi-
nently in the positions taken by institutions that did not share the European Parlia-
ment’s vested interest in promoting its own role. Thus, in the discussions on insti-
tutional reform that have spanned the last 15 years, many national governments
have regularly advocated an increase in the powers of the European Parliament —
a position which apparently had the support of large layers of the population in
countries like Germany3 or Italy. Similarly, in its now famous ruling on the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the German Constitutional Court identified in the institutional weak-
ness of the European Parliament the main shortcoming in the democratic creden-
tials of the European Union:
‘Where (the European Union) assumes sovereign tasks and exercises sover-
eign powers to carry them out, it is first and foremost for the national peoples of
the Member States to provide democratic control via their national parliaments.
Nevertheless, as the Community’s tasks and powers are expanded, so the need
grows to add to the democratic legitimacy and influence imparted through the 
national parliaments by securing the representation of the national populations of
the Member States in a European Parliament, as a source of additional democratic
underpinning for the policies of the European Union4.’
This apparent concession to orthodoxy was all the more remarkable, given
that the Bundesverfassungsgericht ruled out any possibility for democratic govern-
ment ever to emerge at the European level,on the grounds that the European poli-
ty lacks the ethnic and cultural homogeneity that are indispensable for the proper
functioning of any democratic system. Why bother about institutional engineering
if it is unable to ensure the results that one seeks to achieve anyway?
This convergence in the political discourses on European democracy shows
how deeply anchored a model representative democracy is in the western Euro-
pean political culture. To assess the relevance of this model in the EU context, it is
however useful to identify clearly a number of underlying assumptions. First, in its
most basic understanding, the system is based on what one could call an input-
oriented form of democratic legitimation5: people elect their representatives, the
latter take decisions affecting the fate of the polity, and they must be accountable
for their choices before voters. Central to this assumption is the fact that all politi-
cal choices can somehow be reconducted to the will expressed by citizens through
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2 Resolution on the democratic deficit,OJ C 187 1998,p.229.
3 Larat,‘L’Allemagne et le Parlement européen’, (1999) Critique internationale,No 5,
4 Case Nos 2 BvR 2134 and 2159/92, 12 October 1993, reprinted in Oppenheimer (ed.), The relationship be-
tween European Community law and national law:The cases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994,
pp.524–575 at p.553.
5 Scharpf, ‘Democratic policy in Europe’,2 European Law Journal,(1996)  pp.136–155.their votes. Secondly,laws passed by representative bodies are par excellence the in-
struments whereby such political choices are made. In this vision inherited from
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, legislative bills are the expression of an axiomatic ‘general
will’. Thirdly, there is often an implicit equation between the ‘general will’ and the
common good: what legislators decide is supposed to serve the interests of the
whole polity.
Applying such a model to the governance of the European polity is howev-
er problematic. Indeed,I would argue that this model is analytically weak,and nor-
matively ill-adapted to the specificity of the European Union.
The vision of representative democracy that is used in discussions on the le-
gitimacy of European institutions often seems to have more to do with 18th cen-
tury models of democracy than with the governance of complex post-industrial so-
cieties. It fails to take account of the many problems this form of government has
been confronted with at national level. To mention but a few:we have known since
Schumpeter that it is wrong to assume that the people itself decides issues
through the election of representatives6:elections are better described as a way to
choose — or,better said in our times of growing dissatisfaction with politics,to get
rid of — those who govern, and this choice is far from being merely influenced by
competing visions of the common good. Likewise, phenomena such as the 
emergence of large-scale bureaucracies,technological development and the grow-
ing importance of expert advice in public policy make it difficult to argue that all
decisions affecting the fate of the polity are taken by people’s representatives. The
decision-making process is generally much more complex:in many countries,legis-
lation to be adopted by parliaments is almost always drafted by the executive, and
is often conditioned by expert advice or by complex negotiations involving repre-
sentatives of organised interests. Political parties, the role of which was not con-
templated in liberal constitutions, also play an important mediating role. In other
words,the somewhat ethereal vision of representative democracy which is referred
to in discussions on the would-be European democracy has little to do with the
way this model actually operates in our times7.
Applying the representative model at European level is also problematic
from a normative standpoint. Its use often rests on an implicit assumption: if it
works at home (a risky statement,as was just said),it will also work at European lev-
el. Indeed,the institutional reforms of the last 15 years,with their steady increase in
the powers of the European Parliament, seem to be inspired by the idea that par-
liamentary democracy is a valid model at the European level as well as at national
level. This, however, fails to take into consideration the fact that moving from the
national to the supranational level entails a change in the level of analysis. Because
the European Union is not a State,but some sort of union of States,it would be fal-
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mimeo,Lisboa 1999.lacious to imagine that such a transposition can be done mechanically8. On the
contrary, the exercise is fraught with problems. Recent analyses have highlighted
the limits inherent in an input-based approach to the question of democracy in the
European Union. In a conglomerate where people’s primary allegiances tend to re-
main with their State9, the legitimacy of supranational institutions remains prob-
lematic. The development of a democratic debate is hampered by the absence of
a common language and of pan-European media10. Moreover, and more funda-
mentally, the heterogeneity of the European polity is such that the adoption of a
purely majoritarian system, in which decisions can be taken by a majority of repre-
sentatives of the people, is difficult to conceive. The lack of any strong collective
identity makes it difficult to believe that minorities would easily accept that their
fate be decided against their will11. Already now, it is far from rare to hear the EU
being accused of ignoring the traditions or the interests within the Union, in spite
of the many safeguards that exist in the decision-making process to protect Mem-
ber States’ interests. This kind of tension would be likely to grow exponentially if
some strict majoritarian rule were to be adopted. Ultimately, majority rule would
end up feeding centrifugal forces.
Does it follow that the best way to ensure the democratic functioning of the
EU is simply to return to a pure intergovernmental system, in which no decision
could be taken but with the explicit consent of all Member States, as is often ar-
gued in these days of creeping Euro-scepticism? That would be a simplistic conclu-
sion. Even leaving aside the transaction costs inherent in pure intergovernmental
models,it ignores the fact that negotiations in a multi-veto system cannot reach an
optimal outcome unless negotiators depart from their ‘democratic’mandate,name-
ly the preferences of their fellow citizens12. It also overlooks the fact that at nation-
al level too,the State machinery can easily be captured by specific interests,or even
be simply concerned with interests of its own. What is conveniently presented as
the national interest often corresponds more the interests of specific groups of
people, rather than the public good. France’s traditional tough stance on agricul-
tural issues in trade discussions may serve farmers’interests,but does it really serve
those of industrial producers or of consumers? Likewise,Britain’s attitude in the BSE
crisis appeared to be motivated more by a concern for the fate of beef producers
than by the interests of consumers.
This is not without analogy with the motive given by James Madison to jus-
tify the establishment of some kind of constitutional democracy at continental lev-
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12 Scharpf,supra note 10 at p.282.el. Rejecting Montesquieu’s idea that the public good was easier to achieve in a
small, homogeneous republic, Madison argued that it was easier to ignore the in-
terests of minorities in smaller polities:
the fewer the distinct parties and interests,the more frequently will a majority be
found of the same party;and the smaller the number of individuals composing a major-
ity,and the smaller the compass within which they are placed,the more easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression13.
To protect republican government, he wrote, the remedy is to extend the
‘sphere’ of the polity. By taking in ‘a greater variety of ideas and interests’, this
change of scale will ‘make it less probable that a majority of the majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.’14 Applied
to contemporary Europe,such an approach might lead one to view the integration
process as a source of value added in terms of democracy. For a British trade union-
ist in Mrs Thatcher’s Britain, or for a French industrialist interested in greater free-
dom of trade,the Europeanisation of social policy or of trade relations,respectively,
might appear as a way to secure a policy less hostile to their preferences, rather
than as a loss of collective sovereignty. Indeed,behind calls for European interven-
tions, we often find groups of people who somehow have failed to secure from
public authorities the kind of decision they wanted.
Reflections on European constitutionalism must therefore avoid two kinds of
evils. Statism — the tendency to reason as if one could simply transpose at suprana-
tional level solutions experienced at national level  — is likely to lead to conclusions
that might threaten the stability of the whole system. At the same time,however,one
should take account of the fact that the EU is in many respects unlike traditional in-
ternational organisations,be it only because it decides on a wide range of issues that
affect people’s daily life. Advocating a return to the good old days when national sov-
ereignty,embodied in national parliaments,was the answer to all legitimacy concerns
will not help,as a large number of issues appear to require transnational cooperation.
Some sort of democratic input in European decision-making is therefore needed —
urgently, one might argue, given the lack of enthusiasm displayed by citizens of all
Member States in Euro-elections. The best way to achieve this objective,I would ar-
gue, is to go beyond classical discussions on the kind of institutional arrangement
that should exist at the end of the integration process,and to pay greater attention to
the evolution of European governance. Normative analysis should be grounded on a
careful analysis of reality,if it is to avoid the pitfalls of excessive abstraction.
The growth of bureaucratic governance
As indicated above, so far normative discussions on how to improve the le-
gitimacy of European institutions have essentially focused on the powers of the Eu-
ropean Parliament. In many respects,this is but a corollary of a tendency to regard
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harmonisation,i.e.the approximation of substantive rules,be they contained in laws
or in administrative regulations at domestic level,as a key instrument in EU policies.
Harmonisation being primarily a legislative exercise, it was only natural to pay so
much attention to legislative procedures. However, this emphasis on legislative
procedures overlooks a fundamental transformation under way in the governance
of the European Union. Now that the legislative framework for the internal market
is nearly complete, there seems to be a slowdown in the Community’s legislative
activities. Figure 1 shows that the number of primary legislative proposals has de-
clined in recent years.
It would be wrong to conclude from this that the overall volume of Com-
munity regulatory activity is declining. Indeed, the overall volume of Commission
rule-making, most of which takes place in the comitology framework, remains
rather high,as shown in Figures 2 and 3.
The Commission has long been — and by far — the main producer of Com-
munity regulations. Moreover, in 1997, the number of directives adopted by the
Commission exceeded for the first time that of directives adopted by the Council.
In other words,in sheer numbers,the importance of secondary (non-legisla-
tive) rule-making appears to be considerable. The combination of these two ele-
ments — the decline of purely legislative activity,and the respectable size of second-
ary rule-making — suggests that we should reconsider the traditional emphasis on
legislative procedures in discussions on the legitimacy of European institutions. The
legislative phase is but one part (admittedly important) of the decision-making
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Proposals of primary legislation introduced by the European Commission
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Number of regulations adopted by the European Insitutions
Source: General Report on the Activities of the European Union* Data retrieved from CELEX, the interinstitutional 
computerised system on community law,excluding instruments not published in the OJ and instruments listed 
in light type (routine management instruments valid for a limited period).
For years 1993 to 1997, regulations adopted by the European Parliament and Council in accordance with the
co-decision procedure are included in the category ‘Council’process. A growing number of salient political issues are likely to arise in the post-leg-
islative phase,be it in rule-making or the concrete application of Community rules.
Should a given product be authorised?  What kind of precautionary measures are
needed to protect human health in the case of scientific doubts related to our ali-
mentary habits?  The management phase may gain even more importance in the fu-
ture,as the Amsterdam Treaty has enhanced the powers of the European Community
to deal with what is known as ‘risk regulation’ in areas such as human health, con-
sumer policy and environmental protection15. As risk regulation decisions are often
made on the basis of complex scientific evidence,they cannot always,or indeed most
of the time,be made in abstracto,once and for all,in legislation,but rather require in-
dividual,ad hoc decisions,taken by administrative bodies.
If this analysis is correct, a growing number of important decisions at Euro-
pean level are likely to be taken by bureaucratic structures of some kind. In practice,
as the EU largely remains a system of decentralised administration,in which legisla-
tive rules are implemented by the Member States’administration,this suggests that
the role of intergovernmental committees,known as comitology in the Euro jargon,
is bound to increase in the years to come. However,the way those committees oper-
ate may be the source of a variety of legitimacy problems. First,the system is striking
in its opacity. Who does what and how is nearly impossible to tell for a lay audience.
This lack of transparency may undermine the authority of Community decisions:citi-
zens may find it difficult to accept decisions based on recommendations from ob-
scure bodies,the composition and functioning of which remain a mystery. Secondly,
it is not clear that the social prestige of committee members will be sufficient to com-
mand obedience. While scientific experts may derive some authority from their tech-
nical knowledge,bureaucrats are the focus of widespread mistrust in European coun-
tries. Thirdly, the little we know of the way comitology works may also become a
source of concern. The convergence of concerns,interests and language among ex-
perts which is said to be the hallmark of comitology seems to enable the system to
operate fairly smoothly16. However,while positive from the standpoint of efficiency,
this consensus may undermine the legitimacy of the system,as it can easily be de-
picted as one more instance of power in the hands of a closed circle of élites. The risk
of collusion is quite real:can experts be regarded as neutral in areas where research is
largely financed by industry? Can we really assume that they will not be influenced by
their national origins? The BSE crisis has shown that issues of this kind are far from
moot. They must therefore be addressed squarely if one is to put comitology on
firmer grounds for legitimacy purposes.
How may this objective be achieved? Generally speaking,five different types
of arguments are traditionally used to legitimise bureaucratic processes17.G i v e n
the specificity of the Community regulatory process, it would be wrong to assume
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15 Dehousse,‘European institutional architecture after Amsterdam: parliamentary system or regulatory struc-
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beyond,Brussels:CEPS,1997.
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Oxford:Clarendon Press,1995 at pp.41–45.that they can be mechanically transposed to the European level. However,they fur-
nish good yardsticks for assessing the legitimacy of bureaucratic decisions taken at
that level.
— The ‘legislative mandate’approach is the most traditional. Parliament is seen as
the main repository of legitimacy and the administration must strive to achieve
the objectives that are set out in governing legislation.
— In the ‘accountability or control’ model, legitimacy is grounded in the fact that
the administration is somehow under control, i.e. that it is held accountable for
its decisions by a representative body (generally the legislature) or by courts.
— The ‘expertise’ claim stresses that as a result of their technical character, many
decisions cannot be taken by the legislature: expert judgment is needed to
judge the respective merits of competing options,and experts must be granted
sufficient discretion.
— The ‘procedural’approach emphasises the fairness of decision-making processes.
It demands that consideration be given to the interests of persons affected by ad-
ministrative decisions. Procedures designed to associate such persons to the de-
cision-making process are therefore viewed as essential. They tend to vary ac-
cording to the kind of decisions that are taken. Under ‘due process’requirements,
administrative bodies must consider the interests affected by individual decisions.
As regards rule-making,the same concern for fairness may lead to the adoption of
rules guaranteeing transparency and participation or consultation rights.
— Efficiency is also often claimed as a grounds for legitimacy, particularly in re-
cent times,as the ability of government structures to deliver results is becoming
increasingly important. While there are many ways of defining efficiency, two
meanings are particularly relevant for our purposes: decision-making efficiency
(the ability to take decisions when needed) and substantive efficiency, i.e. the
ability to take the ‘right’decisions.
Obviously, these approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Ac-
countability and control can be used to monitor the effective implementation of
legislative mandates or the compliance with the procedural requirements of the
‘due process’model. Likewise, the resort to experts is often advocated on efficien-
cy grounds, and can be balanced through various accountability techniques. Nev-
ertheless,there are clear differences among various claims. The degree of discretion
required in the ‘expertise’ model is at odds with the idea of exhaustive legislative
mandates. Similarly,the vision of the public interest inherent in the ‘legislative man-
date’approach often  assumes the existence of a collective body — the people —
whose interests are represented by Parliament, while the ‘procedural’ model is in-
formed by a more polycentric vision of the polity, in which the coexistence of a
wide variety of interests, which must all be given due consideration, is acknowl-
edged.
At this stage, my concern is not to endorse any one of these models, but
rather to discover how suitable they may be, given the specific character of Com-
munity decision-making. To streamline somewhat the discussion, I will take as a
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starting point the limits of an approach that would rest exclusively on the ‘expert-
ise’model. Involving experts at various levels of the decision-making process is un-
doubtedly necessary, particularly when the decisions to be taken have a technical
dimension. Providing much-needed expertise is clearly an important achievement
of the European committee system. It can even be argued that the quality of de-
liberations among experts will not only contribute to the quality of the regulatory
process, but also to its legitimacy, as was suggested by Joerges and Neyer18.Y e t ,
this does not suffice. For one thing, there is no guarantee that experts’‘delibera-
tions’are actually exclusively inspired by the public good:all sorts of considerations,
ranging from their vision of their country’s interests to possible links with the in-
dustry they are supposed to regulate, may influence the positions they take within
committees. Moreover, even assuming that their attitude is in fact influenced by
purely disinterested concerns, would this suffice to ensure the legitimacy of their
decisions?  I don’t think so: granting experts carte blanche is likely to be unpopular
in a period of widespread mistrust of technocrats of all kinds. Right or wrong, lay
people may also have views on the decisions to be taken, and insist that they too
should be considered. Some sort of control over their deeds is therefore necessary.
Our reflections should therefore focus on the remaining approaches. Various
versions of the ‘legislative mandate’ and the ‘accountability’ models have been in-
voked by those who argue that the European Parliament, now that it has acquired
the status of a co-legislator in many areas,should have more power over delegated
legislation. Both types of arguments are part of the same, supranational avenue:
the European Parliament, it is said, being the institution most representative of the
European people at large, should play a greater role in overseeing comitology. In
contrast, as was just indicated, the procedural model rests on a radically different
vision of legitimacy, one which would require the opening of comitology to repre-
sentatives of all interests affected by its decisions. Each of these two options will
now be reviewed in turn.
The supranational avenue:legislative mandates 
and parliamentary control
Since the introduction of legislative co-decision in 1993, the European Par-
liament has insisted on being treated as a Council co-equal in supervising Com-
mission-implementing decisions. It has opposed particularly vigorously manage-
ment and regulatory committees, which it regards as a way of circumventing its
newly acquired legislative powers: in the four years since co-decision was intro-
duced, comitology was an issue in about two-thirds of the dossiers that were sub-
jected to the conciliation procedure. Disagreement over the proper implementing
procedure was also at the root of Parliament’s rejection of the directive on voice te-
lephony — the first time that Parliament used its co-decision prerogatives to reject
a Council common position.
18 Supra note 15.There are several ways in which the European Parliament could become
more closely involved with the decisions currently being taken within the comitol-
ogy framework.
The first,‘legislative mandate’, approach would suggest that the current bal-
ance between legislation and administrative decisions be altered in order to ensure
that the most salient policy decisions are taken as legislative measures. A return to
legislative policy-making is a technique widely advocated in order to combat the
growing influence of bureaucracies19. Surely, it would be historically incorrect to
describe comitology as having robbed the European Parliament of its legislative
prerogatives,as comitology pre-dates Parliament’s rise to the status of a full-fledged
legislature. However, MEPs have consistently called for a clearer demarcation be-
tween decisions that can be taken through comitology and those that require a
proper legislative procedure20, a position that underlies Parliament’s support for a
clear hierarchy of Community acts. The European Court of Justice itself has sug-
gested that ‘the basic elements of the matter to be dealt with’must be adopted in
accordance with the legislative procedure laid down by the Treaty,while ‘the provi-
sions implementing the basic regulations’may be adopted according to a different
(i.e.comitology) procedure21.
However, there seem to be clear functional limits to what can be achieved
along these lines. As indicated above,it is not always possible for legislation to antic-
ipate all the problems that may arise in the implementation phase. Parliaments may
lack the time or the necessary expertise to solve all problems in advance, and they
may find it expedient to delegate part of the problem-solving task to implementing
agencies. Moreover,the borderline between policy choices and implementation ‘de-
tails’,between legislation and administration,is often blurred when scientific or tech-
nical choices must be made. Prior to the BSE crisis,who would have thought that an-
imal feed was an issue that would gain considerable public attention?
Parliamentary control over the executive, another traditional oversight in-
strument, seems equally difficult to adapt to the specific features of Community
governance. While at national level, parliamentary control over the administration
is a by-product of its control over the cabinet via the institution of ministerial re-
sponsibility,no such thing exists at European level. Although Parliament has gained
considerable control over the Commission in the post-Maastricht years, functional-
ly comitology committees are not under the Commission’s authority22. The vertical
chain of command thought to exist at national level (parliament-executive-bureau-
cracy) is broken at European level, where delegated legislation is, at least partly, in
the hands of networks of national experts. The European Parliament’s role must be
adapted to this network-based reality if it is to be of more than symbolic relevance.
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documents.See case T-188/97,Rothmans International BV v Commission,19 July 1999,not yet reported.Parliament’s response to that structural difficulty has been to put pressure
on the Commission,as the latter plays a leading role in implementation procedures,
and appears to be extremely influential in comitology committees. The Plumb-De-
lors agreement of 1987 stipulated that the Parliament would be notified by the
Commission of most draft implementing measures. These were then to be for-
warded to the responsible parliamentary committee so that it could voice its con-
cerns whenever necessary. Clearly, the effectiveness of such an agreement de-
pends primarily on the Commission’s willingness to keep the Parliament informed
and to take its views into account. In both respects,the first years of the agreement
have been rather disappointing: many drafts have not been sent to the Parliament
and, in all but a handful of cases, parliamentary committees have failed to react23.
The strengthening of Parliament’s grip over the Commission in recent years has led
to a formal recognition of its right to be informed of committees’ proceedings24.
Even if this were to occur, however, a question would still remain: how should Par-
liament process this information,and react if need be?  Here,two problems must be
addressed:lack of time and expertise. Can Parliament effectively scrutinise the hun-
dreds of decisions adopted each year by committees, given its heavy agenda and
complex organisation?  Will MEPs have the relevant expertise?
Entrusting supervision to Parliamentary committees, as was decided in the
wake of the Plumb-Delors agreement, is a sound division of labour. Members of
committees are likely to be better equipped than many of their colleagues to make
sense of the technical issues addressed in draft implementing measures;further,de-
centralisation is needed to deal with the masses of documents involved. But what
kind of relationship should be established between Parliamentary committees and
their counterpart(s) in the web of Comitology committees?
Interestingly, Parliament’s ambitions seem to have increased in parallel with
the emergence of its legislative profile. Parliament has at times expressed an interest
in being more closely  involved with the work of committees,e.g.by including its own
observers in the committees25. This proposal raises a delicate but fundamental issue:
in a system where influence appears to be directly related to the degree of expertise
enjoyed by the various participants in the debate26, what can be the impact of
elected representatives,namely politicians?  True,the European Parliament could set
up its own expert networks to control the work of committees. But in terms of legiti-
macy,the ‘value added’of another layer of experts would be rather thin. Rather than
have politicians clothe themselves as technical experts, as they at times seem
tempted to do27,would it not be preferable to limit their role to a number of basic pol-
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pp.253–272.icy choices and to grant them the right to intervene when issues they deem funda-
mental arise in the implementation phase? Indeed,this seems to be the solution con-
templated in the recent comitology decision as regards regulatory decisions. Rather
than systematically participating in the adoption of implementing legislation,the Eu-
ropean Parliament has been given the right to step in  whenever it feels a political in-
put is needed,and to ask that a proper legislative procedure be followed28. Although
such an opinion would not be binding, it would be likely to enjoy considerable
weight,only because Parliament has given ample evidence of its willingness to go to
Court whenever it feels its prerogatives are being ignored.
Admittedly, such a division of labour would better correspond to the re-
spective functions of legislator and executive in modern societies. Of particular im-
portance, given the technical character of many issues tackled within European
committees, is the Parliament’s power to hold hearings. This technique could be
used more systematically,as a means of obtaining independent expertise and facil-
itating a dialogue with interested parties. It would also enable the Parliament to ex-
ert greater control over the Commission, as the latter would be called upon to re-
act to the views expressed by witnesses. Furthermore, hearings would very likely
attract media attention to particular issues, thereby contributing to improved pub-
lic awareness of the decisions taken at the European level. Such an approach,
which emphasises accountability and the European Parliament’s function as a fo-
rum where the important political issues of the day can be debated,would be bet-
ter suited both to the structure of comitology as a system of regulatory networks,
and to the technical character of the issues tackled through comitology, than par-
liamentary involvement in the day-to-day work of committees.
But would enhanced monitoring by a supranational legislature suffice as a
grounds for legitimacy?  There are reasons to be sceptical. Representative demo-
cracy has become the focus of widespread criticism in western Europe, where it is
often perceived as a system that enables a cartel of élites to exert tight control over
the policy agenda29. Arguably, the gap between the rulers and the ruled may be
even wider at the Community level. To many European citizens,the Parliament still
appears a remote assembly, whose work remains largely unknown and whose
members do not always represent the mood of the populace. More importantly,in
a system where primary allegiances remain firmly rooted at the national level, na-
tional ties may prove to be more important than the supranational logic of parlia-
mentary democracy. To put the matter bluntly,German or Danish consumers might
feel more effectively represented by, say, a delegate from a national consumer or-
ganisation than by  Greek or Portuguese MEPs.
Reflections on the legitimacy of the European policy process must also
come to terms with the polycentric character of the European populace. Not only
is there no European ‘demos’30, but ‘we the people’ cannot simply be read in the
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Union. The truth is that the peoples of the Member States, too, are a kaleidoscope
of regions,cultures and interests not always identified with the State apparatus,and
can all legitimately claim to voice their views and be heard at the European level.
After all, even at national level, the reductive nature of representative democracy,
distorted even further by the structure of many electoral systems,makes it impossi-
ble for parliaments to mirror perfectly the broad range of interests and feelings that
coexist within a single polity. Hence the attractiveness of alternative forms of legit-
imation, which provide for some form of direct participation of affected parties in
the decision-making process.
The procedural avenue:transparency,openness 
and participation
So far,I have argued that several of the approaches traditionally used in order
to legitimate delegated legislation are ill-adapted to the specific needs of comitol-
ogy. Reliance on the expertise model is no longer sufficient in a world where tech-
nocracy has become the focus of much mistrust. Legislative mandates cannot always
be sufficiently clear,as it is impossible to consistently set down precise standards and
objectives. Although more promising,an approach based on Parliamentary control
over expert decisions is still far from sufficient, as the European Parliament cannot
claim to represent all the interests, be they national, local or sectorial, that coexist
within the European Union. Additional techniques ought therefore to be considered
if the legitimacy of European governance is to be put on firmer ground.
Bearing in mind what has just been said about the growing gap between
citizens and government in Europe, one such technique might be to empower all
the parties affected by comitology decisions to express their concerns before the
relevant committees. The main advantages of such an approach would be twofold.
An extensive dialogue with the various segments of civil society would obviate
some of the shortcomings of representative democracy at the European level, by
enabling those who so wish to have a say in the decision-making process31. In so
doing, one might enhance the legitimacy of decisions taken by European bodies,
for there is empirical evidence to suggest that decisions taken by public bodies
(even non-representative ones, such as courts) are more readily accepted when
they appear to be taken according to fair procedures32. A greater openness of the
decision-making process also improve public awareness of the issues discussed at
the European level,thereby contributing to the emergence of a truly pan-European
public sphere.
From the standpoint of openness to the populace at large,the present situa-
tion is defective in several respects. As any scholar who has done research on comi-
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32 Tyler,Why people obey the law,New Haven,Connecticut:Yale University Press,1990.tology knows,information on the actual operation of committees is difficult to find.
The total number of committees remains a mystery33. In 1994, Parliament had to
freeze a share of the appropriations for committees in order to obtain more informa-
tion from the Commission on the number of meetings and their work output34.C o m -
mittees’rules of procedure are difficult to get hold of. When formal rules do exist,they
appear to focus on the internal operation of committees: regulating deliberation
among experts,i.e.relationships between the Commission and national representa-
tives,is their main target35. In contrast,little or no attention is paid to the relationship
between the comitology web and the outside world. True,in some areas,committees
have been created specifically for the purpose of allowing organised interests to give
their input. In the food sector,for instance,an ad hoc committee has been set up to
represent the views of various socioeconomic interests. Yet the Advisory Committee
on Foodstuffs offers a good illustration of the limits of what have been achieved so
far36. As its members are appointed by the Commission,the latter may privilege cer-
tain interests;for instance representatives of environmental interests have been ex-
cluded. Moreover,the committee can only act at the Commission’s request,which ex-
plains why it hasremained inactive for long periods.
Rather than ad hoc representative fora, greater openness in the work of all
committees is needed. This could be achieved with a standard set of procedural
rules regulating the interface between comitology committees and civil society at
large. What kind of principles should these rules contain? Without entering into a
detailed examination of the question,it may be useful to point out some basic ele-
ments. Thus,for instance,the agenda of committee meetings,the draft proposals to
be discussed,and the minutes should be made public37. Interested persons should
be given the opportunity to express their views on any item on the agenda;public
hearings could even be envisaged for matters of particular importance. Commit-
tees should also be required to explain the considerations that underlie their even-
tual choices.
How could such a proceduralisation be brought about?  A number of schol-
ars have warned against the danger of ‘ossification’ of administrative procedures
through codification in a legislative act38. It is fair to say that both the European
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have displayed a growing awareness
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trative procedures? Fitting the foot to the shoe or the shoe to the foot’,(1996) 2 European Law Journal 3-25.of the necessity to protect ‘process’rights such as the right to be heard and the du-
ty to state reasons,when individual rights are directly affected by Community deci-
sions39. However, judicial decisions are necessarily ad hoc, rendered in concrete
cases;they are therefore not the best avenue for injecting new principles into deci-
sion-making processes. Moreover, the overall object of the exercise should not be
forgotten. What matters for legitimacy purposes is not only that justice be done,
but also that it be seen to be done. Put together,these considerations point in the
same direction: the best way to introduce the principles discussed here would be
through a basic decision, adopted in the most solemn of manners, and that would
apply to all kinds of bureaucratic decisions.
The framework comitology decision of 17 July 199940 has already made a
significant number of steps in the right direction. It provides for the adoption of
standard rules of procedure, which will be used by committees to draft their own
rules of procedure, although they retain the right to make the adjustments they
deem necessary41. It also renders applicable to the committees the principle and
conditions governing public access to Commission documents42 — a decision of
considerable importance as both the Amsterdam Treaty and recent rulings of the
European Court of First Instance appear to have reversed the hierarchy of values
that prevailed in the past: public access to documents has become the rule, and
confidentiality an exception to be interpreted narrowly43. In a ruling rendered only
two days after the adoption of the framework decision,the European Court of First
Instance has indicated that as most committees do not have a staff of their own,for
the purpose of access to documents, they are deemed to be under the Commis-
sion,which is in charge of their secretariat44.
All these developments should ease access to committee documents,there-
by enabling those who so wish to keep track of their work. In terms of public
awareness of policies conducted at the European level, this is certainly more im-
portant than the annual report on the working of committees which the Commis-
sion is now required to produce45.However,does this suffice? In my opinion,the an-
swer can only be negative. Transparency is of course important, but only as a
means to ensure a greater openness of decision-making procedures. For the latter
objective to be attained,some provision must be made for participation of individ-
uals in such procedures46, and on this the framework decision is remarkably silent.
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tive assessment’,3 European Law Journal (1997),pp.105–130.Moreover, if the idea is really to enhance the legitimacy of EU decision-making by
granting individuals a say in decisions affecting their fate, then this right should be
granted adequate recognition. From that standpoint too,the solution that has pre-
vailed falls short of the objective. True, the standard rules of procedures to be
adopted could formally sanction some participatory rights, but it would remain le-
gitimate for each committee to adopt more restrictive procedures if it so wishes.
For the process-oriented approach to legitimacy outlined here to be taken serious-
ly, the rights in question should be given a legal status that would protect them
against arbitrary decisions of the rulers. In other words, what appears to be re-
quired is a decision of constitutional nature,namely a formal recognition of partici-
patory rights to be enshrined in the Treaty itself.
A procedural approach of this nature,with its participatory ethos,would bol-
ster the legitimacy of comitology. It should not however be seen as an alternative
to parliamentary control. On the contrary, proceduralisation, because it would fos-
ter public debate, might significantly reinforce the accountability of committees.
One can imagine,for instance,that if a committee were to overlook the concerns of,
say, consumer groups, the European Parliament might be interested in knowing
why. In this case, procedural and accountability concerns, far from being at odds
with one another,would actually be mutually reinforcing.
Conclusion:the need for a process-based approach
It is often said that the functionalist approach followed by the Founding Fa-
thers is no longer able to ensure the legitimacy of the integration process. True,in-
tegration can be credited with a  number of benefits — peace and prosperity be-
ing the most important — but now that it has become clear that decisions taken
at European level influence people’s lives in so many ways, legitimation by out-
puts is not sufficient. People no longer accept that the quality of decisions is all
that matters: they want a say in policy choices that affect their destiny. As a result,
calls for an input-based approach have gradually intensified. However, such calls
are often inspired by an idealised, Rousseauian, vision of parliamentary democracy,
in which representatives of the people serve the collective interest of a polity and
translate it into legislative decisions. This understanding of democracy is so deeply
rooted in western European political culture that it is espoused by two camps that
are at odds with each other:the self-professed European Federalists,advocating the
upgrading of the powers of the European Parliament,and the souverainistes and Eu-
rosceptics of all kinds, for whom there can be no real democracy outside  national
parliaments.
This approach is fraught with difficulties. It rests on a mechanical, transmis-
sion belt, vision of public policy, in which voters control the Parliament, Parliament
controls the executive, and  the latter is supposed to keep the bureaucracy under
control. However, real-life situations tend to be much more complex. Each link of
the chain develops interests of its own and may be captured by specific interests of
some kind. Moreover, the sovereign which is to be represented, the people, is far
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finds a complex constellation of conflicting interests and preferences,which cannot
easily be reconciled. These structural problems, which undermine the functioning
of representative democracy at national level,are magnified at European level. The
sheer size of the polity affects the representativeness of governing bodies: an as-
sembly of some 600 members  cannot claim to mirror all the interests that coexist
within a polity of over 400 million people. The longer the command chain gets,the
looser the ties between rulers and ruled. Consider,for instance,the position of citi-
zens vis-à-vis the two dominant institutions of the European Union. The European
Council is composed of 16 members,out of whom 14 escape their control:they are
without any influence on their appointment or their dismissal. As to the European
Commission, even though the European Parliament now exerts an incommensu-
rably higher control over its destiny than used to be the case in the past,it embod-
ies a complex compromise between the partisan backgrounds and the national ori-
gins of the commissioners, which makes it difficult for citizens to identify with the
institution. Finally, the existence of multiple vetoes at various levels makes it near
impossible to assign the responsibility for most  decisions to a single body,thereby
weakening democratic accountability47. All these elements are undoubtedly nec-
essary to preserve the consensus-based character of the decision-making process,
which is as crucial a constitutional feature in the EU as in any polycentric commu-
nity. However,they make it illusory to hope that representative democracy will suf-
fice to endow European institutions with all the legitimacy they need. As Robert
Dahl has shown, changes in the scale of the polity unavoidably affect the way in
which a democratic political system must respond to the preferences of its citizens:
new paradigms are needed48.
This contribution has pleaded for a radically different approach. Adopting a
resolutely inductive approach, it has taken as a starting point the growing impor-
tance of the post-legislative phase in public policies, and the difficulties faced by
parliaments to keep abreast of complex decision-making processes,which often in-
voke delicate technical issues. Some may of course deplore this evolution,but one
should take notice of structural developments of this magnitude,rather than insist-
ing on a romantic vision of the past. Thus,it is argued,the input-oriented approach
which has so far dominated discussions on the legitimacy of European institutions
needs to be supplemented by a process-oriented one,in which interested citizens
would be given a say in the post-legislative, bureaucratic, phase. Unlike other ap-
proaches,this one attaches less importance to the quality of the inputs received by
decision-makers (citizens’ votes, legislative mandates) than to the fairness of deci-
sion-making procedures:what matters is not that the eventual decision can be for-
mally reconducted to the will of the citizenry,but rather that those who so wish be
given a chance to express their views. Not only would such an approach, with its
emphasis on transparency, openness and participation, appear to be more finely
tuned to the evolution of European governance, but it could also contribute to in-
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form the citizenry of the problems that are addressed at the European level, there-
by facilitating the development of public deliberation, which is as essential an ele-
ment of democracy in a transnational system as it is in a national one.
Admittedly, such an approach departs from classical understandings of Eu-
ropean constitutionalism,which focus on the demarcation of the respective powers
of the Union and of the Member States and on the balance of power between Eu-
ropean institutions. At the same time, however, its ambition is identical to that of
liberal constitutions: to keep power, wherever it lies and whatever its form, under
control, and to ensure the fairness of decision-making processes. Moreover, the
procedural avenue outlined here should not be seen as  substitute to the control
exercised by political institutions. On the contrary, the emergence of a public de-
bate on ‘implementing’ decisions might reinforce the accountability of otherwise
obscure bodies,ultimately contributing to the emergence of a transnational public
sphere. Governance,particularly in present-day complex societies,is a multifaceted
phenomenon,which cannot be encapsulated into one single model.Proceduralising European law:
institutional proposals
Olivier De Schutter
This analysis proceeds from two diagnoses, substantially shared by those
who attended the seminar that yielded this report1. The first relates to the crisis in
our positivist conception of knowledge. This crisis is manifested in the virtually
unanimous acknowledgement that our rationality is limited in scope and that there
is accordingly a need to think in terms of procedures rather than of substance. The
point of the first diagnosis is, instead of the expert approach of unilaterally deter-
mining the ideal solution to a problem, to establish the institutional set-up which
will allow an acceptable solution to be discussed in context on the basis of shared
rather than individual knowledge. The second diagnosis, however, is that we lack
the political, and above all the institutional imagination, that we need if we are to
translate this need for proceduralisation into the practice of governance and deci-
sion-making patterns.
The purpose of this report,proceeding from what was said at the seminar,is
to take the first diagnosis as a basis for a response to the second. It relates specifi-
cally to the art of governance in the European Union. The general philosophy un-
derlying it is that certain still relatively marginal developments in European law that
are sometimes regarded as deviations rather than norms can be taken as a basis for
devising potentialities in terms of the proceduralisation of law. The power of imag-
ination that will be deployed will not be inventive so much as an effort to observe
and reconstruct. What we shall be trying to do is highlight certain practices and ex-
perience and see how they can be put into general application.
The report’s starting point is the point currently reached in reflections about
legal regulation. Everywhere, both in the Member States and in the European
Union,the same feeling is being expressed — the feeling that traditional modes of
thinking about law and the rules governing public intervention have reached their
limits. This has been copiously documented at State level. The welfare state was
designed as a response to the inequalities generated in reality by the formal ra-
tionality of the liberal State2. The crisis in the welfare state is a crisis in its very ra-
1 Seminar organised by the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission with the Centre for the Phi-
losophy of Law which,from the end of 1995 to October 1997,when this paper was presented,brought to-
gether university researchers and officials of the European Commission to consider the question of trans-
formations in the art of governance in the European Union.The seminar looked chiefly at the evolution of
the Commission’s role. The report, however, also considers the European Court of Justice’s potential con-
tribution to the proceduralisation of Community law.
2 The establishment of the welfare state after the crises of the first third of the century and in the post-war
years, can be analysed in terms of a re-socialisation of the economy, which means abandoning the belieftionality since the welfare state,which sometimes jeopardises the autonomy of the
individual, has above all revealed large-scale dysfunctions, an inability to solve part
of the problems which it was created to solve, and today, when it has to evolve, a
high degree of rigidity acting as a disincentive to structural reform. Deregulation
was thought for a while to offer a way out. But the limits of that have been per-
ceived in the last 10 years:the trust placed in private initiative and competition be-
tween private-sector operators has been a cause of exclusion on a now massive
scale, whereas economic growth is becoming purely speculative. The shift in the
paradigms of economics as a science itself is evidence of this, since neoclassical
theses are taking over from the theses of the regulatory school of thought and the
theses of the economic analysis of agreements, which have as their common fea-
ture their opposition to the autonomy of the discipline of economics.
The same type of limits have now been reached in the European Union, al-
beit in a slightly different form and in a shorter timescale. The legal strategy which
presided over the attainment of the internal market went through a phase of mu-
tual recognition of national legislation,followed by a policy of high-profile harmon-
isation,chiefly by means of directives. But it has now become clear that the attain-
ment of the internal market will not be complete until the implementation of har-
monisation instruments,and in particular the transposal of directives,has been put
firmly in the hands of the national authorities. What is at stake here is not just the
tendency of the Member States to remain in a competitive mindset at a time when
they are no longer entitled to compete with each other, within the scope left to
them by the transposal function — penalties for infringements, systematic nature
of prosecutions, thoroughness of administrative controls, effectiveness of redress
procedures3. Something more fundamental is also at stake — the different nation-
al administrative cultures,which recreate the same barriers to free movement when
Community law is implemented as were supposed to be removed by the enact-
ment of this Community law. Might a solution to these new barriers be found in a
fresh transfer of powers to the European Community? Neither public opinion nor
the national administrations appear to think so. A new type of law will have to be
invented to meet these apparently contradictory demands — pursue the actual
harmonisation exercise but without conferring new powers on the Community,
which would in any case be incapable of exercising them with the means current-
ly at its disposal4.
That is the situation in which we are now. At both State and Union levels,
the traditional models have revealed their shortcomings one after the other. Their
limits have taken us by surprise and left us without an answer to the new questions
now facing us. There is now general scepticism about public action. Yet the semi-
nar’s initial assumption was that a new burst of institutional imagination could
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Public Policy,1997.emerge from a better understanding of the crisis of knowledge evidenced by the
failure of the existing models of public intervention — at bottom,this failure is the
result of a crisis in the rationality underlying these models. The real point is to re-
flect on modes of governance which take account of social complexity and the re-
sultant inadequacy of expert knowledge,the rich potential of different national ad-
ministrative cultures, the need for ongoing revision of the rules, the importance of
application in context,rather than denying these phenomena — ultimately,the aim
should be to translate into institutional reforms the diagnosis flowing from realisa-
tion of the failure of the classic modes of regulation. This is the backdrop to our
concern to see that all who are affected by the rules of law are involved in produc-
ing and enforcing them,as well as in monitoring their effects and revising them ac-
cordingly: our hypothesis is that accentuating this involvement in making and
changing the law is a break with the idea that it is enough for a rule to be laid
down unilaterally on the basis of expert knowledge. This is also the backdrop to
our insistence on the grounds given each time a rule is laid down and each time it
is put into practice by the bodies empowered to do so:our hypothesis here is that
the demand for grounds to be given in response to the questions raised by the rule
in the minds of those affected by it constitutes a source of dialogue, which is evi-
dence in its turn that nobody today can claim a monopoly of the objectivity re-
quired when a rule is to be laid down or enforced.
The time has now come to specify what such a change in attitude might en-
tail for each of the institutions concerned.
The affirmation by the courts that everybody 
has the right to make his or her views known
To consider the potential contribution of the European Court of Justice to
this shift, we can begin by considering the requirement it imposes whenever a na-
tional government department withholds the benefit of a Community rule from
someone who enjoys entitlements under it. The relevant government department
is then required to provide reasons for its refusal so that the person concerned can
if he wishes seek judicial review5. There is no reason why this requirement,whether
it applies to a national authority or a Community authority, should not be extend-
ed not only to the guarantees securing fundamental rights conferred by the Com-
munity legal order but also to the interests protected by it. The Community courts
are reluctant to acknowledge a general right of parties affected by the adoption of
Proceduralising European law:institutional proposals 191
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give grounds for their decisions, in situations where the legislation is silent on the
matter6. To our knowledge,absent an express provision,an assurance to this effect
exists only where the decision actually concerns a clearly identified economic op-
erator and the case involves a situation in which that operator is by definition most
familiar with the subject-matter,the information that he can furnish being therefore
indispensable for the adoption of a properly informed decision7. But this is an ex-
ceptional situation and is hardly likely to warrant the assertion that a general right
is enjoyed by all interested parties to be consulted prior to a decision concerning
them8. Imposing these requirements — consultation of interested parties and giv-
ing grounds for the decision as a satisfactory response to the objections raised —
and making them subject to judicial review by the Community courts would en-
sure that the decision taken takes account of all the interests affected by the deci-
sion and does not disregard any of them without universally acceptable reasons; it
would enhance the rationality of administrative decisions, assuming, as we do, that
this refers not to a decision adopted on the basis of unilateral expert knowledge
but to a decision adopted as the culmination of an exchange involving the great-
est possible number of interested parties directed towards finding a solution that
gives the greatest possible satisfaction to all.
Our proposal is therefore that the Community courts should assert a duty to
give parties affected by the adoption of an implementing decision the opportuni-
ty to make their views known to the decision-making authority and to add to that
a duty incumbent on that authority to respond to all such views. This should be a
general duty incumbent both on the national authorities when they give effect to
Community law and on the Community authorities. This duty to consult all parties
affected by the decision should not be subject to the definition of the material and
territorial powers of the authority on which it is imposed. If a decision by this or
that local authority has effects beyond the limits of its territory,as in the case of en-
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6 In the specific field of competition law (Article 3(2)(b) of the first regulation implementing Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty: Council Regulation (EEC) No17/62 of 6 February 1962 (OJ L 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204, subse-
quently amended and amplified on numerous occasions)) and merger control (Article 18(1) and (4) of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between un-
dertakings (OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 11)), and regarding anti-dumping and subsidies for goods from non-
member countries (Article 5 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/79 of 20 December 1979, on protection
against dumped or subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Economic Commu-
nity (OJ L 339,31.12.1979,p.1)),the Community legislation provides for the possibility for certain interested
parties to make their views known to the Commission when it is adopting a decision. Similiter, in State
aids, Article 88(2) (formerly 93(2)) of the EC Treaty, which requires the Commission to take a decision ‘after
giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments’. More recently,the Court would appear
to have pointed to a similar obligation regarding Commission decisions enforcing Article 86 (formerly 90)
of the Treaty, relating to public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or
exclusive rights (Case C-107/95 Bundesverband der Bilanzbuchhalter eV v  Commission (1997) ECR I-0947
(judgment given on 20.2.1997)).
7 Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München,(1991) ECR I-5469 (para 14) (judgment given on 21.11.1991);
as recently applied by the Court of First Instance in Joined Cases T-481/93 and T-484/93 Vereniging van 
Exporteurs in Levende Varkens et al.v Commission des C.E. (1995) ECR II-2941 (paras 56 and 57) (judgment 
given on 13.12.1995).
8 A recent judgment confirms the Court’s reluctance to impose on the Commission an obligation to consult
in the absence of a specific provision requiring it to do so:Case C-142/95 Associazione agricoli della provin-
cia di Rovigo et al.v Commission  (1996) ECR I-6669 (judgment given on 12.12.1996).vironmental decisions or of decisions that attract investments, people in neigh-
bouring areas are affected by it and should therefore be consulted through repre-
sentative associations or local elected officials. If the Community courts were to im-
pose the requirement, that might mean obliging an authority giving permission to
build a waste-treatment facility to have regard to the views of environmental asso-
ciations, including those in another Member State if the question had an impact
transcending national borders9 and at the very least seeking the views of associa-
tions in neighbouring municipalities.
The proceduralisation of the principle 
of proportionality
We believe that a revamped general principle of proportionality could give
the European Court of Justice a second basis for contributing to the proceduralisa-
tion of Community law.
In our view, the demand for proportionality in a decision adopted following
these consultations must be considered in terms of the principle itself, which is to
say that proportionality must be defined in more procedural terms10. The tradi-
tional demand of proportionality, which is that the means used must be commen-
surate with the ends pursued and that there must be a reasonable degree of pro-
portionality between the means and the ends, owes a twofold debt to the form of
rationality which is now agreed to be obsolete: for one thing, it presupposes that
the relation between means and ends is determinable,in other words the environ-
ment in which the decision is taken is assumed to be foreseeable and stable,
whereas it is in fact not11; for another, it presupposes that the values pursued by
public intervention are unequivocal,as is clear from the possibility of ‘balancing’the
means deployed and the ends to which they are deployed (this balancing act  pre-
supposes a common rule which,in the traditional presentation of the proportional-
ity principle,is assumed to be known in advance and not open to discussion)12.B u t
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9 See Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and
private projects on the environment (OJ L 175,5.7.1985,p.40) and K.Lenaerts,‘Nuclear border installations:
a case study’,E.L.Rev,1988,p.159.
10 See also point 9 of the protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality an-
nexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Amsterdam Treaty of 2 October 1997:
this provides that the Commission should ‘except in cases of particular urgency or confidentiality, consult
widely before proposing legislation and,wherever appropriate,publish consultation documents’.
11 Conversely, the review for proportionality is purely marginal where note is taken of the context of uncer-
tainty in which the measure was taken. The Court of Justice has held that ‘since in the present case it is a
question of complex economic measures,which for the purpose of their efficacy necessarily require a wide
discretion and moreover as regards their effects frequently present an uncertainty factor, the observation
suffices that these measures do not appear on issue as obviously inappropriate for the realisation of the
desired object’(Case 40/72 Schröder KG v Germany,(1973) ECR 125 (judgment given on 7.2.1973)).
12 The Court has specified the terms on which it will allow a restriction on the free movement of goods im-
posed to preserve a country’s economic independence;it has acknowledged that ‘petroleum products,be-
cause of their exceptional importance as an energy source in the modern economy, are of fundamental
importance for a country’s existence since not only its economy but above all its institutions, its essential
public services and even the survival of its inhabitants depend upon them. An interruption of supplies of
petroleum products,with the resultant dangers for the country’s existence,could therefore seriously affect
the public security that Article 36 allows states to protect’ (Case 72/83 Campus Oil Ltd. v Ministère de 
l’industrie et de l’énergie (1984) ECR 2727 (judgment given on 10.7.1984)).what significance can still be attached to the demand for proportionality if these
presuppositions are abandoned?  The proceduralisation of proportionality would
mean that what is now up for review is the fact that the decision has been adopt-
ed only as the culmination of a procedure in which all interested parties have been
able to make their views known, all those views having been taken into account.
Either the author of the decision has acted in response to the views made known
to him in the decision adopted;or,if he has declined to accept them,he must have
given clear reasons in a statement of grounds that properly reflects the relevance of
the objections made. The review for proportionality can no longer proceed from
the assumption that there is automatically a stable, foreseeable environment: what
the reviewing body looks at is not whether everything has been properly foreseen
but whether all relevant views have been properly taken into account and there-
fore whether all unknown quantities have been properly brought into the equation
by proper institutional means. By the same token, the review for proportionality
does not assume that there will be no problems with the values pursued,as the tra-
ditional balancing act between means and ends did:the values underlying the de-
cision are those set out in the grounds given for the decision adopted,in response
to the full set of the views objections raised against it,bearing in mind that the ori-
gins of these objections may be found in different and even conflicting legislative
environments13.
Proceduralisation conceived in these terms, it may consequently be noted,
provides a way out of the eternal debate between judicial review based purely on
compatibility with the legislation,where the reviewing court can do more than rule
against manifest errors of assessment, and a form of review verging on verification
whether the decision should ever have been taken, the reviewing court now hav-
ing the power to strike down a decision which goes beyond what is strictly neces-
sary for the attainment of an acceptable end,along the lines of the practice in mat-
ters of fundamental rights14. Proportionality as interpreted in the sense that flows
from the principle of the proceduralisation of law cannot be defined in detail in ad-
vance, bearing in mind the attitude we have called for. It has to be seen purely in
context: the intensity of the review will be heavily dependent on the specific fea-
tures of each decision, as it is only the context of its adoption that will define the
parties who are likely to be affected and, as a result, the scale of the duty to give
reasons and to have regard to the views made known to the authority empowered
to take the decision.
These first two proposals concern consultations prior to the adoption of the
decision and the review for proportionality. They concern the requirements that
the Community courts might impose on the author of the decision, be it a nation-
al authority acting as the indirect Community administration or the author of the
Community measure itself. The affirmation and development of these principles by
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13 On this aspect of our present situation, in which different legislative environments coexist, see M.Walzer,
Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New York, Basic Books, 1983; and L. Boltanski et L.
Thevenot,De la justification:les économies de la grandeur,Paris,Gallimard,1991.
14 This demanding form of proportionality is described by W. van Gerven, ‘Proportionality, abus de droits,
droits fondamentaux’,J.T.,1992,p.305.the Community courts could precede the adoption of a European equivalent of the
Administrative Procedures Act which has governed procedures in federal administra-
tive agencies in the United States since 194615. The advantage of an instrument of
this kind16 is obviously that it guarantees greater transparency in administrative
procedures, to the special benefit of those who are interested in being involved;
legislation along these lines would give them the formal guarantee of their rights
to be consulted and to receive an answer to their preoccupations. But it is neces-
sary to be vigilant, as there is a risk that by being over-precise in determining the
categories of people consulted and the manner of their involvement they are pre-
vented from evolving in any way, even if the need is felt to arise, so that formalisa-
tion generates a loss of flexibility and ability to respond to new situations. And
there must be a link between participation by interested parties and judicial review.
This is a two-way relationship:the right to be consulted is meaningless if the party
enjoying the right has no possibility of applying to the courts for review of the rel-
evance of the response to his questions; seen from the other side, the
decision-maker’s duty to give grounds for the decision is meaningful only if the
content of the grounds given is a matter solely for the person giving them — the
decision-maker must be bound not only to stand by the grounds given, however
full and detailed,but also to respond to all the comments received by him and even
to give reasons for not responding at all or for not responding in satisfactory detail.
Since the Community courts are responsible for reviewing the grounds given for a
decision when an action attacking it is brought — this is the real significance of the
proportionality requirement as seen in procedural terms — the point may well be
that the court, in the specific context of each decision, must spell out the proce-
dural requirements to be respected, without the Community legislator necessarily
having done so in advance.
The involvement of the parties concerned 
in the proceedings before the Community courts 
or the national court responsible for giving effect 
to Community law
But the implications of the proceduralisation of Community law are such
that requirements must also be imposed as to the modus decidendi of the Commu-
nity courts themselves, or the national courts where they apply Community law.
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15 See R. Dehousse, Ch. Joerges, C. Majone, Fr. Snyder, with M. Everson, ‘Europe After 1992. New regulatory
strategies’,E.U.I.Working Paper,Law,No 92/31,Florence,1992,pp.29–31.
16 Certain communications may be seen as forerunners of this:see the communication of 2 December 1992
on increased transparency in the work of the Commission (OJ C63, 5.3.1993, p. 8); the communication on
an open and structured dialogue between the Commission and interest groups (OJ C63,5.3.1993,p.2);and
the communication of 2 June 1993 on transparency in the Community (OJ C166, 7.6.1993, p.4). The com-
munication on transparency was in response to the call made by the Member States in the ‘Declaration on
the right of access to information’ annexed to the Treaty on European Union. The Birmingham European
Council on 16 October 1992 also highlighted the need to ‘make the Community more open, to ensure a
better informed public debate on its activities’.The possibilities for action in the Community courts are notoriously limited. Where
the Court of Justice acts on a request for a preliminary ruling on a question of va-
lidity or interpretation of Community law, the only parties who have standing to
deposit pleadings or observations are the parties to the principal action in the re-
ferring court, the Member States and the Commission, plus the Council ‘if the act
the validity or interpretation of which is disputed originates from the Council’17.
The point would now be to extend this possibility to all interested parties:since the
Court’s answer to a question as to the validity of an instrument of Community sec-
ondary legislation or the interpretation of Community law has effects extending
well beyond the parties to the case, it deserves discussion by other persons and
firms, and the Member State to which they belong — assuming there is one —
cannot be assumed always to present their views properly. Where the Community
court is hearing a direct action,the normal rule is that the right to intervene is ‘open
to any ... person establishing an interest in the result’of the case18. But this provi-
sion is given a restrictive interpretation since, in principle, a mere interest in the in-
terpretation of Community law given in the case will not suffice to justify the inter-
vention. And there is no scope for interventions in cases ‘between Member States,
between institutions of the Community or between Member States and institutions
of the Community’. The problem with this exclusion clause is that it does not take
account of the fact that certain interests, particularly collective interests, are affect-
ed by the application and interpretation of Community law in such cases — an ex-
ample is the interest of consumers where an action is brought against a Member
State for failure to comply with Community law by maintaining health-protection
provisions in national law that also constitute barriers to intra-Community trade19,
and another is the interests of workers where a Member State is accused of breach-
ing Community law by maintaining a benefit for a firm engaged in business in the
public service.
The enlargement of possibilities for intervening in the Community courts,ei-
ther through a fresh interpretation of the relevant provisions or through amend-
ment of them,would be one way of duly reflecting the fact that Community legal-
ity can be properly reviewed only after an exchange that is open to all interested
parties, nobody, for example, having the power to determine whether the propor-
tionality requirement has been met or whether there has been ultra vires action
from a privileged standpoint in relation to all the standpoints that might be adopt-
ed on the same problem. It is submitted that there is no reason why this same par-
adigm-shift in the modus decidendi should not be imposed on national courts hear-
ing cases in the course of which they are asked to apply Community law. It would
be quite conceivable for the European Court of Justice,in cooperation with the na-
tional courts through the preliminary ruling procedure, to impose on the national
courts,as on the national administration when it implements Community law,a du-
ty to refrain from taking a decision until all the parties have been heard — the very
principles of adversary proceedings and natural justice already impose this — but
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17 See Article 20 of the Statute (EC) of the Court of Justice,in the protocol signed at Brussels on 17 April 1957.
18 See Article 37(2) of the Statute (EC) of the Court of Justice.
19 See commentary by M. Goyens in:Th. Bourgoignie (dir.), L’action collective et la défense des consommateurs,
Brussels,Story-Scientia,1992,pp.242–243.also until it has received the views that will enable it to build its decision on a foun-
dation of diverse points of view,proceeding from information drawn from multiple
sources, and manifesting the concern to protect interests going beyond those of
the parties alone20.
The role of the European Commission in the
proceduralisation of Community law:the problem
In describing the need for consultations which,it is submitted,should accom-
pany the adoption of a decision by the European Commission,we have given some
indication of the transformations that the proceduralisation of Community law might
imply for that institution21. But what we have said so far is far from adequate for three
immediately identifiable reasons. First,taking as our example the requirements im-
posed by the Community case-law where a restriction is put on a fundamental right
conferred by the Community legal order on a given individual,we have still to con-
sider what consultations might be envisaged when the measure to be adopted is not
an individual measure or a measure affecting only a limited number of individuals but
has general effect,as is commonly the case of regulations and directives — which are
formally-speaking addressed only to the Member States but have quasi-legislative
impact on a large number of addressees within their jurisdiction. Secondly,the con-
sultation procedure, even regarding measures with a limited scope and a limited
number of addressees,is still far from precise. And thirdly,what has been said so far
relates only to the time of adoption of the decision and not to the monitoring of its
effects and the revisions which it may undergo.
The first two questions can be taken together. The difference between an
individual or limited-scope decision and regulations having general effect must be
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20 The benefit of such an obligation on the national courts would not only lie in the quality of its decision —
the rationality underlying it. It would also constitute an additional degree of realism. As we know,a court
decision, even if it is directly of concern only to the parties to the case, can have wider-ranging conse-
quences,especially if it relates to the extent of the obligations of certain classes of player such as business,
the unions or the state. If all parties interested and not just the parties to the case, who are the ones
bound by the decision, were to be represented before the court, that would constitute no more than a
means of reflecting the reality of the effects produced by the solution to the problem underlying the case.
The pattern of events is currently leading this way. Mr W. van Gerven has drawn my attention to a para-
graph in the recent judgment in Krüger (Case C-334/95: JTDE, 1997, p. 159, judgment given on 17.7.1997),
where the Court of Justice,giving a preliminary ruling on the conditions in which a national court can sus-
pend implementation of a national measure based on an apparently illegal Community measure, was not
content merely to recall that the Community interest must be considered but went on to conclude that
the national court ‘must ... give the Community institution which adopted the act whose validity is in
doubt an opportunity to express its views’(para 45), and must ‘decide, in accordance with its own rules of
procedure,which is the most appropriate way of obtaining all relevant information on the Community act
in question’(para 46). This is interesting for us since it is acknowledged that the interested parties are the
only ones who can define their own interest precisely enough — the author of the Community instrument
can alone identify properly the Community interest in implementation not being suspended — and it is
also implied that the procedural autonomy of the Member States’legal orders may have to yield to an ob-
ligation to allow interested parties to express their views in the national court.
21 There may be an opportunity for this when the Commission is reorganised,as provided by the Declaration
on the organisation and functioning of the Commission adopted by the Amsterdam Conference, this being
scheduled for 2000.relativised. It has just been stressed that even a decision apparently concerning on-
ly one or a few persons can in reality have an impact on a wide range of interests,
and the procedure for adopting it must give them an opportunity to make them-
selves felt and thus to impose on the decision-maker a greater obligation to state
reasons22; conversely, a general regulation, stating the grounds on which it was
adopted,ipso facto specifies the interests which it is specifically calculated to serve,
even if these are general interests such as the interests of consumers,large families,
or producers of this or that, and it affects certain interests more than others, for in-
stance, those of producers who are required to comply with consumer-protection
legislation,or employers who must recognise certain rights for the people they em-
ploy. Admittedly, the more the regulation is general in effect and broad in scope,
the greater also is the risk that the interests affected by it will be dispersed and too
disorganised to make their voice heard in the adoption procedure,which intensifies
the importance of the question whether these interests are adequately represent-
ed by associations,unions or whatever. But none of this should deter us from think-
ing about also proceduralising the adoption of general regulations rather than just
individual or limited-scope decisions (considering the traditional demand for ad-
versarial approach to them). On the contrary, this is something which it is all the
more urgent to think about as there are definite difficulties which are by no means
always easy to solve.
The role of the European Commission 
in the proceduralisation of Community law:
the Commission’s multiple functions
Two difficulties operate in conjunction. The first lies in the fact that different
functions,not easy to reconcile,are exercised by one and the same institution. The
Commission exercises the legislative initiative function,a function of implementing
the general Community law and a function of enforcing Community law. The first
two functions presuppose the establishment of relationships of trust with all the
private and public parties interested in the creation of Community law and a
smooth flow of information between them and the Commission. But the last of
these functions,which demands a degree of independence from the same parties,
is bound to weaken the relationship of trust that the Commission has established.
This difficulty, highlighted by L. Metcalfe23, can be seen as justifying a sharper dis-
tinction between the various activities undertaken within the Commission, with a
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22 I prefer not to overload the text with an excess of detailed examples: the authorisation of a merger inter-
ests not only the relevant firms but also their workers’organisations,the consumers of the goods they pro-
duce, their competitors and their distribution networks; a Commission decision not to commence pro-
ceedings against a State which maintains certain legislation protecting consumer health is of interest not
only to that State but also to economic operators wishing to export to it and consumer associations whose
interests may have been poorly represented by that State (consumers may prefer a wider choice of low-
price goods to a higher level of protection).
23 L. Metcalfe, ‘Building capacities for integration: the future role of the Commission’, Lecture given at the
Schuman-Seminar:‘Maastricht in Maastricht,the Treaty revisited’,held at the Provincial Government House,
Maastricht,13 May 1996.visible institutional expression.To be more precise, the Commission could be split
up into separate relatively autonomous bodies, structured either on a bipartite ba-
sis (one for the functions traditionally exercised by a prosecution department —
action against infringements of Community law by the Member States and, where
there is a definite Community element,private citizens;another exercising the right
of legislative initiative and the detailed implementation of Community regulations),
or on a tripartite basis (which would be predicated on a formal distinction between
the legislative initiative and the implementation function). This type of division
should not imply that action against infringements would no longer proceed with
full regard for considerations of expediency, as is currently the case and indeed re-
quired by the Treaty, leaving extensive scope for pre-litigation negotiations. Nor
should it exclude collaboration between the various divisions of a Commission or-
ganised along these functional lines; this collaboration is, on the contrary, essential
if the implementation of Community regulations is to reflect the difficulties inher-
ent in the effective application of Community law and if legislative proposals are to
draw on the lessons learned from obstacles encountered in the formulation of im-
plementing instruments and in the implementation of Community law. The chief
interest of a sharper separation would depend on the quality of the Commission’s
relationships with the outside world and, in particular, in the completeness and re-
liability of information it received from those to whom Community law is ad-
dressed.
The role of the European Commission in the
proceduralisation of Community law:the multiple
forms of consultation
The second difficulty concerns the practice of consultation, prior to the
adoption by the Commission of a proposal for an instrument or measure conferring
implementing powers in the form of a regulation. The tabular presentation on p.
200 will help,as the difficulty reflects at a number of distinct levels what boils down
to a single dilemma.
To coin a cliché, this presentation shows us two idealised types of consulta-
tion — negotiated rulemaking and expertise. The crisis of rationality underlying our
approach suggests a shift in patterns of consultation. In the expertise model, the
idea was to supply the decision-maker with the information he needed in order to
come to an informed decision, but the purpose of consultations would now be to
ensure that all parties interested in the formulation of the decision are involved in
it and to bring consultations closer to the negotiation model. If this is the shift,
then several of its potential consequences will have to be considered. Analysing
them will enable us to identify the apparently insoluble complexities of consulta-
tion as hitherto encouraged, notably within the structures of the welfare state,
based initially on the idea that the interests that are to be represented can be pre-
defined. Assuming heuristically that consultations on the negotiation model
could be introduced in a structure that remains dominated by the expertise mod-
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el would bring us to a definition of a form of consultation that cannot be reduced
to one of these idealised types. The table above gives a few features of the types of
consultation that will first be contrasted. The transition from the expertise model to
the negotiation model is reduced to two main aspects:
1. The players in the consultation process will be selected in the light of
their ability to represent the interests of a given sector of activity or a given seg-
ment of the population. This presupposes determining the criteria for what consti-
tutes adequate representativeness and, particularly, whether representativeness is
to be seen in a formal sense, being recognised by certain institutional procedures
(such as an organisation representing workers and acting as spokesman for their in-
terests), or in a more substantive sense, being recognised each time in the light of
the specific issues at stake in the consultation process (such as trade-union dele-
gates who have been given a mandate to defend a predetermined position on the
question on which they are being consulted, following internal discussions within
the labour movement). But two difficulties immediately arise.
The first is that the decision to bring players representing certain interests
into the consultations makes a discussion in which the various players can revise
their starting position in the light of the arguments put forward in the course of the
consultation delicate, possibly even illusory. True enough, representation does not
necessarily have to be conceived in terms of a mandate. There is no conceptual
Purposes of consultation Negotiation between
interested parties resulting 
in their agreement
Improvement of information
underlying the Commission
decision
Selection criteria Representativeness of players,
in terms of e.g.an industry or
a segment of the population
Expertise of persons consulted,
quality of information in their
possession
Commission activity in
organising consultation
Equal resources for
participants in the
consultation (passive or active)
Persons consulted selected for
their privileged access to
certain information,no
equalisation of resources
required
Relation between consultation
and the adoption reforms
Risk of bias as players
consulted have specific
interests in the reform being
negotiated
Risk of underestimation of
practical difficulties in
implementing the planned
reform;no guarantee that
persons directly interested in
the planned reform will
actually be involved
Consultation as source of
legitimacy 
Legitimacy flows from the fact
that the solution adopted has
been negotiated
Legitimacy flows from the
objectivity of information
received and from apparent
impartiality of participants in
the consultation reason for excluding the possibility that the representative, having the task of
speaking for himself and for others, might shift his original position and thereby
contribute to the emergence of a consensus between all those involved in the con-
sultation process. But representation does presuppose limits on what the repre-
sentative can do: even if he is allowed some room for manoeuvre, it will be all the
more limited as he is truly representative rather than fictitious and at the end of the
day he must give an account of how he has acted as representative.
The second difficulty, linked to the first, concerns the relation between the
consultation — in the form of a negotiation between players representing certain
interests — and the reforms that are the possible outcome. The dilemma is be-
tween the identity as interested parties of those involved in the consultation and
the scale of the reforms that constitute its outcome: the greater their interest, the
greater their spontaneous tendency will be to defend vested rights and situations,
and the stronger,likewise,will be their tendency to react coolly to the reforms;con-
versely, the less those involved in the consultation process have their own interest
in the outcome of the reforms under discussion, the more they will tend to be ig-
norant of the consequences of these reforms for them,and the more,therefore,the
reforms will be adopted in the interest of everybody,without their scale or the rad-
icalness of their consequences constituting a barrier to their being proposed; the
modern contractual theory,incidentally,takes this basic insight as its starting point.
These difficulties in no way detract from the advantages flowing from the
fact that players who are directly interested in the effects of the decision are in-
volved. These advantages materialise in terms of the legitimacy of the decision and
the attention paid to practical difficulties of implementation, and also in the fact
that the specific interests of the players concerned can themselves be brought in-
to the equation and,if need be,revised or reformulated. But these difficulties are an
incentive to thinking about the manner in which the various players should be in-
volved so as to overcome the rigidity which, as we have seen, may constitute the
price to be paid, whether this rigidity flows from a definition adopted by the inter-
ests represented or from the strategic manipulations that are made possible by the
consultation process.
2. The heuristic shift presented here — from consultation in expertise mode
to consultation in negotiation mode — has a second consequence. This concerns
the fact that, if the shift is to be made, it will be necessary to equalise the re-
sources of all the players involved in the consultations. If it remains purely passive,
this equalisation of resources consists merely of taking account of inequalities be-
tween participants, bearing in mind that there may be multiple sources (access to
information, budgetary resources, accumulated experience, frequency of contacts
with the Commission). But it can also be more active:information in the possession
of some participants can be made accessible to the others, and the activity of the
less well-off among them can be subsidised.
But there are two limits on what such activism can really mean. The first is
factual:there are inequalities that no positive measure can offset precisely. There is
no getting away from the structural factor that a given player will have no past ex-
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is no obvious way of restoring the balance between a player who has frequent con-
tacts with the Commission, enabling him to gradually acquire credibility and to
give way on one issue so as to gain a more sympathetic hearing on another. The
second is legal: there are certain interests, some of them ill-defined and still emer-
gent, that are insufficiently organised and not represented by a spokesman able to
express their concerns in the consultation process where the style is along negoti-
ation lines involving all the players; if the Commission were to prompt the emer-
gence of a spokesman,its independence would be doubted,legitimately enough24,
and its intentions in creating a spokesman would also be suspect — clearly, being
so actively involved in structuring the consultations can be tantamount to manipu-
lating the consultation,prejudging the outcome.
But these two limits are not the only barriers encountered in actively equal-
ising the resources of parties to a negotiation. Two further barriers are worth high-
lighting. First, equalising resources presupposes distinguishing between represen-
tative groups, depending whether, in the terminology with which D. Sidjanski has
familiarised us, they are ‘promotion groups’, meaning ‘ideological groups or groups
defending a cause’, or ‘interest groups’, meaning ‘professional organisations, firms,
business groups and multinational companies’25. Interest groups act for their mem-
bers alone,whereas the advantage sought by the promotion groups is for the gen-
eral benefit — a collective benefit accessible even to those who have in no way
contributed to the effort needed to secure it:this explains why,compared with the
importance of the interest they defend, the resources available to interest groups
are on a substantially greater scale than those available to promotion groups26.B u t
the distinction is not as sharp as the theory of collective assets would have it. For
one thing,the groups always pursue several objectives at the same time — where-
as some do so for the sole benefit of their members or those who share in the col-
lective effort, others do so for the benefit of society at large, defending the cause
that the promotion group defends; for another, as soon as a group has been con-
stituted, even if initially it works only for the benefit of its members, the collective
interest which it represents becomes distinct from the members’ individual inter-
ests, as they would originally have defined them in the absence of a decision to
pool them — it would,for example,be thoroughly artificial to regard a workers’rep-
resentative organisation as an interest group consisting of the workers belonging
to it when the advantages obtained by the organisation are for the benefit of all
workers, whether or not unionised, and there can be a wide gap between the in-
terests of the union and the interests of the individual worker. The distinction be-
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24 This is the concern expressed by the European Parliament when it ‘points out that political institutions
must observe the principle that social players and organisations are independent;notes that the role of the
former is not to bring the latter into being, but rather to provide them with a legal framework and the
means of obtaining information and gaining real access to the institutions’ (resolution adopted on the 
basis of the report on participation of citizens and social players in the Union’s institutional system 
(A4-0338/96,PE 218.253/déf.) (‘Herzog  report’),para.35).
25 D. Sidjanski, ‘Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté européenne’, Il Politico, No 473, 1982,
pp.539–560,at pp.540–541.
26 See O. De Schutter, ‘Les groupes de pression dans la Communauté européenne’, C.H. du CRISP,
No 1398–1399,1993,53 pp.,at pp.5–13.tween categories of groups,depending whether they defend ‘interests’or ‘causes’,is
accordingly both a decisive factor for the active policy of equalisation of resources
between parties involved in a negotiation and a factor that is so difficult to inter-
pret as to raise doubts as to its real usefulness. This,then,is our first difficulty.
The second barrier encountered in actively equalising the resources of par-
ties to a negotiation lies in its potentially infinite nature. We have no valid yardstick
whereby we can define whether the inequality between parties to the negotiation
has been adequately offset. Equality between parties is by definition an unattain-
able horizon, each of them having a different perception of the real impact of his
demands, unless the whole question is reduced to certain aspects of a fundamen-
tal principle of equal entitlements, such as the possibility for each of them to con-
tradict the information taken by the other as a basis for negotiating. The upshot is
that an active policy of equalising resources as between parties will lead the Com-
mission to arouse hopes that it can only dash,given that it cannot keep everybody
happy.
A proceduralised version of consultation
These,then,are the main difficulties that arise if,in our desire to abandon the
expertise model as being excessively compromised with a type of positivist ration-
ality that has now been adequately discredited as illusory, we go on to encourage
forms of consultation conceived in terms of negotiation between interested par-
ties. The purpose of reviewing these difficulties (we have highlighted only the
more striking among them) was simply to illustrate the need to escape the sponta-
neous dichotomy between the two idealised types we are positing. On the one
hand, the effect of consultation on the expertise model is that those who are di-
rectly affected by the decision that is to be adopted27 lose their proprietary rights
in the decision; the effect of the other model is that these rights are restored, to
such an extent that a negotiated policy decision begins to resemble a contract. But
in reality what has to be overcome is the very idea that the decision is a form of
property that can be appropriated and, by being conferred on some, is taken away
from others, for this idea creates dilemmas that constrain us. What are the
prospects for institutional reform if that is the objective we are pursuing?  Let us of-
fer a first avenue to be explored before going on to consider two others.
The first is the idea that the parties to the consultation should be required to
give grounds for the positions they defend, and it has a sound philosophical pedi-
gree based on the ethics of discussion. The point here is to import into social the-
ory and political philosophy a number of tenets of the philosophy of language,and
especially the fundamental notion that whoever makes an assertion binds himself
to make it for reasons that will be universally acceptable, since that is a pragmatic
presupposition for the assertion. This insight would seem to be essential from the
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27 The word ‘decision’should be understood in a generic sense rather than in the technical sense in which it
is used,alongside directives and regulations,in Article 189 of the EC Treaty.point of view of a critique of ideologies. But it is less clear that it offers the key to
an institutional rule that can govern political decision-making. There are actually
two reasons for doubting this.
First,the ethics of discussion force us to idealise:idealisation being necessar-
ily the precursor to any linguistic act is at the very centre of its construction. This
idealisation gives the signal for a critique and provides the instrument for it. But the
scale of the critique on which we embark is infinite,given the inevitably contextual
nature of the framework for the discussion. The good reasons, of course, are those
that are valid irrespective of the context in which they are accepted. But how are
we to tell when this will actually be the case? What other criterion of acceptability
can there be,de jure, for this or that justification than the fact of actual acceptance,
de facto, in a given context? Since the good reasons for a given assertion are given
in a given context, they are inevitably predicated on the context in which they are
given; in a different context, they will have to be reviewed in order to restore their
universal nature.
Moreover, the ethics of discussion are based on the universal ambition of
breaking down the barriers between the standpoints of each of the participants in
a process of interchange focusing on an objective of mutual understanding. But
we have seen the difficulty that arises when the parties to the dialogue are not in
full control of the position they are defending,precisely because they are represen-
tatives and bound by the mandate they have been given or, at the very least, be-
cause they are bound to give an account of what they have said to those on whose
behalf they speak. Consequently the advantages offered by the ethics of discus-
sion, which constitute a valuable contribution as a theoretical critique, also impose
limits if it is to operate as a form of guidance to institutional reform.
There are two other potential avenues to be explored. They can be seen as
complementing each other. They are presented here from two angles — a right of
persons interested in the adoption of an instrument or decision to be consulted
and a general obligation to evaluate public policies, whatever form they may take
— legislative instrument,programme,investment. This places us at the two ends of
the conventional political decision-making chain:the purpose of evaluation is to in-
troduce an element of retroactivity into the chain; reflexivity is further encouraged
by the fact that, as is the case upstream of the decision, the participation of all in-
terested parties downstream of it is also necessary. But let us go into a little detail
on these two proposals.
A general right to consultation
We are already familiar with the first proposal: it is the one we have already
encouraged the Court of Justice to act on, of asserting a general principle of Com-
munity law that any person with an interest in a given matter should have the right
to make his views on a planned decision known to the Commission and to receive
a reply to his objections — the adequacy of the replies, being a statement of the
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This would also seem to be the approach to which the European Parliament gives
pride of place:its resolution on participation of citizens and social players in the Eu-
ropean Union’s institutional system ‘stresses the importance of a general principle
(to be written into the Treaty) proclaiming the right of every citizen and every rep-
resentative organisation to draw up and promote their opinions and to receive
replies directly or indirectly, without that right however implying direct participa-
tion in decision-making”28. The explanatory memorandum is so explicit on this
point that it must be quoted:
We propose that the general right to be consulted should extend to all
those who are interested in a text or decision in preparation and the ef-
fects thereof. By consultation we mean the possibility of delivering opin-
ions and receiving answers. The decision-making power delegated to the
central institutions is not being called into question .... A clear distinction,
however, needs to be made between consultation, a very broadly based
procedure, and dialogue and negotiation, in which representative social
players confer with governing bodies29.
Our proposal,which is echoed by Parliament’s resolution,cannot be proper-
ly understood unless two further points are made. First, the ‘interest’ concerned
here — an interest in being consulted when an instrument is being prepared and,
as we shall see, assessed — must extend to the collective interest defended by
groups in accordance with their freely determined objects. We are not thinking of
a restricted concept of interest,such as the interest referred to in Article 173 of the
Treaty, which is by deduction ‘individual’and ‘direct’and is the basis for admissibili-
ty of a direct action for annulment in the Community courts. This is the sine qua
non for consultation to meet its veritable function of contributing to a better ra-
tionality and greater legitimacy in Community decision-making.
Are we to fear that the consultation process will be opened up so far as to
jeopardise the efficiency of administration? The Court of Justice has feared as much
on occasion30. Then there is the fear that the result would also be to overload the
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28 Resolution adopted on the basis of the Herzog report,para.24. The resolution terms such a right a ‘right to
freedom of expression’. It states that the right ‘must be capable of being exercised on each territory with
public institutions, Community information centres and representative organisations, as well as through
cross-border exchange networks’. The novelty here consists of giving everybody the right to receive a re-
ply to opinions expressed, not only public institutions addressed but also representative organisations
which are assumed to act as spokesmen addressing the Community institutions in the defence of their in-
terests. This concern to secure internal democracy in representative organisations should be welcomed. It
simply confirms the difficulty of conceiving ‘consultation’ in the form prompted by the discussion ethic,
where people speaking on behalf of the representative organisations to which they belong are involved.
29 Herzog report,p.11.
30 See submissions by Mr Advocate-General Warner in Case 113/77 NTN Toyo v Council (1979) ECR 1185, at p.
1262 (‘…there is no doubt that the right to be heard is subject to the general proviso that it must be com-
patible with the requirements of efficient administration’);and Case 9/83 Eisen und Metall AG v Commission
(1984) ECR 2071, at p.2086 (in relation to Article 36 of the ECSC Treaty, which requires the Commission ‘to
give the party concerned the opportunity to submit its comments’ before imposing a penalty, the Court
held that this ‘obligation cannot be understood as requiring the Commission to put forward its counter-ar-
guments in relation to the arguments put forward in its defence by the party concerned. The rights of theCommunity courts. It is submitted that the possibility of applying for judicial review
of the quality of the grounds given in response to objections made in the course of
the consultation procedure is one of the essential conditions of such consultations31.
But the question arises whether the risk is that the floodgates will open to a mass of
court actions seeking either to enforce a right to be consulted which a Community
institution has seen fit to withhold or to obtain an assessment by the Court of Justice
of the legality of a decision adopted following the consultation. And this is the sub-
ject of our second point. In our view the extent of the grounds which the Commis-
sion would be required to give — how detailed,if at all,should its response to views
made known to it in the course of a consultation process be? — must depend on the
relevance of the views in question;the Court of Justice has said as much. Moreover,if
a general ‘right of expression’,as the European Parliament puts it,is to be recognised,
and if it is to be backed up by the possibility of a court action for review of the legal-
ity of the decision taken at the end of the consultation process,as indeed it must,the
Court of Justice,it is submitted,should be left free to select the cases which it sees as
most deserving of a ruling on this point,applying the certiorari system that operates
in the Supreme Court of the United States. A system like this has been seen as pres-
ent in embryonic form in decisions of the Court of Justice,which has dismissed as in-
admissible certain references for preliminary rulings on the interpretation of Com-
munity law which it regarded as manifestly not relevant to the subject matter of the
principal action or which came before it only by reason of procedural complexities
set up by the parties bringing the action in the national court and therefore struck it
as being ‘fictitious’or ‘artificial’32.But the paradox in these decisions is that they have a
curious side effect:instead of ensuring that only the most significant cases come be-
fore the Court, their effect is to give these cases a suspect appearance so that the
Court actually removes them from the Register33. The effect of our suggestion would
be to open up extensive rights of action in the Community courts,including class ac-
tions,but also to enable those courts to manage their own caseload by selecting the
cases that really seem to deserve their attention.
A general duty to evaluate public policies
The second avenue we are proposing to explore is also in the same Parliament
report. The explanatory statement describes the assessment of policies as ‘an essen-
206 Olivier De Schutter
defence are guaranteed by that article since it provides the party concerned with an opportunity to put
forward its arguments. The Commission cannot be required to reply to those arguments, to carry out fur-
ther inquiries or to hear witnesses for the party concerned,where it considers that the preliminary investi-
gation of the case has been sufficient, for that would be likely to render the procedure for establishing an
infringement too cumbersome and extend its duration unnecessarily’(para.32)).
31 This,of course,has been acknowledged by the Community courts themselves. See,for instance,Case 26/76
Metro v Commission (1977) ECR 1875 (judgment given on 25.10.1977);Case 191/82 Fédération de l’industrie
et de l’huilerie de la CEE (FEDIOL) v Commission (1983) ECR 2913, at p. 2935 (para 29) (judgment given on
4.10.1983);Case T-37/92 BEUC and NCC v Commission (1994) ECR II-285,at p.II-307 (para 36) (judgment giv-
en on 19.5.1994).
32 Case 104/79 Foglia v Novello (‘Foglia I’) (1980) ECR 745 (judgment given on 11.3.1980);Case 244/80 Foglia v
Novello (‘Foglia II’) (1981) ECR 3045 (judgment given on 16.12.1981).
33 See for example W. ALEXANDER,‘La recevabilité des renvois préjudiciels dans la perspective de la réforme
institutionnelle de 1996’,C.D.E.,1995,p.561,at p.574.tial democratic right’and defines it as ‘a system whereby information about the im-
pact of Community measures on European societies is gathered and processed from
and by a variety of sources and the effects compared with the objectives officially be-
ing pursued’34. Assessment,meaning not so much ex anteassessment as,above all,ex
post assessment (after a policy or programme has been carried through) and ongo-
ing assessment (while a policy is being implemented)35,is a key component of a pro-
ceduralised legal system. The purpose of introducing it is to generate positive effects
that will involve all those interested in the legislation or the policy in the uncertainty
faced by the author of the relevant instrument or policy. Contextualising the grounds
given for the instrument or policy (as the rapporteur, P. Herzog, put it,‘legislation ...
plainly does not operate in a vacuum’) implies that the grounds originally given for
the adoption of an instrument or the initiation of a policy may be reviewed in the
light of the real effects of applying the instrument or implementing the policy,just as
the actual instrument or policy must be open to review; and it presupposes that,
since application can be in multiple contexts,as can the perspectives from which the
instrument or policy can be assessed,the assessment will involve all the players inter-
ested at all stages of the decision-making process. We shall clarify what is meant by
the assessment we are thinking of as a component of the proceduralised law,in con-
trast with the cost/benefit analysis of a given policy that operates in purely budget-
ary terms and presupposes a quantification both of the benefits and of the disadvan-
tages of the relevant policy. This kind of assessment would be extended in no less
than three directions:it becomes democratic;it assumes the public policy being as-
sessed to be experimental;and it is amplified by a meta-assessment36.
1. There is a transition from an exclusively ‘managerial’assessment to a more ‘dem-
ocratic’ assessment37. The sharpest evidence of this is the fact that the objec-
tives of the policy under assessment are highlighted in the course of the exer-
cise, rather than just the means deployed for the attainment of the objectives
that originally warranted them. This,I think,is what Bernard Perret calls the tran-
sition to a ballistic conception of the impact of public decisions on society. As-
sessment must not be confined to the effects sought by the decision and the
question whether it has had them or not. It must pay attention also to the ex-
ternalities of the decision,to its unforeseen effects,be they positive or negative.
And consideration of these externalities can prompt a kind of retroactive
change in the original grounds given — this policy, adopted to attain the stat-
ed objective, being ultimately capable of being implemented only because its
implementation has shown that, the original objective not being attained, the
positive externalities suffice to give it an acceptable basis.
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34 Herzog report,p.13.
35 Regarding this distinction, see Petit guide de l’évaluation des politiques publiques, Conseil scientifique de 
l’évaluation (France) (CSE Guide’),March 1996,p.12.
36 These paragraphs are based on the discussion introduced by the presentation by B.Perret to the Forward
Studies Unit of the European Commission on 27 March 1996.
37 See the CSE Guide, which contrasts ‘managerial’ assessment, which seeks to make public administration
more efficient,and ‘democratic’assessment,which seeks to improve the quality and transparency of public
debate (p.5). The guide disputes the relevance of this opposition, noting that successful assessments sat-
isfy several functions. But our analysis also encourages this kind of ‘multi-tasking’, which entails abandon-
ing an approach to assessment based solely on a cost/benefit analysis.2. An assessment to decide whether the policy should be pursued or not, or only
on condition that this or that point is rectified,gives way to an assessment with,
among others,the objective of prompting proposals for institutional reforms,af-
fecting the context in which the policy is implemented. In other words,the aim
is no longer to reason in a given institutional context that is itself beyond as-
sessment. The policy under  assessment may fail because it was ill thought out,
or because the incentive effects on those responsible for implementing it were
underestimated,because no account was taken of potential detrimental side ef-
fects;it may also fail because the institutional context is inadequate to secure its
success.
Admittedly, the integration of this into the functions of the assessment adds
new angles to the assessment. I shall mention only three of these here. They re-
late to the experimental nature of the policy when the assessment aims
among other things, to prompt reform proposals ranging beyond its specific
scope. First,the prospect of reform can incite the participants in the assessment
exercise to withhold information that might be interpreted in a manner that is
less favourable to their own situation or to distort the information that they
agree to divulge: here we have a dilemma that was already encountered when
we considered whether the players interested by the implementation of a deci-
sion should be consulted on it. Second, the experimental nature of the policy
might make the players responsible for implementing it to over-invest in it to
ensure the success of the experiment:the guide prepared by the French Scien-
tific Evaluation Council refers in this context to the ‘Hawthorne effect’ — ‘every
experiment begins by succeeding’38. Thirdly, just as the success of an experi-
mental policy may be explained by the experimental nature itself39, so con-
versely the local nature of the experiment may explain its failure — for instance,
where a more effective policy is tried out but has to be coordinated with less ef-
fective existing policies, its failure to get off the ground may not mean that the
experiment has failed but that, on the contrary, it should be tried out on a larg-
er scale to boost the prospects of success40.
These difficulties would seem to imply that any assessment that ranges beyond
the policy itself to the institutional and other structures in which it is operated
is open to manipulation. But if there is an adequate definition of the policy un-
der assessment from the commencement of its operation, specifying the de-
gree of its extension, this risk should be averted41. And there is another point
that must be stressed:there can be no question of manipulation unless it is as-
sumed that the responsibility for the successes and the failures of the policy is
objectively attributed either to the policy itself or to the context in which it is
implemented. Yet the purpose of this extension of the assessment is to provoke
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38 CSE Guide,p.50.
39 The ‘Hawthorne effect’ is not the sole issue here. It is possible that the success of an experiment is due 
entirely to the fact that there is an innovation-friendly environment,or it may be the exception in a cooler
environment.
40 The phenomenon is familiar to the social sciences:see for example J.Elster,Solomonic judgments. Studies in
the Limitations of Rationality,Cambridge University  Press,Cambridge,1989,reed.1992,pp.184–187;P.Livet,
La Communauté virtuelle. Action et communication,Paris,L’éclat,1994,pp.215–220.
41 CSE Guide,p.14.discussion of what may need changing in the policy, its context or even both.
Provoking discussion of the assessment is a third form of extension from the
more conventional approach taken hitherto.
3. The transition now is from an assessment of a public policy,whatever its subject
matter and whatever its degree of sophistication, to the possibility of a
meta-assessment,in other words a second-degree exercise which assesses the
assessment. There are several factors warranting the addition of this new level
of assessment of public policies.
One of the assessment functions is a learning function. The point here,to quote
again from the guide produced by the French Scientific Evaluation Council,is to
‘contribute to the training and mobilisation of public officers by helping them
to understand the processes in which they are involved and to adhere to their
objectives’42. Meta-assessment, which we can define as the presentation for
public discussion of the results of the assessment (reforms called for, conse-
quences in terms of whether or not to pursue the policy being assessed,
whether the experiment should be moved to a more general level) and its
methods (bodies or individuals running the assessment, criteria used, whether
or not instances of bias have been identified) fully serves this objective if all the
layers interested in the relevant policy are involved (those who design it, or im-
plement it,or operate it on the ground,and end-users (general public)).
Meta-assessment is a means of involving a whole series of players (including
representative organisations,the target public and associations) who,for prima-
rily practical reasons, would not have been able to be directly involved in the
preparation of the assessment report itself. Their involvement is essential, and
not only on account of the learning function just mentioned but also because
the same policy can have diversified effects and be perceived in very different
ways, depending on the assessment criteria but also on the context in which it
is implemented, for reasons that may be inherent in the specific local context
(spatial contextualisation) or in a specific set of circumstances (contextualisation
in time). It is all the more important to give pride of place to contextualised as-
sessment as we have seen that assessment can provide an opportunity for re-
viewing the grounds originally given for the policy now being assessed; since
these grounds are generally inspired by the need to satisfy certain needs, such
as those expressed by users of public services or some segment of the popula-
tion,it is indispensable for the assessment to consider the possibility that these
needs may have changed under the impact of the relevant policy — for exam-
ple, its negative side effects might prompt the target category to reconsider
their original preference43.
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42 CSE Guide,p.5.
43 The CSE Guide introduces the assessment technique by observing that ‘Control and audit refer to norms
that are internal to the system being analysed (accounting and legal rules and operating standards),
whereas what assessment seeks to do is to measure the effects and value of the activity in external terms’
(p. 4). But the use of a singular is misleading: there can be a multitude of external points of view, none of
which can claim a monopoly of ‘correct’assessment.210 Olivier De Schutter
The deployment of independent agencies
R.Dehousse recently drew attention44 to a phenomenon to which the Euro-
pean University Institute has devoted a number of studies45: the emergence, espe-
cially since 1990,of European-level agencies consisting of experts from national ad-
ministrative bodies in specific fields — trademark registration, drugs, the environ-
ment — the regulation of which demands technical expertise in areas where de-
velopment is rapid. The function of these agencies is generally to facilitate coordi-
nation between these administrative bodies,the exchange of information between
them and ultimately the emergence of a common administrative culture that will
help to overcome the barriers to the uniform application of Community law with-
out any new transfers of power.
It is paradoxical to affirm that the problems which the art of governing
consists of treating together are interdependent and then to attribute a degree of
autonomy to certain matters which are treated on the basis of specialist expertise
and in relative isolation from the broader context in which they are situated. The
advantages of this development are undeniable, but they appear more closely
linked with the specific situation of Community law — which must develop yet
further the degree of uniformisation but has neither the legitimate powers nor
the means to go for greater centralisation — than with the special advantages of
setting up agencies. By setting up a specialised agency the Community legislator
ensures that the matters it is empowered to regulate enjoy a higher profile,which
in turn prompts the players concerned to formulate demands which otherwise
would not receive such favourable treatment. The dependence of an agency,
which is not financed from the Commission operating budget like the commit-
tees set up under what has come to be known as the comitology system, means
that it must supply certain gaps in the European integration process in the areas
where it is active, for otherwise its remit may be terminated or its resources am-
putated.
But these arguments are reversible. The value of giving an agency a clear re-
mit lies in the visibility that the agency then enjoys and the specific responsibility
for the matters that it is to regulate. But at the same time, since certain agencies
have the function,not only of organising the flow of information between national
administrative bodies and setting up networks of national experts, but also of pre-
senting legislative proposals to the Commission, the question arises whether set-
ting up agencies might not lead to over-regulation. Moreover, raising the level of
responsibility of the agency, once it is responsible for coordinating initiatives in a
given area,runs the risk of diminishing the Commission’s responsibility to a correla-
44 R.Dehousse,‘Regulation by networks in the European Community:the role of European agencies’,op.cit.
45 See A. Kreher (ed.), The new European agencies, EUI Working Paper RSC No 96/49: contributions by J.-CL.
Cambaldieu on the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (trademarks, designs and models) (pp.
49–63), G. Estievenart on the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (pp. 15–21), and
D. Jimenez-Beltran on the European Environment Agency (pp. 29–41) (cited with comments in the article
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tive extent, for the Commission, being less active in that area, will be incapable of
taking clear initiatives and will therefore be tempted to pass the buck on to the
agency where there has been a failure to come up with a common definition of the
problem or to come to a shared diagnosis as to the solutions required. In Meroni v
High Authority, the European Court of Justice deduced from the need to prevent
the institutions from evading the responsibility conferred on them by the Treaty
that there must be limits to the delegation of powers in the Community system,es-
pecially where an institution is required to reconcile contradictory objectives,which
entails exercising a discretionary power46:
… the consequences resulting from a delegation of powers are very dif-
ferent depending on whether it involves clearly defined executive powers
the exercise of which can,therefore,be subject to strict review in the light
of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority,or whether it
involves a discretionary power, implying a wide margin of discretion
which may, according to the use which is made of it, make possible the
execution of actual economic policy.
A delegation of the first kind cannot appreciably alter the consequences
involved in the exercise of the powers concerned,whereas a delegation of
the second kind,since it replaces the choices of the delegator by the choic-
es of the delegate,brings about an actual transfer of responsibility’.
In our context,this decision can be taken as a basis for two different conclu-
sions. If we deduce from it that, where the delegation of certain responsibilities to
agencies exceed the limits set by the Community case-law,the Court of Justice has
the means to condemn it:the delegation accordingly cannot entail the risk that the
European Commission will not fully exercise its responsibilities that is often per-
ceived here. Alternatively, it might be thought that the risk highlighted by the
Meroni judgment will not disappear fully by reason of the protection given against
a delegation of powers not relating exclusively to implementing or information
functions or not offering those to whom Community legislative instruments are ad-
dressed.
46 Case 9/56 Meroni v Haute Authority, 9/56, (1958) ECR, English Special Edition 133 (judgment given on
13.6.1958). The submissions of Mr Advocate-General K. Roemer are eloquent as to the fears expressed by
the Court of Justice regarding the shift in responsibility that is liable to flow from a delegation of powers
to interest groups. In Mr Roemer’s view,‘it is necessary to require that the guarantees laid down by the
Treaty as to legal protection shall continue to exist even in the case of delegation. Those guarantees in-
clude the rules relating to the publication of decisions together with a statement of the reasons on which
they are based and also the provisions relating to proceedings before the Court. The High Authority can-
not evade those guarantees by leaving it to agencies to which powers have been delegated to adopt in its
place the decisions which it is incumbent on it to adopt itself. On the contrary, the decisions of these as-
sociations should be assimilated to decisions of the High Authority or otherwise the latter should itself
adopt the real decisions, the supporting preparatory work and the purely technical implementing meas-
ures being left to others’(at p.190).212 Olivier De Schutter
In any event the development of agencies in Europe can be properly
analysed only in the light of the ‘comitology’ system which, following the logic of
Community law,is the alternative to it:the establishment of advisory,management
and regulatory committees to assist the Commission in its task of implementing in-
struments enacted by the Council47.
47 See Council Decision 87/373/EEC of 13 July 1987 laying down the procedures for the exercise of imple-
menting powers conferred on the Commission (OJ L197, 18.7.1987, p. 3), determining three categories of
committee to assist the Commission. For the situation prior to the comitology decision of 13 July 1987,see
V. Ayral,‘Essai de classification des groupes et comités’, RMC, 1975, p. 330;‘Council and Commission Com-
mittees’, Bull.EC, Suppl. 2/1980; Commission communication of 12 March 1983, COM(83)116 final, Bull.EC.,
3/1983, p. 83. On the academic side, regarding the comitology decision, see Cl.-D. Ehlermann, ‘Compé-
tences d’exécution conférées à la Commission, la nouvelle decision-cadre du Conseil’, R.M.C., 1988, p. 232;
and C. Blumann, ‘Le pouvoir exécutif de la Commission à la lumière de l’Acte unique européen’, R.T.D.E.,
1988,p.23. The Amsterdam Conference called on the Commission to submit to the Council by the end of
1998 a proposal to amend the decision of 13 July 1987.Giving shape to a European civil
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The European Union is finding it immensely difficult to become a polity.
No progress was made on political union or institutional reform at either Maastricht
or Amsterdam. The Intergovernmental Conference taking place throughout 2000
and set to conclude in Paris in December already seems to be setting itself only lim-
ited ambitions. At a time when questions are being raised about global gover-
nance, the Union has not opted for a scheme or a regional identity with a sustain-
able future. Not only has enlargement made the question of political unity more
acute, it also raises the question, to which there is still no answer, of whether the
Community is capable of safeguarding diversity and being enriched by it, and de-
veloping true solidarity at the same time. The need for competitiveness is bound to
be heightened by the single currency,yet nothing has been done to assess and al-
low for the impact of the currency on Europe’s societies; it will not be a real asset
unless the economic system is under control,which is not yet the case. The public
will certainly not support a European Union which has no clear design or identity
and does not nurture its values as a basis on which we can all live together. So, as
Jacques Delors never tires of saying:Europeans must specify the objectives they are
prepared to share and accept the responsibilities which will enable them to
achieve those goals. This raises fundamental questions of method and substance.
Towards a new relationship between society 
and politics
At the moment we are seeing the Member States reasserting themselves,
but also a renewed will to coordinate national policies. No doubt this is a necessary
step towards the day when the Council will assume more responsibility, but the
past has shown there are limits to the intergovernmental approach. The Commis-
sion has started doing more too, but the impact of its action is dulled by pressing
social and economic considerations,and because the terms of reference governing
it basically spring from the internal market agreement. The Commission cannot
and never will be able to perform the tasks of government,namely to give impetus
to the process of pooling the interests of various groups and taking final decisions
on collective choices. We believe that involving the public, their associations and
organisations is the definitive challenge for future European integration. We must
find our way back to our societies and try to bring them together so that in con-
junction with nations they can be shaped into a European society. Political union
cannot become a reality without a European society. In Germany, the debate overa Europe-wide democracy among philosophers and legal experts, especially in the
Karlsruhe constitutional court,made it clear that democracy cannot emerge unless
it is underpinned by a people,in the sense of a society. Such a society does not yet
exist. Along the same lines of thought, Dominique Wolton, the sociologist, clearly
demonstrated that the standard bearers of the idea of political union have under-
estimated the revolution in attitude it entails. Above all, it presupposes a cultural
scheme, but State and Union institutions are still raising objections to such a goal.
Yet again, we need reminding of the lesson taught us by Hannah Arendt and Paul
Ricoeur: any institutional system exercising authority which is not supported by a
society aware of its identity and motivated by the wish to live together will be built
on sand. The ‘authority’ of the political class derives solely from the collective will,
and politics is the concentrated moral and active force of a society. Therefore, we
have to think in terms of a European society and devise an interactive relationship
between it and the institutional political system if we really mean to bring its peo-
ples together. Shaping a society,opening up the institutional system and recasting
it so that ordinary citizens and their organisations can be involved and participate
in it implies an immense programme of research and action.
These problems are general ones, given the change in society’s relationship
to the State,and specific ones,now that the transnational dimension of the exercise
of political power in the face of economic globalisation has become a fact of life.
The shaping of civil society and that of the modern State have become to-
tally intertwined. On the one hand, the economic aspect of society has become
distinct from the political aspect while,on the other,the two aspects have become
linked together in a way not seen before. As Norberto Bobbio points out in his dis-
cussion of Hegel: society is regulated and governed by law ... the State under the
rule of law being distinct from the State as an ethical and political construct1. Civil
society was not established by the rule of law,it existed before it,but depends on it
for its existence, while at the same time it is starting to be capable of choosing a
representative political system and controlling it. Regulatory systems and govern-
ment then act according to the values and commitments of individuals and their
organised mediators. Nowadays,since the information revolution and globalisation,
regulating everything is clearly less effective, does not reflect people’s aspirations
and does not provide a foundation for cohesion. The ongoing historical trend to-
wards individualism challenges hierarchical structures at work and in the State. As
the call for State protection sounds ever louder,the crisis in popular representation
has become more acute,owing to the loss of regard for politics in its present form.
Political organisations do not properly play their role as intermediaries for the peo-
ple, and as a result are perceived as offering merely an appearance of representa-
tion. Does that mean that fashioning a European society in such a climate is just a
fantasy?  No, on the contrary, it would be a catalyst for finding a better solution to
these problems by prompting a rethink of relationships between the people and
politics.
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1 The State and international democracy,European studies,Complexe,1998,p.179.Constructing Europe is a process of mediation through which nations can
react to changes in the world, and at the same time it contributes to the specific
problems of transnational regulation and governance. The problem is that at inter-
national level no societies share a common existence or way of regulating public
order. The European Union is fairly close to the Kantian ideal — revolutionary at the
time — of a group of States governed by law and institutional consensus-seeking.
But it is not a community. Yet,we are clearly seeing the emergence of transnation-
al bodies calling for regulation and aspiring to be political entities themselves. This
is apparent at world level,for example in response to questions raised by the World
Trade Organisation,despite evident contradictions and limits. It is even more obvi-
ous in the European Union, where social and civil dialogue has begun, and Euro-
pean social partners have emerged; these developments go beyond the simple
function of coordinating the work of national organisations2.
The quality of such mediation and participation must be assessed and
looked at from the political perspective, and further steps will have to be taken to
respond to the next challenge: constructing a genuine civil society, regulating it
and determining the implications in terms of defining a general European interest
and within an open,recast institutional system.
A new social model can never be put together unless
the economic sphere is under control…
What is it we want to do together? In the past,the Community’s task was to
achieve peace and reconciliation. Today, when globalisation is more often per-
ceived as generating deep insecurity than as creating opportunity, Europeans
dream of defending and transforming their ways of living and developing,by draw-
ing strength from their values and refurbishing them. In so doing,they will also be
better equipped to become players in a world of brotherhood.
Transforming the social model and building on its achievements,and above
all innovating,is on every country’s agenda and is the subject of research and con-
sensus-seeking in Europe. What is needed are more substantial,more visible efforts
which can be identified and understood. A juridical approach involving the estab-
lishment of social citizenship is one answer, but a society cannot just be legislated
into existence, it must be built on a foundation of contacts and real shared com-
mitments. There can be no effective answer to the social question unless we suc-
cessfully reconsider action in the economic sphere. Karl Polanyi, a student of 19th
century civilisation, wrote that the conflict between the market and the basic re-
quirements of organised social life gave impetus to the century and generated the
characteristic stresses and constraints which finally destroyed that society3. In the
Giving shape to a European civil society and opening up the institutional system 215
2 Concerning the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), see the study by Jon Erik Dölvik: The emer-
gence of an island? The ETUC,social dialogue and the Europeanisation of trade unions in the 1990s.E u r o p e a n
Trade Union Institute,1999.
3 La grande transformation. Aux origines politiques et économiques de notre temps,1944,Gallimard,1983,p.320.20th century, social and political action successfully challenged the treatment of
labour,land and money as goods. Karl Polanyi thought that it meant the end of the
self-regulating market and the market society. He believed many sorts of societies
could then emerge,that the freedom to organise the life of the nation at will would
go hand in hand with close international cooperation between States. At the end
of the 20th century,however,we have not yet reached that point,and the challenge
now is from the formation of a would-be self-regulating global market. Countries
do, of course, have powerful means of acting when crises strike, and their skill in
managing stock market crashes was displayed in 1987 and 1998. It is self-evident,
however, that severe social and economic problems are emerging worldwide and
still more can be expected to strike in future. Even if growth continues, which is
what everyone in western Europe and elsewhere is banking on but cannot take for
granted,it will put severe stresses on the environment and create more marked in-
equalities. Such growth is not sustainable from the ecological and social stand-
point. The goals of sustainable development and social cohesion written into the
European Union treaties are still, to all intents and purposes, categoric. Given that
historically the problem has been how to make the life of society consistent with
the workings of the economy,it is vital for individuals and organisations to become
involved in the process and give it international impetus.
…which presupposes involving all the interests 
in society in the exercise of participatory democracy
The first aspect to be considered is the effectiveness of decision-making
processes. Herbert Simon stressed that when people are confronted with immensely
complex problems and when crucial information is lacking,it is necessary to develop
the various players’capacity to cope and communicate by invoking rationality as a
process4. The challenge of involvement can also be considered from the point of
view of an ethical system grounded in democracy,which is how it is seen by believers
in the proceduralisation of law5. Starting with these two lines of enquiry,we can also
look at proceduralisation of the substance of the matter. The interests at work in so-
ciety would be involved in bringing the economic system under control,incorporat-
ing the need for a redesigned social model,and in defining the general interest in an
institutional system designed to facilitate participatory democracy6.
Needless to say,the cultural practice of those concerned must be consulted
as regards social action, identity and political representation. In addition to its tra-
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4 Rationality as a process and as a product of thought, Richard T. Ely lecture, American Economic Association,
Vol.68,No 2,1988/1989.
5 Jean De Munck and Jacques Lenoble, Les mutations de l’art de gouverner, May 1996; J.De Munck, J.Lenoble
and M. Molitor,‘Pour une procéduralisation de la politique sociale’, Transnational Associations vol. XLVIII, 4,
1996,pp.208-239.
6 In the same vein,I wrote a number of papers in recent years,in particular:
La participation des citoyens et des acteurs sociaux au système intitutionnel de l’Union européenne, report to
the European Parliament,October 1996;
Reconstruire un pouvoir politique — dialogue pour gouverner en partenaires,La Découverte,1997;
Avec l’euro,construire les relations sociales européennes,mission report to the French Government,June 1998;
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ditional functions, organised civil society has become involved in the process of
shaping the general interest, historically by means of the class struggle, and by se-
curing positions of power in the system of political representation. These methods
are by no means obsolete, but their limits are well known. The class struggle does
not look beyond the antagonisms in society to its essential unity and the coopera-
tion between its parts; representation gets caught up in an intra-institutional view
of the balance of forces. Negotiations and joint management are a sort of third way
which looks set to go further;it does not exclude the other two,but for it to be re-
sponsive to the general interest, the composition of the interests involved would
have to be changed and social representativeness redefined. All these areas have
to be given a European dimension. Where is the European right to strike? Where is
there a political spokesman to respond to social action?  Do we want to overcome
the impediments to social dialogue and, if so, how?  Do we want consultation or
consensus-seeking on matters of substance, and joint management of action pro-
grammes?  These questions are addressed both to the culture of the Community
institutions and to national societies.
The problem of developing a European political power centre is bedevilled
by the sovereignty question. As Bobbio wisely points out, sovereignty has two
faces, one turned in and one turned out. It is circumscribed by two matching sets
of limits: internally by the relationships between governors and governed, and ex-
ternally by the relationships between States7. If the sterile stand-off between sov-
ereignty (the State) and federalism is to be overcome,the shackles of citizens’iden-
tification with their nation State must be loosened to some extent so that they are
free to enter into an association which transcends them. Existing political and in-
stitutional systems can oppose such a movement, but they can also accept it and
help it to mature and become responsible. Rulers and elected politicians should
then strive to disseminate and share power,while taking care not to use civil socie-
ty as instruments but to govern in partnership. Let us be open about this, this
would mean going a stage beyond traditional forms of representation and hierar-
chical structures at work.
It would be instructive to study early research and participatory practices.
Tocqueville considered that association and commitment in public life were the
very foundations of a viable democracy. Robert Owen believed in workers’and em-
ployers’cooperation to subordinate machinery to society; Proudhom imagined so-
cial ownership; Jaurès advocated worker participation in management. De Gaulle
dreamed of a society founded on involvement, but inconsistently made it subject
to a leader. Mitbestimmung in Germany is an example of workers’ participation in
management which we could rethink today. Generally speaking,what we must do
now is go beyond these great thinkers’ ideas, and hopefully Europe will become a
laboratory of ideas and experiments. These ideas are closely linked to the specific
proposals briefly set out below, illustrating ways of actively giving shape to a Euro-
pean civil society.
7 Op.cit.p.237.A few serious workshops are working on finding
a new social model
Rethinking our national social models and the European social model,which
at present is only a concept which underlines the fact that they have many features
in common:the quest is on.
Leaving aside ideologies advocating the end of work and work-sharing, we
are faced with the crucial question:refusal to let our values be destroyed means we
must first reassert the value of work and find a new definition of it. These are ma-
jor challenges for society: work which is more creative and gives workers more re-
sponsibility, more independence, greater security and opportunities for mobility in
their working lives, and lifelong training, in order to make the most of human po-
tential and to combat exclusion.
The European Trade Union Confederation has formulated five new negotiat-
ing proposals which tend in that direction. The Supiot report on the future of
labour law in Europe8 has been the subject of exchanges and discussion, and
thought is being given to ways of following up his suggestions. Questions of
method are getting an airing. One suggestion is the proceduralisation of law com-
bined with a strategy to establish basic rights and social citizenship. The Supiot re-
port also advocates another approach, involving drawing up a schedule for the in-
terests at work in society and politics to take action on the key issues, giving due
weight to negotiations at appropriate levels and establishing a legislative frame-
work. However,the effectiveness of the law necessarily depends on how the econ-
omy is managed and regulated. Workers’status cannot be redefined unless the so-
cial obligations and identity of European companies are also defined. We cannot
build up a more universal body of law and make sure it lasts, or open up new
prospects for people’s lifetimes in which each individual would have more control
over his work,his training and his activities in society as a citizen and as a private in-
dividual, and could make them more consistent with each other, unless resources
are mobilised and shared, for there would be a price to pay. Redefining work and
rethinking the structure of solidarity go together.
Another important aspect of a social model and sustainable development is
the defining of common assets, the cultural and organisational processes whereby
Europeans could appropriate goods and services considered to be essential for the
common interest. This would entail specific regulations and agreements and in-
volve setting up European networks of services in the general interest. It is patent-
ly obvious that it is very difficult for Europe to grasp the concept of common assets.
The ambition is not even stated. More generally, Europe cannot reconcile the kind
of society we want to live in and market rules, as society calls upon it to do. It ad-
vocates a balanced approach to the WTO, but very often a definition of what that
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8 Au-delà de l’emploi. Transformation du travail et devenir du droit du travail en Europe, Rapport pour la Com-
mission Européenne, Flammarion, 1999. (Transformation of labour and the future of labour law in Europe:
final report.)means is lacking in the Union itself. For example, for external purposes culture is
not to be treated as marketable goods,but internally the Commission treats it (and
is only authorised so to treat it) as an economic good subject to the rules of com-
petition. The Treaties and the Member States rule out a cultural policy, but the
Commission implements a cultural policy on behalf of the market.
The Union hopes that competition will stimulate Member States to reform
their structures. This means that no priority is given to structural choices governed
by non-market ethical principles. Thus,the primary aim of the procedure to coordi-
nate structural reforms launched at Cardiff is to stimulate the national deregulation
seen as being necessary for the purposes of completing the internal market; this
perpetuates existing tendencies, and its effectiveness is assessed only through the
lens of competition.
The environment and information are areas particularly affected by prob-
lems of common assets, where non-market and market principles clash and for
which social priorities have to be established so that the two can be reconciled.
How can European cultural products be circulated and shared in the Union?  To
cover membership of the Union,should there perhaps be a policy on European ed-
ucation,designed to be one aspect of our national educational systems? While the
Union is reviewing its information technology directives, perhaps it could devise
some joint operations to give its peoples access to the Internet. These are just a
few examples. Meetings,dialogue and measures to achieve these objectives would
bring a European society a step nearer and make it more meaningful.
These matters should be approached from a local angle.The Community be-
comes meaningful wherever people work and live. A local approach necessarily en-
tails a specific,major feature:it means finding practical ways to achieve cooperation
and solidarity. Currently, the impact of the cohesion policies implemented through
the Structural Funds is being assessed. Their effectiveness depends largely on the
ability of local players at national level to find ways of coping with the implications
of the European economy. In this instance,too low a degree of outward devolution
by national government is a handicap.Forward thinking on the post-euro situation
and enlargement suggests that in view of the severe inequalities present,very firm
action will have to be taken to consolidate our efforts towards achieving cohesion.
In fact, the level of per capita pre-accession aid allocated for the new applicant
countries to help them bring their development levels up to scratch is markedly
lower than it was for previous applicant countries. The Union unilaterally requires
them to assimilate its procedures and practices as they stand rather than restruc-
turing itself as an area where States with different structures coexist and support
each other.
Local interests everywhere will have to make much more effort to get to
grips with competition. Can they do it on their own?  Will it be enough to promote
the feeling of belonging to a Community?  Perhaps it will be necessary to set up so-
cial agreements, forms of cooperation, and specifically European networks of serv-
ices at local level. The CEEP is putting forward ideas to that effect. A very enlarged
Europe would lose its identity and splinter if contacts and dialogue are not fostered
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ways of achieving economic and political solidarity — a field largely overlooked by
policy-makers today.
Who regulates the economy,what criteria are they
applying and what are the structural options?
The societal issues facing us need to be resolved by taking control of the Eu-
ropean economic system which is now emerging. Basically, the solutions we find
will be dictated by underlying cultural differences in the approach to intervention.
The majority of interest groups and political organisations believe that we can only
act from outside the market system. This is the modern notion of ‘regulation’as the
setting of rules by an outside agency, to be yoked to macroeconomic government
policy by mobilising its specific tools. Others — and there are still too many of
them — believe that action should and can be taken within individual businesses
and the economic system by altering the balance of power and the terms of man-
agement. From this viewpoint,the problems of individual businesses,of regulation
and of market structures become matters to be determined by society.
The plan for a European company statute is still deadlocked after 30 years of
trying9. Far from giving up, we must now go beyond the purely juridical approach
and embark on far-reaching discussion and action. We need a definition of what a
European company is, for reasons which go to the very heart of what concerns
people in Europe today;what social obligations should European companies have?
How can we set up a system to monitor companies when global financial investors
take over and lay down their criteria for profitability and governance?
‘National’ supervision of companies becomes problematic when they are
multinational. Control has to be shared. When is somebody going to start working
on transnational social ownership of companies?  The Gyllenhamar report on dia-
logue and keeping control of changes gives little space to company obligations
and union negotiating powers. A system of transnational shareholding by employ-
ees,in group funds with risk-pooling to prevent conflicts of interest between differ-
ent groups of employees,could be a ground-breaking formula for what a European
company would be. In practice,employee shareholding is a strictly national matter
and is not one of the Community’s objectives. Only an organised civil society with
increased confidence could remove these taboos and establish a culture of partici-
pation, with the ultimate goal of setting original criteria for effective social man-
agement to offset capitalism’s criteria of financial profitability.
The company question has to be tackled head on if the issue of regulation is
to be broached with an even chance. As we stated earlier,a tendency for a self-reg-
ulating global market emerged in the latter part of the 20th century. Since new
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9 This only includes limited companies and takes no account of the need for a statute for partnerships as
well.forms of information technology are involved,the idea has gained credit. Operators
would settle their disputes and allow for ethical considerations when drawing up
their agreements; when States advocate ‘joint regulation’ the agreement would be
rubber stamped or a public endorsement appended legitimising the private agree-
ment. Another possibility would be joint regulation, where the social partners
would play a part in laying down the rules and assessing their effectiveness. Take
the case of intellectual property rights. This is a matter of major importance which
at the moment is designed to protect a legacy of copyright material for the bene-
fit of large-scale operators and, as such, is rightly condemned by the poorer coun-
tries of the south. A new approach here could be to share our assets, knowledge
and creations. In the Community an entirely new approach could be taken to the
regulatory process,based on reconciling non-market and market principles,and or-
ganised civil society would become a joint regulator.
The Union would still have to wish to be a regional player in the global are-
na. In commercial terms,Europe could lose its way in multilateral negotiations and
fail to consolidate its own regulatory model. In financial terms — the key issue —
prudential regulation is emerging at global level. The call for a specifically European
finance regulation seems to be dying down. Is it because this question has been
raised too late and has already been left behind by globalisation?  Rightly or wrong-
ly, we believe that the way the European financial system is structured will have a
major effect on social issues in Europe,especially the answers found to the question
of the need to find ways of funding the collective development of solidarity. There
is at the moment a Commission and Council action plan to draw up European di-
rectives with the almost sole purpose of developing an integrated financial market
fully accessible to the global market. The plan has not been discussed in public at
all, nor have the social partners been consulted. There is an urgent need to set up
a forum and a set of methods for financial dialogue. It is wrong to assume that re-
gional regulation in the common interest would be impossible. Global prudential
regulation currently reinforces the arguments for value creation and capital asset
formation. Surely,consultations and discussions should be held regarding strategic
choices for restructuring banking and financial institutions? When the call for in-
vestment by the public becomes trans-European, can we manage without rules in
the general interest governing the organisation and management of funds, pre-
venting exclusion and pooling risks?  Now that major moves are afoot to set up
pan-European stock exchanges,can we stand by without laying down some official
rules to cover investment by the public, taxation policy for financial revenue and
operators’profits?
In system theory, a system of regulation concerns the mechanisms which
provide incentives for development and the restoration of order in response to dys-
function. Not only the regulation system but the choice of structures and the way
the system is organised have to be looked at when change and/or crisis occur. Eco-
nomics is mainly concerned with private and public structures and their relation-
ships. There is no space in the European institutional system for any discussion of
what type of mixed economy to opt for. In principle each nation State is free to
choose. The Cardiff process,favoured by some countries and obstructed by others,
goes back to this principle of national subsidiarity but concerns itself with struc-
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macroeconomic policy for growth and employment are reticent on the subject of
how to coordinate any structural reforms. The urge to preserve national control is
understandable: market forces push for convergence towards flexible models of
markets and financing which conflict with certain societal values which some want
to defend or promote. But this is the crux,for if we do not want the choice of struc-
tures to be dictated increasingly by the market, there will have to be strong Euro-
pean cooperation to ensure diversity, complementarity and efficient private and
public structures.
This issue has far-reaching implications for the shaping of a civil society. How
effective would European rules and macroeconomic policies be if they were estab-
lished solely in the institutional sphere?  The grass roots have to be organised and to
work together to assess the rules and make sure they work,as well as to share access
to knowledge,benefit from the experiences of others and together set up innovative
and development schemes in different sectors of activity and at local level.
Proceduralisation in terms of substance
Starting from these thoughts about how to involve civil society, let us look
more closely at some questions of method relating to governance by the
nation-State and the European Union.
The main reason why the interests at work in organised civil society fail to
secure a role in regulatory,consensus-seeking and joint management procedures is
that there is no upward-moving,interactive European dialogue. It should be possi-
ble to be involved in the life of the Community at any work place or in any public
forum. To achieve this, we should establish a right for people to say what they
think. To enable individuals to express their views and take action, civil society or-
ganisations,the Member States and the Union should be jointly and specifically re-
sponsible for providing information and education, and would facilitate interactivi-
ty across national borders. The Commission is considering a proposal whereby Eu-
ropean public administration tasks would be carried out by decentralised local
agencies. Could citizens have access to the agencies to exercise their rights? In a
mission report we did for the French Government in 1998, we advocated regional
missions where civil society organisations would work in partnership with the po-
litical institutions to give citizens access to Europe.
With respect to negotiating powers, any future collective agreements be-
tween the European social partners now have the force of law. There are few of these,
however,so we will also have to define the responsibilities of legislative bodies:with-
out a framework laying down the obligations of companies and financial operators,
employers will feel quite free to negotiate at the most decentralised level.
When drafting its projects and programmes, the Commission makes instru-
ments of those it consults (experts and special-interest groups). In particular,it calls
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ly listen to the advice and recommendations it gets from independent bodies? Be-
fore any decision is taken, trade unions and associations should have the right to
make an assessment or take the initiative, not simply react to Commission blue-
prints. Closely related to this, the dialogue between the institution and the players
should not be cut into separate segments: putting the various players face to face
with one another could produce a discussion of the general interest,going beyond
the expression of specific interests.
When it comes to moving towards this,the information skills and know-how
of the organised interests in civil society are, as everyone knows, inadequate: Com-
mission expertise should be shifted outwards towards civil society and the elected
representatives of the people. This recommendation in my 1996 report was adopt-
ed by the European Parliament, and has just been taken up by Ms Ranzio-Plath,
who has called for the establishment of an independent institute.
Let us take a look at the process of coordinating national policies too. Civil
society has no place in the Cardiff process. Since November 1999 the social part-
ners have been entitled to a say on economic policy guidelines: this is the macro-
economic dialogue initiated at Cologne. This formula looks like a modified version
of the proposal we put to Parliament in 1996 for an annual conference with the
players in civil society where they would discuss economic policy options and
whether they were compatible with each other. This proposal was adopted but not
acted on. It is a pity, since the dialogue initiated by the Council on predetermined
guidelines is in no sense a substitute for a working relationship between members
of Parliament and the social players,or for measures in which they would be jointly
involved to try to set up a public discussion focused towards ordinary citizens, be-
fore decisions are taken. With respect to the Luxembourg process to coordinate
European employment policies, which was launched in 1997, it is an appeal to the
social bodies who are involved in it, particularly in countries where national social
pacts are drawn up. However, coordination on these lines must go beyond just
making a catalogue of juxtaposed national policies,accompanied by principles and
details of arrangements incomprehensible both to the common man and to social
bodies which are uninitiated and non-professional. For this to happen, two things
will be needed: first, we will have to work together to recast our social values and
models — and not just compare various public administration programmes — and,
second, we must, as a matter of course, set up a link to the economic challenges
which have to be faced.
Setting up more and more coordination procedures just produces more
opaqueness and incoherence. Happily, the Portuguese Presidency is aware of this
and is thinking about ways of establishing some coherence. The economic policy
choices, though, are likely to be the unifying factor. Under the treaties the institu-
tions responsible for economic affairs and finance pull much more weight than the
social affairs institutions. Those hoping for ‘government by economists’look to the
Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs and Finance of the Member States in the
euro zone to provide it. Such procedures will not produce coherent choices that
give priority to a social model and a development model;it would require genuine
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mists’could only mean that social issues will be marginalised,or at least their struc-
tures will be placed outside the economic order.
The European Union is not a government,but the three political institutions
between them could in fact share the function. There should be a political agenda
for the social and economic forward movement of the Union. Each year for a
five-year period,the Member States and the Union would undertake certain essen-
tial tasks to which they would be fervently committed. We suggest a strategy plan:
a joint commitment to work towards solidarity, to make full use of human skills all
over Europe. The Union would use the method of the Single Act which served in
the past as a means of constructing the single market. This will involve working to
an eight-year deadline,with decisions by majority voting. The problem of Europe is
not simply the high level of unemployment: it is compounded by very low em-
ployment levels in several countries,structural exclusion,lack of retraining through-
out working life,an imbalance between creativity and innovation,in short,a glaring
under-employment of human skills. The Union could set itself ambitious objectives
such as lifelong training,workers’right to both security and mobility,a duty of inte-
gration and reintegration,sharing and exploiting information and knowledge — in
short,options for the society we live in,involving new approaches to business,reg-
ulation and financing.
European citizenship and the behaviour
of elected politicians
Civil society would be motivated by and committed to inspiring objectives
involving the benefits of Union membership to bear on individuals and on our
shared living conditions. A process of identifying with the Union and belonging to
a Community would then start to take root. These are the foundations of a politi-
cal union. At present, people identify with the nation and the State, not with the
European Union. Citizenship begins with wanting to get involved. There is (still)
great untapped potential among ordinary members of the public who want to be
involved in European integration. Yet participation is impossible without organised
mediators, without media support which ensures that relevant information is ac-
cessible at the grass roots and can be used interactively,without public institutions
capable of promoting education in things European.
At the present time, the NGOs and trade unions want to incorporate funda-
mental rights into the treaties. To formulate universal human rights is to mobilise a
force capable of withstanding any State and tackling the international dimensions
of the present-day insecurity. National legal systems maintain separate and divided
identities. Although in the past there was interest in unifying the law,this is not au-
tomatically the case today. Nations and governments fight shy of it. Such an ap-
proach to common law is useful,but should not obscure other issues at stake,such
as agreements and the organisation of powers without which the economic sys-
tem cannot be brought under control and, consequently, there is no real prospect
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and social dialogue and the task of structuring EMU.
Opening up the political institutions by removing the barriers to participa-
tion has to do with how they exercise and organise their powers.
The way they operate is handicapped by two structural defects: the system
is not designed to explore the views of society,and the impact of its choices is very
poorly assessed,if at all. These two defects could be rectified if organised civil soci-
ety were to be involved in discussions upstream,and in assessment and retroactive
action downstream, using the channels of proceduralisation we have discussed
above.
The workings of the Council are the least open. If public debate could take
place in advance of its decisions, it would be forced to keep to an agenda and
agree to more openness.
The Commission mainly uses participatory management methods. It needs
to be propelled towards participatory democracy, meaning it must share its power
of initiative and power of assessment with organised civil society. If its role as a po-
litical mediator between nation States could be enhanced — enlargement should
bring this about — the Commission might be encouraged to keep company with
organised civil society at the level of businesses and local authorities. This would
mean,however,that disputes with national governments would have to be consid-
ered from the political viewpoint,not simply referred to the courts.
Europe’s elected politicians should be closer to the grass roots, and Parlia-
ment should reconsider how it obtains expert opinion. Its method is inadequate
because it is too dependent on national political parties and the European Com-
mission. I believe it is crucial to set up a working relationship between political par-
ties and the interests active in civil society on the basis of a genuine desire for Eu-
ropean integration. Then the European Parliament could begin to carry out its
function of engaging in an open public debate about choices in the common in-
terest.
The question of how good and how representative the bodies active in Eu-
ropean civil society actually are cannot be evaded. But they do at least exist,which
is by no means a foregone conclusion. It would also be a good thing if elected
politicians asked themselves how well they represent their voters. This being said,
a few comments can be made here.
There is some dispute over what constitutes civil society. Some NGOs claim
that it consists of them and nothing else,and some parts of the media support this
idea among the general public. Some business representatives,on the other hand,
claim that they are the foundation stone of society. In fact,there is too much jock-
eying for power and too many divergent interests, and no single group should
claim that it alone represents all the structures and defines the general interest.
This is why we advocate a broad definition of organised civil society as consisting
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of representatives of the business sector, social institutions, local authorities, trade
unions, NGOs, think tanks and so on10. We urge them to cooperate in solving the
historic problems facing society today,the new models of society,shared control of
the economic system and the democratic momentum towards participation. We
emphasise,too,the need for new forms of relationship between the social and po-
litical movements,both of which are being reconstructed.
Certain criteria have been laid down for social representativeness,particular-
ly for the purposes of conducting negotiations. These are the ability to mobilise
and mutual recognition. On the ground it should probably be supplemented by
elections, reinforcing the coordination function carried out by the social partners.
In addition,more work should be done on making use of the referendum. Civil so-
ciety organisations should think about achieving unity and the contribution they
can make to society as a whole,above and beyond their sectoral interests. Forums
like the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions could
be given a mandate for this purpose; it would call for reforms which political lead-
ers would be ill-advised to ignore. Other autonomous forums should be set up to
carry out forward studies and assessments.
Breathing new life into democracy is a challenge for the 21st century, and
Europe must find answers, regarding both the shaping of civil society and the
building of political authority. We suggest exploring ways towards a civil society in
which private-public relationships would be based much more on partnership,and
where political authority would be more open to rotating functions and participa-
tion.
Can it be done?  Let us try. To quote the New Testament,‘the wind bloweth
where it listeth’. Man can exercise his right to be free and choose his own path. The
poet René Char urges us forward in these words:‘Confront the risk. As they watch
you go ahead,others will get used to what they see.’
10 A similar view is put forward in the Economic and Social Committee opinion on the role and contribution
of civil society organisations in building Europe (Rapporteur:Ms Sigmund).Active subsidiarity:
reconciling unity and diversity
Pierre Calame
Summary
‘Active subsidiarity’ is a practical approach to governance which starts from
a realisation that one of the most important needs of the modern world is to rec-
oncile unity and diversity.
Our world is both deeply interdependent and infinitely varied. Interdepen-
dence unites us, and globalisation of the criss-cross flows of goods, services, infor-
mation and money is binding us daily a little more closely together. Man’s grip on
the biosphere and the resulting risks of imbalance are forcing us to adopt a joint
approach towards managing our common heritage, whose vulnerability is becom-
ing each day more obvious. But the infinite diversity of environmental,cultural and
social situations is something which enriches us. The more the world becomes one
large village, technology becomes knowledge-based and the economy is glob-
alised,the more the importance is recognised of geographical areas and local envi-
ronments that are capable of cohesion, initiative, partnership, innovation, mobilisa-
tion,fine adjustment to local conditions and the assumption of responsibility.
Very large corporations,the only players that so far operate on a truly global
level,have had to devise methods of organisation that satisfy the need for both uni-
ty and diversity. They have achieved this in a multitude of different ways, by cen-
tralising strategy decisions and devolving operational responsibilities, by dissemi-
nating experience and knowledge through movements of people, by creating
room for independent decision-making within the organisation, by breaking down
large entities into units of more human size,by achieving uniformity through audit
rules and procedures rather than by imposing standard working methods, and so
on,but the problem to be addressed by corporations is simpler than the challenge
facing public authorities.
For public authorities,combining unity with diversity poses a set of radically
new problems. No major problem can be solved satisfactorily at a single level:in fu-
ture,the distribution of powers will be the exception and the interlinking of powers
the rule.
But political science and administrative traditions give no guidance for tack-
ling this new situation. With a view to organising responsibilities at the different
levels,they traditionally propose a choice between two alternatives:centralism and
subsidiarity.For the centralist,unity comes first. The nation,one and indivisible,is the on-
ly legitimate body politic. The people are sovereign. Equality is the rule,and this is
reflected in concrete terms in the near-geometrical uniformity of public action
throughout the territory. But, as a result, public action is essentially standardised,
compartmentalised and directed towards individuals taken in isolation, in turn as
citizens, members of the public, beneficiaries and users. A loyal civil servant is (in
theory) a transparent official who applies to citizens the rules drawn up by their
elected representatives meeting in Parliament.
Those rules lay down obligations regarding the means to be employed,
specifying how things must be done and not the aims to be pursued. How can di-
versity be taken into account in these conditions?  By decentralising, devolving ar-
eas of responsibility away from central government and towards other levels. Pub-
lic action is the outcome on the ground of the superimposition of responsibilities
exercised at different levels. Cooperation between those levels is often ensured by
hybrid entities, which are necessary but complex, and through joint financing,
whereby the two systems check their convergence.
For the advocates of subsidiarity, on the other hand, it is diversity which
comes first,as should the free association of small groups united by common ideals
and interests. Public authority and its intrusion into the private lives of individuals
and groups is a necessary evil but an evil that must be kept to the strict minimum
and whose encroachments must be relentlessly resisted. The sovereignty which
belongs by right to the people is delegated to a wider and wider community as the
requirements of interdependence become more compelling.
At European level,the choice between centralism and subsidiarity translates
into a conflict between the advocates of intergovernmentalism and federalism. For
the former, supranationality is an evil, a negation of the sacred and indivisible na-
ture of the nation State. In their view, the only solution is negotiation, pacts and
treaties between sovereign nations. For the latter, supranationality flows from a
pragmatic realisation that the extent to which today’s world is interdependent de-
mands a consistent approach and the shaping of strategy at a ‘regional’level, since
the ‘national’level has become decidedly too narrow.
But what the two systems have in common is that they both address deci-
sion-making only in terms of the distribution of powers, seeing in that process the
only way of clarifying responsibilities,the theoretical condition for obtaining the en-
dorsement of citizens through the electoral system. Unfortunately,it is increasingly
rare for real situations to fit into these theoretical pigeonholes, and one day the
need to manage the complexity of the modern world,composed of a combination
of  local environments and networks, none of which is closed, will have to be ac-
cepted as a basic fact of life.
It is significant that the current disillusionment with political circles is ex-
pressed in similar terms at the different levels of decision-making, from the EU to
the municipality: too much bureaucracy, too much overlapping of procedures and
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theoretical and practical,that the concept of active subsidiarity is meant to face.
Subsidiarity, because it is firmly believed that the justification for public ac-
tion is to be found only at grass-roots level, in a global and collaborative under-
standing of a reality which is itself global and systemic and cannot be broken down
into smaller pieces,and that it is through carrying out shared projects that dynam-
ic local environments can be created and the fabric of a society in which individu-
als are not isolated can be created. But why active subsidiarity?  Active, because it
is recognised that in an interdependent world the levels of power must be inter-
linked and that,unlike the distribution of areas of responsibility,the levels at which
strategies are formulated are varied and separate from the levels at which affairs are
managed on a day-to-day basis.
Active, again, because we do not believe that the reasoning adopted at the
higher levels can be summed up by handing down regulatory instruments or obli-
gations regarding the means to be used,but is reflected at grass-roots level by per-
manent negotiation and partnerships. Active, because the interests guaranteed by
the higher levels are expressed not through the implementation of uniform rules
applying to isolated individuals but through the formulation of obligations regard-
ing the results to be achieved.
These obligations to achieve certain results are addressed to a community
of partners: national civil servants, local government officials, private-sector busi-
nesses and voluntary associations. They force those involved to work in partnership
and create a permanent learning process focusing on appropriate and meaningful
action:action is no longer judged in relation to its outward forms but in relation to
the way in which it is devised and implemented locally, with reference both to the
aims pursued (some of which will have been formulated by regional or national au-
thorities) and the specific circumstances of each context.
We have mentioned interests that are guaranteed by the higher levels. This
is meant only in the geographical sense — a higher scale — and not in the sense
of the ‘overriding interest of the nation’. There is therefore no superior knowledge
that transcends the local level and whose intrinsic wisdom or legitimacy would
make it possible to lay down abstract obligations as to the results to be achieved.
Obligations to achieve given results are built up in the light of experience,by pool-
ing local knowledge.
Active subsidiarity means collectively and constantly working out obliga-
tions regarding results to be achieved. This must be done collectively,because it is
through dialogue between those involved in concrete action that a general ap-
proach to action can emerge; it must be done constantly, because that approach
has to be forever fine-tuned in the light of experience. In such a process, the cen-
tral administration of the State derives its legitimacy not from hierarchical authori-
ty exercised through handing down general rules but from its ability to organise
work in a network bringing different categories of players together.
Active subsidiarity:reconciling unity and diversity 229230 Pierre Calame
A revolution in our way of thinking must go hand-in-hand with a revolution
in the way we do things in practice. This will determine the feasibility of reforming
the State in France.
The ensuing text is a resolutely personal and chronological account of how
I arrived at the conclusion that the concept of active subsidiarity is not only neces-
sary in theory but also workable in practice.
Active subsidiarity:emergence of the concepts
Europe,social exclusion and exchange of experience
I used the term ‘active subsidiarity’ for the first time in May 1993 when
preparing the European seminar on social exclusion held in Copenhagen. Since
1989 and the organisation of an initial meeting of the European ministers responsi-
ble for housing on the topic of housing the poorest sections of the population, I
had come to be working at European level. Housing in Europe is an extremely in-
teresting issue. No one denies the close link between housing and social exclusion;
the idea of a genuine right to housing, even for the poorest members of society, is
apparently taking root throughout Europe. But, at the same time, housing is not
one of the European Commission’s areas of competence and,furthermore,the allo-
cation of responsibilities for housing between the different levels of government
varies widely from one country to another. Sometimes it is the central government,
sometimes the regions,sometimes the basic local administrative units which play a
leading role,but the final outcome,namely the conditions in which people and par-
ticularly the poorest citizens are housed, is always determined by the combination
of actions and finance coming from the various levels. As a result, what does the
fact of proclaiming a right to housing at European level mean in practice?  No rule,
no directive that is binding on the Member States can guarantee that a given result
will be achieved. Does this mean that Europe,as a human community,should give
up the ambition of asserting a right to housing?  We think not. The fact is that, in
order to turn the diversity of situations in Europe to good account, in the wake of
the 1989 ministerial meeting we created with different networks the European
Charter for the right to housing and the fight against exclusion, which, from the
outset,launched a working method based on the exchange of experience. This en-
abled us to discover that exposure to other people’s experience was a source of en-
richment for each and every one of us, even though the contexts differed greatly
and the ‘solutions’ found in one country could not therefore be transposed to an-
other. What we can transpose is not answers but questions: it is identifying the is-
sues through comparing experience in tackling common difficulties, it is this iden-
tification process which enables us to draw up what we have called the specifica-
tions for European housing policies.A ‘third way’between centralism and subsidiarity
At the Copenhagen seminar on exclusion, I happened to be the spokesper-
son for the working group on extending the rights of the poorest members of so-
ciety. A heated discussion of the concept of economic and social rights provoked
a rift between experts from the Mediterranean countries,on one side,and Germans
and Anglo-Saxons on the other. In the opinion of the Germans in particular, intro-
ducing a constitutional guarantee of social rights, at either European or national
level, was a misuse of language since in Germany it was the responsibility of the
Länder or the municipalities to create the necessary economic and social condi-
tions for the exercise of such rights,and proclaiming a constitutional right to hous-
ing would be tantamount to enacting a dead letter which the intended beneficiar-
ies would be unable to rely on vis-à-vis third parties. What I was witnessing was a
clash between the centralist and Germanic views of the State. In that clash,the no-
tion of subsidiarity lay at the heart of the discussion. It became clear to me at that
point that the alternative between centralism and subsidiarity no longer corre-
sponded to the realities of our time, precisely because, in the sphere of social ex-
clusion, the existing situation and the policies pursued are necessarily the com-
bined result of actions and initiatives taken at all levels, ranging from marginalised
persons themselves,through voluntary associations,basic local administrative units,
the regions, etc. right up to the European institutions. It appeared to me that the
inappropriateness of the concepts being handled by the lawyers who dominate
the European scene was the source of many blockages in Europe. I was in fact wit-
nessing the rise of a paradoxical anti-European movement: paradoxical because it
embodied a coalition of two sets of criticisms that apparently contradicted each
other: on the one hand, too much Europe, too many directives, an excessively fas-
tidious straitjacket that complicated and stifled any activity and initiative and, on
the other hand, not enough Europe, a lack of vision for society at European level, a
lack of responsibility for Europe over cultural, social and political issues that were
alone capable of giving Europe an influence commensurate with its real economic
power. If these two contradictory trends of anti-European opinion were joining
forces,was it not because the very form taken by the links between Europe and the
grass-roots administrative units were inappropriate for dealing with the problems
to be faced?  Why not draw on the forms developed in other large organisations in
order to achieve the necessary combination of unity and diversity?  The ‘proposal
for a solemn declaration on Europe’ which I submitted to Jacques Delors in 1993
was set out broadly along these lines.
The parallel between the situation in Europe and the
situation in the French conurbations
I was all the more sensitive to these contradictions with regard to Europe as
they reminded me in every detail of the blockages I had experienced in the French
town planning system between 1968 and 1983. In France,the interdependent eco-
nomic,technical,social and cultural realities are organised at the level of the conur-
bations and,in rural areas,at the level of the country as a whole. All French cities of a
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gether more than 600 municipalities. In most cities the core municipality has histori-
cally been the largest and most populated,but from the 1960s and 1970s onwards,
apart from a few exceptions like Marseille and Toulouse,the majority of the popula-
tion has no longer been living in the core and most of the growth has taken place in
peripheral municipalities further and further away from the centre, leading to a
process of urbanisation,i.e.the development of main residences in the countryside.
The whole of Europe,from the post-war period until the 1970s,was swept by
debates about town planning. It was clear that transport networks,land markets and
housing markets could no longer be organised at the territorial level of the pre-indus-
trial city as it had been demarcated before the development of the private car. In a
number of countries these problems were solved after the war by amalgamating mu-
nicipalities. This trend,which appeared unstoppable in the 1960s,met with stiff resist-
ance in France,where the dimension of the municipality was universally identified with
the idea of local democracy. 36 000 municipalities means 500 000 councillors,most of
whom are unpaid and whose work is an essential component of community life and
citizenship in France. In the history of the country,only authoritarian regimes,and in
particular the Second Empire and the Vichy Government,have succeeded in amalga-
mating municipalities,with the Second Empire creating in particular Paris as we know
it today. Now the debates on the organisation of conurbations are strikingly similar to
the debates about Europe. The institutional problem that we have to tackle in the
modern world is not therefore fundamentally different at each tier of administration:
the fitting together of territorial structures poses identical problems from the smallest
to the largest scale,from the neighbourhood to the entire planet. Hence the impor-
tance of basing the organisation of these structures on concepts that are appropriate
to the problems to be solved,something that is not at present the case. The debate
drags on in France from decade to decade. Many different systems have been tried out
and there is not a single government which does not put the issues of inter-municipal
cooperation and reform of local taxation on the agenda before passing them on to the
next government,like a hot potato,having failed to find the right solution. This is be-
cause we have boxed ourselves into a contradiction through using the wrong con-
cepts: imprisoned in the mindset of the distribution of powers, we find it difficult at
both European and municipal level to imagine the combination of action at different
levels in a system of shared sovereignty, because we have a vague feeling that this
would remove local administration from fair and proper assessment by the electorate
— an absurd idea when one thinks of how much both local and national electoral
campaigns are devoted to blaming others (globalisation,Europe,the central govern-
ment) for what is going wrong in order to claim the credit for what is going right.
Uniform procedures:an attempt to fit square pegs
into round holes
Looking back with hindsight,the thinking that led me to the concept of ac-
tive subsidiarity began very early in my professional career. From 1970 onwards I
worked,first as a project officer and then as a district engineer for the Infrastructure
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draw up what were called at the time modernisation and infrastructure pro-
grammes,i.e.the plans for the public infrastructure necessary to support urban de-
velopment. This work was in turn linked to the preparation of the infrastructure
and urban development masterplan (SDAU). Both planning processes were gov-
erned by national procedures that had been established during the previous
decade in order to cope with rapid urban development for which traditional insti-
tutions,and in particular municipalities,were not prepared. The departments of the
Infrastructure Ministry were responsible for implementing the procedures. But the
Valenciennes region was an atypical case. The problem was not to support rapid
urban growth but to prepare for an impending severe industrial crisis. The region’s
prosperity depended on the triangle of coalmining,steel and basic metal industries,
each of which was tottering. We were therefore faced with the challenge of using,
in order to prepare for an industrial conversion that was certain to be extremely
painful, procedures that had not been devised for that purpose. The challenge in-
volved not only procedures but also administrative practices; it forced us to recon-
sider the relationships between sectoral administrations. When a region benefits
from a growth dynamic that is virtually exogenous and is independent of its own
local development potential,the central government and the regional and local au-
thorities can support that growth through public infrastructure. The segmentation
of administrations and services, albeit regrettable, can still be tolerated: roads,
schools,green spaces and housing are added together willy-nilly,resulting in some-
thing mediocre but more or less coherent since coherence is ensured by the
growth itself,which carries along the infrastructure in its wake. In a crisis,the situa-
tion is completely different. The action of the central government and of the re-
gional and local authorities has to be reconstructed around the crisis itself.
We had at the time a slogan which summed this up neatly:the infrastructure
and urban development masterplan should not merely be a design in the sense of
a plan,it should be a design in the sense of an ambition for the future of the region.
In the circumstances, we could not as officials sincerely see ourselves as simply in
charge of implementing national procedures. We had, on behalf of the State, to
play our role to the full and exercise the powers that we had in practice by virtue of
the financial resources at our disposal and our recognised know-how or our legal or
regulatory powers, for the benefit of a common vision. We had, to put it briefly, to
shift from complying with an obligation regarding the means to satisfying an obli-
gation regarding the ends.
The objective of meaningful action and the importance
of local case-law
In the 1970s — i.e. before decentralisation — I was responsible for issuing
building permits in the Valenciennes region. I found it a fascinating task. Officials
doing this job often have a bad press: they tend to be seen as petty bureaucrats
blindly applying the rule-book. However, I very soon came to realise the extent of
the difficulties involved. The building code,in the name of the unity of the country
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tional level. Again,unity prevails. But since the regions of the country are infinitely
varied,the specific features of each of their component parts have to be taken into
account, and specific rules for each area are therefore laid down in land-use plans
(POS). From then on, everything should be plain sailing — in theory at least. The
national building code and then the local land-use plans would appear to be suffi-
cient to determine unambiguously what is and what is not allowed. That is true in
80 % of cases. But local rules,even if they are detailed,cannot cover the infinite va-
riety of situations that can arise,not least because there has to be room for qualita-
tive assessments,for example to determine whether a project is appropriate to the
site chosen. Area rules, however detailed, lay down obligations as to the means to
be used,whereas harmonious town planning constitutes an obligation as to the re-
sults to be achieved. I therefore had to recognise, along with the other officials re-
sponsible for examining applications for building permits, that anyone who cared
about the final outcome was frequently faced with a dilemma:Should a project be
allowed?  Should permission be withheld?  The rules allowed us to decide either
way. From 1976 onwards we were able to make progress by building up a body of
local case-law. This idea came to me through reading the letters of complaint I re-
ceived from persons whose application for a building permit had been refused or,
conversely,from neighbours who were offended by what we had allowed others to
build. Most of those letters dwelt largely on the inequality of citizens before the
law,an argument that carried a great deal of weight with me. The majority of peo-
ple are prepared to accept the public authorities rejecting their plans in the name
of the general interest but cannot tolerate what they perceive as unfairness and in-
equality of treatment. A major challenge for the administration is to reconcile the
need to take into account an infinite variety of situations (in the strict sense of the
word: no plot of land is identical to another) with the principle of the equal treat-
ment of citizens. The only way of providing a satisfactory response is neither to de-
ny diversity so that equality can prevail nor to accept arbitrariness in the interests of
diversity but to build up a case-law of decisions by the public authorities. We es-
tablished such a case-law by comparing our own approaches with the diversity of
situations. Each Friday morning,I called a meeting of all the people involved in ex-
amining applications for building permits throughout the district and together we
looked into the difficult cases,of which there were around a dozen each week. We
arrived at decisions collectively and took care to write down details of each case in
order to make sure that we would adopt the same approach when a similar situa-
tion arose again. During the first year, we had the impression that we never en-
countered the same situation twice. But a pattern gradually emerged, and the ap-
proach we took towards problems became more even. Succeeding in shifting the
principle of the equality of citizens before the law away from a uniform obligation
regarding the means to be used and towards an obligation of rigour and fairness in
the way in which public officials responsible for achieving a given result deal with
citizens was for us a major step forward.
Such an approach brings about a fundamental change in the attitude of
public officials: instead of being simply guardians of the law, they become the
guardians of good sense. But if the power thus conferred on them is to be exer-
cised democratically,their actions must be public.
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decentralisation process
In 1980 I was moved to Paris and put in charge of the department for eco-
nomic affairs and land use. Imbued with what we had achieved in northern France
during the preceding decade, I felt the full force of the decentralisation process. I
had been hoping for decentralisation,for the reasons I have just set out:I was con-
vinced of the need in France to build up and consolidate the ability to take initia-
tives at local level in order to respond to a future that looked much less clearly
mapped out than it had been in previous decades. To build up this local power,
two important conditions had in my view to be met:solidarity in terms of taxation
had to be created at the levels where interdependence was essential, in other
words at the level of the housing area or of the country; and the levels at which
strategy was framed had to be dissociated from the levels of day-to-day manage-
ment.
I had seen on the ground how much the lack of solidarity in the taxation
field was detrimental to any effort to administer the territory in a spirit reflecting
the real phenomena of interdependence and how essential it was to frame
long-term strategies for conurbations without weighing down day-to-day manage-
ment with burdens resulting from amalgamations of municipalities or the creation
of urban communities. But,in the name of local democracy,the French method of
decentralisation did not devolve powers upwards to conurbation level.
The first mistake was to decide not to reform local taxation. We are therefore
left with a system in which — to simplify matters a little — a town’s revenue comes
from supermarkets and its expenditure goes to the poor. Not surprisingly,therefore,
it is in the municipalities’ interest to attract the former and drive away the latter.
And this creates a vicious circle. We witness, in the greater Paris area for example,
the formation of tax-rich oases such as the City of Paris itself and the Hauts-de-
Seine department. Because they are tax-rich, these areas have a three-fold attrac-
tion for businesses:tax rates are low,other businesses are close at hand with which
they can work, and the areas concerned have high social status (it is more presti-
gious to locate your company headquarters in the Hauts-de-Seine than in the
Seine-Saint-Denis department).
The second mistake was to overlook the relationship between unity and di-
versity, failing to recognise that there are levels at which long-term strategies can
be worked out and levels at which affairs can be administered closest to the
ground. In the 1982 Act, the definition of areas of responsibility verged on an ob-
session. Responsibilities had to be clarified and the entire debate revolved around
the distribution of powers between the different levels, with a view to eliminating
overlaps in matters where the department, the municipality and the region each
had their say. In the interests of clarification the reform ignored the major chal-
lenge of acknowledging the need for overall strategies and, at the same time,
recognising the full value of local initiatives. By failing to conceptualise the links be-
tween the overall and local levels and the relationship between strategic vision and
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was both feudal and rural whereas what was needed was a decentralisation that
would prepare the country for the 21st century.
The interaction between businesses and local development
and the parallel between the private and public sectors
In 1987 Loïc Bouvard, a Member of the French Parliament, and I were asked
by Pierre Méhaignerie, then Minister for Infrastructure and Spatial Planning, to pro-
duce a study on the new challenges in spatial planning. The Minister felt that the
results of the efforts made during the 1960s in order to decentralise economic ac-
tivity in France were gradually being cancelled out by the reverse trend towards the
re-concentration of decision-making powers in Paris. This survey gave us the valu-
able opportunity of meeting over 60 business leaders, in Paris and large provincial
cities, and of gaining an understanding of the transformations that were taking
place in businesses and what those transformations implied for spatial planning
policy. I drew two major conclusions from the exercise.
The first is that the trend towards knowledge-based technology, the reduc-
tion of transport costs and the globalisation of markets is paradoxically upgrading
the importance of location. At first sight,the growth of trade links at European and
world level would appear to cancel out any advantages due to physical proximity;
in actual fact, the importance of proximity is not reduced but merely altered. The
time when the availability of raw materials close at hand was a crucial factor that
determined the location of industry has gone. On the other hand, the modern
economy is a complex system. If it is to succeed,a business needs to avoid having
to deal with all that complexity itself. Even the largest companies would not have
enough resources to do so,and that is why,after the waves of upstream and down-
stream integration we witnessed at the beginning of the century, giving birth to
huge integrated corporations,the trend has gradually reversed,with each firm now
endeavouring to focus on its ‘core business’. This refocusing does not mean that de-
pendence on other sectors of activity has disappeared; on the contrary, it makes
each company and each activity highly dependent on the surrounding conditions,
and in particular on all the factors that contribute to the quality of the physical,so-
cial, economic and institutional environment in which the business operates. That
is why the quality of the local surroundings,their dynamism and the abundance of
the links that can be created and the services that can be found therein have be-
come so important; it is what explains in particular the centripetal attraction of
large metropolitan areas,a trend that can be observed throughout the world,when
some 20 years ago we were foretelling the death of the city in the mistaken belief
that the development of transport and remote communications would definitively
do away with the economies of scale on which yesterday’s cities were built.
The second conclusion I drew from the study was the importance,again for
large companies,of simultaneously coping with interdependence and diversity. All
large organisations must satisfy this twin requirement. Businesses succeeded dur-
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strategic functions (management of long-term issues, finances and the human po-
tential of their executives) while on the other hand granting increasing independ-
ence to small units that operate on a human scale,the only scale at which it is pos-
sible to mobilise human resources and adapt to varied and changing contexts.
The concept of active subsidiarity and the practical methods for putting it
into practice occurred to me during an interview with the managing director of an
international company specialised in carrying out major projects. A large engineer-
ing project is typically a situation in which everything hinges on the ability to com-
bine many different kinds of technical knowledge in cultural, economic, technical
and political contexts that are different each time round. Each project is a one-off;
there is no room for mistakes. A large project that gets off to a bad start can be a
disaster for the company. How can the company put the greatest possible chances
of success on its side?  The managing director we interviewed described to us the
radical change of approach they had made in answering that question. Previously,
the strategy had been to multiply procedures:to avert the risks of failure, the com-
pany had imposed on project managers obligations as to the means they had to
use in order to deal with such and such a situation. But how could those obliga-
tions regarding the means to be used cover all the varied situations that can arise?
The approach taken was merely reducing the project manager’s room for manoeu-
vre and gradually relieving him of responsibility,whereas what was needed was on
the contrary to make him fully responsible while enabling him to draw on all the
company’s experience. The managing director therefore decided to set up a small
working party which met for two years fairly intensively (one week per month) in
order to review all the experience that had been personally acquired by each of its
members, all of whom were qualified professionals. What gradually emerged from
that comparison and exchange of experience was not a collection of recipes for
success but the broad lines of the conditions that had to be met in order to suc-
ceed, irrespective of the individual situation. Consistency is therefore not to be
sought in the means to be employed but in the problems to be solved, and those
problems can only be identified through the comparison and exchange of experi-
ence.
The Caracas Declaration:discovering structural constants
through the exchange of experience
Since 1988 I have been working full time for the Foundation for Human
Progress, an independent foundation set up under Swiss law with the general ob-
jective of harnessing knowledge in the service of the major challenges for the fu-
ture. That task prompted us to reflect on what constitutes knowledge that is useful
for action. We were struck by the mismatch between the tremendous accumula-
tion of scientific and technical knowledge (over 90% of all research conducted by
mankind has been undertaken since the Second World War) and the fact that on
the ground, in trying to tackle the basic problems facing the human race — reso-
lution of conflicts,the fight against social exclusion,protection of the environment,
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lacked, or appeared to lack, knowledge that would be useful to them. We soon
reached the simple conclusion that knowledge useful for action springs from ac-
tion itself,a fact which I had already experienced many times in my professional life:
information coming from people in situations similar to our own is what appears to
us to be most reliable and readily usable. We therefore began to develop networks
and methods for exchanging experience. One of the most fruitful methods is to or-
ganise meetings: not formal gatherings where each participant arrives to give a
speech or listen to a talk and then departs, but genuine opportunities for commu-
nication where practitioners can describe their own experience and share in that of
others. Experience cannot be acquired in splendid isolation.
One of the most significant encounters and the one which in some respects
led to the very idea of active subsidiarity was the meeting we held in Caracas in De-
cember 1991 in conjunction with the Venezuelan Government. We brought to-
gether some 20 people from different continents, all of whom were exercising po-
litical or public administrative responsibilities in the field of the rehabilitation of
poor neighbourhoods or the upgrading of Third World shanty towns. Bringing to-
gether people from such different backgrounds was a feat in itself. Conditions in
poor quarters vary very widely from one country to another: what do an African
shanty town, and Indonesian kampung, a Venezuelan or Mexican barrio, a Brazilian
favela or a housing estate in the Paris suburbs have in common?  Drawing common
conclusions from our different experiences seemed an even greater challenge. But
that is what we achieved thanks to the momentum generated by the encounter.
We asked each participant in turn to outline what,in their experience,was the most
difficult objective to be attained, what were the basic obstacles to be overcome.
And it very soon became clear that those obstacles were the same everywhere. In
other words, despite differences between individual contexts, the relationship be-
tween public action and situations of poverty and socioeconomic vulnerability in-
volves structural constants that can be identified through exchanging experience.
It was that discovery which prompted us to draw up,at the end of the meeting,the
Caracas Declaration,which identifies six fundamental principles for public action in
poor neighbourhoods. The challenge facing public action in these circumstances is
not to apply a uniform procedure in all areas in difficulty but for the players to put
themselves in a position to apply those six principles by finding each time the an-
swers that are most appropriate to the specific local conditions and the partners
available.
We therefore demonstrated, and were able subsequently to confirm in
other areas, that it is possible to formulate for public action obligations regarding
the ends rather than the means, and we established a simple and democratic
method for doing so:instead of being imposed from above,obligations to achieve
a result are the fruit of a bottom-up approach involving the exchange of experi-
ence and of knowledge concerning the structural constants in the situations to be
tackled.
Active subsidiarity can therefore be compared to a yo-yo movement: it
starts with grass-roots experience, experience in different areas is compared and
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duced, these principles constitute obligations to achieve results, they are again
measured against practice, and so on. But this process calls for a fundamental
change of administrative culture, a shift from a hierarchical system to a
network-based system, something which will take some doing. The mindset cur-
rently governing the relations between central and local administration in France
is the following. Local innovations are stimulated or, more often, existing ones are
identified. These innovations are then translated into models which are dissemi-
nated in the hope that they will be generalised. The same mistake is committed
each time:because the system operates in a hierarchical manner,no one can imag-
ine that the role of the central administration can be to orchestrate a network and
nurture constant innovation,exchange of experience and the collective framing of
obligations to achieve results.
Evaluation of public policies and obligations
to achieve results
In 1992 I led the ‘grass-roots’ assessment of the rehabilitation of low-cost
housing. True to my method of working, I was firmly opposed to the ‘scientific’ap-
proach,according to which evaluations have to be carried out by a team of outside
assessors who are completely separate from the people who have worked on a
project. This approach stems in my opinion from a totally unrealistic view of public
action: policy-makers decide on the policy to be pursued, and civil servants imple-
ment it; a ‘scientific’ evaluation is then made, the findings of which are fed back to
the policy-makers,who take them into account and adjust the policy;the new pol-
icy is then implemented by the civil servants, and so on. Instead of this mechanis-
tic approach, inspired by artillery practice (aiming, firing, observation of accuracy,
adjusting the fire), I propose a ‘constructivist’view. A key factor contributing to the
quality of public policies is the desire for meaningful action on the part of the civil
servants implementing them. And it is because I am convinced of this that I believe
that it is possible in practice to introduce in France obligations regarding the ends
instead of obligations regarding the means.
To evaluate the rehabilitation policy,we set up 10 groups at local,city or de-
partment level by co-opting persons belonging to the different institutions that
were involved locally in the rehabilitation of low-cost housing. These local groups
worked for one year according to a common methodology, at the end of which
they drew up a ‘local rehabilitation platform’by comparing and contrasting a large
number of examples of rehabilitation. We then put these local platforms together
and, without great difficulty, we succeeded by consensus in drawing up a national
rehabilitation platform. This means, to put it plainly, that if confidence is placed in
civil servants’ desire for meaningful action and if adequate structures for exchang-
ing experience are set in place,it can be fairly straightforward to draw up the spec-
ifications for effective rehabilitation and to initiate a process of change among the
protagonists themselves,since they have themselves arrived at the conclusions and
have a sense of ownership of those conclusions.
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From a hierarchical approach to networks that are
constantly learning from experience
All these examples show that active subsidiarity brings about a number of
simultaneous breaks with the past:
— thinking in terms of the links between the different tiers of administration and
no longer in terms of the distribution of powers;
— thinking systematically in terms of stimulating a local environment and com-
bining public actions in that environment and not in terms of juxtaposing sep-
arate regulatory actions by different ministerial departments;
— thinking in terms of obligations regarding the ends and not in terms of obliga-
tions regarding the means;
— thinking in terms of networks rather than hierarchical systems;
— thinking in terms of a constant process of learning and managing the collective
memory and intelligence and not in terms of discontinuous processes for
adopting,implementing,evaluating and adjusting public policies.
To sum up, active subsidiarity requires a transition from a mechanistic ap-
proach to public action to an approach that is much closer to the organisation of
living systems.Governance in a larger and more
diverse European Union:lessons
from scenarios Europe 2010
Gilles Bertrand and Anna Michalski
Scenarios Europe 20101:
a focus on governance
The project Scenarios Europe 2010 was undertaken in 1997 on the initiative
of the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission. The purpose of the ex-
ercise was to produce a number of thought-provoking internally coherent pictures
of the future Europe. Its aim however was more wide-ranging. Externally, the FSU
wanted to give itself a tool with which it could engage in an open and structured
debate on the future of the continent with different audiences in Europe and be-
yond. Internally,it wanted to put together different strands of forward-thinking and
policy research that is produced by the services of the Commission.
The scenario exercise was based on structured brainstorming and step-by-
step analysis with some 60 Commission officials from 15 different directorates-gen-
eral divided into five thematic groups. By participating in the working groups, it
was hoped that the officials would gain a deeper understanding of the limits and
opportunities offered in policy areas other than their own. They would also acquire
a fuller insight into the implications that advances in their own area may have on
others and thereby become more open to different views and sensitivities. An
awareness-enhancing process like the construction of scenarios may also help offi-
cials acquire a common language that in the medium to long-term can help to in-
crease coherence between different policies. It is also a potent tool in constructing
a common vision within an organisation pursuing many different, potentially com-
peting,policy objectives.
Coherence of policies, a holistic approach to policy-making and a constant
need for internal and external dialogue is not applicable only to the European
Commission. All organisations and administrations are acting in a context marked
by changing values in society, globalisation of markets and an intensification of
communications and social and economic interactions which renders policy-mak-
ing increasingly complex. In the contemporary world where objectives and out-
comes of policies are questioned daily,a more versatile understanding of the inter-
1 Bertrand,G.(coord.),Michalski,A.and Pench,L.R.,Scenarios Europe 2010:five possible futures for Europe,European
Commission,Forward Studies Unit,1999.This publication can be obtained from the Forward Studies Unit or can
be found on the Internet (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/scenario/index_en.htm).play between different elements of change is necessary. The construction of sce-
narios as a process of collective learning is a tool that can be adapted to various
contexts and serves to increase the awareness of policy-makers in various situa-
tions. Scenarios may also be used to set the terms of reference for citizens who
would like to participate more actively in the decisions that concern them or quite
simply to gain a deeper insight into the interplay between driving trends, structur-
al elements,ideologies and policy outcomes.
In this particular exercise, the construction of the scenarios was organised
around five main themes including, governance and institutions, economic adapt-
ability, social cohesion, enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the external
environment. The work of these groups was then drawn together into five global
scenarios intended to present contrasted,consistent,images of the future.
In what follows, we focus on governance which is a strong dimension run-
ning through all five scenarios. This specific focus renders inevitably the presenta-
tion of the scenarios less comprehensive than in their original form. The reader
who wishes to study economic and social aspects or the external affairs dimension
should refer to the final report.
Triumphant markets
In a world that was increasingly characterised by the fluidity of the markets,
instant transfers of information,sustained communication among networks in con-
stant mutation and by a climate in which anything could be traded and exchanged,
Europe had to shed its aspiration to combine social considerations with economic
competitiveness. At the turn of the century signs were multiplying that the Euro-
pean economy was hopelessly losing out in comparison with the superior Ameri-
can performance. Pressure to follow suit brought a new political elite to power in
Europe that was determined to reduce the State’s stranglehold on the economy
and release the individual’s full entrepreneurial potential.
The reforms of the public sector that followed resulted in a rollback of the
State and a limitation of State intervention to a minimum. More costly policies di-
rected at social security, the environment or regional development were aban-
doned in the name of fiscal restraint and because it proved difficult to show a clear
economic impact in the short run. A minimal social security safety net was main-
tained but means-testing is a standard procedure and provisions for insuring
against the risks of life now largely fall on the individual. European countries are to-
day concentrating on the core policies of external and internal security, upholding
the judicial system, lending support to a European-wide competition policy and
overseeing regulatory processes. It is precisely in its role of ensuring public securi-
ty and an open and fluid climate for business and entrepreneurs that the State has
retained popular legitimacy.
In a context of minimal governance, governments concentrated initially on
managing the process of downsizing the public sector by outsourcing services and
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partments have been involved in a process of deregulation and in the fields where
re-regulation was deemed necessary they have striven towards a central place in
the regulatory processes. Pressure is great on the State to also reduce its role in this
function, but on the whole big and small companies have come to appreciate the
certainty that a stable economic framework and common rules and their enforce-
ment provide them.
As the ‘demos’of European societies is quietly sliding into irrelevance,the lo-
cus of ideological battles is shifting from national parliaments to the courts. It is
here that aggrieved groups in society, be they consumers, recipients of services, or
simply activists of various kinds, are fighting out claims for defective products, fail-
ing services or the breach of contracts of a varying nature. Other forms of control
and complaint procedures have gradually emerged as regulatory processes are
now often outside the direct reach of the State. Specialised supervisory bodies to
which the public has limited access have grown in number partly as compensation
to the growing inability of parliamentarians to fully appreciate the full range of pa-
rameters that are relevant for new legislation. In quite a few domains the leading
role of elaborating and enforcing common rules has been delegated to economic
actors of varying kinds, for instance, professional organisations are being overtaken
by groups of multinational companies. Strong regions have taken over many of the
functions and attributes of the State,and compete ferociously with other econom-
ically strong entities of the world.
With the strong tendency towards individualisation of social and economic
relations, European populations are nowadays characterised as consumers rather
than citizens. The time of ideological mass movements underpinning traditional
politics is over as political parties are in decline to the benefit of pressure groups
pursuing issue-specific goals without overall coherence or purpose. As a result the
public administration is increasingly partisan to special interests and the principle
of a neutral civil service seems to be a thing of the past.
Throughout the decade the EU has progressively reduced its political objec-
tives. Integration is now seen as an instrument for enhanced international compet-
itiveness and there is consensus that common policies should only be pursued to
the extent that they promote this over-arching goal. In fact,the wide enlargement
to 15 new Member States and the growing socioeconomic disparities that followed
led to a marked decline in the ambitions of cohesion and financial solidarity among
EU Member States. For long periods during the past decade,the European Council
has been locked into budgetary disputes where the fault lines have surfaced be-
tween net payers and net receivers and between old and new Member States. As
enlargement of the EU was quick and wide and application and enforcement of
common rules and regulation is lax, today the EU looks more and more like a free
trade area than an integrated political community.
As the policy mix of the EU has come to concentrate on the internal market
and the competition policy, more costly policies such as the common agricultural
policy or the structural funds have been dismantled. The European Commission
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monitoring of compliance and application of common rules and regulations are
left to voluntary/professional organisations.
The growing competition among regions has benefited those regions that
were able to make the most out of the possibilities offered by global markets while
others are struggling to keep up. The power of rich regions impacts on the work-
ings of the EU institutions, in particular the Council of Ministers and the European
Council. With some Member States bowing to the demands of powerful regions
their actions on the European level is increasingly unpredictable.
The Intergovernmental Conference at the beginning of the decade mus-
tered only a limited institutional reform. This reform did not enhance the coher-
ence between different policies,nor did it improve the functioning of the common
policies or the Community programmes. In fact, many of the Community actions
became so complicated and their results so diffuse that in the name of ‘value for
money’actions on the European level were seriously scaled back. Only in the areas
of judicial cooperation and internal security has some progress been achieved, al-
though this is based rather on cooperation than integration. Approximation of
civic law and procedures has arisen as a result of the increased mobility among a
vocal,and increasingly mobile,European elite but only in the form of enhanced co-
operation among some Member States.
The world in 2010 is in many ways a vibrant place driven by the energy re-
leased from the exchange of communication and information offered on global
markets. Many European players are present on the markets,be it the regions,SMEs
or individual entrepreneurs. However, many of the systemic risks that can only be
tackled through a concerted approach on a global level remain unsolved. These
risks include global environmental degradation, organised crime, and rising in-
equalities within and between regions in the world. International organisations are
hopelessly devoid of resources and legitimacy to shape policies that could address
these issues while national governments have lost the capacity and will to do so.
The only remaining global superpower is content with this state of affairs
and as it draws its economic strength from the markets and its uncontested ad-
vances in technology, there is little incentive to become burdened with costly and
intractable issues.
Hundred flowers
Since the beginning of this century,Europe has been beset by a growing po-
litical and economic fragmentation, which in some parts of the continent is reach-
ing an alarming level. There is no doubt about the underlying reason for this de-
velopment, namely the failure of political and administrative structures to antici-
pate and adapt in response to a rapid technological advance and society’s reaction
to it.
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ple became increasingly wary of political leaders’ promises to tackle an all-too-ob-
vious inability of the public sector to follow. Clumsy and ineffective attempts to re-
form only further demonstrated the authorities’inability to understand the needs of
SMEs, students, regions or municipalities, the unemployed or those otherwise ex-
cluded and forced many people to turn away from the State and public sector to
search for solutions nearer to hand. In the face of wide public discontent at the be-
ginning of the century, the political leaderships in most European countries made
half-hearted attempts to reform the public sector and some deeply entrenched
systems such as pensions, social security, education, and taxes. Resistance was too
great and the reform drive ended in a situation of muddling-through where tinker-
ing on the margins of policies and administrative structures only resulted in their
increasing irrelevance. The State is today retreating de facto from economic and
social sectors as the effective implementation and application of policies has been
abandoned. Individual citizens and economic actors no longer take much notice of
rules and regulations and tax-dodging is rife.
The return to local life emerged as a spontaneous movement without over-
all direction or leadership. Some local or regional communities have managed to
replace the State by providing basic public services and ensuring forms of partici-
patory decision-making while others are dominated by clan-like groups tying pow-
er in the hands of a few of dubious respectability. Today, most individuals have di-
rect access to information and communication worldwide via the Internet and
many groups in civil society base their internal organisation and their ability to es-
tablish external contacts on the same medium. In such a context it is not surpris-
ing that inequalities of many different kinds (socio-economic,educational,access to
new technologies) have arisen and that they vary between States, regions, towns
and within the world at large. In Europe some of the most cohesive Member States
or regions have managed to recreate structures and policy systems that make
sense while in other parts the traditional public sector and political structures are
disintegrating.
As the model of representative democracy is in crisis due to widespread ab-
stention and record low membership in political parties, central government and
parliaments have lost much of their popular legitimacy. Since no one cares much,
nothing has as yet occurred to formally challenge the position of the central State
administration and MPs elected on a low rate of participation continue to form
governments that have largely lost contact with society.
Public services have undergone a spontaneous decentralisation mostly to
regions and municipalities or to organisations of civil society,which have taken the
place of the State. Today there are local services ranging from personalised assis-
tance to the most needy,small-scale-lending to basic education and training. Local
communities have also organised skill exchanges and other forms of bartering.
Economic life is largely self-regulated in the best cases by professional organisa-
tions but otherwise through non-transparent and rapidly fluctuating agreements
among initiated companies.
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ous deterioration of the rule of law. This transcends the whole range of public poli-
cies, but also economic and social relations where uncertainty and lack of trust is
seriously impeding economic growth. In fact,organised crime is set on a steep rise
and criminal groupings are making inroads into the weaker urban areas and re-
gions.
The incoherence of public policies and the lack of implementation have led
to less transparency of public action — one of the factors that sparked off public
discontent with the public sector. Accountability of public agents and political
leaders has also suffered seriously as the locus of decision-making and democratic
responsibility for laws and regulations has become extremely blurred.
The lack of leadership and a widespread sense of loss of direction have led
in some cases to de-localised ministries or specialised public agencies looking for
alternative sources of legitimacy in regional and local authorities.
The European Union is in many ways mirroring the situation in many Euro-
pean countries as the weakening of its structures and institutions and the lack of
coherence in its policies have considerably reduced its legitimacy. Its Member
States (except for those, the most homogeneous ones, that decided to leave) still
see the European level as an opportunity to escape from their own domestic weak-
ness by joining together in political statements and declarations. The politicians
care little about the fact that they have neither the capability nor the resources to
implement these proudly presented initiatives and action plans. The common poli-
cies have been seriously affected by the crisis of governance in the Member States;
those based on financial interventions (CAP and the structural funds) have suffered
from the lack of resources while those with a regulatory content (the internal mar-
ket,competition policy etc.) have been discredited due to the lack of enforcement.
The abstention that has struck national parliaments was of course manifest in the
elections to the European Parliament already in the 1990s.
Internal relations among Member States have grown increasingly tense dur-
ing the last two decades with richer regions refusing to fund the European budget.
The instability that characterises the continent in the wake of the rising fragmenta-
tion has led to attempts of weaker States to forge special relations with stronger
and richer neighbours. This tendency is a serious threat to the founding principle
of the EU of equality among States and alliances based on power reminiscent of
the 19th century are emerging in Europe.
Nevertheless, and despite its poor record of keeping international engage-
ments, Europe is seen as the only relevant level for tackling some of the systemic
risks that beset the international environment, be they organised crime, rising
poverty or climate change. However, these risks coupled with fragmentation and
ethnically-inspired tension are elements present throughout the world. The inter-
national system is close to a standstill as both governments and international or-
ganisations are unable to instil some logic into it.
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It is a refreshed Europe that approaches the end of the first decade of the
21st century filled with more self-confidence than some 10 years ago when the first
steps of radical reforms were undertaken. Faithful to its values of a just and open
society the European States have consolidated the main features of socio-econom-
ic and democratic life while undertaking changes that have enabled them to enter
the era of the knowledge society as winners. Reforms were initiated by the Euro-
pean governments at the beginning of the century as it became clear to all that the
traditional welfare state had become too costly,that Europe was lagging behind in
adopting new technologies and that its populations resented the inflexibility of
central administration and political systems. At the same time,it was clear that peo-
ple held on to values of solidarity, responsibility and trust and saw the State, albeit
reformed,as the best guarantor for a human society.
The public sector was reformed through a coordinated initiative in all Member
States along the lines of transparency,efficiency and accountability. Its role was de-
fined as a mediator and animator of networks in which stakeholders of a particular
area should be guaranteed a say in the formulation of policies. There has been a
strong drive towards decentralisation so that decisions are now taken as close as pos-
sible to the citizens. A system of active engagement (subsidiarité active) between var-
ious actors on different levels (European,national,regional and local) has ensured the
proper functioning of a system built on partnership and a duty to cooperate. Ever
since the reforms were set about various new actors (regions, municipalities, large
towns,NGOs,SMEs,universities and large businesses) have been involved in drawing
up the guiding principles and objectives of different policies (in particular those with
a socioeconomic or educational content) and have entered into contractual relation-
ships with the EU or the national State for managing the policies in a particular area.
Ways have been found to render these non-governmental actors accountable to Eu-
ropean citizens and their true representability is assessed regularly.
There are now institutional channels that guarantee citizens’involvement in
the formulation and evaluation of various activities, mostly in the form of citizens’
juries and write-in mailboxes on the web sites of authorities on various levels. On
the whole,European States have adopted a mixed democratic model in which fea-
tures of representative and participatory democracy coexist. Popular legitimacy of
European, national and regional actions now resides in these entities’ capability to
encourage debate and to organise fora and networks necessary to establish a com-
mon understanding on policies. This system of horizontally and vertically connect-
ed structures has, however, one significant downside in its complexity and lack of
transparency due to overlapping structures and multitude of networks. This means
that the real locus for decision-making and responsibility there for is often blurred.
The search for consensus is slowing down decision-making and is hampering the
capability to take rapid action.
The European level is today firmly tied into this multi-level system of gover-
nance. As a matter of fact,the European level was seen as crucially important in the
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European Commission did not spare its efforts in producing convincing arguments
backed up by comparative data to show the necessity for a new way forward. In par-
ticular,its white papers on governance,sustainable development,the reform of social
security and pensions are today considered cornerstones for a concerted approach
to change. Today,European institutions are managing the construction of consensus
involving the many different partners involved. At the same time,they insist strongly
on the principle of subsidiarity to avoid overload. Nevertheless,European agencies,
the European Court of Justice and even the European Council have often to take on
the role of mediator or arbitrator between conflicting interests. In particular,the Eu-
ropean legal system that now stretches far beyond economic questions has become
the centrepiece of this complex system. The integrated system of European Courts
with the European Court of Justice at the top is the guarantor of interest arbitration
and legal certainty. With the law as the backbone of the system,trust and coopera-
tion are rendered possible among widely different players.
Consolidation of its internal structures and policies has resulted in an en-
hanced popular legitimacy of the European institutions. The EU is now more than
ever founded on a sense of shared destiny and slowly a European identity is emerg-
ing based on shared political values. It is the EU’s success in upholding democratic
principles and human values in the face of growing radicalisation of national poli-
tics, in the first half of the decade that gave a real boost to common values. The
adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European system of gover-
nance and law and the euro have been the decisive factors that paved the way for
a gradual constitutionalisation of the European treaties.
The EU’s common policies have developed gradually to embrace a new ap-
proach to technological innovation, social cohesion and education and training.
The euro has been extended to some of the new Member States and the European
budget has been increased. The emphasis is less on lawmaking and more on
benchmarking,best practices and peer pressure.
On the external side,the EU foreign and security policy is upgraded with trade,
international finance, security and defence all being conducted according to the
same principles so as to enhance policy coherence. One of the most significant de-
velopments on the external dimension is the adoption of integrated partnerships
with the EU’s immediate neighbours that combine external policies with policies in
the areas of social cohesion, trade, education and student exchange, environment,
transport,energy and research. These partnerships enjoy crucial political support,an
institutional framework and the necessary budget resources that are today rendering
them a serious alternative to EU membership for the countries in the neighbourhood.
Creative societies
It is a very different Europe that enters into the second decade of the third
millennium:gone are the old structures of the industrial era replaced by a new ap-
proach to wealth and economic growth; gone is the view of the individual as a
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zens;gone is the materialism that so dominated the second half of the 20th centu-
ry as people’s craze for consumerism has given way to creativity,respect for the en-
vironment and a constant search for harmony with the world around. Europeans
have grown less rich in terms of money, but many of them have more time for
leisure and are able to pursue social and creative activities without being penalised
too much in terms of standard of living or social security. There is, however, a pro-
nounced isolationism in western Europe as it struggles to explain to its external
partners the meaning of the reforms that resulted in a radically different organisa-
tion of society.
The violent demonstrations that took place at the beginning of the century
were sparked off by governments’repeated attempts to boost the economy by re-
ducing unemployment and labour costs and companies’relentless pursuit of prof-
it. The outburst of public anger was in fact symptomatic of a deep-seated dis-
agreement with the way in which society had developed in the last 25 years. Peo-
ple in general were incredulous towards the logic that ruled private business which
gave more importance to short-term benefit than to the long-term well-being of
employees or the environment. They also resented national administrations which
were deeply out of touch with the realities of life of most citizens and whose
proclamations seemed increasingly absurd.
It was the Europe-wide forums that helped to diffuse the tension within the
European populations by acting as a safety valve where people could vent their
anger and as a place for dialogue with bureaucrats and politicians about the need
for change. Throughout Europe a new class of politicians came to power on a man-
date for radical reform. This new elite has gained popular legitimacy by translating
people’s urge for transformation of existing structures into new forms of economic
organisation, including an overhaul of national accounting systems, new taxes on
pollution and international financial movements while reducing taxes on work and
consumption.
The credo of the public sector is now based on an egalitarian-ecological im-
perative where government action is based on socially inspired intervention in eco-
nomic domains and stringent application of environmental legislation. Social re-
forms have virtually abolished unemployment, as full activity was one of the cen-
trepieces of reform. The extensive consultation period with the public resulted in a
close interrelationship between the organised civil society and national administra-
tions. In fact, the permanent dialogue between NGOs, professional associations or
interest organisations of different kinds has become one of the main sources of
public legitimacy of government,much at the expense of the national parliaments.
The executive has, throughout the decade, been busy organising and carrying out
comprehensive reforms while the role of the legislative has changed substantially.
Not only have national parliaments (as well as the European Parliament) had to
open up to different sources of representation,but traditional political parties have
undergone a radical change both in their composition and their approach to the
citizens. Some of the dominant parties of the 20th century that had problems in
transforming themselves have fallen into oblivion while new kinds of interest con-
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before the reforms. They are now composed of judges who are keen on enforcing
tough legislation on environmental pollution or dubious business practices. Due to
the emphasis on internal security the courts have also become tougher on enforc-
ing legislation on organised crime,illegal immigration and,more often than not,ex-
pel asylum seekers from distant countries.
The relationship between different levels of government is characterised by
a high degree of decentralisation where the subsidiarity principle implies that the
responsibility for decisions and their application now falls on the level closest to the
citizens. NGOs, particularly in the social field, have been awarded the task of sup-
plying services to local citizens. The popular forums have been made permanent
institutions organised at all levels, from local to European. They are integrated into
the policy-making processes,but remain largely self-organised units.
The postmodern principles of popular empowerment,individual responsibil-
ity and egalitarianism have profoundly altered the relationship between the elite and
the populations. New forms of participation and the imperative of debate and dia-
logue have made public policy much more transparent. On the down side,there is a
greater confusion about who is accountable at what stage of the decision-making
process and who is to bear the responsibility for actions that have been carried out.
To improve this situation NGOs and local authorities have set up popular courts of ar-
bitration that accord responsibility in the case of contention or complaints.
The European Union was fairly isolated during the period of upheaval and
subsequent reforms. Overcoming its initial suspicion towards European institu-
tions, the new political elite has gradually warmed up to integration at European
level. In particular,it is interested in pursuing policies that deal with trans-border is-
sues such as pollution. Also, in the reform of economic and social structures, in-
cluding harmonisation of some social policies, a concerted approach was neces-
sary,e.g.the European directives on lifelong learning,working time management or
reform of the tax system. Also in the case of justice and home affairs,the spread of
organised criminality and the growing pressure of immigration at the external bor-
ders of the EU have resulted in deeper integration and common policies. At the Eu-
ropean level NGOs are closely involved in the shaping of decisions. They are,in the
same manner as on national, regional and local levels, often engaged in the man-
agement of programmes and projects with a European-wide coverage.
The relations between EU Member States were at least initially characterised
by tension between the most reform-minded politicians and the more reticent ones.
Another fault line appeared between the richer and the poorer Member States where
the latter insisted on being compensated for paying a relatively higher price for re-
form. A general downturn in economic growth increased budgetary pressures in EU
Member States and further raised the tension among Member States.
In the international context the EU and its Member States are not practising
what they preach,in the sense that they do not invest enough political will or mon-
ey to tackle difficult global issues,such as global warming,increasing poverty in de-
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modernising international organisations by giving an enhanced voice to global
NGOs.
Turbulent neighbourhoods
It has been a difficult decade for Europe. The armed conflict that erupted
between warring groups in an area in the neighbourhood of the EU spread into the
EU Member States in the form of terrorist attacks and tension among ethnic
groups. The disruption to the life of ordinary citizens and business in the Member
States became so great that, after the Americans’refusal to get involved, European
troops were dispatched to restore peace in the neighbouring area. The EU military
intervention with the big Member States in the lead succeeded in securing an end
to outright war, although instability and confusion remain widespread in the re-
gion. The hostilities have deeply coloured Europeans’ outlook; their main concern
today is security and stability but in the form of an urge to erect barriers and isola-
tion from the world around.
The siege mentality taking hold of western Europe has changed the role of
public administration and government whose priorities are to secure internal sta-
bility through a set of heavy-handed measures in home affairs. There is also a
strong emphasis on Member States’ military capabilities, which has a direct influ-
ence on their economic policies and the allocation of budgetary resources. This is
coupled with a widespread tendency to protect strategic industries from interna-
tional economic competition through trade barriers and direct State aid.
Popular legitimacy is directly linked to the authorities’display of force by pa-
trolling soldiers on the streets, expulsion of illegal immigrants or otherwise harsh
treatment of asylum seekers and the tough, even violent, police methods in the
fight against organised crime. Since law and order is nowadays a top political pri-
ority little attention has been given to social and economic reform, reform of the
central State administration or the management of public policies. In fact, tradi-
tional political parties and bureaucrats have regained their legitimacy, as has the
traditional model of representative democracy. The courts have a tendency to look
through their fingers even with some of the most flagrant abuses of human
rights. The courts,together with various enforcement agencies,take a lenient view
on the link between the authorities and big industry, including non-conformity of
business practices such as price fixing, abuse of dominant positions, State aid, etc.
Also many cases of political interference in the conduct and management of large
enterprises have been registered but they passed almost unnoticed in the media
and in the public at large.
There is a strong tendency towards centralisation in the hands of key min-
istries and the principles of transparency and public accountability are largely sac-
rificed in the name of efficiency and a need for rapid action. Budgetary resources
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security agencies has been upgraded.
Overall,the public has given its passive consent to authoritarian policies and,
in the face of instability and a feeling of insecurity,it has turned passive and inward-
looking. There is today a much less pronounced will of the public to get involved
in public policy-making with the exception of the very local level. The European
public is characterised by political passivity and satisfied with general elections as
an expression of democratic engagement. The role of NGOs in public life is much
reduced in comparison to the last decades of the 20th century. In particular,those
with a strong engagement in civil rights,democratic watch,the environment or the
developing world have suffered from a lack of popular support and hostility on be-
half of public authorities.
The development of the EU is deeply influenced by the outbreaks of violent
conflict in its neighbourhood. The decision to dispatch a peace-enforcing mission
outside its borders gave rise to the setting-up of a European Security Council with
the bigger Member States being permanent members and the smaller participat-
ing on a rotating basis. Justice and home affairs has been firmly established as one
of the core pillars of the EU with several new policies being adopted accompanied
by new agencies, such as the European border police and customs service and a
European intelligence agency. These policies put the emphasis on repressive meas-
ures rather than cooperative and inclusive ones.
On the whole,the EU has taken a decisive intergovernmental turn resulting
in a weakening of the supranational European institutions,the European Commis-
sion, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. The intergov-
ernmental conference at the beginning of the decade resulted in a limited insti-
tutional reform which, after the very limited enlargement to central and east Eu-
rope, led to further erosion of the capabilities of the institutions. Big Member
States are able to impose their will not only in security-related questions, but also
in economic and social affairs. The application of the internal market regulations
has suffered from national abuses and the weakness of the Commission while en-
forcement of European legislation is eroding under political pressure of Member
States. The turndown in economic growth that followed after the end of the war
led to pressure from the net-contributing Member States to reduce the size of the
redistributive policies of the EU, namely the structural funds and the cohesion
fund. Also large parts of the common agricultural policy have been re-nation-
alised.
It is not only Europe and the surrounding regions that are characterised by
instability. In other parts of the world, perhaps with the exception of North Ameri-
ca,increasing poverty,depletion of natural resources,especially water,pollution and
the spread of ethnic tension and organised criminality is rendering the world an ex-
plosive place. Building walls against the outside world can only be a short-term so-
lution. It is also one that is bound to break given the global imbalances between
the rich few and the many poor, particularly as, up to now, the latter have suffered
disproportionally from environmental damage and demographic imbalances.
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in the European Union
On the basis of the scenarios and the indications they give us concerning
the five possible models of governance (or lack of governance), the following re-
flections are meant to bring the debate on European governance one step further.
The point of departure of this reflection is the observation that our societies
are undergoing rapid change. This change is neither linear in time nor homoge-
neous in its geographical application. National cultures,values and traditions shape
institutions and modes of governance. The interaction between the basic charac-
teristics of a society and the structure of national institutions determines the dom-
inant mentality of public administrations. Even though the public administrations
of the EU are reportedly showing more similarities than differences, they remain
distinct and are driven primarily by national interests and concerns. A European
governance system will have to integrate different systems while at the same time
forging a distinct model of operation and identity. In the light of the profound
changes that are affecting the structures and policies of the EU, the following di-
mensions seem particularly important.
Managing increasing diversity
The EU is facing one of the most decisive challenges of the future, that of
managing diversity. This is obvious given the prospect of enlarging the EU to in-
clude a further 13 countries. New Member States will bring with them different
policy needs, political and administrative cultures and popular perceptions of Eu-
rope and the EU. Enlargement, however, is not the only source of greater diversity;
other deep-rooted trends acting at social and economic levels impose greater di-
versity in people’s values, ways of living and outlooks on the world and politics.
Economic developments demand more flexible ways of regulating the labour mar-
ket, simplified rules for taxation and accounting and easier access to investment
capital for entrepreneurs and business start-ups.
Diversity will not only put greater pressure on the resources and objectives
of European policies,but also demand a higher degree of understanding and flexi-
bility in regard to the context in which policies will be applied. Contextualisation
asks for delegation to national,regional and local authorities and greater decentral-
isation of competencies in managing and controlling community policies and pro-
grammes. A concrete example is the delegation of the Community competition
policy that in the future will involve national enforcement agencies and courts to
deal with cases under a certain size. In the context of managing diversity, partner-
ships between European, national, regional and local actors will be crucial in some
policy areas,while networks of stakeholders will be required in others.
Increasing diversity will also be felt in the implementation and application of
Community rules and regulations. Complete homogeneity in legal approximation
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based on mutual recognition allows for a much higher flexibility as to the practical
measures of implementation. With the enlargement of new Member States, some
with obvious weaknesses in national administrative and enforcement structures,
the application and implementation of rules and regulations becomes a real chal-
lenge. The key argument here is not to seek homogenisation in a larger EU, nor to
fall back on national solutions for implementation, but rather to determine the tol-
erance threshold of diversity in application, above which trust between Member
States will erode and threaten entire sectors of EU policy.
Participation:the case for wide consultation
A wider area with a greater degree of diversity will require from EU institu-
tions a more strategic policy of consultation with different groups and players with
a stake in EU policy. What may today be seen as a ‘passive’openness to stakehold-
ers should be shaped into a deliberate ‘active’ policy of consultation of all players
who have a direct interest in the policy area in question. Such a policy should also
seek the participation of weaker or non-traditional players and therefore be pre-
pared to offer support (financial or institutional) to weak,but essential groups in so-
ciety. The public actor, on the European level the Commission, should develop its
capacity to set up and manage networks, permanent or ad hoc, in order to organ-
ise an ongoing consultation process. However,it is also part of the task of the pub-
lic actor to make these networks transparent and accessible from the outside. Their
accountability to the general public should be ensured by regular reports on their
activities, appearances before elected parliamentary bodies when necessary and
regular information to the European or national ombudsmen. A wider institutional
representation on the European level could be achieved by a reform of the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee.
Linked to the question of consultation of stakeholders is the issue of sub-
stantial debate and consultation in advance of a major reform of existing policies. It
seems an unavoidable step given the resistance to shake up ‘old’ or ‘sensitive’ poli-
cies that otherwise run the risk of eroding into irrelevance in a context of change.
In this context,the possibility offered by the Internet and through other forms of in-
formation technology could be employed in order to diffuse Green and White Pa-
pers and collect comments. Other forms of interaction with the general public and
the organised civil society should be explored and tested.
Flexibility:governance by objective
In a more diverse Union it seems increasingly important to emphasise gov-
ernance by objectives. Greater diversity as to national interests and outlooks could
partly be compensated by debate and prior agreement on the objectives of new
legislation and policies. In such a perspective implementation and enforcement
would be measured against the capacity of new measures to achieve over-riding
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form of implementation of detailed legislation. An essential part of the governance
process would in this perspective be devoted to consultation and debate. On the
European level, the European Commission’s Green Paper on the relations between
the EU and the ACP countries constitutes an example since the principles and main
ideas of the reform of the EU’s development policy was preceded by extensive con-
sultation with the countries concerned.
However,a greater use of governance by objective in the EU begs the ques-
tions of how to ensure tolerant levels of deviation in implementation and enforce-
ment,with what measures could deviant behaviour be sanctioned and,finally,how
should the EU react to deviant behaviour or political direction of a Member State?
Support from the public at large
Public support of EU policies in a context of increasing fluidity of markets and
societies seems dependent on the formulation of some over-arching policy goals to
which adequate resources should be devoted. Public support will be dependent on
whether or not the EU is perceived to be achieving these goals. The EU should,there-
fore,concentrate on those key elements that will have a direct impact on people’s so-
cial and economic well-being,security and inter-generational solidarity.
At another level, the EU could build popular support by encouraging and
underpinning networks in various areas. These should be made open and include
players representing different interests. They should also be made accountable to
democratic bodies and be subjected to judicial scrutiny when required. These net-
works should not, however, replace parliamentary bodies but rather complement
them or, in technical areas, contribute to a deeper understanding of the various is-
sues at stake.
For the sake of democratic accountability and enhanced popular legitimacy,
a constitutionalisation of the EU political system and administrative processes
seems increasingly crucial. A constitutional structure would make explicit the locus
of decision-making, attribute the level of competence in different areas and make
explicit institutional representation. Political accountability of European institutions
would benefit from more clearly defined areas of responsibility and the citizens
would benefit from explicit access to administrative and judicial complaint proce-
dures.
In the future context,a European system of governance would require a Eu-
ropean judicial system that spans over a larger number of areas and that has the
power to act as an arbiter of last resort between conflicting interests. This would
constitute a necessary counterbalance to the fuzziness that multiple networks and
partnerships imply. It could also act as guarantor of unity in a context of diversity
by upholding a minimal level of homogeneity in the application of policies and
implementation of legislation, and so help to promote trust among the players in-
volved.
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Finally,a European constitution could be a potent way of enhancing the po-
litical discourse on the European level. By creating a political arena, competing
views on the direction of policy developments and political priorities would have
to present clear options to European citizens.
A constitutional development on the European level constitutes one way to
re-invigorate our democratic systems and renew the role of traditional political par-
ties. And to the extent that relevance and interests influence public support of a po-
litical system,it is also an effective way to enhance the Europeans’support of the EU.PART IV:CONCLUSIONSDeveloping new modes
of governance
Notis Lebessis and John Paterson
Recent developments in institutional
and administrative reform
Introduction
For those who have been involved in the discussions about European gov-
ernance instituted by the Forward Studies Unit at the beginning of 1996 and con-
tinuing by way of seminars, workshops, working papers and ultimately this book,
these are surely very encouraging times. Reform of the way in which the European
institutions go about their business has not had such a high profile — and the feel-
ing that genuine change is possible has not been so tangible — since the days of
the Delors Commission. But whereas the emphasis then was on the adaptations
necessary to complete the single market, now the focus of attention is upon what
must be done to achieve political integration. This is a project that is perhaps
fraught with even more difficulty than its economic counterpart in so far as it rais-
es serious questions about the nature and practice of democracy in contemporary
conditions, but it is one that, for the same reason, offers the possibility of rich divi-
dends,if successful.
It is possible to identify three key initiatives in this regard. Two of these, the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on institutional reform1 and the process of ad-
ministrative reform within the Commission2,are relatively clearly defined. The third,
‘Shaping the new Europe’,is at present more nebulous — of necessity given that it
represents the Commission’s strategic objectives for 2000–053. It is possible to pre-
dict that because of the background to the first two and the consequent political
will that underpins them, they will be driven to completion with relative efficiency.
The third,by comparison,because of its particular status and because it raises more
difficult questions for all of those involved in the European project,is just as likely to
have a more painful progress and its success is by no means assured.
1 Launched on 14 February 2000 at the General Affairs Council,Brussels.
2 ‘Reforming the Commission:A White Paper’Communication from Mr Kinnock in agreement with the Pres-
ident and Ms Schreyer,1 March 2000 — hereafter referred to as the White Paper on administrative reform.
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions; strategic objectives 2000–05 ‘Shaping the new Europe’.
COM(2000) 154 final,9 February 2000 — hereafter referred to as the strategic objectives.We argue in this paper, however, that this third initiative is the most impor-
tant for the future of Europe — so important indeed that the processes of institu-
tional and administrative reform need to be understood in its context if their 
impact is not to be entirely lost or if they are not in fact to become counter-pro-
ductive. This is a serious contention and one that needs to be carefully justified. We
begin, therefore, (Section 1) by examining briefly the first two reform initiatives,
drawing out the implications of the precise circumstances in which they arose and
thus identifying the limitations and opportunities inherent in each. We suggest
that the opportunities can only be realised in the context of a more adequately
complex understanding of the environment in which the European institu-
tions must work in the years to come. We recognise that the third initiative, the
Commission’s strategic objectives, appears to respond to some extent to such an
understanding (in particular the focus on governance with the promise of a White
Paper in the early part of 2001) but conclude that the foundations remain incom-
plete and unsteady and that the necessary linkages to the processes of institution-
al and administrative reform are not yet explicit.
The paper thus continues (Section 2) with one possible account of the
emerging policy environment, drawing out the trends to which the institutions
must respond and allowing us to identify the main implications for the policy
process — specifically the limitations of existing instruments and the consequent
need for innovative methods4. Building on this understanding, we go on (Section
3) to try to identify the key features of such new modes of governance and then
(Section 4) to make some initial suggestions for the White Paper on governance.
Our view, in short, is that this is a time of unique opportunity for the Com-
mission. Reform is underway and there is both the public expectation and the po-
litical will to sustain it. But the euphoria of action after inaction must not produce
action for its own sake. Undue haste at this juncture may result in an unduly re-
stricted view both of the nature of the problems and of the possible responses.
There is a need, then, for calm reflection and for nerves strong enough to resist
pressure for change which has not been located within the bigger picture of gov-
ernance reform. If it is a time,therefore,of unique opportunity for the Commission,
it is surely also a time of unique challenge.
The tone of caution apparent in the introduction may be a source of frustra-
tion for those who have waited long and patiently for concrete steps towards im-
provements in the legitimacy,effectiveness and efficiency of European governance.
There is certainly no denying the progress represented by the IGC and by the White
Paper on administrative reform. It is necessary, nevertheless, to be clear about just
how much can be realistically expected from these initiatives.
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4 Throughout the paper,we draw on ideas first articulated in the following papers:Notis Lebessis & John Pa-
terson (1997a) ‘Evolutions in Governance:What Lessons for the Commission?  A first assessment’; (1997b)
‘The Future of European Regulation’; (1998) ‘A Learning Organisation for a Learning Society: Proposals for
‘Designing Tomorrow’s Commission‘’; (1999) ‘Improving the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of EU Gover-
nance’all in the series Working Papers of the Forward Studies Unit,European Commission.The IGC on institutional reform
The level of resolve behind this initiative is immediately evident from the
fact that it has both clearly defined objectives and a strict timetable. In this last re-
gard the Helsinki European Council made a ‘firm political commitment to make
every effort to complete (it) by December 2000’ with rapid ratification thereafter
and implementation of the resultant reforms by the end of 20025. In order to be
able properly to assess its objectives,we need to be clear about the preoccupations
of the European Council meeting in December 1999. Confirming the importance
of the enlargement process launched at Luxembourg two years earlier, it stated
bluntly that ‘(a)n efficient and credible enlargement process must be sustained.’6
The commitment to a precise timetable for the IGC on institutional reform and to
ratification of the necessary Treaty amendments is therefore a function of the Euro-
pean Council’s belief that the EU ‘should be in a position to welcome new Member
States from the end of 2002.’7 The agenda for the IGC can accordingly be under-
stood as determined in large part by the institutional issues which must be re-
solved if the EU is to be able to operate efficiently with an enlarged — indeed al-
most doubled — membership. The list thus includes the so-called Amsterdam tri-
angle (the size and composition of the Commission; the weighting of votes in the
Council; and the possible extension of qualified majority voting) together with a
catch-all ‘other necessary treaty amendments in connection with the above issues
and implementing the Treaty of Amsterdam.’8
All of this is unquestionably essential if there is not in future to be a com-
pletely unwieldy institutional structure continually bogged down in tortuous deci-
sion-making procedures. But there could be no serious suggestion that these
changes will be sufficient if the Union is to integrate more members, many of
whose political, economic, social and administrative histories are very divergent
from the existing Member States. Of course, work proceeds at other levels to en-
sure that the relevant institutions and procedures in these countries are made com-
patible with those of the existing members. But as difficult as the adoption of the
increasingly complex acquis communautaire will be for these prospective members,
the question remains as to whether the envisaged process of accession is in any
way as sophisticated as both the current crisis of legitimacy within the EU and the
further diversity the new members will introduce demand. It must of course be ac-
knowledged that the IGC has taken steps to cope with diversity in so far as it has
broadened its agenda to consider the possible future use of reinforced cooperation
— a mechanism already foreseen in the Treaty of Amsterdam and designed to al-
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5 Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 11 December 1999 — hereafter referred to as the 
Conclusions,paragraph 5.
6 Conclusions,paragraph 3.
7 Conclusions,paragraph 3.
8 See the Finnish Presidency Report ‘Efficient institutions after enlargement: options for the Intergovern-
mental Conference’ (Council of the European Union 13636/99) 7 December 1999. The Helsinki European
Council followed this report in deciding the agenda for the IGC (see the Conclusions paragraph 16). The
subjects listed under ‘other necessary treaty amendments’ are responsibility of the members of the Com-
mission; allocation of seats in and legislative procedures of the European Parliament; the problem of the
workload of the ECJ and Court of First Instance;and possible reforms to other institutions and bodies.low certain Member States to proceed further and faster than others without sub-
verting the acquis communautaire or fragmenting the internal market9. But the im-
plementation of this mechanism remains a matter solely for the highest levels of in-
tergovernmental cooperation and thus does not necessarily respond to the diversi-
ty internal to a given Member State.
It could thus be said that the reforms in prospect at the IGC are a necessary
first step but that it remains to be seen whether other aspects of the process of gov-
ernance — perhaps well below that which would require Treaty amendment or in-
tergovernmental agreement — are in need of attention. Nor is such a question re-
mote from the higher level of reform. Rather, it is intimately bound up with that
process. While the resolution of the issues on the agenda of the IGC may indeed pro-
duce more efficient  institutions, this does not necessarily say anything about
whether they will be regarded as any more legitimate or whether they will be seen
to be effective by those whom they ultimately exist to serve. In other words, im-
proving the capacity to act does not necessarily improve the substantive merit of the
ultimate action. It is not obvious,for example,that the reforms in prospect will do any-
thing significantly to address the perception that the European institutions are re-
mote and undemocratic. Indeed, it is always possible that changes needed to ac-
commodate an enlarged membership may be seen to dilute democratic legitimacy
further. Nor do the planned reforms address the pressures placed on the policy
process by an ever more complex environment and manifest,for example,in the in-
creasing difficulty it experiences in coping with risk issues or in adequately repre-
senting the range of views and interests of which modern societies are composed.
The increased diversity implied by enlargement merely serves,therefore,to add to the
complexity of the environment confronting the European institutions. If the existing
policy process is showing signs of strain in the face of complexity,it seems clear that
enlargement will only add to the pressure for change. That being the case,the ques-
tion becomes one of considering what further reforms need to be carried out and
how they must be articulated with the highest level changes.
It needs to be recognised immediately that the Helsinki summit was not in-
different to such lower level reform. It approved, for example, the Council’s recom-
mendations for internal reform10. Similarly,it recalled its commitment in support of
reforming the Commission’s administration in order to enhance efficiency, trans-
parency and accountability and looked forward to the ‘comprehensive programme
of administrative reforms’11 which that body has now produced in the form of the
White Paper — the second reform process with which we are concerned.
The White Paper on administrative reform
The mass resignation of the Commission in March 1999 was a crisis in every
sense of the word for that institution. It was, first of all, a moment of great difficul-
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9 Informal meeting of the IGC negotiation group,Sintra,14 and 15 April 2000.
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11 Conclusions paragraph 21.ty whose importance cannot be overestimated. That the guardian of the Treaty had
been found wanting to such an extent by the Union’s most democratic body raised
very profound questions about the way in which the Commission operated. It was
also,however,a crisis in the sense of being a decisive moment,a turning point. The
swift and unanimous response of the Member States to the resignation in the nom-
ination of Romano Prodi as President was viewed positively by an expectant Euro-
pean public who shortly afterwards delivered a further wake-up call to the politi-
cians and bureaucrats (if one were needed) in the miserable turn-out at the elec-
tions to the European Parliament in June. These signals seemed, however, to have
been received and understood. The incoming President made it clear from the out-
set with his early speeches to the Parliament that reforming the Commission would
be a central concern of his period of office. And this promise was made good with
the appointment of a Vice-President with specific responsibility for administrative
reform, the swift publication of a consultative document12 and the adoption of a
White Paper on 1 March 200013.
The reform process certainly appears ambitious and unequivocal. In the
preface to the consultative document, a clear objective is identified: to ensure that
efficiency,accountability,transparency,responsibility and service are universally ap-
plied within the Commission as working conventions14. Then, encouragingly, the
process was identified as having started with two questions which do not appear
to impose any restrictions on the reforms that are possible: (a) what are the tasks
and functions of the Commission in the years to come? and (b) what sort of organ-
isation must it be in order to fulfil them15?  Despite such an apparently blank-sheet
approach, the White Paper that emerged from the short consultation period is
rather limited in its ambitions — its own proclamations to the contrary notwith-
standing16. The reform strategy proposed is composed of three related themes.
The first of these does offer some hope (reform of the way in which political priori-
ties are set and resources allocated) but the remaining two (changes to human re-
sources policy and reforms of financial management) look relatively mundane — at
least as they are presented in the White Paper. Dealing first of all with the latter two
pillars, these can be very readily assessed: they represent the bare minimum in
terms of human resources policy and internal financial management that should be
in place in an organisation with the position and responsibility of the Commission
and the fact that they can be presented respectively as ‘important’and as ‘an over-
haul’17 at the turn of the 21st century would be a cause for embarrassment if they
were not so obviously and urgently required. Taken in the round, they betray an
overwhelming concern with efficiency which,while commendable,is conspicuous-
ly not qualified by a commensurate concern with legitimacy and effectiveness de-
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12 ‘Reforming the Commission: consultative document’Communication from Mr Kinnock in agreement with
the President and Ms.Schreyer CG3(2000) 1/17 18 January 2000 — hereafter referred to as the consultative
document.
13 See footnote 2 above.
14 Consultative document,p.iii.
15 Consultative document,p.1.
16 For example,‘the scope and ambition of the reform programme far exceeds that of any previous exercise’
White Paper on administrative reform p.2.
17 White Paper on administrative reform pp.2–3.spite occasional passing references. That brings us back to the first theme of reform
concerning the allocation of political priorities. While the establishment of a strate-
gic planning and programming cycle with a key coordination role for the Secretari-
at-General looks promising, the limitations of the other themes must raise doubts
here too. And,indeed,the emphasis is again very much upon efficiency,with activ-
ity-based management, more efficient use of internal and external resources and
more efficient,performance-oriented working methods being the key factors iden-
tified18.
Given the nature of the events of March 1999, however, it is not at all sur-
prising to find that the consultative document manifests the emphases that it does.
This merely serves to highlight the extent to which this reform process too is a re-
action to a particular issue rather than a planned and measured development.
There certainly were reforming processes underway before the crisis19 but the fact
that they are hardly trumpeted in the White Paper speaks volumes for their ade-
quacy in coping with the problems that eventually brought the college down —
not to mention their utility in dealing with the more profound questions of legiti-
macy and effectiveness.
The extent to which the two initiatives considered so far are responses to
rather narrowly defined crises or problems is,therefore,productive of relatively lim-
ited reform agendas. But more than that,the desire,indeed the need,to be seen to
be responding rapidly and substantively to these issues leads to a relatively re-
stricted view of the environment in which the institutions must operate. In the
case of the IGC, the view is of enlargement understood principally in terms of the
mechanics of decision making at the highest levels in the context of a possibly
doubled membership. In the case of administrative reform, the view is of the fun-
damental shortcomings of the Commission exposed by the crisis of March 1999. In
this respect, the strategic objectives of the Commission for 2000–05 represent an
important opportunity to broaden the view.
Shaping the new Europe 2000–05
Published on 9 February 2000, the Commission’s strategic objectives for the
next five years were effectively the first opportunity for the Prodi Commission to set
out its distinctive vision of the EU as it enters a critical phase of its existence, the
previous months having been spent essentially coping with the immediate fall-out
from the demise of the Santer Commission. This is,then,a crucially important doc-
ument, but one nevertheless which only a couple of months later appears to have
sunk from public view. This is all the more surprising given that the document is
unequivocal about the priority in the years to come of political integration,a
process which runs the risk of impinging most directly upon national sovereignty
and of bringing to the forefront the vexed and vexing question of the true nature
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progress unrelentingly towards a strong-form federalism, a European superstate?
The relative public and media indifference in the face of a stated drive towards po-
litical integration is perhaps explained by the fact that the document uses no such
language and more importantly seems to contain no such hidden agenda20.I n -
stead the focus is very firmly upon a political integration which takes ‘full account
of ...national and regional identities,cultures and traditions’21 and one which strikes
‘a new balance between action by the Commission, the other institutions, the
Member States and civil society’bringing ‘Europe much closer to the people it ex-
ists to serve’22.
Specifically, the Commission is proposing four strategic objectives for the
next five years:promoting new forms of European governance;a stable Europe with
a stronger voice in the world;a new economic and social agenda;and a better qual-
ity of life. Given our discussions in the foregoing subsections, it will be clear that it
is the first of these objectives which is of greatest interest. But beyond our current
concerns,it is also the case that the remaining objectives very much depend upon
the first for their successful attainment. With these points in mind, therefore, we
need to try to have a clearer idea of just what the Commission has in mind when it
speaks of promoting new forms of European governance.
In particular, the attainment of this key objective is seen as related to five
components: giving people a greater say in the way Europe is run; making the in-
stitutions work more effectively and transparently; adapting the institutions to the
needs of enlargement; building new forms of partnership between the different
levels of governance within the EU; and ensuring an active and distinctive Euro-
pean contribution to the development of global governance. It is immediately
clear that this initiative is proactive in stance and broad in scope where the others
discussed previously are reactive and narrow. Furthermore, it explicitly recognises
the need for wider and deeper reform in the face of enlargement, as well as for le-
gitimacy and effectiveness to complement efficiency more fully in the drive for
change. It therefore possesses considerable potential with regard to the further de-
velopment of the European project at this critical juncture. But what form will its
contribution take?  What is the Commission to do in order to promote new forms
of governance?  What are these new forms of governance in any case?
To all of these questions at present there appear to be no readily available
answers. But given the degree of innovation presumably envisaged this is hardly
surprising. What is in view is a White Paper due for publication in the spring of 2001
in which the Commission will clarify the content of this key strategic objective. It is
our contention that this White Paper is precisely the place where the Commission
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4 April 2000.
21 Strategic objectives p.3.
22 Strategic objectives p.4.can begin to address the limitations that currently beset reform:firstly, by develop-
ing a more adequately complex picture of the emerging policy environment than
is visible in the narrow focus of the IGC or the process of administrative reform;and
secondly, by developing a vision of the policy process that marks a break with the
traditional models which currently restrict the range of reform options. This will be
a complex and difficult process and one in which the Commission must try to en-
gage as many stakeholders as possible. By way, however, of trying to establish
some starting points and to provide some indications, we go on in the following
sections to discuss some of the findings of the governance project with regard to
these issues.
The emerging policy environment
A diagnosis of current problems
There is general recognition of the relevance of the European project when
it comes to addressing global challenges such as sustainable development, north-
south inequalities and related reforms of the international system. There is equally
a desire for more European action in the field of common foreign and security pol-
icy (most recently manifested in relation to the Balkans) and with regard to issues
such as migration and refugees, international crime, and so on. In each case, it is
understood that concerted action at a level beyond the nation State is required if
desired ends are to be achieved23.
And yet the public perception of European action is often negative. This can
be due to the fact that the debate on European issues is often heavily skewed by
the interests of national politics,with European action being portrayed as ‘unneces-
sary interference’in more and more areas of daily life. But it is also due to the fact
that to a great extent the ‘democratic deficit’ has not yet been successfully ad-
dressed despite the express intentions of the framers of both the Maastricht and
Amsterdam Treaties. Decision-making at the European level is all too often a mat-
ter for the opaque and confusing process of comitology which tends to favour a
limited group of powerful and professionally represented actors in any given policy
area. This leads to a situation where it is easy for European action to be portrayed
as not being properly accountable and as lacking legitimacy24.
Meanwhile, the public increasingly feels that their lives are being shaped by
forces which appear to be outside the control of political actors whether at the na-
tional,European or international level. Problems in recent years such as the Asian fi-
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210–229.nancial crisis and a seemingly endless succession of food safety scares only add to
the widely-held impression that the globalised economy and technological sys-
tems are following their own logics irrespective of the needs of individuals and de-
spite the interventions of political actors. As a consequence, the political reliance
on scientific and other expertise that has been a feature especially of the post-war
era is increasingly called into question and doubts are expressed about ‘technical
solutions’which supposedly obviate the need for wider debate. There is according-
ly ever greater scepticism about the ability of conventional political arrangements
to produce detailed plans for medium- to long-term action and to implement
them with any significant degree of success25.
Closer scrutiny of the operation of the policy process has also raised further
concerns which are not unrelated to this last point. The fact that there may be
democratic representation at the point of formal decision making is seen to be in-
adequate where there are problems with both the earlier and later stages of the
process — stages which are increasingly understood to be just as determinant of
eventual outcomes. Thus,the predominance of experts and administrators — and,
more worryingly, of an often very narrow range of represented interests — in the
initial phases of the process where options are formulated can unduly restrict the
choices to be considered at the point of decision-making. Similarly, technocratic
hegemony at the stages of the implementation and evaluation of policies can raise
doubts about the extent to which decisions are responsively translated into action
and to which their effects are measured in terms which are meaningful to all inter-
ested actors26. It is all too easy to suggest, as a consequence, that accountability
and legitimacy are increasingly a matter of public relations to sell a fait accompli,
rather than key components of a political process.
It is evident,then,that however vital are the institutional reforms under con-
sideration, they will not by themselves be sufficient to address this range of prob-
lems and concerns. Even if the IGC were to be extended to encompass, for exam-
ple,proposed reforms which focus on the empowerment of the Parliament27,these
would not address problems of legitimacy and accountability which are now un-
derstood to permeate every stage of the policy process. Nor indeed will any re-
forms guarantee the effectiveness of European action in so far as they fail to tackle
the restricted views offered by technocratic understandings of the implementation
and evaluation of policy. Europe needs to address issues of legitimacy and effec-
tiveness in a comprehensive manner and must be prepared to consider new meth-
ods of achieving them beyond those suggested by traditional majoritarian parlia-
mentary models.
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speech by the German Foreign Minister,Joschka Fischer,at the Humbolt University,Berlin,12 May 2000.While these are problems that also confront national level public actors,it is
possible to identify a number of reasons why they particularly concern the Euro-
pean level — reasons associated essentially with the trajectory of the European
project. Generally speaking, the European project has followed a trajectory
from negative to positive integration. In other words, at the outset, the project
was concerned to remove barriers to the establishment of a common market (such
as tariffs) and to guarantee the four freedoms. As time went on,however,it became
progressively apparent that the completion of a single market required active in-
tervention in more and more policy areas which may not at first sight have been
identified as representing barriers to trade but which,if left untouched,could allow
Member States to enjoy unfair competitive advantages28.
This is a significant shift,but it is a question whether the structure of the Eu-
ropean policy process has adapted sufficiently to reflect it. At the outset, there
were two complementary forces which encouraged an essentially vertical struc-
ture. On the one hand, Member States recognised the advantages in sharing sov-
ereignty in areas where there were already significant interdependencies. On the
other, and perhaps more importantly in the immediate aftermath of the war, there
was a recognition among the political élite driving the project that it was important
to achieve an institutional structure which provided strong,centralised control of
these policy areas29. The independence of the Commission, for example, was cru-
cial in maintaining a long-term European vision30. Similarly, the European Court of
Justice was active from the outset in establishing the pre-eminent position of Eu-
ropean law vis-à-vis any contradictory national measure31.
For as long as the Community was concerned with issues of negative inte-
gration, this vertical and centralised structure was not subject to serious sustained
challenge. Over time,however — and especially with the signing of the Single Eu-
ropean Act in 1986 and the subsequent drive towards the completion of the single
market in 1992 — the Community’s involvement with positive integration devel-
oped exponentially32. This shift has raised problems which have strained the verti-
cal structure of the European policy process and exposed weaknesses in centralist
arrangements which were crucial to the success of the early stages of the project.
As a consequence, decentralising pressures have built up on the Communi-
ty. This was already evident,for example,in the principle of subsidiarity in the Maas-
tricht Treaty33 and reappeared in the banner under which the Amsterdam Treaty
was drafted of ‘bringing Europe closer to the citizen’34. And yet it seems clear that
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30 See Fitzmaurice, J. (1994) ‘The European Commission’ in Duff, A., Pinder, J. & Pryce, R. (eds.) Maastricht and 
beyond:building the European Union.. London:Routledge.
31 See Weiler,J.(1981) ‘The Community system:the dual character of supranationalism’1YBEL 267.
32 See Weiler,J.(1991) ‘The transformation of Europe’100 Yale LJ 2403.
33 Now Article 5EC.
34 See,for example,‘A strategy for Europe’,Final report from the Chairman of the reflection group on the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference,Messina,2 June 1995.to date only limited progress has been made in achieving decentralisation to a de-
gree and of a sort that meets either the expectations of civil society or the de-
mands of complex problems. It is certainly true that the process of administrative
reform within the Commission envisages greater decentralisation, but again the
stated emphasis raises concerns about its responsiveness to the nature of the prob-
lem:‘(e)xternalisation should only be chosen when it is a more efficient and more
cost-effective means of delivering the service or goods concerned’35.
Nor is it the case that the difficulties confronting the European policy
process are associated only with its vertical and centralist arrangements. Problems
also arise because of its functional segmentation. At all levels from the Council
and the Commission downwards, administrative bodies are characterised by their
division into a range of directorates-general or ministries or departments, each re-
sponsible for clearly defined policy areas. The main aim of this arrangement is to
reduce complexity. Instead of attempting the impossible task of regulating the
entire policy environment from the vantage point of one government actor, that
environment is divided up into more manageable pieces and allocated to spe-
cialised departments. These departments can then develop the expertise neces-
sary to solve the problems associated with their particular area,and the locus of re-
sponsibility for any given task is relatively easy to determine.
For public actors,this structure has been flexible enough to allow newly-aris-
ing tasks associated with the shift from negative to positive integration to be allo-
cated either to existing or to newly-formed departments. At the level of the Euro-
pean project, for example, the establishment of a largely functioning market and
the progress made towards the single currency are testament to the success of this
approach to the management of complexity.
Nevertheless,the concomitant increase in the number and range of respon-
sibilities lying with public actors has exposed the limitations of this vertical, seg-
mented approach. In particular, while focusing on a given aspect of the policy en-
vironment serves from one perspective to reduce complexity and to render it more
manageable, it can equally serve to mask complexity by hiding the interdepen-
dencies which may exist between policy areas. Such interdependencies may
take the form either of negative externalities which because of an overly restrict-
ed focus at the point of policy formulation may only become evident when they
are irreversible or at least very expensive to resolve (for example, the BSE crisis); or
of synergistic opportunities which again may be missed at the outset because of
an inability to appreciate a broader context and only recognised when the degree
of policy implementation makes it impossible to take them up or to do so only with
reduced effectiveness or efficiency (for example, the interrelationship between
transport and environment policy).
The tendency to consult with only a limited set of powerful actors at the
stage of policy formulation mentioned above merely serves to exacerbate the
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when evaluation is considered. In too many cases the fact that evaluation criteria
are not framed by all of those with a direct interest in policies and that, in any
event,evaluation results are often not fed back into the process of revision,only in-
creases the likelihood that policy interdependencies will be missed.
As a growing range of issues has come to be dealt with at the European lev-
el and as this development looks set to continue,policy conflict is likely to pose an
increasing problem for the institutions. Such issues have in the past been dealt
with on a reactive and ad hoc basis and it is by no means clear that the overriding
efficiency focus of the current reform proposals will do anything to remedy this
problem. There is,therefore,a need for a consideration of institutional options that
are proactive,flexible and less restricted in outlook.
Implications for the policy process
The work of the governance project stresses that the current understanding
of the European policy process,which focuses almost exclusively on the moment of
decision-making,needs to be modified. The growing evidence of the pressures on
the existing approach needs to be responded to in a proactive and systematic way
rather than as at present on a reactive and ad hoc basis. In other words, the entire
process from the framing of problems, through the formulation of policy, to its im-
plementation, evaluation and revision needs to be opened up and liberated from
the shadowy world it currently inhabits — civil society needs to be engaged in and
by European action.
As matters stand,European policy risks being developed on the basis of a par-
tial (in the sense both of being incomplete and biased) picture of the issues and of
the range of possible responses. There is a lack of public debate on the evolutions
which actually shape the lives of Europeans,and thus the European agenda does not
accurately reflect the priorities of civil society. The functionally-segmented policy
process only serves to reinforce this situation by effectively imposing pre-established
understandings of the limits of problems and thus restricting openness both to in-
terdependencies and to other stakeholders. Likewise, the vertical structure of the
policy process reduces responsiveness to contextual differences and details which
may have a profound impact on effectiveness as well as on perceived legitimacy.
Such an approach denies the policy process the benefit of the full range of
available expertise and knowledge as well as of a better informed and engaged civ-
il society. It will thus remain the case that policy is seen to emerge as a compro-
mise among the limited set of actors who dominate a particular field, rather than
on the basis of consensus or cooperation among all of those who are actually af-
fected,irrespective of whether they have traditionally been recognised as having an
active role to play.
There is a need, in short, to abandon ideas of central planning and control
which years of experience have revealed to be entirely unrealistic and to rest on in-
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the control of outcomes which in any event escape the best intentions of public ac-
tion,attention should shift to the control of processes which aim to enhance the re-
sponsiveness of public action to the nature of the environment in confronts.
Reform needs, therefore, to focus on possible means to increase the oppor-
tunities for and improve the quality of public debate on European issues through-
out the policy process — not least in ways which allow functional boundaries to be
overcome and the predominantly vertical alignment to be moderated by comple-
mentary horizontal structures. Such a focus will have implications for the possibili-
ties that may emerge for civil society and for the roles that may be envisaged for
European public actors.
Romano Prodi has identified the next tasks for the Union as moving from a
single market and single currency towards a single economy and a single politics.
We can now characterise such a move as involving further progress along the tra-
jectory of positive integration and, on the analysis presented here, as further in-
creasing pressure on the institutions of the Union (and indeed all levels of public
actor involved in the European policy process) in terms of accountability and legit-
imacy, policy conflict and decentralisation. It would appear, then, that this move
can only be achieved,not by addressing the simple distance between Europe and
the citizen, but by reappraising the nature of the relationship between Europe
and the citizen. It can no longer be a paternalistic relationship, but rather must be
one of partnership.
These findings further highlight the importance of the Commission’s pro-
motion of new forms of governance as a priority among its strategic objectives.
They also draw attention to the fact that the work of the IGC on institutional reform
and the process of administrative reform within the Commission will only be mean-
ingful if they are set in the broader context of such an understanding of the policy
environment and not unduly restricted by their immediate concerns. Enlargement
will only serve to increase the strains on legitimacy and effectiveness if it is not ac-
companied by appropriate reforms at all stages of the policy process rather than
simply at the institutional decision making stage. The reformed Commission may
be more efficient but it needs to consider the relevance of those reforms to the
new forms of governance it seeks to stimulate as well as its place within the result-
ant architecture.
The potential importance of the White Paper on governance therefore be-
comes all the clearer. The White Paper on the completion of the single market was
the defining act of the Delors Commission and the driving force behind the signif-
icant progress that has been made since the mid-1980s towards economic integra-
tion36. If similar progress is to be made towards political integration,the forthcom-
ing White Paper will have to provide the driving force and thus become the defin-
ing act of the Prodi Commission. The difficulty, as we noted above, is that it is not
Developing new modes of governance 271
36 COM(85)310.yet clear what the Commission has in mind when it talks about promoting new
forms of governance. In this regard, the diagnosis and implications presented in
this section can perhaps provide some indications — at least of the broad themes
the White Paper might address. In the following section, therefore, we present
some of the key features of new modes of governance that emerged from the For-
ward Studies Unit’s project. To be clear, these features are not intended as a blue-
print or as an exhaustive list. Rather they are offered by way of stimulating debate
in a field whereby definition there will be little existing material or experience on
which to draw as Europe strives to define new ways of coping with the political
challenges thrown up the increasingly complex policy environment.
Key features of new modes of governance
Given the lack of clarity about what is implied by new modes of governance
mentioned at the end of the foregoing section, we might usefully preface our dis-
cussion of what we see as their key features with an attempt to define the word
‘governance’. Without this, we will not know what is properly our concern — and
indeed the concern of the forthcoming White Paper on this subject. We can state
first of all and quite straightforwardly that,for us,governance is concerned with the
organisation of collective action. Now, clearly, a wide variety of alternatives could
be subsumed under this very brief definition and we would need, therefore, to be
more specific about what we understand by organisation and by collective action.
In this regard,we find ourselves very much in agreement with the more elaborated
definition of governance provided by Calame and Talmant:
Governance is the capacity of human societies to equip themselves with
systems of representation,institutions,processes and intermediary bodies
in order to manage themselves by intentional action. This capacity of
conscience (the intentional action), of organisation (the institutions and
intermediary bodies), of conceptualisation (the systems of representa-
tion), of adaptation to new situations is a characteristic of human soci-
eties37.
In the foregoing section, we have essentially attempted to offer initial an-
swers to two broad questions. What is the nature of the emerging policy environ-
ment? What are the implications for the policy process? In this section,we build on
the answers arrived at and,through a series of sequential though interrelated steps,
try to develop a set of key features which appear to be indispensable to modes of
governance which are aimed at responding to the new understanding of the con-
text of public action. Because of this development in a series of interrelated steps,
the key features need to be understood as mutually supportive components in an
overall framework,rather than as ‘pick and mix’accessories for more traditional pol-
icy mechanisms and instruments.
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p.19.Overcoming limited understandings of problems
For reasons both of effectiveness and of legitimacy, there appears to be a
need to escape from the constraints imposed on the policy process by the current
emphasis on expert or bureaucratic constructions of the problems that are per-
ceived to require intervention at the level of public authorities. In so far as this em-
phasis allows only a narrow understanding of problems to inform the policy
process,there is a danger,first of all,that their full nature will not be appreciated (in-
cluding the possibility that problems may be overlooked entirely or may be over-
stated) and,secondly,that the solutions developed to deal with them will prove in-
effective or counterproductive to the extent that they produce unforeseen side-ef-
fects.
Apart from this basic question of effectiveness (with all that it implies for ef-
ficiency, particularly in the medium to long-term) there is also the question of le-
gitimacy. If citizens routinely perceive that the expert and bureaucratic definition of
problems, desired objectives and means of achieving them are remote from their
concerns,then the legitimacy of that public action is seriously undermined. At one
time,of course,it would have been possible to point to a periodic democratic man-
date to justify action by public authorities. Whether this mandate,offered as it is to
the legislature,was ever truly sufficient to cover the delegation of authority to low-
er and less obviously accountable levels of government, it is increasingly under-
stood to be woefully inadequate in the context of ever more diverse societies and
of the complex tasks now confronting public actors.
This is hardly a new observation and governments have for long undertaken
various forms of consultation as part of the process of developing and implement-
ing policy. The difficulty is that this consultation has frequently been a relatively
hidden process conducted with an established list of comparatively well-organised
and well-funded groups representing often quite narrow interests. Thus, in pro-
moting new forms of governance the Commission needs to ensure that it does not
simply follow a well-trodden path and repeat current practices which, while for-
mally open and inclusive, are in fact closed and exclusive. Overcoming the con-
straints of narrow bureaucratic and expert constructions of problems and solutions
means taking seriously the need to break the cartels of representation and consul-
tation which currently exert a covert stranglehold on key stages of the policy
process.
The issue of overly restricted views of problems is not, however, confined to
the division that can exist between expert and lay knowledge. Bearing in mind the
contribution of Ladeur in this volume,the fragmentation of knowledge that is char-
acteristic of modernity extends to — and indeed is most marked insofar as it relates
to — the division between different types of expert knowledge. The problem of
overcoming limited understandings is thus as much one of overcoming the limits
imposed by expert disciplines and the shift away from current consultation prac-
tices must accordingly reflect this fact as well.
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If this break from current limited practices of consultation is to be achieved,
new forms of governance will need to include guarantees about the participation
of stakeholders. It should be clear from what was said at the end of the foregoing
subsection that ‘stakeholder’must be understood broadly here. In other words,the
term is not intended here in the sense that it has come to embody in everyday
speech — that is,as a shorthand for those areas of civil society habitually excluded
from direct involvement in policy decision making. Instead it is meant literally, to
encompass all of those who have a stake. Thus, not only are the experts and bu-
reaucrats from within the policy area traditionally associated with a particular issue
included,together with those actors from civil society that a more enlightened reg-
ulatory approach might bring in, but also experts and bureaucrats from other poli-
cy areas, other disciplines who are understood to have a stake in the context of a
policy process which acknowledges interdependencies.
Seeking to ameliorate the problems of narrow understandings of problems
is not, therefore, about displacing expert opinion in favour of its lay counterpart.
This would rightly be subject to criticism. It is, however, about taking seriously the
nature of the scientific process which underlies expert opinion and incorporating
the implications into the policy process. In particular, the concern is with the fact
that the scientific rationality produces knowledge not certainty,and with the fact
that this knowledge is not absolute but rather provisional and inherently and nec-
essarily subject to ongoing testing, revision and even replacement. As a conse-
quence, the policy process needs to be able to accommodate not only the possi-
bility that expert opinion may be wrong or perhaps only relatively right, but also
the probability that different expert disciplines deploying the same scientific ra-
tionality will conceptualise issues in different ways. In other words, it needs to be
able to cope with the fragmentation of knowledge that is an ever more important
characteristic of the emerging policy environment.
If we are not advocating the displacement of expert opinion in favour of lay
opinion, but are nevertheless concerned with the limited understanding of prob-
lems that the former can impose on the policy process,we need to be clear that we
do not see improvement only in the better integration of different expert disci-
plines. Despite our insistence on a proper understanding of the scientific process
and on the status of the knowledge it produces, we nevertheless insist also that it
remains the best means at societies disposal for the production of knowledge. Ac-
cordingly, lay opinion that is brought to the policy process without the underpin-
ning of scientific rationality must be treated with due caution. But it must not simply
be dismissed out of hand as has happened in the past. There are a variety of ways
in which it can make a contribution. At the most basic level, for example, it might
represent further empirical information. It might also assist experts in developing
more targeted and understandable communications with civil society. More im-
portantly from our point of view,however,is the opportunity it provides for a more
meaningful exchange, a mutual enhancement of competing perspectives — not
just an education of civil society, but a means of forcing expert opinion to justify
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will elaborate on this point in Section 3.4 below.
What this acceptance of plurality leads to is a need for the policy process to
be sensitive to context — what is appropriate for one context may not be suitable
for another. Whether we are primarily concerned with legitimacy, effectiveness or
efficiency, we will surely agree that the blanket implementation of policy irrespec-
tive of contextual specificities is unlikely to produce a result that could be positive-
ly evaluated. To work these points through to their conclusion:the content of pub-
lic action aimed at the attainment of outcomes deemed socially desirable cannot
be pre-established outwith the context of application and other than with the col-
lective involvement of all of those with an interest — expert and lay alike,and irre-
spective of who has been included in previous approaches.
Taking account of inequalities
If the policy process is to operate so as to accommodate a plurality of views
beyond those of traditionally-involved public actors and existing habitual consul-
tees, and is to be sensitive to context, then there will be an attendant need to en-
sure that those coming into the process for the first time are not disadvantaged by
their relative lack of organisation and resources. If this issue is not addressed, then
the result would be similar to many current consultation processes where there is a
formal universal right to participate which nevertheless presupposes a certain min-
imum level of material and cognitive resources possessed in fact only by certain ac-
tors. New forms of governance, therefore, will at the most basic level need to take
account of any inequality of resources and make allowances accordingly.
Beyond that most basic level it may also be appropriate to consider the
ways in which active steps may be taken to compensate less well-resourced stake-
holders, perhaps by offering material help or perhaps by providing access to neu-
tral expertise. This may seem to some to be a rather radical step,but it can be seen
as analogous to the situation in all Member States where, if individuals involved in
litigation lack the means to provide legal representation,the State will step in to as-
sist. Understood in this light,the idea of active support for stakeholders in the def-
inition of problems and the development of solutions — issues which may affect
them as much as litigation — appears much less extreme.
Quite how this assistance would be directed, however, is at this point an
open question and there may be legitimate fears that what is being proposed
could sow the seeds of increased debate — and perhaps even litigation — over is-
sues about which there is in principle no reasonable disagreement. We need to
move on to the next step, therefore, to achieve some greater clarity about the na-
ture of the policy process which until now has been characterised mainly by the
need to consider more viewpoints and to get more stakeholders actively involved.
How is the process constructed from new forms of governance to operate? How is
its basic approach to be understood?
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If we return to the point made above about the provisional nature of scien-
tific knowledge, it is frequently the case that such a suggestion provokes a defen-
sive reaction from the public actors and experts who have been its traditional
champions. They have tended, as we said, to equate the knowledge generated
with certainty,and thus to justify the removal of questions treated in this way from
the realm of politics. If the outcome of research whether in the realm of social pol-
icy, economics or technology is certain, then there is simply no need to debate it.
So runs the traditional argument. For one thing,non-specialists will not be able to
understand the processes involved. For another, the debate will be useless be-
cause the result must be the same as that produced by research if the develop-
ment and implementation of policy is not to be subverted by irrationality. When
we insist, to the contrary, on the provisional nature of the knowledge produced,
and also upon the fragmentation of knowledge that is such a striking character-
istic of the emerging policy environment, this traditional approach appears in-
creasingly inadequate — and, more importantly, indefensible from a strictly scien-
tific point of view.
What, then, are the implications of such a recognition for the policy process
itself?  Accepting that there is now no privileged viewpoint in the sense that none
can claim to have an unquestionable understanding of problems, objectives and
means, it seems immediately apparent that reform must seek to increase opportu-
nities for collective learning. What we understand by this last idea is more than just
negotiation and compromise. Opportunities for collective learning would need to
encourage an acceptance of the necessarily incomplete and provisional nature of
any perspective brought to a given interaction and seek to facilitate a mutual cri-
tique of those perspectives by the various stakeholders whether expert or lay. This
might take the form of obliging stakeholders not only to formulate their position
explicitly, but also to explain the effects of that position on other stakeholders and
on other aspects of the problem that they bring to light. Different stakeholders,
both expert and lay, would, in other words, be required to demonstrate the coher-
ence of their constructions, not only in terms of their initial position but also in
terms of the positions of others which have emerged as part of the process of col-
lective learning.
This process has implications for both effectiveness and legitimacy. The first
relates to the fact that each perspective must learn from the others if there is to be
an adequate understanding of the problems in hand. This does not mean that one
or more perspectives cannot simply be wrong. It means only that there is no pre-
judgment in this regard, but rather that there can only be such an assessment on
the basis of a reasoned discussion. Overcoming the limited understandings of ex-
isting approaches thus involves informing expert opinion with lay judgment to the
extent that that is appropriate and equally assisting other perspectives to under-
stand the reasoning behind expert findings and their impact. It also means, of
course,in the context of fragmented knowledge,assisting mutual learning between
different expert understandings of given issues.
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learning approach offers a significant opportunity to bolster it by ensuring that it
does not close off options unduly on the basis of untested assumptions and by en-
gaging stakeholders who are otherwise suspicious and even sceptical. This leads
on to the second implication of the collective learning approach, the fact that by
bringing bureaucratic and expert decision making back into the political process in
a way which is not obstructive to it but rather enhances it in terms of effectiveness,
also offers the possibility for increased legitimacy.
To be clear,this emphasis on collective learning is not at all about producing
a definitive account of problems and solutions (a point explained further in the
next subsection). Rather, it is a question of establishing processes which allow for
the ongoing enrichment of each representation. The essential aim of such collec-
tive learning opportunities is to attempt to enhance communication among di-
verse rationalities which increasingly seem to be mutually indifferent or to ‘talk past’
each other. To that extent,the aim is to move towards a common language which
can maintain a coherence that is otherwise threatened.
Ensuring ongoing evaluation and revision of policies
The recognition of the importance of collective learning discussed above,
implies that the implementation of policies cannot be regarded as a one-off exer-
cise. Learning, after all, is not an activity that is limited by time but rather must be
regarded as ongoing. It is therefore necessary to put in place mechanisms which
ensure meaningful ongoing evaluation of policies and their ultimate revision on
the basis of the information generated by such evaluation.
In the same way that we saw the benefits that could accrue from seeking to
increase opportunities for collective learning at the stages of problem-setting, the
definition of socially desirable objectives and the choice of means,so the stages of
evaluation and revision could be enhanced by a similar approach. At present, it is
too often the case that the criteria of evaluation are the product of the same expert
or otherwise closed processes which define the initial problem,the consequent ob-
jectives and the choice of solutions. There is accordingly a risk that these criteria
will produce evaluations of implemented policies that are even more remote from
the concerns of other stakeholders or significantly at odds with an adequate un-
derstanding of the problem at hand. Similarly, irrespective of the quality of such
evaluations,the results are too often simply consigned to the shelf instead of being
fed back into the process of revising policies. If the evaluation and revision of poli-
cies was enhanced by opportunities for collective learning,both of these problems
would be reduced — the quality of evaluation would be improved and there
would be no opportunity for a lack of feedback. Again,there are obvious effective-
ness and legitimacy gains to be had from this approach, to say nothing of im-
provements in efficiency. The increasingly obvious difficulties facing public actors
as they seek to plan in detail for the range of issues that fall within their area of re-
sponsibility must act as a strong incentive for the systematic use of enhanced eval-
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able and its impact upon the policy process.
The ideas of evaluation and revision as they are discussed here can serve to
enhance the function of memory that is already performed by public actors. Insti-
tutions and rules essentially act as a collective memory,crystallising knowledge at a
given point and acting as a basis for future action. These institutions and rules are,
of course, subject to modification on the basis of ongoing experience, albeit that
this is frequently a slow and reactive process. In the context of the emerging poli-
cy environment described above however,characterised by an ever increasing rate
and scope of change, by a fragmentation of knowledge and by a growing aware-
ness of the interdependency of problems and issues,there is a need to increase the
opportunities for such modification — specifically in ways which can respond to
these characteristics. Seeking to enhance the evaluation and revision of policies by
means of a collective learning approach is a means of responding to this need.
Improving policy coherence
The recognition that collective learning is a key response to the difficulties
thrown up by the emerging policy environment has further implications for ways in
which the policy process might be enhanced. Problem and objective-setting, the
choice and implementation of means, and the evaluation and revision of policy
must not focus solely on a given policy domain. Rather, steps should be taken to
ensure that these different stages of the policy process in a given domain are aware
of the impact of decisions taken on other policy areas. It is already the case that the
more inclusive approach envisaged above — encompassing broader expert and
lay input — will heighten the likelihood that trans-boundary or cross-cutting prob-
lems will be identified and incorporated into decision making. But this cannot be
left to chance. Rather, new modes of governance need to address the question of
policy coherence from the outset and build in procedures for ensuring that nega-
tive externalities and synergistic opportunities are identified and acted upon.
Collective learning and a new understanding of control
and responsibility
Collective learning is clearly the overall theme connecting the key features
of new modes of governance discussed above and this has implications for the way
in which public actors understand their precise role. In particular, the control aims
of governmental action are shifted away from the top-down definition of ends and
means and towards the establishment of and support for inclusive, participative
procedures oriented towards collective learning.
There is no question of public actors no longer being concerned with the at-
tainment of objectives. It is simply that these must come to be understood as col-
lectively-generated and inherently mutable goals which are expressions of a con-
278 Notis Lebessis and John Patersontextualised rather than of a general will which in any case is increasingly under-
stood to be more symbolic than real. Nor is there any diminution or dilution of re-
sponsibility as regards public actors. As guardians of a policy process understood
as being enhanced by opportunities for collective learning, the location and the
weight of responsibility are as clear and as onerous as ever.
Bridging the gap between citizen and Europe:the key
features and the White Paper on governance
Can we then, on the basis of these first steps, move on to offer some more
concrete indications for the Commission as it begins to prepare the White Paper on
governance?  In this section we follow the same steps, identifying some examples
of specific problems that it appears the Commission will have to address and at-
tempting to suggest some solutions in terms of the key features. We should em-
phasise that this is not intended as an exhaustive list;the examples are purely illus-
trative and intended as a contribution to the general debate on governance stimu-
lated by the announcement of the White Paper.
Improving the opportunities for and quality
of public debate on European issues
The need to escape from the confines of expert and bureaucratic under-
standings of policy problems, objectives and solutions was identified as the first
step on the road towards the development of new modes of governance, for rea-
sons both of legitimacy and of effectiveness. Guaranteeing the participation of
stakeholders was proposed as the second step, ensuring that all of those with an
interest or a contribution — whether expert or lay — should be able to contribute
to the policy process. This key second step, however, risks being of limited impact
if no attempt is made to bridge the widening gap between expert and bureaucrat-
ic institutions on one hand and civil society on the other. In other words, the spe-
cialisation and sophisticated resources which characterise the former put them at a
significant advantage over lay stakeholders with the consequent risk that any guar-
antees of participation become merely formal. While no area of politics is immune
from this problem, it is clearly one which particularly afflicts the European level. If
the traditional structures of representation which are supposed to ensure contact
between public actors and citizens are perceived to be inadequate — and indeed
in crisis — at the national and even local levels,how much more is this the case at
the European.
In seeking to address this problem,reform is hampered in so far as there is a
continuing tendency to speak of a ‘democratic deficit’ and thus to seek inspiration
for reform in the nation State model of representative democracy. The problem,
however, runs much deeper than this much-used phrase indicates and conse-
quently requires a similarly more profound response. Rather than a democratic
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of mutual awareness between civil society and public authorities and according-
ly more appropriate to focus the reform process on options aimed at addressing
this problem. As we noted above,there is at the most basic level an urgent need to
improve the level of public awareness of the major themes of European policy and
to provide opportunities for civil society to contribute to their development — and
this is an area where new modes of governance can play a significant role.
The Dialogue on Europe exercise38 designed to engage the public in the in-
stitutional reform process is an excellent example of such an approach and, quite
apart from the knowledge and information it will generate for the process of re-
form, careful study of its implementation can yield valuable lessons for the White
Paper on governance. Similar — and indeed more ambitious and ongoing — proj-
ects in the future would appear to be a key way of ensuring that the gap between
public actor and civil society continues to narrow and that the problems of overly
restrictive perspectives are minimised. Failure to adopt such a second-order ap-
proach means that there is a danger of the Dialogue on Europe becoming a no-
table one-off exercise in participative governance, merely a product of the fortu-
itous conjunction of the IGC and the publication of the strategic objectives.
Without pre-empting the outcome of any such study,we might at this point
try to identify the sort of issues that the Commission should consider in the context
of the White Paper on governance and the sort of mechanisms it might propose. It
would seem,first of all,that it is necessary to address the question of how European
issues can be brought systematically into the public eye and their relevance made
tangible to civil society. This will not be a simple task, nor will it be one that is
amenable to one-off, quick-fix solutions. Rather it is one that will require a long-
term commitment and involve the institution in seeking to take full advantage of a
range of opportunities to engage with civil society. There are at least two major
considerations to be borne in mind in this regard. The first is that, at present, the
public in any Member State are often confronted with news of ‘Europe’only when
EU policies are perceived by local politicians or media to conflict with national, of-
ten short-term,interests. The second consideration is that the European agenda,in
so far as it is presented at all at Member State level, is frequently perceived to be
complex and remote from everyday concerns or to be disproportionately con-
cerned with essentially trivial problems. Consequently, the White paper on gover-
nance needs to address these issues and look for ways to overcome them.
As regards the first consideration,it may be fruitful to examine ways in which
national debates on issues of common concern could be better aligned in terms of
timing and of themes. This would involve making better use of the opportunities
presented by the media and by information technology. Such an alignment would
restrict the chances of important issues being reduced to short-term national con-
cerns and allow the European dimension to emerge with greater clarity. The em-
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President,Mr Barnier and Mrs Reding,in association with Mr Verheugen,adopted 15 February 2000.phasis on new information technology evident in a range of Commission initiatives
should be refocused so as to support such an aim rather than being a response on-
ly to efficiency concerns. It is important to appreciate,however,that this aim to im-
prove the visibility and understanding of the European dimension at the Member
State level is not simply about improving the quality and targeting of information
flowing from public actor to civil society. If legitimacy and effectiveness are to be
enhanced there has to be both an effort to ensure the genuine relevance of Euro-
pean policy to the concerns of civil society at every level and a willingness to en-
gage in dialogue, in establishing the basic channels of communication that will al-
low for the collective learning that lies at the heart of new modes of governance.
These observations bring us back to the second consideration mentioned above.
As a step towards democratising the relevance of the European agenda, it
would be helpful to concentrate on establishing clear and explicit links between it
and important events on the global stage such as WTO meetings and climate con-
ferences. Such an approach would have the advantage of demonstrating the rele-
vance of EU policy to such questions as climate change and globalisation which are
among the highest priorities for European civil society. It would also possess the
advantage of emphasising the importance of the EU as a global player, again
strengthening its position as against narrower interests. Apart from the link with
new modes of governance, this would also be a key means of furthering progress
as regards the second strategic objective. Among existing developments which
could be drawn upon in this regard are recent efforts to achieve ‘structured dia-
logues’— for example in relation to social,environmental and trade policy39.
But combating perceptions of complexity and remoteness is not just about
making explicit the links between the European agenda and the global level, it is
equally importantly about connecting that agenda with national,regional and local
levels in ways which allow citizens to feel that they are engaged in the policy
process. This perhaps presents the greatest challenge to bodies such as the Com-
mission because it involves the possibility of coming into conflict with the sensitiv-
ities of political and public actors at those levels. Whatever the means by which civ-
il society is engaged, therefore, they must seek to achieve an articulation with all
levels of public actor and utilise the resources they offer. Among the initiatives that
may assist in commencing this process of engagement between the different lev-
els might also be the establishment of more regular meetings on general policy is-
sues such as the annual conference proposed by the Parliament40. In order to en-
sure a collective learning orientation, the organisation of such meetings should be
characterised by openness and participation.
Progress in this direction can also be achieved by building upon the emerg-
ing trend at national, European and international levels to make use of more inno-
vative means and channels of representation. A key point to note, however, is that
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40 Resolution of the European Parliament (A4-0338/96)this trend is often the result of crises which have served to highlight the shortcom-
ings both of existing policy processes and of emergency response mechanisms —
there has been widespread dissatisfaction with the degree of secrecy and with the
unwillingness to listen to public concerns which have characterised these process-
es41. In such circumstances,therefore,public actors such as the Commission should
be more ready to promote the use of ad hoc representative or consultative mech-
anisms on specific issues of concern such as citizens’conferences,deliberative opin-
ion polls,citizens’juries,public hearings,focus groups and forums. It is more impor-
tant, however, to realise that crisis situations are very frequently the result of a lack
of appropriate information that other stakeholders could have readily provided, an
overly narrow focus on the part of the policy process,an unwillingness on the part
of experts to look beyond their immediate concerns or to admit other viewpoints,
and so on.
It is also possible to improve the quality of information available to the on-
going policy process by enhancing monitoring and early warning resources
throughout Europe. Without such capacities, there is a danger that the European
agenda will more often be reactive than proactive,with all that such a situation im-
plies for efficiency as well as for any other measure of the success or failure of poli-
cy. The Parliament or the Commission could be envisaged as playing a part in the
fulfilment of such a role, where they would aim in particular to enhance two as-
pects of the development of policy. First of all, in seeking to improve the quality
and quantity of data available,and as a means of providing a better perspective for
current choices, these institutions should focus upon a long-term vision for policy
to act as a counterweight especially to politically and economically-driven short-
term goals. Secondly, they should seek to reframe problems, issues and questions
in ways which transcend the boundaries of the currently segmented policy
process,with a view to revealing their frequently cross-cutting nature. In each case,
the amount of resources required to carry out such a role meaningfully would be
beyond what is available to either institution. It would be a case,therefore,of their
seeking to animate networks of actors at Member State and perhaps lower levels as
a means of increasing the level of resources available, while simultaneously ensur-
ing broad and deep coverage for these monitoring and early warning capacities
throughout the EU.
Improving the transparency and openness
of European policy making
As regards the question of guaranteeing the participation of especially lay
stakeholders,there might be a temptation to suppose that this is a relatively simple
matter of establishing some basic rights of audience. In order to be meaningful,
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learning,the guarantees must be more far-reaching. First and foremost,we are con-
cerned here with improving the transparency and openness of the policy process.
For as long as these issues are not properly addressed,civil society will continue to
feel disengaged — indeed disenfranchised — from European action. In consider-
ing new modes of governance therefore, there would appear to be a need first of
all for the EU institutions to consider a general policy of transparency,with more
systematic use of a range of media, especially information technology, to ensure
that precise and straightforward details about the European policy process are eas-
ily available to civil society.
Among further steps to be considered in this regard could be the adoption
by the EU institutions of a general policy of inclusion which would guarantee the
systematic involvement of representatives of all affected interests at all stages of
the policy process from the framing of problems to the evaluation and revision of
policies. This would be a significant move and one that would not be without con-
siderable difficulty, but the onus should be upon those opposing such a step to
make their case rather than vice versa — and it ought by now to be clear that con-
siderations only of efficiency should not be regarded as a sufficient reason to block
a policy of inclusion. To repeat,enhancing the capacity to act is no indication of an
enhanced quality of action.
Beyond these initial steps, and in order to seek for ways to support them, it
would be instructive for the White Paper on governance to include consideration of
relevant experience in the United States — a jurisdiction with a relatively long his-
tory of administrative procedures which appear both relevant to our immediate
concerns and generally more developed than their European counterparts. To be
clear, it would not be a matter of slavishly following US administrative law in every
detail but rather of seeking to draw appropriate lessons from both positive and
negative experiences in that jurisdiction.
The precise lessons to be drawn would, of course, be a matter for those
drafting the White Paper and for the process of consultation it initiates. Significant
among them,however,might be the value of formalising certain basic rights which
could underpin the broader developments in the policy process entailed by the
promotion of new forms of governance. Such basic rights might include those of
information,consultation and expression. These would be linked to corresponding
obligations on the part of public actors,such as the requirement to give reasons for
decisions (explaining the grounds on which they have been reached, explaining
why any representations have been disregarded, etc.). While these rights already
exist to a greater or lesser extent in many Member States, and indeed at the Euro-
pean level, the impact of their formalisation in a new European Charter of Political
Rights should not be underestimated. Again,it would be possible to point to an ex-
isting development in order to suggest that progress is already being made in this
regard. The report of the expert group on fundamental rights42 is a sign of the EU’s
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42 ‘Affirming fundamental rights in the European Union:Time to Act’Brussels,February 1999.commitment to protecting especially the rights contained in the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. It should be clear, however, that we have in mind a
broader set of rights than those immediately mentioned by the Expert Group — al-
beit that this would by no means be beyond what the ultimately envisage as
emerging insofar as they see the initial specification of rights only as an intermedi-
ary act paving the way for further completion. In particular, ‘(t)he guarantee of
rights must be seen as open process,based on dialogue within civil society and re-
sponding to new challenges.’43 In this regard, the Aarhus Convention44 provides
useful guidance on how rights relating to access to information,involvement in de-
cision making, and so on, could be added so as to enhance the ECHR list in ways
which would support a collective learning orientation for the policy process. That
such an enhanced charter would by no means be alien to the EU is evident from
the fact that, relating as it does to environmental issues, the EU institutions will be
subject to the correlative obligations when the Aarhus Convention comes into
force,probably in 2001.
In addition to such a charter,the passing of a framework act codifying com-
mon principles for regulatory authorities at European and national levels, as dis-
cussed by Dehousse in this volume,would constitute the concrete implementation
of these rights and obligations as regards public actors. The uniformity offered by
this approach would assist transparency insofar as it would provide fixed reference
points for the public to assess the decisions of authorities responsible for formulat-
ing and implementing European policy.
A further lesson that might be drawn from such an examination of US expe-
rience might be the utility of adopting a form of negotiated rulemaking45. Again,
there are certainly indications that the experience is not all positive but the oppor-
tunity would be there to examine the possibility of promoting the positive aspects
while seeking to minimise the negative. And, of course, while the United States
presents a particularly rich and obvious source for such examples, this is by no
means to say that there are none comparable within the EU — at both the Euro-
pean and at Member State levels. For example, in the social domain, a number of
directives have emerged from what is essentially a process of negotiation among
the social partners. While this, therefore, represents a step towards the kind of ap-
proach envisaged by new modes of governance, it needs to be recognised that
questions as to the representativeness of such actors remain, as well as questions
over sensitivity to contexts. A further example, which is frequently cited as indica-
tive of the successful involvement of a fuller range of stakeholders in the develop-
ment of policy,is that of the process which led to the auto-oil directives46. It should
also be mentioned in this respect that the concept of co-regulation has recently
been advanced as a means of ensuring both that the general public interest is
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mark,25 June 1998.
45 Negotiated Rule-making Act 1990 (5 USC sections 561–570) supplementing the rule-making provisions of
the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 1946 (5 USC section 553).
46 For a convenient review,see European Dialogue,May–June 1999,Issue 3.maintained and that flexibility is permitted in the definition and implementation of
policy goals47. There is clearly a resonance between these aims and the message of
this paper, and we would propose that new modes of governance and hence the
White Paper are seen as part of the exploration of these ideas that the proponents
of co-regulation urge.
The physical implementation of any such proposals would no doubt require
new mechanisms and there would be implications for the role and function of each
of the European institutions. It is important to stress that although the White Paper
is a Commission initiative, new modes of governance clearly impact upon all stage
and levels of the policy process and will thus call for changes in the other institu-
tions. In terms of the implementation of basic rights and obligations, therefore, it
would be possible to envisage that the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions,for example,could be given a role of regulating consul-
tation processes,channelling communication between civil society and the institu-
tions. A role as procedural regulator could be envisaged for the Committees of the
European Parliament, while the European Court of Justice and the national admin-
istrative courts could be given the task of enforcing procedural rights and obliga-
tions.
Many of these proposals would require Treaty amendment, but that is not a
reason to exclude them from the White Paper on governance. On the contrary,they
are commensurate with the degree of ambition revealed by the strategic objec-
tives as regards political integration and with the degree of renewal required if the
European project is to cope with the emerging policy environment. It may no
doubt be felt that such proposals which potentially involve in some cases a signifi-
cant shift in the operation of the policy process, risk inflaming eurosceptic opinion
in certain Member States. But the White Paper can in fact be an opportunity in this
respect to build bridges. Much that is pejoratively dismissed as eurosceptic is, on
closer analysis, criticism of precisely the sort of issues that new modes of gover-
nance seek to address. There is accordingly a chance for traditionally europhile and
eurosceptic opinion to come together in a project which at first sight may appear
divisive. After all,developments which aim to enhance transparency,accountability
and access must surely be as attractive to those Member States who are sometimes
characterised as reluctant Europeans as to those who are frequently identified as
belonging to the core.
Redressing material and cognitive inequalities
Of course, providing civil society with rights of participation and imposing
corresponding obligations on public actors only goes so far towards ensuring that
new modes of governance address the deficit of mutual awareness that exists be-
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tween the two sides in the policy process. There remains the question of differen-
tial resources,both material and cognitive.
In seeking to deal with this question,it should not be assumed that less-ad-
vantaged stakeholders are already in existence as relatively easily identifiable enti-
ties,and organised to a greater or lesser extent. It may be the case that,as an issue
arises,important stakeholders are not at all organised,and may not be at all well-in-
formed about the potential impact them. Redressing material and cognitive imbal-
ances may therefore, first and foremost, involve public actors in assisting the emer-
gence of stakeholders as organised entities in order that they may make a mean-
ingful contribution to the policy process.
The possibility of dealing with material inequalities by means analogous to
legal aid was discussed in the foregoing section, and it is possible to develop this
idea with some more concrete examples. There is at present,for example,a debate
within the Commission about the possibility of financing the core activities of cer-
tain NGOs48. This would certainly go some way towards redressing imbalances in
some cases, but leaves open the question of the legitimacy and accountability of
such groups. In this regard, first steps are being taken by the Commission towards
the publication of a list of NGOs,detailing such information as where the organisa-
tion derives its funding, who are its principal officers, and so on. The availability of
such information would assist in decision-making about which organisations might
properly receive funding. A further possible answer to this question is provided by
Schmitter49. In particular,he proposes a voucher system in which citizens would be
able to influence the allocation of public finances to those groups they would pre-
fer to see taking an active part in the policy process. Again,the availability of infor-
mation about the background and operations of NGOs would appear to be indi-
spensable to such a system.
There are, then, possibilities for the redress of material inequalities but we
must also consider ways in which cognitive differences could be addressed. In this
regard,there a number of options which could be included for debate in the White
Paper on governance. Here we will look specifically at the use of prospective stud-
ies and the development of pluralistic scientific expertise.
In order to further clarify the importance of developing the new modes of
governance implied by the White Paper,it is worth emphasising here that such en-
hancements of the cognitive resources available to civil society would also have a
direct impact on the achievement of the third and fourth strategic objectives. In
other words, we should be clear that the White Paper is not just about promoting
new modes of governance for their own sake but about developing the means re-
quired to deal effectively with the most pressing issues confronting Europe.
48 See note 39 above.
49 Schmitter, P., C. (2000) How to democratise the European Union … and why bother? (Governance in Europe)
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.Opening up the process of expert
and bureaucratic decision-making
We noted earlier that there is a growing recognition that the traditional re-
liance on technical fixes and expert solutions which preclude democratic debate
serves frequently to mask problems which may then emerge in a catastrophic form.
A series of events (such as global warming, the difficulties associated with nuclear
waste management and a succession of food safety scares) has revealed the limits
of this approach and emphasised the extent to which apparently technical prob-
lems are intimately related to vital political choices. Encouraging the development
of pluralistic scientific expertise would help to improve awareness of scientific un-
certainties and assist in the more open deliberation of collective choices. At issue
in this regard is the need to develop a culture of risk in which the priorities are to
address unequal risk distributions and to ensure that risk-related activities and re-
search pay attention to the societal concerns and needs expressed in open political
processes rather than to those imputed by experts and bureaucrats in confidential
procedures behind closed doors50.
Pluralistic scientific expertise is, therefore, needed essentially for three rea-
sons. First of all, it is required in order to make scientific decision-making more re-
sponsive. To be clear,it is not a question of holding scientific rationality hostage to
irrational fears and unfounded concerns. Rather,it is a matter of reconnecting sci-
ence and society as a means of coping with such fears and concerns. Secondly,
such a pluralistic approach is needed in order to help transcend the boundaries of
segmented scientific expertise. It is a truism that experts in different and even
closely-related disciplines often find themselves unable to communicate with each
other because of the ongoing specialisation and differentiation of science. There is
no way that this process can be reversed as it is the inevitable attendant of
progress. Indeed, insofar as such progress is socially desirable then it would be
counter-productive to even attempt such a reversal. It does, however, have an un-
desirable side effect in that progress within the confines of one specialised disci-
pline may be carried out in ignorance of unintended knock-on effects elsewhere.
The aim,therefore,is to improve communication between disciplines. Whether be-
tween such disciplines or between science and society,the third reason that plural-
istic scientific expertise is needed is precisely to encourage the systematic exposure
of unspoken or even unexamined assumptions and uncertainties underlying both
expert and lay opinion. The aim is thus to render political those choices which have
traditionally been regarded as a matter purely for experts,irrespective of the extent
of their ramifications and the scale of their error costs.
It is thus possible to make out a rather strong case for the development of
pluralistic scientific expertise. The question then becomes one of how it might be
implemented. This is certainly a matter for careful consideration, but whereas it
might at one time have been extremely controversial to suggest any intrusion of
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they have in many cases lost the trust of the public and are much more willing to
seek for solutions. Some examples can be given from recent developments in the
United Kingdom and in France. First of all, hybrid mechanisms involving both ex-
pert and lay input could be so structured as to influence the dynamics of scientific
knowledge development. In this regard, a range of options is reviewed in a recent
report by the UK House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, in-
cluding consultation at the different levels of government, deliberative polling,
standing consultative panels, focus groups, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences,
and so on51. Secondly, following especially from the work of Philippe Roqueplo,
public procedures could be established which would permit expert testimony to
be given in a court-style setting where each side would be able to question com-
peting expert opinions,and the information produced could be fed into the policy
process to enhance the quality and acceptability data available. The aim in each
case is to improve communication between science and society by encouraging
the exposure of assumptions mentioned above and to make political the choices
that have been reserved to experts. As Roqueplo clarifies, the idea is not so much
to reach the truth (which he describes as practically a mission impossible), but
rather to open a public space which contains the truth52.
Supporting collective learning
All that has been discussed so far will count for nothing, however, if new
modes of governance are not structured in such a way as to encourage collective
learning — the unifying theme of all the key features discussed in this paper. In cir-
cumstances where it is increasingly understood that predictability and detailed
planning are problematic, ideas of centralised control are recognised as unrealistic
and give way to a new focus on the need to coordinate collective action. This in
turn places the emphasis on communication among different rationalities,perspec-
tives and contexts — where communication is understood as a genuine mutual
critique of positions involving a requirement to take account both of the impact of
other perspectives on ones own position and vice versa.
In addition to the ideas discussed in the foregoing subsection where the fo-
cus of attention is communication between lay and expert rationality or between
different expert disciplines,progress can also be made insofar as an exchange of ex-
periences is encouraged between different contexts, as suggested by Calame. He
observes that we are often essentially confronted by generic problems which af-
fect us all,but in specific contexts which each imply individual aspects and partic-
ularities. The specificity of contexts can both obscure the structural components of
problems and demand carefully adjusted responses. This tension means that on
the one hand there can be a failure to fully comprehend the underlying nature of a
given problem which is common to all contexts while on the other an understand-
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52 Philippe Roqueplo (1997) Entre savoir et décision,l’expertise scientifique (Sciences en Question)INRA Editions.able desire to respond to those aspects of a problem which appear most pressing
in a specific location. There are obvious efficiency and effectiveness implications of
any failure to resolve this tension. What Calame proposes,therefore,is to approach
problems first of all at the local level, attempting to describe the essential features
of the given context without attempting to be exhaustive. As a means of seeking
to distinguish between those characteristics which are purely contextual and those
which are structural, the task is then to compare the information produced by dif-
ferent contexts. This examination allows the basic questions which make up the es-
sential problem to be discerned and refined,while simultaneously retaining the in-
formation on the diverse ways in which those questions have been answered. The
net result is thus a better picture of the common structural components of a given
problem as well as a range of illustrations of how they might be addressed,without
of course attempting to prescribe solutions. Common principles can accordingly
be developed and a shift can be made away from the command and control no-
tion of the obligation of means towards an obligation of outcomes — where this is
understood as an obligation to respect these common principles,rather than as in-
dicating a fixed substantive result.
Further progress towards promoting collective learning would be achieved by
the formalisation of basic rights and obligations discussed above — especially such
obligations as reason-giving. There is no question,however,that this vital aspect of
new modes of governance poses one of the most significant challenges to the future
development of the policy process. It should,therefore,have a prominent place in the
White Paper with a view to raising its profile and seeking to stimulate debate on ex-
isting experience,best practice,innovative approaches,and so on.
In addition,as we will suggest below,it will be difficult to increase opportuni-
ties for collective learning unless and until such an approach is systematically
adopted by public actors as between different policy areas. It is accordingly the case
that a key role in developing and promoting a collective learning approach will be
played by the Commission itself as it seeks to orient itself as a learning organisation.
Developing collective evaluation and revision of policies
If prospective studies and pluralistic scientific expertise can enhance the in-
formation deployed in the development of policy, independent evaluation can en-
sure that when the impact and effectiveness of that policy comes to be examined,
the criteria to be tested are meaningful to affected actors. It can also assist in
achieving greater transparency in the policy process as a whole and equally make
it less likely that evaluation results are left to gather dust but rather are fed back in-
to the process to inform the revision of policy. In this regard the proposals made by
the Parliament for an independent office to carry out evaluation should be closely
examined in the context of the White Paper on governance53. To be clear, such an
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l’Union européenne Exposé des motifs et Résolution A4/0338/96office would have the role of encouraging,supporting and coordinating evaluation
throughout the EU, rather than attempting the impossible task of carrying it out
centrally,and would also be involved in overseeing methodological coherence.
There are, of course, already examples within the Commission of develop-
ments which seek to improve information provision and to achieve pluralist ap-
proaches to evaluation. In addition, these practices have been progressively en-
hanced by methods such as Green Papers,new modes of involving socio-economic
actors in the formulation of research objectives,and so on. But these remain ad hoc
and often one-off exercises entered into at the discretion of the Commission. A
more systematic approach can assist not only in enhancing the evaluation and re-
vision of policies, but also in developing the collective memory adequate for the
emerging policy environment. In this regard,the Commission might well be able to
draw lessons from successful organisations of longer standing.
What is required, in sum, is a more developed consideration of the ways in
which Europe can be brought closer to civil society by providing opportunities for
ongoing active and meaningful engagement throughout the policy process on a
more systematic basis. Such an approach,implying a more deliberative orientation,
can allow legitimacy and accountability to be achieved on a continuing basis. At
the very least,the systematic development of these tools would allow best practice
to be diffused throughout the EU. The White Paper on administrative reform in dis-
cussing the strategic planning and programming function emphasises the impor-
tance of the proper use of ex ante and ex post evaluation54 but there is no mention
of the concerns raised here about the quality, source and relevance of that infor-
mation. These should, therefore, be among the key issues to be considered in the
context of the White Paper on governance.
Achieving policy coherence
The segmented structure of EU policy making structures contributes signifi-
cantly to a situation where policy coherence is more difficult to achieve and where the
probability of policy conflict is increased. Synergistic opportunities can go unnoticed
until it is no longer efficient to take them up,while negative externalities can remain
undetected until their effects are irreversible or extremely expensive to correct. In
short,the potential effectiveness of European action can be seriously compromised.
Given the understanding developed in Section 3 of how policy coherence is
achieved (as a matter of concern at all stages of the policy process from the for-
mulation of choices through to the stages of evaluation and revision) and given the
Commission’s particular role in this process, this is an issue of fundamental impor-
tance for the White Paper. The proposals for the regrouping of responsibilities al-
ready made by Mr Prodi55 indicate a recognition of this problem but it is a question
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equal opportunities;reform;interinstitutional relations;and external relations.whether these will allow sufficient flexibility to deal with,for example,opportunities
and problems that emerge unexpectedly as between regrouped broader policy ar-
eas. Furthermore, elements of the process of administrative reform offer some po-
tential in this regard, notably strategic planning and programming. As we indicat-
ed earlier, however, the emphasis appears to be very much upon financial and effi-
ciency considerations, a narrowness of focus that could further exacerbate seg-
mentation while appearing to ameliorate it. Addressing this issue will therefore in-
volve a consideration of further alternatives.
A key example would be the systematic use of the cross evaluation approach
where one policy is evaluated from the point of view of another. This entails the de-
velopment of programmes, objectives and indicators in each policy area which
demonstrate how other policy objectives are taken into account,synergistic oppor-
tunities are sought and acted upon,and early warning of negative externalities is en-
sured. In other words,collective learning is applied to the relationship between pol-
icy areas. In this regard,the developments regarding environmental policy (including
the requirement in the Maastricht Treaty that other sectors give an account of their
environmental orientation and specify which instruments and indicators they have
developed to achieve it) should be closely examined with a view to applying this ap-
proach in a more systematic manner. The fact that the Cardiff summit already took
steps to encourage these developments and that similar requirements now also ap-
ply to consumer protection and employment provide a clear indication of the impor-
tance of this type of reform. The White Paper on governance is an opportunity to ex-
amine how these developments are operating in practice and to seek to stimulate a
collective learning understanding of their implementation.
Beyond this example drawn from existing EU level experience, it would also
be instructive to consider initiatives at Member State level which seek to enhance
policy coordination. The UK government’s report on such coordination issues, for
example,lists a series of actions which are aimed at improving ‘the formulation and
management of cross-cutting policies and services.’56 These include:achieving ap-
propriate leadership from senior political and administrative actors to create a cul-
ture where a cross-cutting approach is encouraged and rewarded; improving poli-
cy formulation and implementation by engaging other stakeholders; and develop-
ing appropriate skills in public services by improved human resources policy.
Enhanced vertical and horizontal articulation
in the policy process
We concluded Section 3 by suggesting that the collective learning orienta-
tion which unites new modes of governance has implications for the questions of
control and responsibility as they apply to public actors. It is a matter now of seek-
ing to offer a somewhat firmer indication of what such a modified understanding
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and Innovation Unit,January 2000,p.5.of these dimensions could mean as the Commission prepares the White Paper on
governance. The ongoing debate about subsidiarity provides a useful context in
this regard — albeit that a full discussion of the links between new forms of gover-
nance and subsidiarity is well beyond the scope of this paper.
Those who have championed the idea of subsidiarity over recent years
might indeed claim that they are somewhat in advance in responding to the moti-
vations behind this paper, and that the concept is already a means of coping with
the emerging policy environment we have outlined above. Stressing as it does the
relationship between the different levels of government,there are certainly superfi-
cial similarities between subsidiarity and the new forms of governance discussed
here. The differences between them, nevertheless, seem to us to be more impor-
tant. Most strikingly, whereas proponents of subsidiarity often seek to produce a
catalogue of competencies or a clear division of labour (and thus an essentially Tay-
lorist version of the concept), the approach adopted here emphasises the difficul-
ties associated with any such hierarchical rigidity. It focuses instead on the means
required to facilitate both vertical and horizontal articulations more flexibly and re-
sponsively. In other words, whatever benefits subsidiarity might offer as compared
to an overly-centralised and top-down approach, its inherent rigidity risks exacer-
bating the problems associated with segmentation and the narrow focus of expert
and bureaucratic rationalities highlighted here.
New modes of governance are, therefore, more in tune with the notion of
active subsidiarity discussed by Calame in this volume. Whereas the traditional
form effectively presupposes the ability to divide tasks on a once-and-for-all basis,
and thus to plan in detail on the basis of readily identifiable problems and straight-
forwardly implemented programmes, active subsidiarity recognises the need for a
more modest approach. As mentioned above, therefore, in place of an obligation
with regard to means, the focus is on an obligation with regard to outcomes,
where this is understood as an obligation to respect common principles rather
than to reach substantive results. Accordingly,in place of rigid problem-setting,the
aim is to establish mechanisms fundamental to the policy process which facilitate
an ongoing exchange of experience and thus a flexible and responsive posture in
the face of the complex and dynamic policy environment.
The aim of such an approach would be to seek for a collective agreement on
the conditions for success of public action, and thus to achieve a policy process
characterised both by the wide range of perspectives apparent in modern society
and by ongoing opportunities for each of those perspectives to be enriched
through interaction with the others. Such an active, as opposed to a Taylorist, ap-
proach to subsidiarity is better able to produce the flexibility necessary to accom-
modate the diversity of contexts and the ongoing modifications of framings that
are defining features of the emerging policy environment. In this way, there is a
chance to ensure that a dynamic equilibrium is maintained between standardisa-
tion on the one hand,and context-specific solutions on the other.
In this regard,despite the apparent preference for a ‘catalogue of competen-
cies’approach to subsidiarity that is evident at different levels of government with-
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subsidiarity suggested by Calame and developed here especially in terms of collec-
tive learning. This is not to suggest that they are pure examples of this approach,
but rather that they suggest a move in that direction which might usefully be con-
tinued. We can mention especially in this respect the structural funds. Their opera-
tion was explicitly intended to be a matter of the collective construction of policy
through ongoing vertical and horizontal interactions between public actors and so-
cial partners. Further, recent developments in European social policy (such as the
coordination of employment policy) indicate a shift away from an approach based
on the imposition of top-down solutions and towards the development of policy in
an organised process of the exchange of experience57. Again,then,the White Paper
is an opportunity to examine past and present experience in terms of new modes
of governance and to assess the extent to which promising ideas have been re-
alised in practice.
Conclusion
Reform is very much on the agenda of the EU as it faces up to the prospect
of enlargement and as it comes to terms with the shortcomings of the past. A key
message of this paper,however,is that the process of reform must not be restricted
by the issues that happen to dominate for the time being. Coping with enlarge-
ment and responding to the problems that have beset the Commission are vitally
important exercises. They do not,however,represent the totality of what will need
to be done if the institutions — at all levels — concerned with the development
and implementation of European policy are to be able to operate effectively and
accountably,as well as efficiently,in the emerging policy environment.
Characterised by the fragmentation of knowledge, diversity, an ever increas-
ing rate and scope of change and complex interdependencies, the environment
confronting public actors and civil society and of which they form a part will re-
quire a broader vision which incorporates existing reform processes and articulates
them with more far-reaching exercises. In this regard, the White Paper due in the
spring of 2001, represents a perfect opportunity for the Commission to launch the
debate required to begin the process of developing the new forms of governance
that can be designed from the outset to cope more adequately with these complex
demands.
Drawing on the discussion instituted by the Forward Studies Unit on the
question of governance in recent years,this paper has attempted to outline the key
features of the new modes of governance that might serve to complement the ex-
isting structures of the policy process in ways which can achieve such an improved
accommodation. Linked by a common theme of seeking to increase opportunities
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for the encouragement of collective learning, such new modes of governance can
be characterised as being concerned with:
— overcoming the limited understandings of problems which appear to be at the
root of many of the difficulties faced by public actors, masking as they do both
negative externalities and synergistic opportunities between policies and con-
texts;
— guaranteeing and supporting the participation of stakeholders as a means of
enhancing the setting of problems and objectives, and of developing and im-
plementing solutions;
— improving the communication between different expert disciplines, not least
with the aim of enhancing coherence among policies;and
— developing the process of evaluating and revising policies to reflect this em-
phasis on overcoming narrow expert approaches by enhancing exchange
among all stakeholders whether expert or lay.
In short, new forms of governance are about seeking for ways to improve
the articulation between the different levels of government (vertically) and be-
tween different policies and contexts (horizontally). In this regard, they are charac-
terised by flexibility rather than rigidity since they focus on the need to facilitate
the exchange of experiences among all of the different actors who have an interest
in the policy process. Existing methods of developing and implementing European
policy have served the Community and the Union well, but they need to be com-
plemented and enhanced if the momentum they have built up is to be continued
in a setting where traditional politics and government struggle to accommodate
growing complexity and diversity. The forthcoming White Paper is a key opportu-
nity to move the debate forward in this direction.Bibliography
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